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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The Commission actively supports Member States in the analysis, design and implementation of 
their employment policies. The Employment in Europe report is one of the main instruments of this 
support. 
The 19th edition of the Employment in Europe report comes at a time when the EU is experiencing strong 
employment expansion: in 2006, employment increased in all EU Member States and overall job growth 
has been the strongest since the launch of the Lisbon strategy in 2000. Moreover, strong job creation 
appears to be continuing in 2007. This is very positive news which shows that policy efforts in the area of 
employment are beginning to bear fruit in many Member States. At the same time, we must not forget 
that the ambitious Lisbon and Stockholm employment targets remain a considerable challenge and leave 
no room for complacency. 
As in previous years, this issue of Employment in Europe addresses topics that are high on the European 
Union's employment policy agenda, complementing and expanding on the themes covered in previous 
reports. In particular, as in 2006, the report aims to inform the broad policy debate on flexicurity, which 
resulted earlier this year in a Commission Communication on Flexicurity with a view to reaching an 
agreement on a set of common principles at European level by the end of 2007. The report also takes 
account the European Year of Equal Opportunities 2007 by addressing the issue of work-life balance. It 
also complements the recent Commission Communication on Youth with a special focus on youth 
employment. 
The overarching theme of this report is flexicurity and the closely related issue of life-cycle approach to 
work. While last years' report focused on the external aspects of flexicurity, this year's chapter on working 
time and work organisation seeks to enrich the flexicurity debate by looking at internal flexibility, i.e. within 
firms. Both the chapter on older workers and the panorama focus on young people expand on the review 
of the labour market trends for these two groups featured in the Employment in Europe 2005 and aim to 
contribute to the promotion of a life-cycle approach to work. As in previous years, the Employment in 
Europe 2007 pays particular attention to human capital development and looks at the issue of vocational 
training and, in particular, at the role of public policies in this domain. Finally, the report examines the 
evolution of the labour income share in the EU and addresses important issues, such as equity, efficiency 
and stability in the age of globalisation and rapid technological progress. 
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The Commission actively supports Member States in the analysis, design and implementation of their
employment policies. The Employment in Europe report is one of the main instruments of this support.
The 19th edition of the Employment in Europe report comes at a time when the EU is experiencing strong
employment expansion: in 2006, employment increased in all EU Member States and overall job growth
has been the strongest since the launch of the Lisbon strategy in 2000. Moreover, strong job creation
appears to be continuing in 2007. This is very positive news which shows that policy efforts in the area of
employment are beginning to bear fruit in many Member States. At the same time, we must not forget
that the ambitious Lisbon and Stockholm employment targets remain a considerable challenge and leave
no room for complacency.
As in previous years, this issue of Employment in Europe addresses topics that are high on the European
Union's employment policy agenda, complementing and expanding on the themes covered in previous
reports. In particular, as in 2006, the report aims to inform the broad policy debate on flexicurity, which
resulted earlier this year in a Commission Communication on Flexicurity with a view to reaching an agree-
ment on a set of common principles at European level by the end of 2007. The report also takes account
the European Year of Equal Opportunities 2007 by addressing the issue of work-life balance. It also com-
plements the recent Commission Communication on Youth with a special focus on youth employment.
The overarching theme of this report is flexicurity and the closely related issue of life-cycle approach to
work. While last years' report focused on the external aspects of flexicurity, this year's chapter on work-
ing time and work organisation seeks to enrich the flexicurity debate by looking at internal flexibility, i.e.
within firms. Both the chapter on older workers and the panorama focus on young people expand on the
review of the labour market trends for these two groups featured in the Employment in Europe 2005 and
aim to contribute to the promotion of a life-cycle approach to work. As in previous years, the Employment
in Europe 2007 pays particular attention to human capital development and looks at the issue of voca-
tional training and, in particular, at the role of public policies in this domain. Finally, the report examines
the evolution of the labour income share in the EU and addresses important issues, such as equity, effi-
ciency and stability in the age of globalisation and rapid technological progress.
The findings presented in Employment in Europe 2007 are a highly relevant contribution to the employ-
ment policy debate in the European Union and in the Member States. I would therefore like to recom-
mend this report to you.
Vladimír Špidla
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Stronger economic growth in 2006…
...has led to a robust recovery of
labour markets in the EU
Progress towards the overall Lisbon
employment target has been the
best since 2000, and there has also
been marked progress towards the
female and older workers’ targets
Employment growth has been posi-
tive in all 27 Member States…
…with prime-age workers and
employees in full-time or permanent
employment making a strong contri-
bution
Strong disparities in labour market
outcomes persist across Member
States 
Economic growth in the EU turned out to be better than expected in 2006,
mainly due to brisk global growth and favourable domestic conditions. GDP
growth for the EU-27 averaged 3% for the year as a whole, up from 1.8% in
2005, and is expected to grow at a similar rate in the current year.
In 2006, labour markets in the EU made a robust recovery. After rather modest
increases in previous years, employment growth in the EU-27 picked up
significantly in 2006 and, at 1.4%, was at its strongest since 2000. In addition,
labour productivity accelerated in comparison with 2005 and grew at a slight-
ly higher rate than in the United States, although the EU continued to under-
perform slightly in relation to the United States in terms of employment
growth.
Due to stronger employment growth, the EU has made its best progress since
2000 towards its overall employment rate target of 70%, as well as towards
the targets for female (60%) and older workers’ (50%) employment rates. The
overall female and older workers’ employment rates reached 64.3%, 57.1%
and 43.5%, respectively in 2006. Despite this progress, it seems increasingly
challenging for the EU to meet the overall employment target of 70% and the
older workers’ target of 50% within the next four years, although the target
of 60% for female employment seems to be within reach.
For the first time in at least a decade, employment expanded across the entire
EU, with all 27 Member States showing a rise in employment. Particularly high
employment growth was observed in a number of the new Member States,
namely Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia, and in Ireland, Luxem-
bourg and Spain. Even those Member States that had displayed no increases
in employment in the previous year, namely Germany, Hungary, the Nether-
lands and Portugal, experienced significant employment growth in 2006.
Overall, there was a net increase of over 4 million persons in employment in
the EU-27 in 2006, with women contributing slightly more to employment cre-
ation than men. With respect to age, prime-age workers aged 25–54 ac-
counted for almost two-thirds of this increase, with a higher share of prime-
age women than men. Older workers above the age of 54 contributed just
under a third to employment growth. Almost 90% of employment growth
was due to employees in paid employment, with the remainder due to the
self-employed. 
Despite an increase in employment in all Member States, large variations per-
sist across countries. In 2006, employment rates ranged from as low as around
55% in Poland to more than 77% in Denmark. At the same time, employment
rates for women remain substantially below those for men in most of the EU-
27. There is also a substantial variation between Member States with respect
to employment rates for older people aged 55–64.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
PANORAMA OF THE EUROPEAN LABOUR MARKETS WITH A SPECIAL FOCUS ON
YOUTH EMPLOYMENT
 
Positive outlook for continued
employment growth
Youth unemployment remains a
challenge, despite some recent
improvements
Youth in precarious jobs or long peri-
ods of inactivity are especially at risk
of economic and social exclusion 
Addressing school failure and famil-
iarising youth with working life are
needed...
…along with effective activation
strategies and removing obstacles to
hiring young people
Population ageing is a serious chal-
lenge to the labour market, econom-
ic growth and social protection sys-
tems in Europe
Increasing the labour force participa-
tion of older people is essential,
through addressing the reasons for
their inactivity
Active ageing strategies are starting
to produce results, with employment
12
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The continuing economic upturn is expected to have positive effects on the
labour market. Employment is projected to grow by 1.4% in 2007 and 1.1% in
2008. With more jobs being created, the number of jobless is likely to decrease
even further: the unemployment rate is expected to fall to 7.2% in 2007 and
6.7% in 2008.
A more detailed look at the employment situation of the younger generation
reveals that youth unemployment and difficulties in successfully integrating
young people in the labour market remain a challenge for many EU Member
States. Despite signs of some overall recent improvements, a real break-
through in reducing youth unemployment has yet to occur. At 17.4%, the
average youth unemployment rate in the EU is still at a high level and it has
not improved relative to unemployment rates for prime-age adults. Further-
more, as a whole, the EU underperforms in the international context, with
substantially more youth in unemployment and fewer working than in other
industrialised countries, such as the United States, Canada or Japan. 
Young people frequently face problems in making a smooth and rapid transi-
tion from education to work. A small but significant part of youth remains
trapped in temporary, often low-pay jobs from which they find it difficult to
exit. Another group at risk are those youth who experience longer spells out-
side employment, education or training. 
Insufficient education attainment is one of the main causes behind the poor
labour market performance of young people. Therefore programmes, which
address school failure early on, familiarise youth with the world of work and
prepare them for the need for lifelong learning in order to adapt their quali-
fications throughout their working lives, are a crucial factor to improve the
labour market situation of young people.
In addition, better integration of disadvantaged youth suffering from long
spells in unemployment or inactivity will also require more effective activation
strategies than in the past. Moreover, youth are one group which is most likely
to be negatively affected by institutional settings favouring those with a per-
manent job at the expense of newcomers. The problems due to labour market
segmentation could be partly addressed by making it easier for firms to hire
young people. 
The EU is facing a substantial challenge due to population ageing, which is the
result of low fertility rates and increasing life expectancy. The population is
expected to become much older, with a marked change in the age structure of
both the overall and working-age populations, and with the labour market
more and more influenced by the older generation. This will have an impact on
economic growth and lead to mounting pressure on social protection systems.
In this context, increasing participation, especially of older people, and delay-
ing the exit from the labour force will be essential. However, currently over
half of 55–64 year olds in the EU are inactive, mainly for reasons of retirement
but also due to poor health, personal or family responsibilities, or the belief
that no work is available. Transition into inactivity for older people is nearly
always a path of no return. 
Recent results indicate that efforts by Member States to implement measures
in support of active ageing, as called for by the European Employment Strat-
ACTIVE AGEING AND LABOUR MARKET TRENDS FOR OLDER WORKERS
of older workers up markedly since
2000…
…and with this, expansion associat-
ed with positive aspects of employ-
ment
While the increase of female older
workers is mainly due to cohort
effects, for men it appears more
strongly linked to recent policy
measures related to active ageing
Despite recent improvement much
remains to be done to reach the
Stockholm target
There are different approaches to
active ageing across Member States –
countries with more integrated
approaches are more successful than
others
Raising older people’s labour market
participation requires addressing a
range of factors…
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egy, are starting to produce results. Employment of older workers has been
one of the most dynamic components of the EU labour market in recent years,
with employment rates for older workers up 7 percentage points since 2000,
even though this was, for a large part, a period characterised by sluggish eco-
nomic and employment growth. Pension reforms and cohort effects among
women have contributed to this improvement.
The recent rise in the employment of older workers has not been associated
with any noticeable rise in the precariousness of their employment, nor is it
mainly associated with an increased prevalence of part-time work or self-
employment. Furthermore, much of the employment growth has been in
relatively highly skilled, knowledge-intensive sectors, and with a shift away
from the more manual occupations towards the non-manual and more know-
ledge-intensive occupations. This suggests that older workers’ employment is
benefiting from the ongoing trends of population ageing and the shift to a
more knowledge-based economy. 
Much of the rise in employment rates for older workers is due to the increase
in rates for older women, which is due in turn mainly to the knock-on effect
of the increasing participation over time of women in general (women of
younger generations have higher age-specific participation rates than women
of older generations). This is as a result of changes in cultural attitudes regard-
ing female participation, higher skill levels among women and greater possi-
bilities to reconcile work and family responsibilities. In contrast, the increase
in rates for men is a result of the delays in exiting the labour market, this
being more due to such factors as reforms of pension and social protection
systems, and other recent measures associated with active ageing.
Despite the recent improvement, efforts to promote active ageing must still
be pursued vigorously. Labour market participation of older people in Europe
remains low by international standards and the employment rate for people
aged 55–64 is still 6.5 percentage points from the Stockholm target of 50% by
2010. Nevertheless recent trends suggest the chances to make substantial
progress are encouraging.
Different types of approach to active ageing currently exist across Member
States. Features of the systems which are more successful in supporting active
ageing include good levels of general health for older people and reasonably
high standard retirement ages; relatively high spending on active labour mar-
ket policy measures and participation in lifelong learning; flexibility with
regard to working hours and work organisation; and reduced financial pres-
sures on older workers to leave the labour market, both in terms of the finan-
cial incentives for older workers to retire and the cost pressure on employers
to hire younger rather than older workers. Certain groups of Member States,
in particular Nordic countries, have implemented a more integrated approach
to active ageing and have been relatively more successful in integrating and
retaining older workers in employment compared to others.
Increasing the labour market participation of older workers further will
require overcoming the continuing barriers and disincentives they face to
employment. A broad range of factors needs to be addressed. Apart from
financial incentives embedded in pension systems, early retirement schemes
and other tax and benefit systems, as well as more flexible wage-setting that
is less linked to seniority, the general challenges include changing attitudes to
older workers, maintaining and promoting the health and working capacity of
workers as they age, and developing the skills and employability of older
workers through effective lifelong learning. Suitable working conditions need
to be provided, including more flexible working time and work-organisation
…including gender-related aspects
of differences in participation at all
ages
Wider implementation of integrated
strategies is needed, with a focus on
the entire working lifespan
Flexicurity is an integrated strategy
also involving flexibility within the
firm
This may concern either flexible
working-time arrangements (inter-
nal flexibility)… 
…or flexible forms of work organisa-
tion (functional flexibility) Innova-
tive workplace practices enhance
firms’ competitiveness, but there is
no convergence towards a single
model of the ‘flexible firm’
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arrangements, together with employment opportunities for an ageing work-
force. It is also necessary to provide a generally supportive environment for
active ageing.
Addressing gender-related issues is important. The low employment rate for
older workers in Europe is largely a result of the relatively low rates for older
women, and, in a broader perspective, for women in general. Further efforts
to reduce the gap in activity between men and women will be a key element
of any strategy to increase the labour supply of older people. In this context,
lack of sufficient support for women in combining work and family responsi-
bilities continues to be an important factor limiting their participation, while
it will be increasingly important to develop new mechanisms or extend exist-
ing policies to ensure adequate coverage of older female workers’ needs.
Addressing the challenge of demographic ageing and its impact on the work-
force will require the wider implementation of more integrated strategies
than has been the case to date. Measures are needed which emphasise the
integration of older workers and improve their employability as well as clos-
ing off early exit pathways. Member States have been undertaking reforms
and implementing measures to support active ageing, and there are also some
indications that employers are beginning to address the issue of managing an
ageing workforce, but further progress is needed. In taking active ageing for-
ward, particular attention should be paid to promoting access to employment
throughout working life; a comprehensive active-ageing strategy must focus
on the entire working lifespan and all age groups, not just older workers. 
The recently adopted Commission Communication on flexicurity recognises
that flexibility goes beyond the ease or difficulty to hire and fire employees
(external flexibility) and can also be provided within the firm, either via flexi-
ble working-time arrangements (i.e. internal flexibility) and/or different forms
of work organisation, such as teamwork, work rotation, discretion at work
(i.e. functional flexibility). 
Since the mid-1990s, the rise in the incidence of part-time work is associated
with the substantial increase in the female employment rate – more than off-
setting the trend decline in hours worked per worker – leading to an overall
increase in labour utilisation. The incidence of flexible working-time arrange-
ments varies significantly across EU Member States. The evidence from surveys
suggests that flexible working-time arrangements help to reconcile pro-
fessional demands with employees’ preferences, leading to increased job satis-
faction and a better work-life balance. On the other hand, long and irregular
working hours tend to be detrimental for the perceived job quality and health
conditions of workers. 
Competitiveness pressures and technological progress have led many firms in
advanced economies to adopt more flexible forms of work organisation,
together with complementary human resource management policies. Flexible
forms of work organisation are loosely characterised by flatter hierarchical
structures, a stronger involvement of employees in decision making, and
greater discretion/autonomy of workers in the completion of their tasks,
coupled with richer job content. These innovative working practices show sig-
nificant complementarities/synergies and are more effective when combined
with certain human resource management practices, such as on-the-job training
WORKING TIME, WORK ORGANISATION AND INTERNAL FLEXIBILITY –
FLEXICURITY MODELS IN THE EU
EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE 2007
The taxonomy of flexicurity regimes
needs to be updated by considering
forms of flexibility provided within
the firm…
…which turn out to provide signifi-
cant value added. Advanced internal
flexibility is an important component
of ‘good’ flexicurity models
A rich job content and autonomy at
work seem to be part of win-win
strategies that can simultaneously
improve firms’ results and raise
employees’ job satisfaction…
…and they are also key for learning
and innovation
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and contingent pay systems. However, there is no overall convergence towards
a single model of the flexible workplace. Firms in EU Member States have
adopted distinct national strategies of organisational change because of
different institutions, socio-political preferences, economic structures, histori-
cal contexts, etc. 
Based on the institutional complementarities/policy regimes literature, the
2006 issue of Employment in Europe (EiE) proposed a typology of EU labour
markets along the dimensions of flexibility and security. However, flexibility
referred exclusively to its external component as measured by OECD’s Employ-
ment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator. The 2007 issue of EiE uses data
from the European Survey of Working Conditions (European Foundation) to
compute country-specific indicators of various forms of flexibility provided
within the firm (both internal and functional) in order to update and refine
the taxonomy of EU flexicurity systems presented in EiE 2006.
The analysis strongly suggests that consideration of both external and in-
ternal forms of flexibility (and their interaction) is essential to characterise
labour markets/flexicurity regimes across the EU. Two regimes are found to be
associated with relatively ‘good’ socio-economic outcomes. The first regime
(mainly ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries) is characterised by high external flexibility
combined with average levels of advanced forms of internal flexibility. It dis-
plays high labour mobility, low segmentation, innovation, take-up of training
by employees and moderate success in poverty reduction, combined with low
budgetary costs. The second regime (mainly ‘Nordic’ countries) is characterised
by advanced forms of internal flexibility (complex tasks, workers’ autonomy,
flexible working-time arrangements), combined with moderate levels of 
external flexibility. It is associated with good economic outcomes (labour market,
productivity, innovation); greater job satisfaction and work-related health;
and strong reduction in inequality/poverty, combined with higher budgetary
costs. Therefore there is no model that performs better on all counts i.e. there
is no single policy ‘recipe’ for success. 
Different flexible practices of work organisation do not have the same impact
on the quality of working conditions. The advanced internal flexibility (or dis-
cretionary learning) model, which combines greater demands on workers, in
terms of responsibilities and problem-solving activities, with increased auton-
omy at work, may represent a win-win solution, reconciling both employers’
and employees’ interests, particularly when combined with better support for
workers moving between jobs and enterprises. In fact, it is simultaneously
characterised by firms’ enhanced performances and better working conditions
as opposed to traditional forms of work organisation. On the other hand,
more basic forms of functional flexibility, such as task rotation, teamwork and
strict production norms, seem to be detrimental to job satisfaction, work-life
balance and work-related health outcomes. 
The way work is organised plays a key role in the absorption and creation of
knowledge. Models characterised by discretion/autonomy at work combined
with complex problem-solving activities are the best performing in the devel-
opment of in-house innovation, while the so-called ‘lean’ model, characterised
by a low degree of autonomy and a large emphasis put on task rotation and
teamwork, tends to be associated with the adoption and/or modification of
existing technologies. Workers’ discretionary efforts in understanding and
solving production-related problems seem, therefore, to be a key factor for
learning and innovation, in addition to completing ‘standard’ education
levels (i.e. secondary education) and/or participating in lifelong training. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Continuing vocational training is
increasingly important due to major
long-term trends that have affected
EU economies over the past decades
Policies targeted towards continuing
vocational training could pursue four
key objectives in the context of the
Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs
There are signs that the free market
is unable to provide an efficient level
of investment
Findings show that equal access to
training remains an issue for the EU
Government intervention can thus
be justified on the grounds of effi-
ciency and equity
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Continuing vocational training at the initiative of the enterprise is being
increasingly recognised in EU economies, given the long-term trends and char-
acteristics of the structural changes in modern economies over past decades.
These changes have been marked by a transition from a model of production
based on mass production to a new productive model driven by quality and
innovation; a major employment shift towards service sector jobs; and the 
significant increase in the education attainment level of the workforce. These
changes have strengthened the need for continuing vocational training to
guarantee that workers who entered the workforce several decades ago have
the skills required to participate effectively in today’s economy, but they have
also put an increasing pressure on the new generations of workers to continu-
ously acquire the skills necessary to learn and innovate in a new era char-
acterised by rapid change.
There are at least four good reasons that call for the strengthening of continu-
ing vocational training in the context of the Lisbon Strategy and these may
also form the objectives for future policies. First, policies can reduce social
exclusion and income inequality caused by insufficient human capital by rais-
ing the skills and the employability of at-risk workers. Second, these policies
can be a means of keeping older workers, who entered the labour force with
low levels of schooling, active in the labour market, thereby helping sustain
the social protection systems. Third, policies targeted towards continuing
vocational training are a crucial ingredient for the implementation of flexicur-
ity policies by making internal labour markets more dynamic in the context of
permanent economic changes, and workers’ skills more transferable among
employers, while reinforcing the perceptions of employment security. Finally,
these policies can help ensure that workers acquire and upgrade the skills
necessary in an era characterised by rapid change and learning, making Euro-
pean enterprise more competitive in the knowledge-based economy.
There are some indications that the free market cannot provide an efficient
level of investment in continuing vocational training because of possible market
failures. Probably the most prominent market failure related to continuing
vocational training is the poaching problem. This refers to the possibility that
workers leave their current employers who provided the training in order to
join other employers who do not pay for such an activity but gain part of the
resulting benefits. In many circumstances, such market failure does not pro-
vide adequate incentives for employers to invest in continuing vocational
training. 
Empirical findings indicate that some groups of employees have a lower likeli-
hood of participating in employer-sponsored training than others in the EU.
Access to training remains unequal, particularly for older workers, the less edu-
cated, those in precarious jobs and workers with the lowest income. This has a
negative impact on the employability of these groups, and hence increases the
risk of social exclusion and income inequality. It also undermines the sustain-
ability of the social protection systems by increasing the older workers’ prob-
ability to exit the labour force early. Furthermore, the likelihood of participa-
tion in training remains quite low in small enterprises, which has potential neg-
ative effects on the innovation activities of this important business segment.
For these reasons, government intervention may be required to ensure that
the two traditional objectives of education and training – i.e. efficiency and
equity, as stressed by the Commission’s 2006 Communication Efficiency and
STRENGTHENING CONTINUING VOCATIONAL TRAINING AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE
ENTERPRISE
EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE 2007
Supply-side policies may help secure
investment in continuing vocational
training…
…as well as its benefits
The labour income share in Europe
has been declining since the mid-
1970s, while the skill composition of
the total wage bill has changed
notably
This evolution has a major socio-
economic importance
Technological progress, and labour
market institutions and policies can
be seen as the most important drivers
of this evolution, but they have dif-
ferentiated effects on the income
shares of workers with different skill
levels
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equity in European education and training systems – are reached. In this
respect, government intervention can take three different forms: provision,
regulation and funding. However, when implementing policy instruments,
governments have to find the right balance among these forms of inter-
vention in order to achieve both efficiency and equity.
Specially designed policies may contribute to reducing under-investment in
continuing vocational training, while, in certain circumstances, improving
equality of access to training for all workers. These policies include fiscal
incentives and subsidies, collective labour agreements and compulsory agree-
ments through levy-based schemes. When designing such policies, govern-
ments should, nevertheless, be careful to avoid possible adverse effects on the
efficiency of resource allocation.
Supply-side policies may also help secure the benefits of continuing vocation-
al training. Reforms aiming at aligning productivity and wages should be con-
sidered with caution because they may reduce the benefits from continuing
vocational training that accrue to the employers providing such training to
their employees. On the contrary, policy instruments aiming at reducing
turnover, such as payback clauses, may be useful since, to a certain extent; they
allow employers to secure the benefits of their investment in continuing vo-
cational training. Lastly, policies promoting quality assurance, accreditation
and certification of training may have differentiated effects. Whilst the
accreditation of training contributes to improving the information on the
quality and nature of training, thereby helping employers to take training
decisions, the certification of training may reduce the incentives of firms to
provide continuing vocational training to their employees (certification
increases the transferability of their employees’ skills by making them more
visible to other employers). On balance, however, these policies are socially
desirable, as they can ease job-to-job mobility, thus contributing towards
implementing flexicurity policies.
The labour income share, which measures the part of value added that is allo-
cated to labour, fell markedly in the EU and Japan, and to a lesser extent in
the USA. In the EU, the labour income share started to decline shortly after the
first oil price shock, currently falling below the levels attained in the 1960s.
The data also shows that the share of the skilled workers rose steadily over
past decades while the share of the unskilled workers declined progressively. 
The evolution of the labour income share involves issues of equity, economic
efficiency and macro-economic stability because it has an impact on personal
income distribution and social cohesion, the direction of the adjustment in
wages and employment, and the composition of aggregate demand. 
Once the restrictive assumptions of the basic neo-classical growth model are
relaxed, the evolution of the labour income share can be understood as the
outcome of a complex interaction between technological progress and labour
market institutions and policies, and, to a lesser extent, other drivers, such as
trade openness. However, depending on the degree of substitution between
the production factors, changes in these drivers may have a different impact
on the income share of the different skill types. This is very well illustrated by
the effects of variables associated with technological progress, such as capital-
to-labour ratio or ICT use, which has a positive effect on the income share of
medium- and high-skilled workers and a negative impact on the income share
of low-skilled workers.
THE LABOUR INCOME SHARE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Technological progress has been a
major driving force the decline in the
labour income share
Balanced packages of stability and
growth-oriented macro-economic
policies and labour market polices
are needed in order to address any
adverse developments in the labour
income share
Policies based on flexicurity princi-
ples are a concrete way forward for
promoting a fairer share of the fruits
of economic growth 
CONCLUSIONS
A cyclical upturn in the economy con-
tributed last year to the best employ-
ment performance of the EU since
the launch of the Lisbon Strategy…
…but this only strengthens the case
for speeding up structural reforms in
areas such as flexicurity and a life-
cycle approach to work…
…as the analysis presented in this
report demonstrates.
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Technological progress appears to have made the largest contribution to the
fall in the income share of aggregate labour. However, this loss was unevenly
spread over the different skill-types as the high-skilled workers increased their
share while the low-skilled workers saw their income share fall. Trade open-
ness also had a negative impact on the aggregate labour income share but to
a lesser extent than technological progress, and its impact fell primarily on the
medium-skilled workers. 
In order to address any adverse developments in the distribution of value
added between capital and labour and between the different skill types of
labour, policy-makers need to pursue macro-economic polices oriented to
stability and growth, creating an economic environment that contributes to
further capital and technological progress. However, in order to realise this
potential, it is imperative that these policies are complemented by labour
market polices that take into account the different responses of the different
skill types to these drivers and, most importantly, by policies that allow the
low-skilled to progress to a higher skill level so that the adverse effects, which
stem from their high degree of substitutability with capital, can be mitigated. 
Some degree of employment flexibility within a secure context should facilitate
the creation of new jobs and the destruction of those that become unproductive,
as well as facilitate the swift progression of workers to more rewarding jobs
rather than keeping them trapped in low-skilled jobs, the income share of
which is adversely impacted by capital deepening and technological progress.
Employment expansion, apparent in the EU since 2004, continued in 2006, this
time significantly helped by a relatively broad-based economic recovery. Each
of the EU Member States recorded employment growth in 2006 and the total
net increase of over 4 million people in employment represented significant
progress toward the Lisbon and Stockholm employment targets, proving last
year to be the most successful since the launch of the Lisbon Strategy in 2000. 
The improved economic climate should by no means obscure the urgent need
for a continuing labour market reform across the EU. On the contrary, the
current cyclical improvement presents a unique opportunity to push more
strongly for the structural changes needed to achieve a breakthrough towards
the overreaching Lisbon objectives of full employment, quality and productiv-
ity at work, and social and territorial cohesion. The analysis presented in this
Employment in Europe demonstrates how a strategic and integrated policy
approach towards key priority areas identified in the conclusions of the
2006/2007 Joint Employment Report, such as a life-cycle approach to work or
flexicurity, can actually make a difference to the labour market performances
of different Member States.
Life-long learning remains a necessary ingredient of successful policy packages
in the EU labour markets and this year’s Employment in Europe report looks
specifically into policy solutions that improve both efficiency and equity in
continuing vocational training. This report also examines the recently much-
debated issue of the labour income share developments in the EU and sug-
gests some policy responses best equipped to mitigate their possible adverse
effects. Overall, the findings of Employment in Europe 2007 support the gen-
eral direction of the main policy initiatives at EU level within the employment
pillar of the re-launched Lisbon Agenda.
EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE 2007
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of
recent developments in the European
labour market until 2006 and com-
pares them with developments in an
international context, in particular
with those in the United States and
Japan. The chapter begins with an
overview of recent labour market per-
formance, examining the current situ-
ation and recent trends in the Euro-
pean Union (EU) set in a global per-
spective. It then focuses in more detail
on the latest developments in activity,
employment and unemployment rates
across the individual Member States,
with a focus on progress with regard
to the Lisbon and Stockholm employ-
ment rate targets. The chapter also
contains a special section on the
labour market performance of young
people in the EU which complements
Chapter 2 of this report on active age-
ing and labour market trends for older
workers. The findings reported in this
chapter are based on data available up
to June 2007
1
. EU averages generally
refer to all 27 Member States of the
EU, while some of the tables and
charts include data for the EU-15
aggregate to provide a longer-term
historical perspective.
2. EU LABOUR MARKET
PERFORMANCE IN A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
The world economy continued to
develop strongly in 2006. World
GDP growth for 2006 is estimated
at 5.2%, up from 4.8% in 2005 and
only slightly below the recent high
of 5.3% observed in 2004. Particu-
larly strong growth was again
observed in certain emerging
economies such as China (10.7%)
and India (8.7%). In the United
States, economic activity started to
slow down after a strong first quar-
ter in 2006, mainly due to a down-
turn in the housing sector and the
accompanying decline in residential
investment, but also to a slowdown
in manufacturing. Nevertheless,
GDP growth was still at 3.3%, com-
pared to 3.2% in 2005. In Japan the
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Source: Eurostat, national accounts.
1 The figures in this chapter are based on the data available up to June 2007 and generally include data for the years up until 2006. For further
details on the data and the sources used, see the statistical annexes.
Source: Eurostat, national accounts.
economy expanded by 2.2%, up
from 1.9% the year before.
Economic growth in the EU turned
out to be better than expected in
2006, mainly due to brisk global
growth and favourable domestic
conditions. GDP growth for the EU-
27 averaged 3% for the year as a
whole, up from 1.8% in 2005, and is
expected to grow at a similar rate
in the current year. 
In 2006, the economic upswing was
finally reflected in EU labour mar-
kets. After rather modest increases
in the previous years, employment
growth in the EU-27 picked up sig-
nificantly in 2006 and showed its
strongest increase since the late
1990s (Chart 1). For the year as a
whole, EU employment growth
averaged a healthy 1.4%, up from
the previous year’s level of 0.9%.
Reflecting the improvement in
labour market conditions, the
employment rate in the EU rose to
64.3% (Chart 3), while the un-
employment rate fell to 7.9%, down
from 8.7% the year before (Chart 4).
Yet despite these improvements,
the average EU employment rate
remains well below that of the Unit-
ed States and Japan, while the aver-
age EU unemployment rate is still
almost double the rate in the Unit-
ed States and Japan.
In the United States, the labour mar-
ket continued to be robust despite
first signs of slower economic
growth. Employment continued to
expand at a faster rate than in the
EU, with growth at 1.7%, the same
level as the year before (Chart 2, see
page 19). The unemployment rate
continued to fall and was at 4.6% in
2006, down from 5.1% in 2005 and
at its lowest level since 2001. In
Japan, the turnaround in the labour
market observed in 2004 continued
in 2006. Employment growth was
positive for the third consecutive
year, although, at 0.4% both in 2005
and 2006, much lower than in the EU
and the US, while the unemploy-
ment rate continued to fall from
4.4% to 4.1%.
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Source: DG EMPL calculations based on long-term trends in employment and population, Commission Services.
Table 1 - International comparison of key indicators, 2004 – 2006
2004 2005 2006
Population (millions)
EU-27 487 489 491
EU-25 457 460 462
EU-15 383 386 388
USA 293 296 298
Japan 128 128 128
GDP (in 1000 million purchasing power standards, current prices)
EU-27 10670 11099 11671
EU-25 10453 10865 11414
EU-15 9522 9874 10344
USA 9795 10312 10859
Japan 3147 3271 3406
GDP growth at constant prices (annual % change)
EU-27 2.5 1.8 3.0
EU-25 2.4 1.8 2.9
EU-15 2.3 1.6 2.8
USA 3.9 3.2 3.3
Japan 2.7 1.9 2.2
Employment rate (as % of working age population)
EU-27 62.9 63.4 64.3
EU-25 63.3 63.8 64.7
EU-15 64.7 65.2 66.0
USA 71.2 71.5 72.0
Japan 68.7 69.3 70.0
Employment growth (annual % change)
EU-27 0.7 0.9 1.4
EU-25 0.7 0.9 1.5
EU-15 0.7 0.8 1.3
USA 1.1 1.7 1.7
Japan 0.2 0.4 0.4
Unemployment rate (as % of civilian labour force)
EU-27 9.0 8.7 7.9
EU-25 9.0 8.7 7.9
EU-15 8.0 7.9 7.4
USA 5.5 5.1 4.6
Japan 4.7 4.4 4.1
Source: GDP and employment growth from national accounts, Eurostat (employment growth for Japan
from AMECO database, Commission Services). GDP in purchasing power standards from AMECO data-
base, Commission Services. Employment rate from Eurostat (annual averages) and OECD data for US and
Japan. Unemployment rate from the harmonised unemployment series, Eurostat. Population from
demographic statistics, Eurostat, and for US and Japan from AMECO database, Commission Services. 
Note: Employment rates for the EU and Japan refer to persons aged 15-64; US employment rate
refers to persons aged 16–64.
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The increase in economic growth in
the EU reflects an increase in aver-
age labour productivity growth. EU
labour productivity (in terms of GDP
per person employed) grew by 1.5%
in 2006, up from a 1% increase in
2005 (Chart 5). In Japan, labour pro-
ductivity growth was also up, with
1.8% in 2006, compared to 1.5% in
2005. In the United States, on the
other hand, labour productivity
growth again turned out to be less
dynamic than the year before (1.4%
in 2006, after 1.8% in 2005 and 3%
in 2004). Considering productivity in
terms of GDP per hours worked,
productivity growth in the EU also
increased in 2005 (Chart 6). 
According to the European Commis-
sion’s Spring Economic Forecast
2
, the
economic outlook for the EU-27
remains positive for this and the fol-
lowing year. For 2007, real GDP is
predicted to expand by 2.9%, i.e. at
a similar pace to 2006. For 2008, a
slight deceleration to 2.7% is forecast,
which would still be significantly above
growth rates experienced in the
first half of the decade. It is expect-
ed that the main drivers of the
economy will be domestic demand,
including private consumption and
investment, and a continued strong
though somewhat slower growth in
exports.
The economic upturn is expected to
have positive effects on the labour
market. Employment is projected to
grow by 1.4% in 2007 and 1.1% in
2008. Together with the employ-
ment expansion in 2006, this trans-
lates into an estimated 8.8 million
new jobs over the period
2006–2008. With more jobs being
created, unemployment is likely to
decrease further; the unemploy-
ment rate is expected to fall to 7.2%
in 2007 and to 6.7% in 2008. Labour
productivity growth in the EU (in
terms of real GDP per employed
person) is estimated to remain static
at 1.5% in both 2007 and 2008.
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2 European Commission (2007).
Source: AMECO database, Commission Services.
3. LABOUR MARKET
SITUATION IN THE EU
3.1 Employment
growth in the EU
Member States
In 2006, employment expanded
across the entire EU. For the first time
in at least a decade, all 27 current
Member States experienced employ-
ment growth (Chart 7). Particularly
strong growth rates were observed
in a number of the newer Member
States. Estonia had the highest
employment growth with 5.4% and
thereby underlined a greatly
improved employment situation
already established in the previous
year. Employment in Latvia devel-
oped almost as equally impressively
with an increase of 4.8%, after 1.5%
the previous year. Poland, the
biggest of the new Member States,
also saw a further strong expansion
of employment (+3.3%); following a
long period of employment contrac-
tion during the beginning of the
decade, employment in Poland
began to pick up again in 2004 and
has developed increasingly well
since then (Table 2). Employment in
Bulgaria continued to grow at a
robust rate (+2.4%), albeit slightly
less dynamically than in previous
years. Slovakia also had employ-
ment growth of over 2%, signifi-
cantly up from the previous year’s
growth rate. Cyprus, the Czech
Republic, Lithuania and Slovenia all
had employment growth in excess
of 1%; however, in the case of
Cyprus and Lithuania, this was a less
dynamic development compared to
the previous year. Employment in
Hungary finally expanded again in
2006 (+0.7%), after having contract-
ed in 2004 and stagnated in 2005.
Malta experienced less dynamic
employment growth in 2006
(+0.9%) compared to the previous
year. The lowest employment
growth rate of all the Member States
was observed in Romania, which saw
only marginal improvements in
employment for the third year in a
row and which were not enough to
make up for the strong employment
losses that occurred in the late
1990s and at the beginning of this
decade.
As for the older Member States,
employment growth continued to
be particularly strong in Spain, Ire-
land and Luxembourg. Though
slightly less dynamic than in 2005,
employment in Ireland expanded by
4.2% and in Spain by 3.3%. Luxem-
bourg managed to up the pace
again and saw its employment grow
by 3.7% in 2006. Almost all the
other Member States also managed
to increase their employment
growth compared to the previous
year, although in some countries the
improvement was moderate. Even
those Member States that had per-
formed worst in 2005, namely Ger-
many, Portugal and in particular the
Netherlands, saw their employment
grow again in 2006, although they
still remained below the average
growth rate for the EU. In Belgium,
Finland and the United Kingdom,
annual employment growth
remained at about the same level as
in previous years.
As for labour productivity, all of the
new Member States continued to
exhibit strong growth, which was
well above the EU average, despite
a more tempered pace in most
countries compared to the previous
year (Table 3 - see page 24). In par-
ticular, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Slovakia saw their labour pro-
ductivity (in terms of GDP per per-
son employed) increase by more
than 5%. Amongst the bigger old
Member States, Germany stands out
as the country with the highest pro-
ductivity growth: 2.5% in 2006, the
highest for Germany since the
beginning of the decade. Productiv-
ity in the United Kingdom now also
stands above average, while it
remains subdued in France and par-
ticularly weak in Italy and Spain.
Overall, the highest productivity
growth in the old EU-15 was
observed in Finland with +4%.
3.2. Employment rates
and the EU
employment targets
3.2.1. Overall progress
towards the Lisbon and
Stockholm targets
Due to a stronger employment
growth in 2006, the EU made its best
progress towards the overall
employment target since its defini-
tion at the Lisbon European Council
of 2000 (Box 1). Between 2005 and
22
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
EE LV IE LU E
S PL B
G SK D
K SE IT LT C
Z
C
Y EL A
T FI
EU
-2
7
EU
-1
5
N
L SI B
E
M
T FR U
K
D
E
H
U PT
Chart 7: Employment growth for EU Member States, 2006
An
nu
al
 %
 c
ha
ng
e
Source: Eurostat, national accounts.
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Table 2 - Employment growth for EU Member States, US and Japan, 1997 – 2006
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE 0.5 1.6 1.3 2.0 1.4 -0.1 0.0 0.6 1.0 0.9
BG -3.9 -0.2 -2.1 4.9 -0.8 0.2 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.4
CZ 0.2 -1.5 -3.4 -0.2 0.5 0.6 -1.3 0.1 1.6 1.6
DK 1.2 1.5 1.0 0.4 0.8 -0.1 -1.3 0.0 0.7 1.8
DE -0.1 1.2 1.4 1.9 0.4 -0.6 -0.9 0.4 -0.1 0.7
EE 0.0 -1.9 -4.4 -1.5 0.9 1.3 1.4 0.0 2.0 5.4
EL -0.5 2.9 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.2 1.5 3.4 0.9 1.4
ES 3.6 4.5 4.6 5.1 3.2 2.4 3.1 3.5 3.8 3.3
FR 0.4 1.5 2.0 2.7 1.8 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.8
IE 5.6 8.6 6.2 4.6 3.0 1.8 2.0 3.1 4.6 4.2
IT 0.3 1.0 1.1 1.9 2.2 1.6 1.5 0.4 0.3 1.7
CY 0.6 1.6 1.9 1.6 2.2 2.1 3.8 3.8 3.6 1.5
LV 4.4 -0.3 -1.8 -2.9 2.2 2.3 1.0 1.1 1.5 4.8
LT 0.6 -0.8 -2.2 -4.0 -3.8 3.6 2.2 0.0 2.5 1.7
LU 3.1 4.5 5.0 5.5 5.6 2.9 1.8 2.3 3.0 3.7
HU 0.2 1.8 3.4 1.3 0.3 0.0 1.3 -0.7 0.0 0.7
MT 0.0 0.0 0.7 8.4 1.8 0.6 1.0 -0.8 1.8 0.9
NL 3.3 4.1 3.9 3.1 2.6 0.5 -0.5 -0.9 0.0 1.2
AT 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.0 0.6 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.4
PL 1.4 1.2 -3.9 -1.6 -2.2 -3.0 -1.2 1.3 2.3 3.3
PT : : 1.9 1.7 1.6 0.5 -0.4 0.1 0.0 0.6
RO -3.8 -2.3 -4.5 2.5 -0.8 -2.7 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
SI -1.9 -0.2 1.4 0.8 0.5 1.5 -0.4 0.5 0.3 1.2
SK -1.2 -0.4 -2.7 -1.8 0.6 -0.5 1.8 -0.3 1.4 2.3
FI 3.3 2.0 2.5 2.2 1.5 1.0 0.1 0.4 1.4 1.4
SE -1.3 1.6 2.1 2.4 1.9 0.2 -0.3 -0.6 0.4 1.8
UK 1.8 1.0 1.4 1.2 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.8
EU-27 0.7 1.3 0.9 1.7 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.4
EU-15 1.0 1.7 1.9 2.2 1.4 0.7 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.3
US 2.3 2.1 1.9 2.0 -0.7 -0.3 0.9 1.1 1.7 1.7
JP 0.7 -1.2 -1.4 -0.6 -0.8 -1.6 -0.3 0.2 0.4 0.4
Source: EU and US data from national accounts, Eurostat; Japan data from AMECO database, Commission Services.
Note: ‘:’ data not available.
Box 1 – Lisbon and Stockholm employment rate targets and the relaunched Lisbon Strategy
The Lisbon European Council of 2000 set a strategic goal, over the decade 2000–2010, for the EU ‘to become the
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth
with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’. It specifically stated that the overall aim of employment and
economic policies should be to raise the employment rate to as close to 70% as possible by 2010 and to increase the
employment rate for women to more than 60% by the same year, not least in order to reinforce the sustainability
of social protection systems. In addition to the 2010 Lisbon targets, the Stockholm European Council of 2001 set a
new target of raising the average EU employment rate for older men and women (aged 55–64) to 50% by 2010. 
Recognising the limited progress achieved so far towards these targets, the European Council decided in 2005 to
relaunch the Lisbon Strategy without delay and refocus priorities on economic growth and employment. As part of
this, a new set of employment guidelines for the period 2005–2008 was adopted by the Council in July 2005 to
reflect the renewed focus on jobs, and they form part of the integrated guidelines package also adopted in 2005,
which lays out a comprehensive strategy of macro-economic, micro-economic and employment policies to redress
Europe’s weak growth performance and insufficient job creation. The employment guidelines continue to reflect
the EU’s overall goal of achieving full employment, quality and productivity at work, and social and territorial cohe-
sion, and advocate a life-cycle approach to work that tackles the problems faced by all age groups. The eight
employment guidelines fall under three broad areas for action, namely to:
• Attract and retain more people in employment, increase labour supply and modernise social protection systems;
• Improve adaptability of workers and enterprises;
• Increase investment in human capital through better education and skills.
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Table 3 - Productivity growth for EU Member States, US and Japan, 2000–2006
Growth in GDP per person employed Growth in GDP per hour worked
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
BE 1.7 -0.6 1.6 1.0 2.3 0.1 2.0 1.7 -0.8 1.6 1.4 3.6 -0.7 2.0
BG 0.5 4.9 5.3 2.0 3.9 3.5 3.6 : 4.1 5.4 2.7 2.5 3.8 3.3
CZ 4.1 2.1 1.6 4.7 4.1 4.7 4.7 3.9 6.7 2.4 4.9 3.6 4.9 3.8
DK 3.1 -0.1 0.5 1.7 2.1 2.4 1.3 2.1 -0.6 0.9 1.9 1.8 1.3 1.2
DE 2.3 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.5 2.5 2.6 1.8 1.5 1.2 0.7 1.3 2.1
EE 11.0 6.8 6.3 6.2 8.0 8.6 5.5 : 7.2 6.4 5.5 7.5 7.6 3.7
IE 5.3 2.8 4.2 2.3 1.2 0.9 1.7 5.6 3.3 5.0 3.5 1.4 1.2 1.8
EL 4.6 5.4 3.7 3.4 1.7 2.3 2.7 4.0 5.2 3.7 3.4 5.0 2.8 2.2
ES 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.8 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.5
FR 1.0 -0.3 0.1 1.1 2.4 1.4 1.2 3.7 0.9 3.1 1.4 0.8 2.0 1.2
IT 1.7 0.0 -0.9 -0.6 0.8 0.3 0.2 2.4 0.8 -0.7 -1.1 1.5 0.6 0.0
CY 3.4 1.8 -0.1 -1.9 0.4 0.3 2.3 : -5.0 1.2 -0.8 1.0 1.4 2.3
LV 10.1 5.7 4.8 5.4 7.5 8.7 7.0 9.4 6.2 5.2 4.4 10.5 9.0 6.7
LT 8.4 10.9 3.2 7.9 7.3 5.0 5.7 1.6 11.8 4.8 8.9 6.0 1.5 6.6
LU 2.7 -2.9 0.9 -0.5 1.3 1.0 2.4 3.0 -1.8 1.5 0.8 3.7 0.9 3.3
HU 3.7 3.6 4.4 3.3 5.4 3.7 3.1 4.2 6.0 4.0 4.3 5.6 4.3 3.6
MT 4.0 -2.8 1.4 -3.3 1.2 1.2 2.0 : 0.5 0.6 -2.5 -0.7 4.5 2.0
NL 2.0 0.3 0.3 1.4 3.4 1.8 1.8 3.9 -1.2 0.7 0.9 3.5 2.2 2.1
AT 2.3 0.3 1.1 0.9 2.1 0.7 1.9 2.7 0.3 0.9 0.5 1.9 1.2 1.7
PL 5.8 3.4 4.5 5.1 4.0 1.2 2.4 : 4.1 4.3 4.8 4.0 0.6 2.3
PT 1.6 0.2 0.3 -0.4 1.2 0.5 0.5 4.6 0.1 0.2 0.8 0.3 1.0 0.5
RO -0.3 6.6 8.1 5.5 8.0 3.9 4.7 : : : : : : :
SI 3.3 2.2 1.9 3.1 3.9 3.7 4.0 2.6 1.8 3.1 2.6 6.3 3.6 3.0
SK 2.6 2.6 4.7 2.3 5.8 4.6 5.8 2.5 3.3 7.8 6.8 3.6 2.6 5.4
FI 2.7 1.1 0.7 1.7 3.3 1.5 4.0 3.6 2.1 1.0 2.1 3.1 1.9 3.8
SE 1.9 -0.8 1.8 2.0 4.7 2.5 2.4 3.3 0.6 3.3 3.2 3.3 2.3 2.7
UK 2.6 1.5 1.3 1.7 2.2 1.0 1.9 3.3 1.3 2.4 2.8 2.5 0.7 2.6
EU-27 2.3 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.9 1.0 1.5 : : : : : : :
EU-15 1.9 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.8 1.0 1.6 2.7 1.0 1.4 1.1 1.6 1.2 1.5
US 1.6 0.5 2.7 2.7 3.0 1.8 1.4 2.4 2.0 3.0 3.0 2.8 1.8 :
JP 3.5 0.9 1.9 1.7 2.5 1.5 1.8 2.9 1.6 2.5 1.6 3.2 2.3 :
Source: EU and US data from national accounts, Eurostat; Japan data from AMECO database, Commission Services.
Note: ‘:’ data not available.
Table 4 - Employment rates for EU Member States in 2006 and progress towards Lisbon and Stockholm targets for 2010
Total employment rate Female employment rate Older people's employment rate
2006 Change Change Gap below 2006 Change Change Gap below 2006 Change Change Gap below 
2006–2005 2006–2000 2010 target 2006–2005 2006–2000 2010 target 2006–2005 2006–2000 2010 target
BE 61.0 -0.1 0.5 9.0 54.0 0.2 2.5 6.0 32.0 0.2 5.7 18.0
BG 58.6 2.8 8.2 11.4 54.6 2.9 8.3 5.4 39.6 4.9 18.8 10.4
CZ 65.3 0.5 0.3 4.7 56.8 0.5 -0.1 3.2 45.2 0.7 8.9 4.8
DK 77.4 1.5 1.1 > 73.4 1.5 1.8 > 60.7 1.2 5.0 >
DE 67.2 1.8 1.6 2.8 61.5 1.9 3.4 > 48.4 3.0 10.8 1.6
EE 68.1 3.7 7.7 1.9 65.3 3.2 8.4 > 58.5 2.4 12.2 >
IE 68.6 1.0 3.4 1.4 59.3 1.0 5.4 0.7 53.1 1.5 7.8 >
EL 61.0 0.9 4.5 9.0 47.4 1.3 5.7 12.6 42.3 0.7 3.3 7.7
ES 64.8 1.5 8.5 5.2 53.2 2.0 11.9 6.8 44.1 1.0 7.1 5.9
FR 63.0 -0.1 0.9 7.0 57.7 0.1 2.5 2.3 37.6 -0.3 7.7 12.4
IT 58.4 0.8 4.7 11.6 46.3 1.0 6.7 13.7 32.5 1.1 4.8 17.5
CY 69.6 1.1 3.9 0.4 60.3 1.9 6.8 > 53.6 3.0 4.2 >
LV 66.3 3.0 8.8 3.7 62.4 3.1 8.6 > 53.3 3.8 17.3 >
LT 63.6 1.0 4.5 6.4 61.0 1.6 3.3 > 49.6 0.4 9.2 0.4
LU 63.6 0.0 0.9 6.4 54.6 0.9 4.5 5.4 33.2 1.5 6.5 16.8
HU 57.3 0.4 1.0 12.7 51.1 0.1 1.4 8.9 33.6 0.6 11.4 16.4
MT 54.8 0.9 0.6 15.2 34.9 1.2 1.8 25.1 30.0 -0.8 1.5 20.0
NL 74.3 1.1 1.4 > 67.7 1.3 4.2 > 47.7 1.6 9.5 2.3
AT 70.2 1.6 1.7 > 63.5 1.5 3.9 > 35.5 3.7 6.7 14.5
PL 54.5 1.7 -0.5 15.5 48.2 1.4 -0.7 11.8 28.1 0.9 -0.3 21.9
PT 67.9 0.4 -0.5 2.1 62.0 0.3 1.5 > 50.1 -0.4 -0.6 >
RO 58.8 1.2 1.2 11.2 53.0 1.5 1.2 7.0 41.7 2.3 4.4 8.3
SI 66.6 0.6 3.8 3.4 61.8 0.5 3.4 > 32.6 1.9 9.9 17.4
SK 59.4 1.7 2.6 10.6 51.9 1.0 0.4 8.1 33.1 2.8 11.8 16.9
FI 69.3 0.9 2.1 0.7 67.3 0.8 3.1 > 54.5 1.8 12.9 >
SE 73.1 0.6 0.1 > 70.7 0.3 -0.2 > 69.6 0.2 4.7 >
UK 71.5 -0.2 0.3 > 65.8 -0.1 1.1 > 57.4 0.5 6.7 >
EU-27 64.3 0.9 2.1 5.7 57.1 1.1 3.4 2.9 43.5 1.3 6.6 6.5
EU-15 66.0 0.8 2.6 4.0 58.4 1.0 4.3 1.6 45.3 1.2 7.5 4.7
2010 target 70 % More than 60 % 50 %
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS annual averages.
Note: Data for RO 2002; 2006 data for DE and FR provisional.
The column ”Gap below 2010 target” is for illustrative purposes only, since the 2010 target is a collective for the EU and not individual Member States.
The symbol ”>” indicates that the respective target has been exceeded by the Member States concerned.
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2006 the average employment rate
for the EU rose by almost 1 percent-
age point to 64.3%. The employ-
ment rate for women rose by 1.1
percentage points to 57.1%, while
that for men rose by a slightly more
moderate 0.8 percentage points to
71.6%. As a result, the gender gap in
employment rates in the EU nar-
rowed further between 2005 and
2006, falling by 0.3 of a percentage
point to 14.5 percentage points. For
older people (aged 55–64) the
employment rate rose again sub-
stantially by 1.3 percentage points
to 43.5%, after already having
increased by 1.5 percentage points
the previous year. 
Despite improved progress in 2006,
the overall, female and older work-
ers’ employment rates were still more
than 5, 3 and 6 percentage points
below the respective Lisbon and
Stockholm targets for 2010 (Table 4 ).
Although the economic and labour
market outlook for 2007 and 2008 is
relatively positive as well, achieving
an EU employment rate of 70% by
2010 remains very ambitious, given
that annual employment growth
would need to be significantly
stronger than it has been in the past
seven years or than is currently fore-
cast for the next two years. This said,
it is also worth pointing out that the
gap left to meet the Lisbon and
Stockholm goals is smaller for the
‘old’ EU-15 Member States for which
the targets were originally set; the
overall employment rate for the EU-
15 was 66% in 2006, the female
employment rate 58.4% and the
older people’s employment rate
45.3%.
3.2.2. Employment rate
developments in the Member
States 
Large variations remain in employ-
ment rates between the EU Member
States. In 2006, these ranged from as
low as around 55% in Poland to more
than 77% in Denmark. Rates rose in
all Member States except for a few
which experienced a standstill or
marginal decrease, namely Belgium,
France, Luxembourg and the United
Kingdom. The largest increase in
terms of percentage points (pp)
occurred in Estonia (+3.7 pp) and
Latvia (+3 pp), followed by Bulgaria
(+2.8 pp). Three of the bigger Mem-
ber States, namely Germany, Poland
and Spain also showed a noticeable
increase of 1.5 percentage points or
more.
Employment rates for women remain
substantially below those for men in
most of the EU Member States (Chart
8). Despite the continuing reduction in
the disparity between male and
female employment rates, large gen-
der differences of around 20 percent-
age points and more still remain in
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy and
Spain, while in Malta the gap is almost
40 percentage points, reflecting the
fact that only one in three women of
working age is in employment. Only
Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Swe-
den show a gender disparity of less
than 10 percentage points.
As for the older segment of the
labour market, Sweden, by a wide
margin, continues to have the high-
est employment rate for older work-
ers aged 55–64 in the EU. It is also the
only country where the employment
rate of older workers is close to that
of the overall employment rate
(69.6% vs. 73.1%). At the other end
of the spectrum are a number of new
Member States, namely Hungary, Slo-
vakia, Slovenia, Malta and Poland,
where only a third or even less of
older people hold a job. Low rates
are also recorded for Belgium, Italy
and Luxembourg (Table 4).
3.2.3. Individual situations in
relation to employment
targets 
While the Lisbon and Stockholm
employment rate targets are collect-
ive targets for the EU as a whole, it is
interesting to examine the position
of individual Member States with
respect to the collective EU targets
for 2010. Based on employment rates
in 2006, these can be summarised as
follows:
• Austria reached an overall
employment rate of over 70% for
the first time in 2006 and is now,
along with Denmark, the Nether-
lands, Sweden and the United
Kingdom, one of the five Mem-
ber States which already meets
the overall EU target for 2010 of
an employment rate of 70%.
Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Portugal
and, for the first time, Estonia
and Germany are presently with-
in 3 percentage points (Chart 9 -
see page 26). However, the gap
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remains over 10 percentage
points in seven Member States,
namely Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy,
Malta, Poland, Romania and Slo-
vakia. Since the launch of the Lis-
bon Strategy, the greatest
improvement in the overall
employment rate have taken place
in Bulgaria, Spain, Estonia and
Latvia where the rates have risen
by around 8 percentages points
and more. However, rates with
respect to 2000 have also slightly
declined in some Member States,
namely in Poland and Portugal.
• 13 Member States already meet
the 2010 employment rate target
for women, including, for the
first time, Cyprus, Germany,
Latvia, and Lithuania. Ireland is
very close and France and the
Czech Republic are within 3 per-
centage points (Chart 10).
Among the remaining Member
States, the gap remains above 10
percentage points in Greece, Italy
and Poland, and as high as 25
percentage points in Malta. Since
2000, large increases in the
female employment rate have
been achieved in Bulgaria,
Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Latvia
and Italy, where rates have all
risen by around 5 percentage
points or more, and in Spain,
which is up 12 percentage points,
although Greece and Italy are
still far from the target.
• For the older people’s 2010
employment rate target, nine
Member States already meet the
target, but only three others –
Germany, Lithuania and the
Netherlands - are within 3 per-
centage points of it (Chart 11).
While substantial gaps remain
for many Member States (15–25
percentage points in nine cases),
substantial progress has been
made since 2000 towards the tar-
get in many countries. In particu-
lar, 20 Member States have
achieved increases of 5 percent-
age points or more, with espe-
cially strong rises (over 10 per-
centage points) in Bulgaria, Esto-
26
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nia, Finland, Germany, Hungary,
Latvia and Slovakia. Only Poland
and Portugal have experienced
declines in employment rates for
older people since 2000,
although Portugal’s rate is
already above the 2010 target.
3.3. Features of EU
employment expansion
Between 2005 and 2006, there was a
net increase of around 4 million per-
sons in employment in the EU-27,
with women contributing slightly
more to employment creation than
men. With respect to age, prime age
workers aged 25–54 accounted for
almost two-thirds of employment cre-
ation, with women making a higher
contribution than men. Older workers
above the age of 54 contributed just
under a third to employment growth,
while younger people (15–24) con-
tributed around 4%. Almost 90% of
employment growth was made up of
employees, with the remainder self-
employed. Around two-thirds of the
newly created jobs were either full-
time or permanent jobs (Table 5).
Looking at employment expansion in
the EU since the beginning of the
decade, almost 12  million or 6% more
people were in employment in 2006
than in 2000. This increase has not
been uniform with respect to gender,
age and type of employment. There
are marked differences in the labour
market performance trends of the var-
ious elements of the population and
by type of employment arrangement,
as detailed below (Table 6): 
• Increasing female participation
In terms of gender, women have
accounted for the greatest growth
in employment, both in relative
and absolute terms. Indeed, the
overall increase in female employ-
ment has been more than twice
that for men. This reflects the
recent trend of rising labour mar-
ket participation of women, for
whom activity rates have increased
from 60% to 63.4% between 2000
and 2006 against an increase in the
male rate of only 0.6 percentage
points from 77.4% to 78%.
• Increasing participation of older
people aged 55–64
Relative to employment levels in
2000, growth has been greatest
for the 55–64 age group, where
employment has increased by
almost 28%. Even in absolute
terms the increase for the 55–64
age group has been dramatic,
accounting for nearly half the
overall increase in employment
and not far below the total
increase for the whole prime
working-age group. This reflects
a 7 percentage point increase in
activity rates for those aged
55–64 since 2000 and indicates
that, as well as cohort effects,
developments such as recent
reforms in pension systems and
other measures related to active
aging, which have postponed the
statutory retirement age and
more generally reduced incen-
tives for early retirement, are
taking effect and contribute to
the reversal of the decrease in
participation of older workers in
many Member States (see Chap-
ter 2 of this report for a detailed
analysis of the labour market
participation of older workers).
27
Table 5 - Contribution to employment creation in the EU-27 between 2005 and
2006 by age, gender and type of employment
% contribution to employment creation 2005–2006
Total Men Women
Age and gender
Total 48.8 51.2
15–24 3.9 3.0 0.9
25–54 65.3 29.7 35.6
55–64 27.8 14.2 13.7
Type of employment and gender
Employee versus Employee 88.5 41.9 46.5
self-employed Self-employed 11.5 6.1 5.4
Full-time versus part-time Full-time job 66.2 37.3 29.0
Part-time job 33.8 11.3 22.4
Permanent versus Permanent 65.3 30.8 34.4
fixed-term
employees Fixed-term 34.7 16.3 18.4
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS annual averages.
Note: EU-27 full-time/part-time indicators do not include IE.
Table 6 - Change in employment in the EU-27 between 2000 and 2006 by age,
gender and type of employment
2000–2006
(million) Relative 
Total 11.6 5.7
Gender
Men 4.2 3.7
Women 7.4 8.5
Age
15–24 -0.7 -3.0
25–54 7.1 4.5
55–64 5.3 27.6
Type of employment
Employee versus Employee 12.1 7.3
self-employed Self-employed 1.4 4.5
Full-time versus part-time Full-time job 5.7 3.3
Part-time job 5.9 18.1
Permanent versus Permanent 7.1 4.9
fixed-term
employees Fixed-term 5.0 24.8
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS annual averages.
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• Declining youth employment
While the prime age and older
age groups have experienced
increases in employment, the
15–24 age group has witnessed a
contraction in employment of
around 3% since 2000, with activ-
ity rates falling by 1.5 percentage
points to 48.4%. This develop-
ment may be partly explained by
increased participation in educa-
tion, since as enrolment in educa-
tion rises so labour market partic-
ipation falls. Indeed, the share of
young people in education has
increased considerably in most
EU Member States over recent
years
3
, affecting labour force par-
ticipation, although in the longer
term the implied improvement in
human capital should have a pos-
itive effect on overall employ-
ment performance and the econ-
omy.
• Rising shares of part-time and
fixed-term employment
In terms of developments by type
of employment, the relative
growth in part-time and fixed-
term employment since 2000 has
been substantial, with increases
of 18% and 25% respectively.
The extended availability of part-
time jobs has facilitated the par-
ticipation of women in particular
by allowing them to combine
work and family responsibilities
better, although it should also be
recognised that part-time work
may have fewer fringe benefits
and career possibilities than full-
time jobs, and may to a certain
degree reflect the unavailability
of full-time work. Furthermore,
although recourse to part-time
work may reflect personal prefer-
ences and may help people to
(re-)enter and stay in the labour
market, the high gender gap in
the share of part-time workers is
also evidence of the differences
in time-use patterns between
women and men, and of the role
of carer predominantly assumed
by women as well as the greater
difficulties they face in trying to
reconcile work and private life.
3.4. Activity rates 
In 2006, the economically active pro-
portion of the working age popu-
lation (aged 15–64) – i.e. that part of
the population in employment or
actively looking for a job – stood at
70.1%, about 0.5 percentage points
up from the previous year. Despite
having increased at a rate equal to or
higher than in other major industri-
alised countries, average labour force
participation in the EU remains low
by international comparison. The
United States, for example, has an
activity rate which is 5 percentage
points above that of the EU and com-
pared to its European neighbour,
Switzerland, it is almost 11 percent-
age points lower. 
Last year, Bulgaria and Estonia both
showed a strong increase of over 2
percentage points in their activity
rates, but Austria, Germany, Latvia,
Malta, Romania and Spain also had
28
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3 See Employment in Europe 2005, chapter 1, section 6.2.2.
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relatively strong increases of 1% or
more. Activity rates for the individual
Member States ranged from just
under 60% in Malta, with Bulgaria,
Italy, Hungary, Poland and Romania
also substantially (5 pp or more)
below the EU average, to almost 81%
in Denmark (Chart 12). Although
rates for men and women are rather
close in certain Member States, such
as Finland and Sweden, large dispari-
ties remain in several countries, par-
ticularly Greece, Italy and Spain, and
especially Malta, implying there is
still much scope for increasing female
participation in many Member States.
Looking back at the development
since the beginning of the decade,
activity rates in the EU have on aver-
age increased by 1.5 percentage
points since 2000 (Chart 13). This has
been driven almost entirely by the
continued increase of female partici-
pation which went up by 2.7 percent-
age points compared to only 0.4 per-
centage points for men.
3.5. Unemployment 
In 2006, the EU has seen its most sub-
stantial decline in unemployment since
the end of the last decade. The EU’s
average unemployment rate dropped
from 8.7% in 2005 to 7.9% in 2006.
Among the individual Member States,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and
Slovakia have seen the strongest
reduction, although the latter two
countries still have the highest unem-
ployment rates in Europe. In Bulgaria
and Germany unemployment rates
were down by a little over 1 percent-
age point and most of the other Mem-
ber States recorded smaller reductions.
Rates went up in only seven Member
States, although only marginally in
most cases. The highest increase in
2006 was recorded in the United King-
dom, where unemployment rose by
0.5 percentage points.
Despite this, the United Kingdom at
5.3% continues to have by far the low-
est unemployment rate among the big
Member States and one of the lowest
in the overall ranking. The lowest rates
in 2006 were observed in Denmark
and the Netherlands (3.9% each) and
Cyprus, Ireland and Luxembourg also
had rates below 5%. Poland and Slova-
kia remained on the other end of the
spectrum with 13.8% and 13.4%
respectively (Chart 14).
Gender disparities in the average EU
unemployment rate continued to
decrease to 1.6 percentage points in
2006, with unemployment rates at
7.2% for men and 8.8% for women.
Nevertheless, in several countries
the unemployment gender gap
remains large, especially in Greece,
Italy and Spain. However, in a few
Member States, namely Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Ireland, Romania
and the United Kingdom, unem-
ployment rates for women are actu-
ally lower than those for men.
The drop in the overall unemploy-
ment rate is also reflected by a fur-
ther fall in the long-term unemploy-
ment rate.
4
After a high of 4.2% in
2004 and 4% in 2005, it came down
to 3.6% in 2006, the lowest rate in
the  period 2000 to 2006. Despite a
considerable reduction last year,
Poland and Slovakia still have the
highest long-term unemployment
rates in the Union (7.8% and 10.2%
respectively). At close to 5% it also
remains high in Germany, Greece and
Bulgaria. Similar to overall unem-
ployment rates, women are relatively
more affected by long-term unem-
ployment than men in a majority of
Member States (4% vs. 3.3%), with
the largest gender differences being
found in the Czech Republic, Italy,
Poland, Slovakia, Spain and, above
all, Greece (Chart 15 - see page 30).
4. LABOUR MARKET
TRENDS FOR YOUNG
PEOPLE
4.1. Introduction
The integration of young people in
the labour market is a major policy
issue for the EU and many individual
Member States. Despite a shrinking
and increasingly better-educated
youth population, young people in
many Member States still face con-
siderable problems in making the
29
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transition from education into
employment. And many of those who
have gained a foothold in the labour
market often hold unstable jobs with
unfavourable conditions. This is seen
as having a negative impact, not only
on young people’s financial and social
situation or training but also for the
economy and social cohesion at large.
The main purpose of this section is to
give an overview on the current
labour market position of the
younger generation in the EU and to
examine how it has developed since
the beginning of the decade. It starts
with a presentation of standard
measures of the labour market per-
formance of youth, namely un-
employment and employment. It
then looks at those groups of young
people who can be considered to be
especially at risk of doing poorly on
the labour market (i.e. youth not in
employment or education and those
with a poor education). Finally, it will
present information on the school-
to-work transition of young people
and the type of jobs they occupy.
As for the definition of ‘youth’, con-
ventionally the analysis of youth
employment and corresponding offi-
cial statistics tend to focus on the
group aged 15–24. However, defining
‘youth’ by age alone remains to some
extent arbitrary, especially when look-
ing at the employment situation of
young people. Given extended peri-
ods of (university) education and,
more generally, longer periods of
transition for youth from education
into employment in many countries, it
seems conceptually more apt to con-
sider youth as the transition process
from leaving continuous education
into significant employment.
5
Although a majority of people in the
Member States complete their school-
to-work transition in their twenties,
patterns and lengths vary between
countries and groups of people. This
should be kept in mind, although for
practical purposes the data presented
in this sub-chapter will mostly refer to
young people under the age of 30 and
differentiate between youth aged
15–24 and young people aged 25–29
where appropriate. 
4.2. Standard measures
of youth employment
and unemployment
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Chart 15: Long-term unemployment rates by gender for EU Member States, 2006
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Note: Data for DE and FR provisional.
5 See Lefresne (2003) for a discussion on the definition of youth for purposes of labour market analysis.
6 The agreed targets include: an EU average rate of no more than 10% early school leavers; at least 85% of 22 year olds in the EU should have
completed upper secondary education by 2010; every unemployed person is offered a new start before reaching six months of unemployment in
the case of young people in the form of training, retraining, work practice, a job or other employability measure. See section 4.5 on the current
state-of-play concerning the two youth education targets. As for the target concerning a new start for unemployed youth, no data is yet available
for the great majority of Member States. 
Box 2 – Youth employment policies at EU level
The European Employment Guidelines – as part of the Jobs and Growth pack-
age adopted by the Council in 2005 – call for intensified efforts to build
employment pathways for young people and to reduce youth unemployment.
With the adoption of the European Pact for Youth, Member States gave promi-
nence to policies affecting young people. More and better investments in
human capital, alongside improvements in quality and efficiency of education
and training systems, are key factors to increasing educational attainment 
levels and to equipping young people with the skills and competencies
required in a knowledge-based economy. The guidelines include targets for
the reduction of early school leaving, the rise in educational attainment levels
and a ‘new start’ within six months of unemployment for unemployed youth
6
Member States’ national reform programmes, presented in autumn 2005, pro-
vided the opportunity for the Commission to assess whether and how the
Council’s political commitments have been translated into concrete policy
measures at the national level. In its analysis put forward to the 2006 Spring
Council, the Commission found that, overall, Member States’ responses to the
youth employment challenge needed to be more comprehensive and to be
expanded further. The Commission proposed to accelerate the offer of a new
start for young people. 
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4.2.1. Overall trends
Assessing the labour market situation
of young people is not a straightfor-
ward exercise as different indicators
produce a mixed picture. When look-
ing at absolute numbers, both youth
unemployment and employment have
decreased in recent years for the EU-27
as a whole. Between 2000 and 2006,
the total number of unemployed
youth aged 15–24 in the current EU-27,
dropped from slightly over 5 million to
4.6 million. During the same period,
total youth employment fell from
around 22.6 million to about 22 mil-
lion. At the same time, the number of
young people who do not actively par-
ticipate in the labour market increased
slightly from 33.2 million to around
33.8 million.
8
The decrease in youth employment
and labour market participation, as
well as unemployment for the 15–24
age group, also shows in relative
terms. Over the past six years the aver-
age youth activity rate has dropped by
1.6 percentage points to 44%, while
the youth employment rate has
decreased by 0.8 percentage points to
36.3% (Table 7 - see page 32). The
unemployment rate of young people
participating in the labour market was
on the rise until three years ago, but
was down to 17.4% in 2006, compared
to 18.5% in 2000. Another indicator,
the youth unemployment to youth
population ratio, has also fallen from
8.4% in 2000 to 7.7% in 2006.
9
The
share of unemployed youth among all
unemployed aged 15–64 fell from
25.2% in 2000 to 24.3% in 2006.
Compared to youth aged 15–24,
young people aged 25–29 are show-
ing significantly higher activity and
employment rates which almost reach
those of adults aged 30–54. Further-
more, while labour market participa-
tion and employment of the 15–24
age group has decreased since 2000,
both have increased for the 25–29 age
group. However, similar to the group
aged 15–24, people in the second half
of their 20s are, on average, signifi-
cantly more affected by unemploy-
ment than prime-age adults. 
With respect to long-term unemploy-
ment lasting more than 12 months,
young people are, on average, less
affected than prime-age adults, due
to their higher hiring and job separa-
tion rates (see section 4.4). Although
still high, overall long-term un-
employment of young people also
has, on average, decreased since
2000. In 2006, 30% of unemployed
youth aged 15–24 were long-term
unemployed, down from almost 34%
in 2000. For the age group 25–29, the
percentage of long-term unemployed
decreased from 44% to 41%. By com-
parison, the share of long-term
unemployed among unemployed
adults aged 30–54 was at almost 52%
in 2006 and has increased since the
beginning of the decade. 
This overview suggests that the aver-
age labour market performance of
young people in the EU-27 has some-
what improved since the beginning of
the decade. Youth unemployment is
down and the decrease in youth
employment and labour market partic-
ipation is mostly due to a higher share
of youth in education and therefore
not available to the labour market. 
In principle, demographics should also
favour the labour market situation of
youth in the EU, as their proportion of
the overall population is already
decreasing and will fall even further
over the coming decades. Presently,
31
The 2006 Spring Council confirmed that Member States should reach the
agreed target by 2007 and stressed the need to reduce the period to four
months by 2010. With regard to the Youth Pact, the Council stressed the need
to develop more effective cross-sectoral strategies linking education, training,
employment, social inclusion and mobility, including developing links to the
newly adopted European Pact for Gender Equality.
Youth employment issues have also been given a higher profile in the Commis-
sion’s Strategic Guidelines for Cohesion for the period 2007–2013 as well as in
the new European Social Fund (ESF) regulation. This provides greater
opportunities for appropriate EU support of Member States’ measures. 
In the recent Communication on Promoting young people’s full participation
in education, employment and society
7
, the Commission underlined the need
to promote the labour market integration of youth in the larger context of
general employment policies, namely in the framework of flexicurity policies.
In the next Lisbon cycle, starting in 2008, Member States are invited to estab-
lish flexicurity strategies, based on their respective specific challenges and with
active involvement of social partners, which integrate four policy components
– flexible contractual arrangements, effective lifelong learning systems, active
labour market policies and modern social security systems.    
7 COM(2007) 495 final.
8 EU LFS annual averages.
9 The reason for looking at both youth unemployment rates and ratios is that a use of only the unemployment rate can produce a distorted picture
when comparing the youth labour markets of different countries. More precisely, one difficulty with using the unemployment rate as an indicator
for the labour market performance, especially of young people, is that it shows the number of unemployed youth as a percentage of the youth
labour force, i.e. those who are either employed or unemployed but actively looking for work. Using the youth labour force as a denominator
can lead to distortions when comparing countries with great differences in youth activity rates or when activity rates change significantly over
time. For instance, youth unemployment rates for two countries with identical numbers of youth and unemployed youth will differ if one country
has a higher share of youth not available to the labour market because of, for example, a higher number of youth in education.  More concretely,
the country with a higher share of youth in education (or otherwise inactive) will display a higher youth unemployment rate. See OECD (2000),
Appendix 4 for a detailed discussion of this issue.
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the working-age population in the
EU-27 amounts to a total of 327 mil-
lion people of whom around 61 mil-
lion are in the age group 15–24. The
share of youth in the working-age
population in the EU-27 was 18.5% in
2006, down from 19% in 2000. In the
medium and long-term, the youth
population will drop even further,
both in absolute and relative terms.
According to Eurostat’s population
projections, the number of young
people in the EU is estimated to shrink
by almost 12% to around 53 million in
2020, while the overall working-age
population is estimated to fall by only
around 2% over the same period.
Accordingly, the share of the youth
population in the working-age popu-
lation is estimated to decrease to
around 16.4% in 2020.
10
However, despite recent overall
improvements in the labour market
performance of young people and an
already shrinking youth population,
the labour market situation of young
people in the EU does remain a con-
cern. Firstly, improvements in the
labour market situation of youth,
although welcome, have been rela-
tively small and have not significantly
changed overall rates either for
youth employment and un-
employment in absolute terms or rel-
ative to the prime-age labour force.
Secondly, compared to other big
industrialised countries, youth un-
employment rates in the EU are sig-
nificantly higher and employment
rates significantly lower, suggesting
that Europe is still not making suffi-
cient use of an increasingly scarce
‘resource’.
11
Thirdly, a look only at EU
averages hides important and quite
substantial differences between
Member States and different groups
of youth.
4.2.2. Youth unemployment 
Among the 27 Member States, Den-
mark and the Netherlands are the two
Member States with the lowest share
of unemployed youth in relation to
the youth labour force (Chart 16).
Their youth unemployment rates were
at 7.7% and 6.6% respectively in 2006.
The only other Member States with
youth unemployment rates below
10% in 2006 were Austria, Ireland and
Lithuania. At the other extreme, with
youth unemployment rates above
20%, are Belgium, France, Greece,
Italy, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
Sweden. While still high and above
average, youth unemployment rates in
Poland, Slovakia, Finland, Greece, but
also Italy and Bulgaria have decreased
significantly compared to the begin-
ning of the decade (Table 8 - see page
38). Estonia and Lithuania also experi-
enced a very significant drop in the
32
Table 7 - Standard measures of labour market performance for youth and prime-age adults in the EU-27, 2000–2006
Indicator Age 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Activity rate 15–24 45.6 45.4 44.9 44.2 44.2 44.2 44.0
25–29 82.0 81.7 81.8 81.6 82.0 82.1 82.6
25–54 82.6 82.5 82.6 82.9 83.2 83.7 84.1
30–54 82.7 82.6 82.7 83.1 83.5 84.0 84.4
Employment rate 15–24 37.1 37.4 36.7 36.0 35.9 35.9 36.3
25–29 72.8 73.1 72.6 72.3 72.6 73.0 74.3
25–54 75.9 76.2 76.0 76.1 76.4 77.1 78.1
30–54 76.5 76.8 76.6 76.9 77.1 77.8 78.8
Unemployment rate 15–24 18.5 17.7 18.3 18.6 18.7 18.7 17.4
25–29 11.3 10.6 11.3 11.4 11.4 11.0 10.0
25–54 8.1 7.6 8.0 8.1 8.2 7.9 7.2
30–54 7.5 7.0 7.4 7.5 7.7 7.4 6.7
Unemployment ratio 15–24 8.4 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.3 8.3 7.7
25–29 9.2 8.6 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.1 8.3
25–54 6.7 6.3 6.6 6.7 6.9 6.6 6.1
30–54 6.2 5.8 6.1 6.2 6.4 6.2 5.7
Share of unemployed in age group relative 15–24 25.2 25.4 24.9 24.5 24.0 24.5 24.3
to total unemployed aged 15 25–29 18.3 17.9 17.9 16.9 16.7 14.6 14.5
25–54 67.4 67.5 68.2 68.2 68.3 67.7 67.2
30–54 55.3 55.3 55.8 55.2 55.7 53.0 52.7
Long-term unemployed as percentage 15–24 33.9 33.6 33.6 33.6 31.1 31.0 30.0
of total unemployed in the same age group 25–29 44.0 42.9 41.7 42.7 40.7 41.2 41.1
25–54 49.6 49.7 48.1 49.3 48.8 49.7 49.5
30–54 51.3 51.6 49.9 51.2 51.0 52.0 51.7
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS annual averages.
Note: EU-27 aggregates based on annual averages, except DE 2000–2004 Q2; FR 2000–2002 Q1; CY 2000–2003 Q2; 2004 av. Q2-Q4; LV 2000–2001 av. 
Q2 & Q4; LT 2000–2001 av. Q2 & Q4; LU 2000–2002 Q2; MT 2000–2001 Q2; SE 2000 Q2.
EU-27 aggregates for long-term unemployed share do not include NL 2000–2002, AT 2000-2001 and SE 2005–2006.
10 For the demographic context see also Chapter 2 on active ageing and labour market trends for older people.
11 While the youth unemployment rate for 15–24 year olds in the EU-27 was 17.4% and the employment rate 35.9% in 2006 (see Table 7), the
respective rates for the United States were 10.5% and 54.2%, for Canada 11.6% and 58.7% and for Japan 8% and 41.4%. See OECD (2007a).
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youth unemployment rate and are
now well below the EU average. Some
Member States, on the other hand,
have seen a strong rise in their youth
unemployment rate, with Sweden
showing the biggest increase. Other
Member States with strong increases
during the same period are Portugal,
Malta, Hungary, Luxembourg and Ger-
many although they still remain close
to or below the EU average. France
experienced a less strong increase, but
its youth unemployment rate still
ranks among the highest in the EU. 
A look at the youth unemployment
to population ratio seems to mostly
confirm this picture on youth unem-
ployment. Although country rankings
are different between the youth
unemployment rate and ratio, most
Member States with a relatively low
rate also tend to have a low ratio
(e.g. NL, DK), and vice versa (e.g. PL,
SE) (Chart 16). However, a number of
Member States with average or high-
er than average unemployment rates
exhibit lower than average youth
unemployment ratios (e.g. BG, HU),
and vice versa (MT, UK)
As with any gender differences,
unemployment rates for young
women in the EU are higher than for
young men, although this un-
employment rate gender gap has
been narrowing since the beginning
of the decade. In 2000, the unem-
ployment rate for women aged
15–24 in the EU-27 was 19.4% com-
pared to 17.8% for men, i.e. a differ-
ence of 1.6 percentage points (Table
8 - see page 38). Six years later, the
difference between male and
female youth unemployment rates
was down to 0.7 percentage points,
mainly as a result of a relatively larg-
er drop in the female youth unem-
ployment rate compared to the male
youth unemployment rate.
There are a number of notable differ-
ences between Member States. While
some only show small differences
between male and female youth
unemployment rates in 2006 (namely
DK,  LT, AT, SK and SE), there are a few
countries with very significant gender
gaps. The most extreme case is Greece,
where the female youth unemploy-
ment rate is 34.7%, almost twice as
high as for young males, and where
the gender gap has actually slightly
increased with respect to 2000
(although rates have come down for
both young men and women). Other
Member States with a particular large
youth unemployment gender gap are
Spain and Italy (although it has
decreased substantially in these two
countries compared to 2000).
However, when looking at the youth
unemployment to population ratio
instead of the unemployment rate, a
different picture emerges. While the
average unemployment ratio for
young men was 8.1% in 2006, it was
7.2% for young women (Table 8 - see
page 38), i.e. the share of the unem-
ployed is actually smaller among the
female youth population than among
the male youth population. Only
Greece and Spain had a significantly
higher unemployment ratio for female
youth than for male youth, while in
the other Member States the ratio for
young men was higher than or very
close to that of young women. These
differences between the gender spe-
cific unemployment rates and ratios
reflect different activity rates between
male and female youth. In almost all
Member States young men have a sig-
nificantly higher activity rate than
their female counterparts, due to a
higher share of young women than
young men in education or taking care
of home and family. 
Comparing youth to prime-age
adults, the average youth unemploy-
ment rate in the EU-27 is 2.4 times
higher than the average prime-age
adult unemployment rate. The relative
unemployment ratio between youth
and prime-age adults is 1.3. Both the
relative youth unemployment rate
and ratio have not changed signifi-
cantly since 2000, thus indicating that
not only are youth, on average, sig-
nificantly more likely to be affected
by unemployment, but also that the
average unemployment situation
with respect to adults has not
improved over time. 
There are, however, big differences
between Member States. In general,
youth unemployment ratios seem to
correspond to adult unemployment
ratios. For example, in Poland and Slo-
vakia and, to a lesser degree, France,
Greece and Spain, both the percent-
age of unemployed youth and unem-
ployed prime-age adults is relatively
high, indicating that youth unemploy-
ment in these countries may also be
part of a more general unemployment
problem (Chart 17 - see page 34). On
the other hand, Finland, Sweden and,
to a lesser extent, Malta and the Unit-
ed Kingdom have a significantly high-
er unemployment ratio among youth
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than among prime-age adults, thus
suggesting that unemployment in
these countries may be a more youth-
specific issue, while it is less of a prob-
lem for adults.
4.2.3. Youth employment
Examining the opposite perspective
to youth unemployment, Denmark
and the Netherlands have the highest
youth employment rates, with
around two-thirds of the 15–24 age
group holding a job. At the other
end of the spectrum, only less than
one-quarter of youth were in
employment in Hungary, Bulgaria,
Luxembourg, Poland, Lithuania,
Greece and Romania (Chart 18). For
the age group 25–29, employment
rates were, on average, more than
twice as high as the younger age
groups, because most young people
have already made the transition
from education to the labour market
by that age. On the whole, countries
with high employment rates for the
younger age group also tend to show
relatively high employment rates for
the 25–29 age group (Chart 19).  
Countries with high overall youth
employment rates also tend to have the
lowest differences between employ-
ment rates of young men and women;
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the United Kingdom show
very similar employment rates for
young women and men and high over-
all youth employment at the same time.
Greece and Italy on the other hand
have very low overall youth employ-
ment and the most extreme gender dif-
ferences, with young men more than
one-and-a-half times more likely to
work than young women.
Compared to 2000, employment rates
among youth (15–24) have decreased
in most Member States (Table 8, see
page 38). The most significant
decrease was in Hungary, where the
overall youth employment rate
dropped by almost 12 percentage
points from 33.5% to 21.7% between
2000 and 2006. Malta, the Czech
Republic, Romania and Luxembourg
also experienced youth employment
rate decreases by more than 8 per-
centage points. The few exceptions
where the youth employment rate has
increased are Spain, Estonia, Slovenia,
Sweden, Bulgaria, Latvia and France. 
When looking at youth employment
rates, especially for the 15–24 age
group, it is worth noting that a 
significant share of employed young
people are apprentices or working
students who are counted as
employed by definition.
12
On aver-
age, around one-third of employed
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12 The European Labour Force Survey uses the International Labour Office definition of employment by which a person is employed if he or she
performed work during the reference week of the survey, even for just one hour a week, for pay, profit or family gain, or was not at work but had
a job or business from which he/she was temporarily absent because of, for example, illness, holidays, industrial dispute, or education and training.
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youth are students or apprentices
(compared to only 8% of the 25–29
age group), and in some countries
this share is much higher, namely in
Denmark and the Netherlands where
over 60% of employed youth are stu-
dents or apprentices, and Finland and
Germany with more than half of
employed youth also being students
or apprentices (Chart 20). This obser-
vation also corresponds to a high
share of employed youth in these
countries which perform part-time or
temporary jobs, not because they
cannot find full-time or permanent
work, but because they choose to
(see section 4.6.2).
13
Chart 21 (see page 36) compares the
employment rate of all 15 to 24 year
olds (i.e. students and non-students)
to the employment rate of non-stu-
dents of the same age group. It illus-
trates several things: first, the non-stu-
dent youth employment rate is signif-
icantly higher in all countries than the
overall youth employment rate includ-
ing students. Secondly, for some coun-
tries the non-student employment
rate produces a different picture from
the one gained by looking at the over-
all youth employment rate only. In
particular Belgium, the Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Lux-
embourg have a significantly higher
than average share of young non-stu-
dents in employment, despite a low
overall youth employment rate. This
suggests that these countries have low
youth employment rates mostly
because of a relatively high share of
non-working students (or otherwise
inactive youth) but that they are rela-
tively successful in integrating young
people into the labour market once
out of school. Thirdly, several coun-
tries do well on both youth employ-
ment indicators, foremost Denmark
and the Netherlands, but also Austria,
Ireland and the United Kingdom,
while others perform below average
on both accounts, namely Bulgaria,
Romania, Poland, Italy, Hungary,
Greece, France and Slovakia.  
Chart 22 (see page 36) compares
employment rates of young non-stu-
dents to that for prime-age adults
and indicates that high youth
employment tends to correspond to
the level of employment among the
prime-age population. This, together
with a similar correlation between
youth and adult unemployment
observed in the previous section, sug-
gests that policies which help to
improve overall labour market per-
formance may also help to create
jobs for young people.
Finally comparing Member States
performance with respect to both
employment and unemployment
35
13 It also suggests that in some countries it is acceptable and institutionally possible for young people to combine work and study, while in other
countries the transition into work follows only after having finished education. See also Van de Velde’s (2007) comparative analysis of youth to
adult life transitions in Denmark and France, which finds that young people in Denmark tend to combine school with professional experience or
alternate between the two, while in France a high value is placed on initial training, with greater focus on earning a degree, without working
along the way, and with the aim of entering into full-time employment at the start of a career. 
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shows no clear correlation for the
15–24 age group. Some countries
show both low youth unemployment
to population ratios and employment
rates (e.g. LT, HU and LU) while others
show low unemployment ratios, but
high employment rates (DK and NL)
(Chart 23). This is at least partially
due to large differences across Mem-
ber States in the proportion of youth
still in education or otherwise inac-
tive and unavailable to the labour
market. However, as for the 25–29
age group, differences in activity
rates between Member States are
much smaller compared to the 15–24
age group. Therefore  the relation
between both indicators is more
clear-cut for young people aged
25–29, i.e. countries with relatively
high employment also tend to show
relatively low unemployment among
the 25–29 age group (Chart 24). 
4.3. Youth not in
education or
employment
Indicators, such as the employment
rate and unemployment rates or
ratios, provide information about the
relative situation of young people
who already have a job or are active-
ly looking for one. However, they do
not cover those who are inactive,
either because they are still pursuing
an education or for other reasons. 
Looking at the activity status of
young people, Chart 25 illustrates
that the vast majority of teenagers in
the EU-27 remain in education until
around the age of 16 or 17. After
that, the share of those entering the
working world increases steadily with
age, while the share of young people
in education decreases. By the age of
29, around two-thirds of those in that
age group are in employment while
around 7% are in education. Further-
more, a considerable share of young
people in education also work in
some way or another, as already
noted in the previous section. 
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Chart 25 also shows that from the
age of 19 there is a fairly stable share
of 17–19% of young people who are
not in education, employment or
training (NEET). It is this group of
either unemployed or inactive youth
who are not following an education
which can potentially represent a
problem for policy-makers, especially
if they have trouble finding work or
drop out of the labour force al-
together because of being discour-
aged to work or for other unspecified
reasons (as opposed to those who are
inactive because of family commit-
ments, military service, travel or
leisure).14
Again, the EU average sometimes
masks big differences between the
Member States. For example, Den-
mark and the Netherlands have by
far the lowest NEET rates among 20
to 24 year olds, and the majority of
the other Member States are below
or close to the EU average of 18.6%
(Chart 26). However, a few coun-
tries, namely France, Italy, Poland,
Romania and Slovakia have NEET
rates among 20 to 24 year olds in
excess of 20% and Bulgaria is close
to 30% (although the group has
decreased in recent years in Bul-
garia, Poland, Romania and Slovakia,
but remained the same level in
France, Hungary and Italy). As for
the 15–19 age group, NEET rates
tend to be much lower than for
those aged 20–24, reflecting the fact
that teenagers in most countries are
still in (compulsory) education. How-
ever, a few Member States do show
high NEET rates among teenagers of
10% and more, namely Malta, Spain,
Italy, the United Kingdom, Romania
and Bulgaria.
It certainly needs to be added that
not everybody who is NEET will
remain so continuously. Many young
people will not be in a job or educ-
ation at some point in their life, but
enter into one or the other again
eventually. Research undertaken by
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14 Around 43% of 15–29 year olds who are inactive and not in education do not participate in the labour market because of taking care of children or
other family members or because of other family responsibilities, the vast majority of them women. Another 43% of those inactive and not in education
– most of them young males – are either discouraged by the labour market or name other reasons, with the rest being ill or suffering from a disability.
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS annual averages. 
Notes: Unemployment ratio for MT uncertain due to small sample size.
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS annual averages
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS annual averages.
Note: Figure LU for 15–19 years old uncertain due to small sample size. Data for DE and FR provisional. For SE
participation in education or training refers to the week preceding the survey reference week (instead of four
weeks in the other countries). 
Chapter 1 Panorama of the European labour market 
38
Ta
bl
e 
8 
- 
La
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 o
f 
yo
ut
h 
(a
ge
 1
5–
24
) b
y 
M
em
be
r 
St
at
e 
– 
st
an
da
rd
 m
ea
su
re
s 
by
 g
en
de
r,
20
00
 a
nd
 2
00
6
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
s
U
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
s
U
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
ti
o
s
Lo
n
g
-t
er
m
 u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
20
00
20
06
20
00
20
06
20
00
20
06
20
00
20
06
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
B
E
29
.1
32
.8
25
.4
27
.6
30
.4
24
.7
17
.5
15
.3
20
.3
20
.5
18
.8
22
.6
6.
2
5.
9
6.
5
7.
1
7.
0
7.
2
29
.1
27
.2
30
.8
28
.3
25
.8
30
.8
B
G
19
.7
21
.8
17
.7
23
.2
25
.4
21
.0
35
.5
37
.6
32
.8
19
.5
18
.9
20
.3
10
.8
13
.1
8.
6
5.
6
5.
9
5.
3
48
.6
48
.0
49
.5
41
.4
43
.5
39
.1
C
Z
36
.4
39
.3
33
.5
27
.7
31
.5
23
.7
18
.1
18
.7
17
.3
17
.5
16
.6
18
.7
8.
0
9.
1
7.
0
5.
9
6.
3
5.
4
37
.8
37
.0
38
.8
37
.9
38
.8
36
.8
D
K
66
.0
68
.5
63
.3
64
.6
65
.0
64
.1
6.
7
6.
8
6.
7
7.
7
7.
9
7.
5
4.
8
5.
0
4.
5
5.
4
5.
6
5.
2
:
:
:
:
:
:
D
E
46
.1
48
.6
43
.6
43
.4
45
.1
41
.6
8.
5
9.
5
7.
4
13
.7
14
.8
12
.5
4.
3
5.
1
3.
5
6.
9
7.
8
6.
0
23
.5
23
.7
23
.2
33
.2
34
.5
31
.4
EE
28
.3
31
.7
24
.8
31
.6
37
.0
26
.1
24
.4
24
.5
24
.2
12
.0
10
.0
14
.7
9.
1
10
.3
7.
9
4.
3
4.
1
4.
5
25
.4
28
.5
(2
1.
2)
(2
0.
3)
(2
5.
0)
20
05
(4
6.
6)
20
05
IE
50
.4
54
.2
46
.6
50
.0
53
.6
46
.2
6.
9
6.
8
7.
1
8.
6
9.
1
8.
0
3.
8
4.
0
3.
5
4.
7
5.
4
4.
0
19
.9
(2
1.
5)
:
22
.2
27
.0
(1
9.
7)
20
04
EL
27
.6
32
.7
22
.4
24
.2
29
.7
18
.7
29
.2
21
.6
38
.2
25
.2
17
.7
34
.7
11
.4
9.
0
13
.8
8.
2
6.
4
9.
9
50
.2
42
.9
55
.1
48
.0
42
.6
51
.6
ES
32
.5
38
.2
26
.7
39
.5
44
.4
34
.4
26
.0
20
.4
32
.9
17
.9
15
.0
21
.6
11
.4
9.
8
13
.0
8.
6
7.
8
9.
5
29
.3
25
.5
32
.4
11
.9
9.
8
13
.6
FR
28
.2
31
.3
25
.1
29
.3
33
.3
25
.2
20
.6
19
.0
22
.6
22
.6
21
.2
24
.5
7.
3
7.
3
7.
3
8.
6
8.
9
8.
2
21
.1
19
.8
22
.4
26
.9
28
.6
25
.1
IT
26
.4
30
.7
22
.1
25
.5
30
.6
20
.1
31
.1
27
.6
35
.4
21
.6
19
.1
25
.3
11
.9
11
.7
12
.1
7.
0
7.
2
6.
8
57
.5
56
.7
58
.3
43
.6
43
.6
43
.7
C
Y
36
.7
39
.5
34
.3
37
.4
41
.0
34
.1
10
.2
(6
.7
)
13
.3
10
.0
8.
9
11
.1
4.
2
(2
.8
)
5.
3
4.
1
4.
0
4.
3
(1
6.
0)
:
(2
3.
1)
(1
1.
9)
20
05
:
:
LV
29
.2
34
.3
23
.8
35
.9
42
.8
28
.7
22
.1
20
.9
23
.7
12
.2
10
.5
14
.7
8.
3
9.
1
7.
4
5.
0
5.
0
4.
9
43
.4
46
.7
39
.3
19
.2
(2
1.
5)
(1
6.
8)
LT
25
.2
28
.3
22
.1
23
.7
26
.4
20
.9
30
.2
32
.1
27
.5
9.
8
10
.0
(9
.6
)
10
.9
13
.4
8.
4
2.
6
2.
9
(2
.2
)
43
.1
50
.2
(3
1.
4)
(2
1.
4)
20
05
(3
5.
6)
20
04
:
LU
31
.8
35
.3
28
.3
23
.3
25
.4
21
.2
(6
.4
)
(5
.7
)
(7
.3
)
16
.2
(1
7.
0)
(1
5.
2)
(2
.2
)
(2
.1
)
(2
.2
)
4.
5
(5
.2
)
(3
.8
)
:
:
:
(3
0.
0)
(4
0.
4)
:
H
U
33
.5
37
.3
29
.7
21
.7
24
.5
18
.8
12
.5
13
.7
10
.9
19
.1
18
.6
19
.8
4.
8
5.
9
3.
6
5.
1
5.
6
4.
6
37
.0
39
.6
32
.7
36
.8
37
.2
36
.3
M
T
52
.4
52
.0
52
.8
44
.7
47
.3
42
.0
11
.8
(1
3.
1)
(1
0.
4)
16
.1
17
.5
(1
4.
5)
7.
0
(7
.9
)
(6
.1
)
8.
6
10
.0
(7
.1
)
(2
3.
8)
20
01
:
:
(3
6.
1)
20
05
:
:
N
L
68
.7
70
.0
67
.3
66
.2
67
.2
65
.1
5.
8
5.
0
6.
5
6.
6
6.
1
7.
1
4.
2
3.
7
4.
7
4.
6
4.
3
4.
9
:
:
:
19
.2
19
.9
18
.6
A
T
52
.5
57
.3
47
.9
54
.0
58
.2
49
.9
5.
1
5.
0
5.
3
9.
1
8.
9
9.
3
2.
8
3.
0
2.
7
5.
4
5.
7
5.
1
14
.2
20
02
13
.3
20
02
15
.5
20
02
15
.9
(1
8.
0)
(1
3.
6)
PL
24
.5
27
.3
21
.8
24
.0
26
.9
21
.0
35
.1
33
.3
37
.2
29
.8
28
.3
31
.6
13
.3
13
.6
13
.0
10
.2
10
.6
9.
7
36
.5
34
.0
39
.2
42
.4
42
.3
42
.4
PT
42
.2
48
.1
36
.2
35
.8
39
.8
31
.6
8.
8
6.
6
11
.8
16
.3
14
.5
18
.4
4.
1
3.
4
4.
8
6.
9
6.
8
7.
1
21
.2
(2
0.
3)
(2
1.
8)
29
.2
29
.6
28
.8
R
O
33
.1
35
.8
30
.5
24
.0
27
.3
20
.6
20
.0
22
.2
17
.2
21
.4
22
.3
20
.2
8.
3
10
.2
6.
3
6.
6
7.
8
5.
2
42
.3
40
.3
45
.5
51
.0
50
.5
51
.9
SI
32
.8
35
.7
29
.7
35
.0
39
.2
30
.3
16
.3
14
.6
18
.5
13
.9
11
.6
16
.8
6.
4
6.
1
6.
7
5.
6
5.
2
6.
1
42
.4
(4
1.
7)
43
.0
35
.8
(3
1.
5)
(3
9.
8)
SK
29
.0
29
.8
28
.2
25
.9
29
.2
22
.5
36
.9
39
.7
33
.8
26
.6
26
.4
27
.0
17
.0
19
.6
14
.4
9.
4
10
.5
8.
3
43
.1
43
.9
42
.0
61
.4
63
.9
58
.1
FI
41
.1
42
.3
39
.9
42
.1
42
.6
41
.6
21
.4
21
.1
21
.7
18
.7
19
.0
18
.4
11
.2
11
.3
11
.1
9.
7
10
.0
9.
4
8.
1
(8
.8
)
(7
.5
)
(5
.8
)
(9
.0
) 2
00
5
:
SE
36
.9
36
.6
37
.1
40
.3
40
.2
40
.4
9.
5
10
.8
8.
1
21
.5
21
.0
22
.0
3.
9
4.
4
3.
3
11
.0
10
.7
11
.4
11
.8
12
.2
:
7.
0 2
00
4
7.
92
00
4
5.
92
00
4
U
K
56
.6
58
.6
54
.6
53
.2
54
.1
52
.2
12
.6
13
.7
11
.5
14
.1
15
.9
12
.1
8.
2
9.
3
7.
1
8.
7
10
.2
7.
2
12
.3
14
.6
9.
4
13
.5
16
.8
8.
8
EU
-2
7
37
.1
40
.4
33
.9
36
.3
39
.3
33
.3
18
.5
17
.8
19
.4
17
.4
17
.1
17
.8
8.
4
8.
7
8.
2
7.
7
8.
1
7.
2
33
.9
32
.7
35
.3
30
.0
31
.0
28
.9
no
 A
T 
N
L
no
 A
T 
N
L
no
 A
T 
N
L
no
 S
E
no
 S
E
no
 S
E
So
u
rc
e:
Eu
ro
st
at
, E
U
 L
FS
 a
n
n
u
al
 a
ve
ra
g
es
.
N
o
te
: 
D
at
a 
fo
r 
20
00
: 
D
E,
 
C
Y,
 
LU
, 
M
T,
 
SE
 
Q
2;
 
FR
 
Q
1;
 
LV
 
an
d
 
LT
 
av
.Q
2 
&
 
Q
4.
 
EU
-2
7 
ag
g
re
g
at
es
 
fo
r 
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
 
u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
 
sh
ar
e 
d
o
 
n
o
t 
in
cl
u
d
e 
N
L 
an
d
 
A
T 
in
 
20
00
 
an
d
 
SE
 
in
 
20
06
.
‘:’
 d
at
a 
n
o
t 
av
ai
la
b
le
. D
at
a 
in
 b
ra
ck
et
s 
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
 d
u
e 
to
 s
m
al
l s
am
p
le
 s
iz
e.
EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE 2007
39
Ta
bl
e 
9 
- 
La
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 o
f 
yo
un
g 
pe
op
le
 (a
ge
 2
5–
29
) b
y 
M
em
be
r 
St
at
e 
– 
st
an
da
rd
 m
ea
su
re
s 
by
 g
en
de
r,
20
00
 a
nd
 2
00
6
Em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
s
U
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
te
s
U
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
ra
ti
o
s
Lo
n
g
-t
er
m
 u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
 
20
00
20
06
20
00
20
06
20
00
20
06
20
00
20
06
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
To
ta
l
M
en
W
o
m
en
B
E
80
.7
85
.2
76
.0
78
.7
83
.0
74
.4
9.
2
8.
8
9.
7
10
.1
9.
3
11
.0
8.
2
8.
2
8.
2
8.
9
8.
6
9.
2
44
.4
44
.2
44
.5
36
.1
33
.6
38
.3
B
G
58
.3
63
.8
52
.3
68
.3
75
.4
60
.8
19
.1
19
.3
18
.9
10
.3
9.
5
11
.3
13
.8
15
.3
12
.2
7.
8
7.
9
7.
7
55
.9
55
.7
56
.3
49
.0
48
.4
49
.8
C
Z
72
.6
88
.7
56
.1
74
.0
87
.2
60
.1
9.
4
6.
6
13
.7
6.
6
5.
5
8.
1
7.
5
6.
2
8.
9
5.
2
5.
1
5.
3
43
.4
40
.7
46
.2
45
.6
45
.9
45
.3
D
K
80
.0
85
.5
74
.5
81
.0
86
.1
75
.8
5.
6
4.
2
7.
1
5.
1
4.
3
6.
1
4.
8
3.
8
5.
7
4.
4
3.
8
4.
9
(9
.4
)
:
:
(9
.1
)
:
:
D
E
75
.7
81
.4
70
.0
72
.7
75
.8
69
.4
6.
9
7.
4
6.
3
11
.4
12
.4
10
.4
5.
6
6.
5
4.
7
9.
4
10
.7
8.
0
32
.6
32
.2
33
.2
40
.4
40
.9
39
.7
EE
71
.9
81
.5
61
.9
82
.1
90
.2
73
.8
13
.9
13
.4
14
.6
4.
3
(4
.6
)
(4
.1
)
11
.6
12
.6
10
.6
3.
7
(4
.3
)
(3
.1
)
35
.2
42
.0
(2
5.
6)
45
.7
(5
2.
9)
(3
8.
9)
IE
83
.9
89
.0
78
.6
82
.8
87
.3
78
.2
4.
1
4.
4
(3
.7
)
4.
8
5.
5
4.
0
3.
6
4.
1
(3
.0
)
4.
2
5.
1
3.
3
26
.6
(3
1.
1)
:
27
.1
33
.5
(1
7.
9)
EL
68
.1
81
.3
54
.4
72
.9
82
.2
62
.8
17
.5
12
.2
24
.6
14
.0
9.
7
19
.4
14
.5
11
.3
17
.8
11
.8
8.
8
15
.1
55
.8
48
.8
60
.5
51
.3
43
.2
56
.2
ES
69
.0
78
.7
59
.1
77
.0
83
.3
70
.3
17
.3
12
.6
22
.9
10
.3
8.
0
12
.9
14
.4
11
.3
17
.6
8.
8
7.
3
10
.4
35
.1
29
.2
39
.2
14
.7
12
.4
16
.6
FR
76
.0
83
.5
68
.7
75
.8
81
.3
70
.3
12
.7
11
.0
14
.6
11
.3
11
.3
11
.3
11
.0
10
.3
11
.8
9.
7
10
.3
9.
0
25
.2
23
.1
27
.2
32
.4
34
.4
30
.3
IT
58
.9
69
.1
48
.7
65
.0
74
.0
55
.7
17
.5
14
.6
21
.2
11
.6
9.
8
14
.0
12
.5
11
.8
13
.1
8.
5
8.
1
9.
1
63
.5
63
.6
63
.4
47
.7
47
.2
48
.1
C
Y
83
.3
93
.4
74
.3
82
.8
87
.4
78
.3
(3
.4
)
(2
.8
)
(4
.2
)
5.
9
5.
7
(6
.1
)
(3
.0
)
(2
.7
)
(3
.2
)
5.
2
5.
3
(5
.1
)
:
:
:
(1
1.
8)
:
(1
5.
9)
LV
69
.6
76
.4
62
.7
77
.9
85
.4
70
.1
15
.5
15
.7
15
.1
6.
9
7.
4
6.
3
12
.7
14
.3
11
.2
5.
8
6.
9
4.
7
50
.8
51
.2
50
.2
27
.7
27
.4
28
.1
LT
75
.4
73
.9
76
.9
81
.4
86
.0
76
.7
14
.7
17
.9
11
.4
4.
6
(5
.1
)
:
13
.0
16
.1
9.
9
3.
9
(4
.6
)
:
46
.6
53
.5
36
.7
(2
9.
2)
(3
0.
1)
20
05
(3
4.
8)
20
04
LU
80
.3
86
.2
74
.3
80
.2
87
.0
73
.2
(4
.4
)
:
(6
.0
)
6.
7
(5
.2
)
(8
.4
)
(3
.7
)
:
(4
.8
)
5.
7
(4
.8
)
(6
.7
)
:
:
:
(2
4.
7)
(3
9.
4)
:
H
U
69
.6
82
.5
56
.2
71
.2
81
.4
60
.7
7.
3
7.
6
7.
0
8.
6
8.
4
8.
8
5.
5
6.
7
4.
2
6.
7
7.
5
5.
9
41
.4
43
.9
37
.2
41
.2
42
.8
39
.3
M
T
73
.1
89
.3
56
.1
79
.2
90
.8
66
.1
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
(4
3.
7)
20
05
:
:
N
L
86
.4
92
.8
79
.8
86
.5
90
.0
83
.1
2.
6
2.
0
3.
3
3.
4
3.
4
3.
4
2.
3
1.
9
2.
7
3.
0
3.
2
2.
9
:
:
:
24
.9
24
.7
25
.1
A
T
80
.6
86
.4
74
.9
80
.5
85
.3
75
.6
3.
3
2.
6
4.
0
5.
6
5.
6
5.
6
2.
7
2.
3
3.
1
4.
8
5.
1
4.
5
15
.0
20
02
12
.9
20
02
18
.0
20
02
17
.9
21
.6
(1
3.
4)
PL
68
.7
78
.9
58
.2
70
.8
78
.6
62
.9
18
.1
15
.3
21
.8
15
.3
14
.0
16
.8
15
.2
14
.3
16
.2
12
.8
12
.8
12
.7
41
.0
37
.4
44
.5
49
.3
48
.7
49
.9
PT
82
.8
88
.3
77
.3
78
.0
82
.8
73
.1
4.
4
2.
8
6.
2
11
.1
8.
2
14
.2
3.
8
2.
5
5.
1
9.
7
7.
4
12
.1
29
.5
(2
8.
0)
30
.5
37
.2
37
.5
37
.1
R
O
74
.5
80
.5
68
.1
69
.5
73
.6
65
.2
8.
8
9.
4
8.
0
9.
4
10
.8
7.
6
7.
2
8.
3
5.
9
7.
2
8.
9
5.
3
50
.9
49
.2
53
.5
56
.4
55
.7
57
.5
SI
81
.2
82
.9
79
.3
77
.5
82
.8
72
.3
7.
3
6.
9
7.
8
10
.4
7.
5
13
.5
6.
4
6.
2
6.
7
9.
0
6.
7
11
.3
51
.2
53
.9
48
.7
40
.3
(3
8.
5)
41
.6
SK
67
.5
77
.2
57
.5
72
.2
84
.0
59
.8
19
.0
18
.4
19
.9
12
.4
11
.8
13
.3
15
.9
17
.4
14
.3
10
.2
11
.2
9.
2
51
.1
50
.3
52
.4
71
.7
73
.2
69
.7
FI
74
.1
81
.3
66
.4
77
.2
83
.1
70
.8
10
.7
9.
2
12
.5
7.
7
7.
0
8.
7
8.
9
8.
3
9.
5
6.
5
6.
3
6.
7
16
.8
19
.6
(1
3.
9)
10
.9
(1
3.
3)
(9
.5
) 2
00
5
SE
75
.1
77
.9
72
.2
78
.2
81
.7
74
.6
5.
9
5.
1
6.
9
8.
7
8.
6
8.
9
4.
7
4.
2
5.
3
7.
5
7.
7
7.
3
13
.8
18
.7
8.
5
12
.2
20
04
13
.3
20
04
10
.9
20
04
U
K
79
.8
87
.6
72
.4
79
.8
86
.8
73
.1
5.
7
6.
1
5.
1
5.
5
5.
9
5.
0
4.
8
5.
7
3.
9
4.
6
5.
5
3.
8
20
.5
25
.7
13
.3
17
.5
22
.2
10
.7
EU
-2
7
72
.8
80
.8
64
.7
74
.3
80
.6
67
.9
11
.3
9.
9
12
.9
10
.0
9.
5
10
.7
9.
2
8.
9
9.
6
8.
3
8.
4
8.
1
41
.1
39
.7
42
.5
37
.6
38
.2
36
.9
n
o
 A
T 
N
L
n
o
 A
T 
N
L
n
o
 A
T 
N
L
n
o
 S
E
n
o
 S
E
n
o
 S
E
So
u
rc
e:
So
u
rc
e:
 E
u
ro
st
at
, E
U
 L
FS
 a
n
n
u
al
 a
ve
ra
g
es
.
N
o
te
: D
at
a 
fo
r 
20
00
: D
E,
 C
Y,
 L
U
, M
T,
 S
E 
Q
2;
 F
R
 Q
1;
 L
V
 a
n
d
 L
T 
av
.Q
2 
&
 Q
4.
 E
U
-2
7 
ag
g
re
g
at
es
 f
o
r 
lo
n
g
-t
er
m
 u
n
em
p
lo
ye
d
 s
h
ar
e 
d
o
 n
o
t 
in
cl
u
d
e 
N
L 
an
d
 A
T 
in
 2
00
0 
an
d
 S
E 
in
 2
00
6.
‘:’
 d
at
a 
n
o
t 
av
ai
la
b
le
. D
at
a 
in
 b
ra
ck
et
s 
u
n
ce
rt
ai
n
 d
u
e 
to
 s
m
al
l s
am
p
le
 s
iz
e.
Chapter 1 Panorama of the European labour market 
Quintini and Martin (2006) and based
on European Community Household
Panel (ECHP) data for 1997 to 2001
suggests that there is a frequent
turnover into and out of NEET status
and that this turnover is higher for
youth than for prime-age adults. 
However, in a number of the 13 old
Member States observed there is a rel-
atively high share of youth who always
remained in the NEET category during
the entire five-year observation peri-
od, namely Italy where the ‘always
NEET’ incidence was at around 30%,
Greece (around 20%) and France, Ger-
many, Ireland, the Netherlands and
Spain (more than 10%).
The likelihood of not being in educa-
tion, employment or training is
strongly correlated with a person’s
educational attainment level. While
the NEET rate for 20–24 year olds
with upper secondary education or
university education is 14.4% and
13.1%, respectively, a full third of
those young people who have not
completed upper secondary educa-
tion can be classified as NEET (Table
10). For the 20–29 age group, this link
between education and joblessness is
even more pronounced and it persists
into later life. 
There is also a strong gender dimen-
sion to this, as poorly educated
young women have a much higher
incidence of being NEET than their
male contemporaries, while a gender
difference also exists for those with
medium and high educational attain-
ment, but to a much lesser degree. 
This link between poor education and
an increased risk of joblessness gener-
ally holds true for most Member
States, although with variations in
intensity. In a number of Member
States, however, this relationship is
reversed to the extent that younger
people aged 20–24 with a high educa-
tional attainment actually have a high-
er likelihood of being NEET than their
less well-educated contemporaries.
This applies mainly to most of the
Mediterranean Member States – in
particular Greece, Spain, Cyprus and
Portugal. There are also several coun-
tries – Germany, Lithuania, Slovenia,
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria –
where young university graduates
have a lower risk of being jobless than
those with a low educational attain-
ment, but still have a higher jobless
risk compared to those with a medium
educational attainment. In most of
these Member States this inverse edu-
cation/NEET structure disappears when
looking at older youth aged 25 to 29.
Only in Portugal and Slovenia do high-
ly educated 25 to 29 year olds also
remain at a higher risk of being jobless
than their medium-skilled contempo-
raries, while in Italy this phenomenon
only appears in this age group. 
One explanation suggested for the
observation that higher education is
not necessarily an insurance against
joblessness is that young people who
40
Table 10 - Share of youth (age 20–24) not in education, employment or training, by educational attainment level and gender, 2006
Low Medium High
Total Men Women Gender Total Men Women Gender Total Men Women Gender 
difference difference difference
BE 38.4 31.0 49.4 -18.5 12.8 10.6 15.2 -4.6 13.4 13.5 13.3 0.2
BG 68.0 55.9 81.2 -25.2 19.8 18.9 20.8 -2.0 23.3 : (29.3) :
CZ 41.1 32.1 52.2 -20.2 11.8 8.2 15.6 -7.5 9.0 7.7 9.9 -2.2
DK 10.9 (5.5) 18.8 : 5.2 5.5 5.0 0.5 : : : :
DE 28.8 25.5 32.1 -6.6 14.1 15.0 13.3 1.7 17.5 12.3 19.9 -7.7
EE 29.5 21.5 49.9 -28.4 10.2 (4.7) 15.5 : : : : :
IE 37.8 27.0 53.9 -26.9 9.7 8.5 11.2 -2.7 6.4 : (6.2) :
EL 29.5 16.3 54.4 -38.1 12.8 8.4 17.2 -8.8 30.8 24.4 34.3 -9.9
ES 21.5 17.2 27.9 -10.7 11.1 8.7 13.3 -4.5 15.6 13.9 16.8 -2.9
FR 45.6 38.0 54.9 -16.8 17.6 13.6 21.9 -8.3 10.8 8.7 12.5 -3.8
IT 40.2 29.4 55.5 -26.1 16.5 15.6 17.3 -1.8 15.2 12.2 16.9 -4.7
CY (16.3) (9.1) (33.7) : 12.2 13.0 (10.9) : 18.7 : 18.5 :
LV 28.6 19.5 45.0 -25.4 13.1 7.9 17.8 -9.9 : : : :
LT 40.4 (37.3) (45.7) : 10.0 8.5 11.4 -2.8 (11.8) : : :
LU (16.9) (14.5) (20.3) : (6.9) : (7.5) : : : : :
HU 47.0 37.7 58.6 -20.8 13.3 11.0 15.6 -4.6 18.4 (17.9) 18.6 :
MT (18.1) : (22.8) : : : : : : : : :
NL 15.5 11.4 21.3 -9.9 4.2 3.1 5.3 -2.2 3.6 (3.0) (3.9) :
AT 30.3 23.9 37.3 -13.4 8.0 7.4 8.7 -1.3 : : : :
PL 47.9 44.0 54.6 -10.6 18.3 17.1 19.5 -2.3 17.6 (16.6) 18.1 :
PT 16.9 14.3 20.8 -6.4 7.4 6.2 8.4 -2.2 25.6 : 27.6 :
RO 48.1 41.5 55.2 -13.7 20.6 21.8 19.3 2.5 30.6 (30.0) 30.9 :
SI 31.7 (27.9) (38.0) : 9.5 8.3 10.9 -2.5 (19.9) : (22.8) :
SK 63.0 61.6 64.5 -2.9 16.6 12.9 20.4 -7.5 15.9 : (18.1) :
FI 26.8 23.4 31.2 -7.7 11.0 9.6 12.2 -2.6 : : : :
SE 31.7 31.1 32.7 -1.6 13.1 12.9 13.4 -0.5 7.2 : 7.4 :
UK 38.5 29.3 49.6 -20.4 12.6 9.0 16.2 -7.2 10.3 12.3 8.7 3.6
EU-27 33.6 27.2 41.8 -14.7 14.5 13.0 16.0 -2.9 13.1 11.6 14.2 -2.6
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS annual averages. 
Note: ”:” data not available. Data in brackets uncertain due to small sample size.
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attain higher levels of education have
had less time to acquire relevant work
experience or they, especially those
with university degrees acquired over
a long period (as opposed to those
with shorter or vocational degrees),
may not meet labour market demands
in the countries concerned
15
. Conse-
quently, many of those with an aca-
demic degree may take longer to
obtain a foothold on the labour mar-
ket than those without one. However,
once the transition has been made,
education does tend to display positive
returns for the investment in the form
of a significantly lower risk of unem-
ployment. 
Joblessness is also a phenomenon
which is much more likely to affect
youth with foreign citizenship than
young nationals. Young people from
a non-EU country living in the EU are
approximately twice as likely to be
NEET, compared to youth living in
their country of birth. They are also
significantly more likely to find them-
selves in this position compared to
youth coming from another EU Mem-
ber State. Among the countries for
which detailed data are available,
Belgium and France have the highest
NEET rates among young third-coun-
try nationals (Chart 27). In Belgium,
the NEET rate of young third-country
nationals is also very high compared
to young nationals, and this ratio is
even higher in Austria and the
Netherlands (the latter two Member
States have lower overall youth NEET
rates). In the United Kingdom, on the
other hand, the rate is relatively low
for young third-country foreigners.
4.4. Labour market
transitions of youth
Another concern in the context of
youth employment is the transition of
young people from education into
working life. On average, almost two-
thirds of youth leaving education in
the EU do have a job one year after
leaving school, although the school-
to-work transition seems to work bet-
ter in some countries than in others
(Chart 28). In Austria, Ireland, Latvia,
Finland, Estonia and the United King-
dom, close to 75% or more of young
people have a job one year after hav-
ing left the educational system. In
Denmark and the Netherlands this
rate even exceeds 80% while Bulgaria,
Greece, Italy and Romania are at the
other end of the scale with less than
50% of young non-students being
employed one year after leaving per-
manent education.
Again, education seems to play an
important role in successful school-
to-work transitions. On average, less
than 4 out of 10 school leavers with a
low educational attainment level
find themselves in a job one year
after having finished their education,
compared to almost two-thirds of
those with a medium level of educa-
tion and more than three-quarters of
those with a high level of education
(Chart 29 - see page 42). In other
words, better-educated youth tend to
41
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Chart 27: Youth (age 15–24) not in education, employment or training by 
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15 See Fernández (2006) who examined this phenomenon for the Spanish labour market.
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Chart 28: Youth school-to-work transition  - labour market status of non-students
(age 15–24) one year after leaving school, 2006
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education in the previous year.  
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS annual averages.
Note: Data for ‘Other EU-25 citizens’ for ES, FR, LU, NL, AT uncertain due to small sample size.
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make a more speedy insertion into the
job market than their less-educated
peers.
16
Research also suggests that the dual
systems of combining work and edu-
cation through vocational training or
apprenticeships found in countries
such as Austria, Denmark and Ger-
many seem to improve the transitions
and employment prospects of young
people.
17
Looking at overall labour dynamics,
young people tend to move into and
out of jobs much more frequently
than prime-age workers. In 2006, an
average of 25% of young workers
quit, lost or changed their job, com-
pared to 11% of prime-age workers
aged 30–54. On the other hand, the
proportion of young people moving
into a new job was also much higher,
with almost 17% of young workers
being newly hired, compared to 7% of
prime-age workers. Added together,
labour turnover
18
for young people is
almost two-and-a-half times as high as
for prime-age adults. To a large
degree this is natural as young people
are more likely to move in and out of
jobs in search of the best possible
match between their skills and those
required by their employers.   
However, youth labour turnover rates
differ greatly between Member
States and tend to correlate with
those of the prime-age population;
Member States with a high labour
turnover among young workers also
tend to have a high labour turnover
among their prime-age population
and vice versa as suggested by Chart
30. Denmark, Finland, Latvia, Spain
and the United Kingdom are the
countries where labour turnover for
both age groups is above the Euro-
pean average, while France also has a
higher than average turnover rate
for young people but (slightly) lower
than average turnover for the prime-
age group. 
Interestingly, the reasons for a high
labour market turnover, especially
among young people, seem to differ
between these countries. For Finland,
Spain and France, the high degree of
turnover seems to be linked, at least
partially, to a high share of young
people who are employed on tempor-
ary contracts; in the case of France
and Spain most of them involuntarily
so (see section 4.6.2). In Denmark,
Latvia and the United Kingdom, on
the other hand, high labour turnover
among young people does not go
hand in hand with a particularly high
incidence of temporary contracts.
Not surprisingly, countries with a
highly dynamic labour market also
42
16 This is also confirmed by findings in Employment in Europe 2004, Chapter 4: Labour market transitions and advancement: temporary employment
and low pay in Europe.
17 See, for example, Kogan and Schubert (2002), Ryan (2001) and Quintini and Martin (2006).
18 More precisely, labour turnover is here defined as the sum of the hiring rate and the job separation rate. The hiring rate is calculated as the percentage
of workers in the age group who have less than one year’s tenure at time t, over total employment at time t-1. The separation rate corresponds to the
share of people unemployed, inactive or employed with less than one year’s tenure at time t, who were employed at time t-1, over total employment
at t-1. This follows the method for calculating labour turnover used in Employment in Europe 2006, Chapter 2, section 3.1.6.
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Chart 29: Youth school-to-work transition by educational attainement in the EU–27
- labour market status of non-students (age 15–24) one year leaving school, 2006
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Note: Non-student school leavers defined as 15 to 24 years old who have completed their education in the pre-
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tend to have significantly fewer
young people in long-term un-
employment than countries with a
low labour turnover (Chart 31). 
4.5. Youth education
attainment level
Given that the risk of making a bad
transition into working life or being
without a job tends to be higher for
the poorly educated than for the bet-
ter educated in most Member States,
it must be of concern that still almost
one in seven young people in the EU-
27 drop out of school without at least
an upper secondary qualification
(Chart 32). Although the proportion
of early school leavers declined from
17.6% in 2000 to 15.3% in 2006, the
incidence of early school leavers in
the EU still remains well above the
target rate of 10% set in the frame-
work of the European Employment
Strategy. It is especially high in Malta
and Portugal, where around 4 out of
10 young people leave the school sys-
tem without achieving a satisfactory
level of education, but also in Spain
where 3 out of 10 fail to do so and in
Italy where it is 2 out of 10. 
The EU is also still lagging behind its
other target on youth education,
namely that at least 85% of 22 year
olds in the EU should have completed
upper secondary education by 2010,
although things have improved in
recent years. Presently, upper second-
ary attainment for 20–24 year olds is
at 77.8% (Chart 33), up from 76.6%
in 2000.
In practically all Member States,
young men are more likely to drop
out of school early (the exception
being Austria) and less likely to com-
plete upper secondary education.
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4.6. Youth employment
structures
4.6.1. Professional, sector and
occupational structure
The overwhelming majority of young
people with a job are employees. In
the EU-27 only about 4% of youth
aged 15–24 and 9% of those aged
25–29 are self-employed, compared
to around 16% of people aged 30–54
(Chart 34). These percentages have
not changed significantly since the
beginning of the decade. 
On the one hand, the low share of
self-employment among youth is not
surprising as many young people still
lack the skills, experience and
resources to open their own business.
On the other hand, there seems to be
an untapped potential for young
people to become entrepreneurs as
more of than half of them indicate
that they would prefer to be self-
employed rather than being an
employee.
19
In most Member States, the share of
self-employed youth seems to be cor-
related with the overall share of self-
employed. For example, Greece, Italy,
Poland and Romania have a relative-
ly high share of self-employed among
both their prime-age and younger
populations, although there are
exceptions (e.g. Ireland).
20
The economic sectors with the largest
average share of youth among their
workforce are wholesale and retail
trade and the hotel and restaurant
business (Table 11). On the other hand,
youth tend to be significantly under-
represented in agriculture, mining,
electricity and water supply, transport
and communication, public adminis-
tration, education, and health and
social services.
As far as the occupational structure
of youth employment is concerned, it
is not surprising that youth aged
15–24 are strongly underrepresented
in senior or management positions
given their young age and lack of
work experience (Table 12). They are
also under-represented in profession-
al occupations that often require
advanced degrees or additional train-
ing. Nevertheless, the share of both
youth and young people (aged under
30) in professional and technical
occupations has increased since 2000,
a reflection of the fact that more
youth have been entering and finish-
ing higher education. At the same
time, however, the share of youth
aged 15–24 in low-skilled service and
retail positions, as well as elementary
jobs, has also increased, while the
44
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19 Eurobarometer (2004).
20 In Greece, Poland and Romania, a big part of self-employed young people appear to run (presumably small) businesses in the agricultural sector,
with manufacturing and trade activities also being of importance, while self-employed young people in Italy rather tend to be in construction,
manufacturing, business activities or trade.
Table 12 - Occupational structure by age group, 2000 and 2006 (% of total employment in age group)
2000 2006
15–24 25–29 30–54 15–24 25–29 30–54
Skilled non-manual Legislators, senior officials and managers 2.2 5.3 8.8 1.9 5.0 9.0
Professionals 4.1 12.5 13.5 4.4 15.1 14.1
Technicians and associate professionals 11.7 16.2 15.3 12.7 18.3 16.1
Low skilled non-manual Clerks 14.2 13.4 11.9 13.1 12.2 11.1
Service workers and shop and market sales workers 22.7 15.1 11.8 25.8 15.6 12.0
Skilled manual Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 5.7 4.2 5.0 4.0 3.1 4.5
Craft and related traded workers 20.1 16.5 15.6 18.0 14.5 14.7
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 8.1 9.4 9.7 7.2 8.3 9.4
Elementary occupations Elementary occupations 11.1 7.4 8.5 12.8 8.1 9.0
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS annual averages.
Note: Data for 2000: DE, CY, LU, MT, SE Q2, FR Q1, LV and LT av.Q2&Q4. 
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Chapter 1 Panorama of the European labour market 
share of skilled manual occupations
has decreased. 
4.6.2. Youth in part-time and
temporary employment 
Young people in the EU are signifi-
cantly more likely than adults to
work in temporary and/or part-time
jobs. On average, 4 in 10 employed
15 to 24 year- olds work on a tempo-
rary contract (Table 13) compared to
around 1 in 10 prime-age adults.
Around a quarter of youth work in
part-time jobs as opposed to 16% of
the 25–54 age group. While the inci-
dence of temporary and part-time
work has been rising for adults as
well as youth, the increase has been
significantly more pronounced for
young people. 
There are no large gender differ-
ences at EU level with respect to tem-
porary youth employment. On aver-
age, young men are in fact slightly
more likely to be in a temporary con-
tract than young women (40.8% vs.
40.2%), although there are of course
differences between Member States.
As for part-time work, gender differ-
ences are much more pronounced,
with young women on average
almost twice as likely to work part-
time than young men.
To a certain extent it is to be expect-
ed that youth face a higher likeli-
hood of temporary and part-time
work, as employers may be reluctant
to offer a permanent and full-time
contract to somebody who is just
entering the labour market with little
or no previous work experience. For
many youth, a temporary or part-
time job is seen as a stepping-stone
towards permanent employment. As
shown in Chart 25 (see page 35), the
share of young people with a perma-
nent contract increases with age, and
by the age of 29 an average of almost
50% of people that age are in a per-
manent job (with around 10% in a
temporary job and the rest either in
education or otherwise inactive,
working as self-employed or a family
worker, or  unemployed). 
However, the issue can become
problematic if a young person
becomes trapped in a situation mov-
ing from one temporary contract to
another without being able to get
into a permanent job. (Chart 35)
shows the incidence of temporary
work among people in the 20–24
age group compared to those aged
25–29. In all Member States (except
Cyprus), the share of 25 to 29 year
olds in temporary work is lower
than for their younger peers. How-
ever, some Member States show a
particularly high incidence for both
the younger and older youth age
group, namely Portugal, Slovenia
and Poland with more than 30% of
25 to 29 year olds in temporary con-
46
Table 13 - Incidence of temporary and part-time work among youth (age 15–24), 2000 and 2006
Incidence of temporary work for employees Incidence of part-time work
2000 2006 2000 2006
Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women
BE 30.8 28.1 34.3 30.0 28.7 31.5 19.7 11.7 30.0 20.7 11.9 31.9
BG 12.2 12.5 12.0 12.6 12.3 12.9 4.9 (5.0) (4.7) 2.9 : :
CZ 12.4 11.4 13.5 18.9 18.0 20.1 4.3 2.9 6.0 3.9 2.9 5.3
DK 27.4 28.8 25.7 22.4 24.6 20.1 46.2 37.6 56.1 58.4 47.9 69.5
DE 52.4 55.0 49.5 57.6 60.1 54.8 12.0 8.5 16.0 19.3 14.3 24.9
EE 6.7 8.9 : 7.3 7.4 (7.3) 11.8 8.7 15.9 13.0 7.7 20.6
IE 15.9 14.4 17.7 10.9 9.0 13.0 21.4 15.9 27.9 : : :
EL 29.5 27.9 31.4 25.0 23.0 27.8 8.3 7.0 10.1 13.3 10.6 17.5
ES 68.3 69.2 66.9 66.1 65.3 67.1 12.9 7.7 20.5 21.1 13.3 31.6
FR 55.0 56.3 53.5 49.8 49.0 50.9 22.1 12.9 33.6 21.6 12.0 34.5
IT 26.6 25.4 28.2 40.9 38.4 44.9 10.5 6.4 16.2 17.5 10.1 29.1
CY 18.7 16.3 20.9 21.2 16.2 26.6 8.3 (7.2) 9.4 9.5 (5.7) 13.6
LV 10.9 12.3 (8.7) 14.4 15.2 13.2 13.2 10.5 17.4 8.7 6.1 12.7
LT 9.3 (8.0) (10.9) 10.5 11.9 (8.7) 16.4 16.8 15.8 9.0 (7.8) (10.6)
LU 14.5 (15.3) (13.4) 33.2 34.8 31.4 (8.8) : (14.5) (8.8) : (13.0)
HU 13.6 14.0 13.1 16.9 17.9 15.4 2.8 1.9 4.0 4.7 4.3 5.3
MT (8.1) (11.2) : (8.0) : : (7.8) (10.1) : 13.5 (11.1) (16.3)
NL 35.5 34.9 36.1 43.5 42.9 44.3 60.2 52.7 68.3 68.3 59.6 77.5
AT 35.1 38.9 30.8 35.2 38.5 31.3 9.5 5.3 14.3 14.7 8.6 21.8
PL 14.8 14.6 14.9 67.3 65.4 69.7 16.2 13.6 19.5 19.3 16.2 23.3
PT 41.4 38.3 45.6 49.3 47.1 52.2 6.2 4.6 8.4 8.4 5.7 11.8
RO 3.3 3.6 2.9 5.0 5.1 (4.9) 15.5 17.1 13.6 16.1 17.4 14.4
SI 46.3 41.6 52.2 64.2 56.4 74.9 14.1 12.3 16.5 29.8 23.8 38.4
SK 10.5 11.3 9.8 14.2 13.8 14.8 (1.0) : : 3.3 (1.8) 5.3
FI 45.4 41.0 49.8 44.2 40.7 47.5 35.7 25.3 46.6 39.3 27.9 50.8
SE 45.2 39.5 51.0 59.0 52.2 66.0 38.3 27.6 49.4 42.2 28.3 57.7
UK 14.2 14.1 14.3 12.9 12.5 13.2 32.0 24.1 40.4 35.1 27.2 43.4
EU-27 34.9 35.7 34.0 40.9 41.0 40.7 20.2 14.9 26.5 25.3 18.4 33.6
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS annual averages.
Note: Data for 2000: DE, CY, LU, MT, SE Q2; FR Q1; LV and LT av.Q2 & Q4; BG 2001 and RO 2002. Data for full-time/part-time indicators for IE 2005.
‘:’ data not available. Data in brackets uncertain due to small sample size.
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Chart 36: Temporary work by youth aged 20–24 by reason, 2006 
Source: Eurostat, LFS annual averages.
tracts, and Spain with more than
40%
21
. This suggests that youth in
these Member States are more like-
ly to face a series of temporary jobs
and have therefore more difficulties
in making a transition into stable
employment than in others.
22
The question whether temporary
and part-time contracts need to be
considered as precarious also
depends on the degree to which this
situation is involuntary – how much
of it is because someone would have
liked to work in a permanent or full-
time job, but could not find one.
Chart 36 shows that the incidence of
involuntary temporary work among
the youth varies greatly among
Member States. In Spain, Poland,
Sweden, Portugal, France, Belgium
or Greece, for example, a majority
of temporarily employed youth
would have liked to work in a per-
manent job, but could not find one.
In Slovenia, Germany, Finland, Italy,
the Netherlands, Denmark or Aus-
tria, on the other hand, a majority
of those in temporary employment
did not want a permanent job (or
were still in their probationary period
or in training).
With respect to part-time work, it is
interesting to note that in the two
Member States with the highest inci-
dence of part-time working among
the youth, Denmark and the Nether-
lands, (Chart 37, see page 48) the inci-
dence of involuntary part time work-
ing in relation to overall part-time
work is very low. This seems to corre-
spond largely with the high number of
working students in both countries
examined in section 4.2.2. Sweden,
France and Italy, on the other hand,
show a high incidence involuntary
part-time working among youth in
part-time employment.
47
21 See OECD (2007b), p.50 f., for a discussion of temporary employment of youth in Spain. This study confirms the high rate of involuntary temporary
youth employment in Spain and finds that transitions for youth from temporary to permanent employment are significantly below the European
average. Furthermore, it finds that some temporary jobs offer good prospects and serve as stepping-stones into the labour market, especially if
staying with the same employer during temporary employment. However, temporary jobs involving frequent changes of employers tend to
represent a trap from which young people find difficult to exit.  
22 Note, however, that this consideration does not take into account the fact that youth in some countries enter the labour market later than in
others and are therefore also more likely to show a higher incidence of temporary work in their late 20s, compared to countries where transitions
tend to occur earlier. 
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4.6.3. Earnings structure of
employed youth
Young people tend to earn signifi-
cantly less than the overall workforce
does. According to data from the
European Structure of Earnings Sur-
vey 2002, average hourly earnings of
employees below the age of 30 are
around 25% below those of the over-
all workforce (Chart 38). The youth
wage gap is highest in Greece, the
Netherlands and Germany, where
younger workers only earn about
two-thirds of what an average work-
er gets. Relatively moderate wage
gaps of between 5% and 15% were
observed in Finland, Malta, Hungary,
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithu-
ania. Only in Estonia and Latvia did
young peoples’ earnings match those
of the average.
Lower average earnings for young
people are partly explained by the
fact that the youth tend to be over-
represented in sectors of the econ-
omy where wages are relatively low
and under-represented in better pay-
ing sectors. For example, earnings in
trade and the hotel and restaurant
business – both activities with the
highest share of youth in their work-
force – are substantially lower than in
other service activities or industry
(Table 14). Furthermore, young people
are also more likely to be paid lower
wages due to the lack of previous
work experience and the need for
training until they become fully pro-
ductive. With age and presumably
increased productivity, earnings tend
to increase at least into prime age. 
Research undertaken by the OECD on
the basis of 1997 to 2001 data from the
ECHP, also suggests that the incidence
of low pay among younger workers
tends to decrease as they get older and
that a relatively high share of poorly
paid youth eventually make it into bet-
ter paid jobs, as opposed to a lower
share which makes a transition from
unemployment into employment. It
therefore seems, on balance, it is bet-
48
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Chart 37: Part-time work by youth aged 20–24 by reason, 2006
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS annual averages.
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Table 14 - Hourly earnings by age and economic activity, 2002 (in purchasing power standards)
Employees under 30 years of age All age groups
Industry Total Construction Services Wholesale Hotels Industry Total Construction Services Wholesale Hotels 
and services industry (excl. public and retail and and services industry (excl. public and retail and 
(excl. public (excl. admin.) trade restaurants (excl. public (excl. admin.) trade restaurants
admin.) construction) admin.) construction)
(C - K) (C - E) (F) (G - K) (G) (H) (C - K) (C - E) (F) (G - K) (G) (H)
BE 11.09 11.93 11.04 10.71 9.82 8.67 13.73 14.31 12.49 13.53 12.42 9.25
BG 1.50 1.46 1.39 1.57 1.22 1.06 1.98 2.01 1.76 2.00 1.38 1.31
CZ 4.82 4.65 4.21 5.09 4.24 3.98 5.45 5.22 4.97 5.80 4.76 5.63
DK 11.84 13.47 14.11 11.26 9.98 11.75 15.34 16.44 16.46 14.71 12.83 12.48
DE 10.25 11.25 8.56 9.78 9.09 6.74 14.89 16.11 12.96 14.02 13.04 9.21
EE 4.09 3.91 3.68 4.25 3.70 2.61 4.07 4.06 3.98 4.09 3.72 2.54
IE 10.74 11.35 11.82 10.40 8.29 7.74 13.74 14.16 14.47 13.37 10.46 9.13
EL 5.82 5.83 6.36 5.77 5.40 5.61 8.61 8.88 8.64 8.45 7.09 6.57
ES 7.31 7.60 7.22 7.20 6.85 6.36 9.81 10.35 8.39 9.89 9.24 7.26
FR 11.01 11.02 9.05 11.20 9.91 9.71 14.29 14.69 12.21 14.31 12.42 10.87
IT 8.39 8.29 8.00 8.55 8.10 7.39 11.05 10.68 10.06 11.55 10.21 8.54
CY 6.03 5.59 6.58 6.05 5.22 5.62 8.24 7.52 8.52 8.41 7.14 6.51
LV 2.98 2.84 2.73 3.08 2.29 2.01 3.02 3.11 2.77 3.00 2.24 1.97
LT 3.29 3.24 2.88 3.38 3.09 2.21 3.60 3.65 3.33 3.61 3.29 2.30
LU 12.06 11.91 10.46 12.27 9.63 8.90 15.51 15.28 12.83 16.00 12.61 10.03
HU 4.01 4.06 3.03 4.10 3.37 3.17 4.68 4.68 3.66 4.85 3.96 3.40
MT 7.50 7.38 6.11 7.78 7.14 6.34 8.69 8.25 7.47 9.26 8.15 7.31
NL 9.57 10.62 11.77 9.16 7.80 9.74 13.94 14.99 14.21 13.59 11.72 11.21
AT 8.75 9.45 8.92 8.33 7.52 6.35 12.03 12.90 11.62 11.61 10.28 7.48
PL 4.25 4.07 3.61 4.51 3.85 3.16 5.38 5.25 4.66 5.63 4.65 4.27
PT 5.35 4.55 4.95 5.96 5.15 4.19 6.88 5.87 5.81 8.00 6.63 4.88
RO 1.89 1.71 1.54 2.24 1.80 1.52 2.52 2.44 2.09 2.81 2.14 1.83
SI 6.06 6.22 4.99 6.17 5.63 4.31 7.43 7.23 6.30 7.92 6.98 5.72
SK 4.28 4.03 3.22 4.54 4.28 2.86 4.79 4.62 3.97 5.00 5.57 3.09
FI 9.88 10.47 9.55 9.49 8.78 8.55 11.64 11.89 11.01 11.51 10.72 9.18
SE 9.78 10.06 10.27 9.61 9.60 8.10 11.98 11.79 11.70 12.15 11.50 8.92
UK 11.23 12.10 12.36 10.97 9.00 7.67 15.37 15.85 15.24 15.20 11.85 8.83
EU-25 9.16 8.98 8.74 9.29 8.01 7.79 12.32 12.38 11.00 12.48 10.73 8.73
Source: Eurostat, Structure of earnings survey 2002
23 Quintini and Martin (2006), pp. 9 and 17.
24 For this section and the detailed methodology of calculating job mismatches see M. Wolbers (2002). 
ter to start out working in a low-paid
job than to have no job at all.
23
With respect to gender differences,
young women in the EU earn on aver-
age around 6% less than their male
counterparts (Chart 38). Poland,
France, Slovenia and Malta showed
only a marginal gender gap in youth
earnings, while Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, which had the lowest age
gap, rank among those countries with
the highest gender gap. In general,
the gender pay gap for young work-
ers is much lower than for older work-
ers (6% vs. 23%), which seems to be
partly a reflection of the fact that a
high proportion of young women in
employment have not been affected,
for example, by career breaks for
maternity and child rearing. More-
over, young womenhave on average
higher levels of education relative to
their male counterparts and than
older generations of women.
4.6.4. Job mismatches among
employed youth
Another issue with respect to youth
employment is to what extent
young people take up occupations
that are not close to their educa-
tional qualifications. Research based
on data from the 2000 Labour Force
Survey ad-hoc module
24
suggests
that a relatively large number of
young people in Europe are indeed
affected by mismatches between
their jobs and qualifications, albeit
with significant variation between
countries. Of those Member States
where data are available, Italy and
Greece show the highest percent-
age of school leavers aged 15–35
working in a job outside their field
of education (47% and 40% respec-
tively), followed by Greece, Den-
mark and Sweden. The lowest per-
centage is found in the Netherlands
(29%). 
In most Member States, having a job
mismatch is negatively correlated
with age: younger persons are more
likely to work in a job outside their
field of education than older ones
(Chart 39). Similar negative correla-
tions apply to the level and field 
of education: job-qualification mis-
matches are more frequent among
those with a lower educational
attainment compared to those with a
higher education, and young people
with a degree in humanities/arts,
agriculture or sciences tend to find
themselves working more frequently
in a non-matching job than, for
example, those with a qualification in
education or health services or in
engineering, manufacturing and con-
struction (presumably because the
latter educational fields tend to be
more job specific than the former).
Furthermore, in most Member States,
young women tend to be more often
affected by job-qualification mis-
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matches than young men are. As for
labour market outcomes, those with
a job-qualification mismatch also
tend to have a lower occupational
status compared to those with
matching jobs. They are also more
likely to find themselves in a tempo-
rary and/or part-time job and show a
higher propensity to be on the search
for a new job than those with a
matching job.
5. SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSIONS
In 2006, labour markets in the EU
made a robust recovery. After rather
modest increases in the previous
years, employment growth in the EU-
27 picked up significantly in 2006
and, at 1.4%, showed its strongest
increase since 2000. For the first time
in at least a decade employment
expanded across the entire EU, with
all 27 Member States showing a rise
in employment. Particularly high
employment growth was observed in
a number of the newer Member
States, namely Estonia, Latvia,
Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia, as well
as in Ireland, Luxembourg and Spain.
Even those Member States that had
performed worst in the previous year,
namely Germany, Hungary, the
Netherlands and Portugal, still expe-
rienced significant employment
growth. In addition, labour produc-
tivity grew at a higher pace than in
2005 and at a slightly higher rate
than in the United States, although
the EU continued to slightly under-
perform relative to the US in terms of
employment growth.
Due to stronger employment growth,
the EU has made its best progress
since 2000 towards the overall
employment rate target with the rate
now standing at 64.3%, and there
was marked progress towards the
targets for female and older persons’
employment targets (currently at
57.1% and 43.5% respectively). Nev-
ertheless, despite this progress, it
seems increasingly challenging for
the EU to meet the overall employ-
ment target of 70% and the older
workers’ target of 50% within the
next four years, although the target
of 60% for female employment
seems to be within reach.
Regarding the younger generation,
youth unemployment and difficulties
in successfully integrating young
people in the labour market remain a
challenge. Despite signs of some
overall improvements, there is evi-
dence of persisting problems in a
number of Member States and for
certain disadvantaged groups of
youth. 
On the positive side, average labour
market performance of young peo-
ple in the EU has improved somewhat
compared to the beginning of the
decade. Youth unemployment is
slightly down and the share of long-
term unemployed youth has
decreased substantially compared to
the beginning of the decade (unlike
the share of long-term unemploy-
ment among unemployed prime-age
adults which has increased during the
same period). Labour market partici-
pation and employment of youth
aged 15–24 has decreased, but this is
mostly due to a higher share of youth
remaining in education and improv-
ing their skills. For young people
aged 25–29, on the other hand,
employment rates have increased in
recent years. 
However, despite these improve-
ments, there has yet to occur a real
breakthrough in reducing youth
unemployment. At 17.4%, the aver-
age youth unemployment rate is still
at a high level and it has not
improved relative to unemployment
rates for prime-age adults. Further-
more, as a whole, the EU underper-
forms in the international context,
with substantially more youth in
unemployment and less of them
working than in other industrialised
countries, such as the United States,
Canada or Japan. 
In addition, there are important differ-
ences between Member States, which
are quite significant both in dimension
and over time. For example, youth
unemployment rates range from
under 8% in Denmark and the Nether-
lands to over 25% in Greece, Poland
and Slovakia. And while around two
thirds of youth have a job in Denmark
and the Netherlands, less than a quar-
ter do so in Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary,
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland and
Romania. Moreover, youth tend to do
better in Member States with high
employment and low unemployment
among prime-age adults (and vice
versa). This suggests that the successful
integration of youth into the labour
market depends, for a big part, on a
country’s overall labour market per-
formance. Therefore, economic poli-
cies aimed at increasing job creation in
general will help to increase employ-
ment for young people.
Furthermore, young people often
face problems in making a smooth
and quick transition from education
to work. On average, around one-
third (and in some Member States
more than half) of young people are
still not in employment one year
after finishing their education. While
a large majority of young people will
eventually make it into a stable and
permanent job, a smaller, but signifi-
cant part remains trapped in tempor-
ary, often low-paid jobs from which
they find it difficult to exit. Another
relatively small but relevant group at
risk of labour market and social
exclusion are youth who experience
longer spells of being neither in edu-
cation, nor employment nor training
(NEET). 
Education, or rather the lack of it,
plays a key role in this. Young people
with a low educational attainment
are much more likely to be affected
by (long-term) unemployment, in-
activity or difficult school-to-work
transitions than youth with upper sec-
ondary or university education.
Therefore it is a concern that still
almost one in seven young people in
the EU drops out of school early with-
out having received any relevant
qualification. Although the incidence
of school failure has continued to
decline in recent years, it still remains
50
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well above the target rate of 10% set
in the EU employment guidelines. The
EU is also still lagging behind its other
youth education target, namely to
have at least 85% of 22 year olds
achieving a medium educational
attainment, i.e. completing upper sec-
ondary education. Here too, the situ-
ation has improved in recent years,
but the current level is still about 7
percentage points short of the target.
However, good education does not
always seem to work as an insurance
against difficult transitions, jobless-
ness or precarious employment. In
several Member States, young univer-
sity graduates are actually more likely
to be unemployed or inactive than
their peers with only medium or low
educational credentials. Moreover, a
significant minority of young people
find themselves working in jobs out-
side their field of education. Some of
the consequences of these job-qualifi-
cation mismatches are that those
affected tend to have a lower occupa-
tional status and are more likely to be
in temporary or part-time jobs com-
pared to those with matching jobs.
All this implies that good education is
crucial for a successful transition into
working life and that the qualifica-
tions of youth need to be brought
more in line with current and future
requirements of the labour market.
Programmes which address school
failure early on, familiarise youth
with the world of work – e.g.
through (properly defined) intern-
ships, vocational training or appren-
ticeships – and prepare them for the
need of lifelong learning in order to
adapt their qualifications throughout
their working lives, are one impor-
tant way to improve the labour mar-
ket situation of young people.
Integrating disadvantaged youth suf-
fering from long spells of unemploy-
ment or inactivity may also require
adequate activation strategies. How-
ever, these will have to be well
designed and monitored as many
active labour market policies target-
ed at youth so far have shown disap-
pointing results.
25
Finally, there is a need for reducing
institutional barriers to the labour
market entry of youth. Youth are
one group which is most likely to be
negatively affected by institutional
settings which favour insiders in
permanent employment and make
it unattractive to hire newcomers.
This is particularly the case with
strict employment protection legis-
lation (EPL) which tends to reduce
the number of dismissals but
decreases the entry rate into work.
Strict EPL on regular contracts has
been shown to contribute to labour
market segmentation, high
turnover for temporary employ-
ment, and precarious employment
situations involving temporary con-
tracts with low protection and limit-
ed prospects for permanent employ-
ment.
26
Making it easier to hire
young people and removing labour
market segmentation is therefore
another crucial issue to be
addressed.
A framework for developing con-
crete and coordinated policy
responses to the main causes of
youth employment problems may
be found in the larger context of
general employment policies, name-
ly the recently proposed common
principles on flexicurity
27
. These aim
at integrating four policy compo-
nents – flexible contractual arrange-
ments, effective lifelong learning
systems, active labour market poli-
cies and modern social security sys-
tems – in order to enhance flexibili-
ty and security at the same time in
the labour market. 
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25 See Employment in Europe 2006, Chapter 3: Effective European labour market policies, p.139. For an overview and assessment of youth activation
policies also see Walther and Pohl (2005).
26 See Employment in Europe 2006, Chapter 2: Flexibility and security in the EU labour markets.
27 COM(2007) 0359 final.
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1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most remarkable features
of recent trends in labour markets in
Europe has been the substantial
increase in employment of older
people, and this during a period of
relatively limited economic and
employment growth. Since 2000, the
employment rate (ER) for people
aged 55–64
1
has risen by 7 percent-
age points in the EU-25
2
, compared to
a rise of 2.3 percentage points for the
working-age population as a whole.
However, despite this improvement,
employment of older people in
Europe remains low by international
standards, and many workers still exit
the labour market at relatively early
ages. 
The need to improve labour market
participation of older people has
gained heightened attention in
recent years, especially in view of the
significant demographic changes the
European Union (EU) will undergo
due to population ageing. Indeed,
population ageing is one of the most
important challenges facing the EU,
posing a threat to its macro-econom-
ic performance and competitiveness.
In this context, increases in participa-
tion and employment rates for older
workers are essential to help sustain
economic growth, reinforce social
cohesion and the adequacy of pen-
sions, and manage the rising financial
burden on social protection systems.
Increasing the labour market partici-
pation and employment of older
people is therefore of key impor-
tance to EU policy, which is to be
addressed through a comprehensive
and sustainable approach known as
‘active ageing’. Indeed, in its synthe-
sis report to the 2004 European
Spring Council
3
the Commission iden-
tified active ageing as one of the
three priority areas for which swift
action is needed to deliver the Lisbon
Strategy. The report highlighted that
efforts to promote active ageing
must be pursued vigorously, particu-
larly in those Member States with low
employment rates for older workers
and low average exit ages from the
labour market. More recently, the
European Commission’s Green Paper
on demographic change
4
has again
highlighted the challenge of an age-
ing population in Europe.
The promotion of active ageing is
reflected in two complementary tar-
gets that the EU has set itself – the
2001 Stockholm European Council set
a target that by 2010 at least 50% of
the EU population aged 55–64 should
be in employment, while the 2002
Barcelona European Council conclud-
ed that ‘a progressive increase of
about five years in the effective aver-
age age at which people stop work-
ing in the EU should be sought by
2010’. Within the European Employ-
ment Strategy, the need to improve
the labour market participation of
older workers is fully taken into
account in the Employment Guide-
lines (2005 to 2008)
5
, which highlight
that as part of a new intergenera-
tional approach particular attention
should be paid to promoting access
to employment throughout working
life. In the framework of the Open
Method of Coordination (OMC) in
the field of pensions, the 2006 Joint
Report on Social Protection and
Social Inclusion
6
highlighted that to
ensure adequate and sustainable
pension systems, Member States are
implementing a three-pronged strat-
egy of reducing public debt, reform-
ing pensions and increasing employ-
ment, and that many have undertak-
en reforms that have begun to trans-
late into higher employment rates of
older people, notably by strengthen-
ing incentives to work longer.
To address the challenge of the age-
ing population and meet the targets
the EU has set itself, it is essential to
create the necessary conditions to
support people who wish to take
53
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1 Conventionally the concept of ‘older workers’ has logically focused on the age group approaching retirement, namely the group aged 55–64 with-
in Europe. Most of the analysis in this chapter is therefore focused on people in the age range 55–64, since this is also the main age group tar-
geted by ageing-related policies, but, where relevant, some analysis is also provided on the group aged 65 and over. With demographic ageing
and the target of delaying the exit age by five years, the latter group will enter more and more into labour supply considerations and it is there-
fore useful to also examine the factors which affect their participation. Indeed, policy and pension revisions currently being considered in many
Member States could well lead to a need to revise the currently accepted definition of ‘older workers’ at some stage in the future.
2 The analysis of developments between 2000 and 2006 mainly focuses on the EU-25 Member States and the associated aggregate due to the avail-
ability of more complete data series over this period, and due to a significant break in series in the employment rate of older workers in Roma-
nia for technical reasons during this timeframe. Furthermore, several sections refer only to the EU-25 since the relevant data series currently avail-
able are not yet set up to include the EU-27 aggregate (e.g. Eurostat population projections). 
3 Delivering Lisbon – Reforms for the Enlarged Union, report from the Commission to the Spring European Council, COM(2004) 29.
4 European Commission, ‘Confronting demographic change: A new solidarity between the generations’, COM(2005) 94 final.
5 Council Decision of 12 July 2005 on Guidelines for the employment policies of the Member States, (2005/600/EC).
6 Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2006, adopted by the Council on 10 March 2006 (7294/06)
advantage of the opportunities
offered by longer and more produc-
tive lives in better health. For individ-
ual companies and the economy as a
whole it is essential to raise the
employment rate for older workers, so
that any labour shortage can be avert-
ed or mitigated by making fuller use
of the available resources. For this to
be successful, governments and social
partners need to work together to
develop the skills and employability of
older people while maintaining the
health, motivation and capacities of
workers as they age. Age discrimina-
tion and negative stereotypes of older
workers must be tackled, while work-
ing conditions and employment
opportunities must be adapted to an
age-diverse workforce.
In light of the above, the purpose of
this chapter is not only to provide an
update of the analysis on older work-
ers presented in the 2003 Employ-
ment in Europe report
7
but also to
carry out a review of the main fea-
tures of the recent substantial
improvement in the labour market
situation of this group, to examine
the main factors influencing their
labour market attachment and the
differences and similarities in
approaches to active ageing across
Member States, and to explore in
broad terms the underlying reasons
for the remarkable rise in employ-
ment of older workers in recent years.
2. DEMOGRAPHIC AND
POLICY CONTEXT –
WHAT’S AT STAKE
2.1. Demographic
context
As stressed by the Heads of State and
Government at their informal Hamp-
ton Court Summit in October 2005,
demographic ageing is one of the
main challenges facing the EU in the
coming years. The ageing of the EU
population is the result of the follow-
ing main trends:
• the low fertility rate, which at 1.5
children is well below the replace-
ment rate of 2.1 needed to main-
tain the population (disregarding
immigration);
• the current step in the popula-
tion age profile resulting from
the post-war baby boom and
the subsequent decline in fertil-
ity in recent decades, which will
progressively move to older ages;
• increasing life expectancy. This is
expected to lead to a spectacular
increase in the number of people
surviving into their 80s and 90s,
meaning that many could survive
several decades in retirement.
As a consequence of these trends, the
total population in the EU is expected
to become much older, with a
marked change in the age structure
(Chart 1). By 2050 almost one in three
citizens in the EU will be aged over
65, up from the current level of
around one in six. At the same time
there will be a marked change in the
size and age structure of the working-
age population (i.e. those aged
15–64), with the peak of the age dis-
tribution moving to higher and high-
er ages (Chart 2). As a result, participa-
tion levels, and overall labour force
numbers, will be more and more influ-
enced by the activity patterns of the
older generations.
2.1.1. Impact on the working-
age population
In economic terms, a key aspect of
demographic ageing will be its
impact on the overall size of the
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Chart 1: Developments in the age pyramid structure of the EU-25 from 2005 to 2050
Age pyramid of the EU-25 in 2005 Age pyramid of the EU-25 in 2030 Age pyramid of the EU-25 in 2050
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Source: Eurostat, population projections baseline variant.
7 Employment in Europe 2003, chapter on ‘Labour market trends and characteristics of older workers’.
working-age population (those aged
15–64), which is expected to decrease
by around 53 million (or 17%) by
2050 compared with 2005 levels.
Although continuing to rise in the
medium term, the working-age pop-
ulation in the EU-25 will start declin-
ing soon after 2010, while there will
be marked variations in develop-
ments for underlying age groups
(Chart 3).
By 2030, the working-age population
in the EU-25 will total 288 million,
down from 308 million in 2005, while
there will be 116 million people aged
over 65, compared to 77 million in
2005. The number of youth (aged
15–24) and young adults (25–39) is
already falling, and for both groups
the population will continue to
decline significantly (down 12% and
16% respectively between 2010 and
2030 (Table 1)). Although rising ini-
tially, the number of 40–54 year olds
will also start to fall shortly after 2010.
In parallel, the number of people
aged 55–64 will grow by 9.5%
between 2005 and 2010 (from 52 mil-
lion to 57 million), and by 15.3% (to
66 million) between 2010 and 2030.
As a result, the working-age popula-
tion will include an increasingly
important share of older people in
the age range 55–64 in the next two
decades, with the share rising from
17% in 2005 to stabilise at around
23% from 2025 onwards (Chart 4 -
see page 56). Employers will there-
fore have to rely increasingly on the
experience and skills of older work-
ers. At the same time, the dependen-
cy ratio (the number of people aged
65 years and older relative to those of
working-age) is foreseen to rise from
the current 25% to 40% by 2030, and
reach 53% by 2050, with the result
that instead of having four people of
working age for every person aged
65 and over as at present there will
be only two people by 2050.
Underlying the general evolution
foreseen at EU level in the working-
age population are marked differ-
ences across individual Member States
(Table 2 - see page 56). In the medium
term (between 2005 and 2010), most
Member States should see a moder-
ate increase in the size of the work-
ing-age population, with more pro-
nounced increases in Cyprus, Ireland,
Luxembourg, Malta and Spain. In con-
trast, the working-age population
would already have declined in the
Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary,
55
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Table 1 - EU-25 working-age population trends, 2005–2050
Projections for the EU working age population 2005–2050 (in millions)
2005–2010 2010–2030 2030–2050 2005–2050
Young people (15–24) -2.4 -6.7 -5.0 -14.0
% change -4.1% -12.0% -10.2% -24.3%
Young adults (25–39) -3.9 -14.9 -6.1 -24.9
% change -3.9% -15.6% -7.5% -25.0%
Adults (40–54) 4.1 -10.0 -12.8 -18.7
% change 4.2% -9.8% -13.8% -19.0%
Older workers (55–64) 5.0 8.7 -9.0 4.7
% change 9.5% 15.3% -13.6% 9.1%
Source: Eurostat population projections 2004, baseline variant
Italy and the three Baltic States
(Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).
At the same time, the share of
older people aged 55–64 within
the working-age population will
increase for all Member States except
Austria and Sweden, with the most
noticeable rises in France, Finland,
Slovenia, Slovakia and especially
Poland. Currently the shares are high-
est in the Scandinavian Member States,
which partly explains why these coun-
tries have already taken significant
steps to improve the labour market
participation of older workers with
some success.
In the longer term, and in purely
demographic terms, the impact on
Member States of changes in the size
and structure of the working-age
population up to 2050 are likely to be
most problematic for the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia
and Spain, and it is these Member
States which may face the greatest
pressure to adapt labour markets
accordingly. They will suffer substan-
tial declines in the working-age pop-
ulation of the order of 20–30% by
2050, and almost all will also see a
marked rise (in excess of 5 percent-
age points) in the share of older
workers in that population
8
(Table 3).
Among these, Lithuania, Poland and
Slovakia appear to face the greatest
challenge arising from changes in the
size and structure of the working-age
population. 
A group consisting of Belgium, Den-
mark, France, the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom should experi-
ence much lower reductions in the56
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Table 2 - Projected developments in the working age population and the share of older people aged 55–64 in the WAP
Change in the WAP relative to 2005 level (% change) Share of older people aged 55–64 in WAP (%)
2010 2030 2050 2005 2010 2030 2050
BE 2.0 -3.9 -8.1 16.8 18.9 21.5 20.8
CZ -1.0 -15.0 -30.7 18.5 20.5 22.7 24.8
DK 0.2 -4.9 -8.7 19.8 20.2 22.2 20.1
DE -1.3 -12.2 -23.7 17.6 18.0 24.3 23.4
EE -2.0 -16.6 -26.9 16.2 17.5 19.6 23.9
IE 4.9 18.5 14.3 14.1 15.6 19.7 20.2
EL 1.0 -5.0 -21.5 16.5 18.1 24.7 22.7
ES 2.9 -2.1 -23.1 15.2 16.4 25.5 22.2
FR 2.1 -1.1 -4.4 16.6 19.5 20.9 19.9
IT -0.5 -10.0 -26.9 18.1 18.9 26.6 22.7
CY 8.5 16.2 16.7 14.9 16.3 18.7 24.2
LV -2.4 -18.6 -30.0 16.4 16.5 20.3 24.8
LT -0.5 -14.8 -26.0 15.2 15.5 20.6 25.6
LU 5.3 16.4 28.6 15.3 16.6 20.4 18.8
HU -1.2 -13.1 -25.3 17.5 19.6 21.2 22.8
MT 5.6 7.0 10.9 17.9 20.5 18.0 22.3
NL 1.7 -2.2 -4.2 17.6 19.3 22.0 19.7
AT 0.7 -5.2 -14.8 17.3 16.9 23.5 22.9
PL 1.5 -13.6 -27.5 14.1 18.1 19.2 25.7
PT 0.5 -6.3 -22.3 16.5 17.9 23.4 21.7
SI 0.1 -11.5 -24.4 15.8 18.6 23.3 23.1
SK 1.4 -11.2 -28.5 14.0 16.9 20.3 26.4
FI 1.0 -9.4 -13.7 19.6 22.3 20.1 21.4
SE 2.1 1.2 3.2 20.1 20.0 20.9 21.5
UK 2.4 0.1 -4.3 17.7 18.3 21.6 21.9
Source: Eurostat, population projections (2004, baseline variant).
8 Some of the 2050 projections may be too pessimistic for certain Member States, as recent data on total fertility rates published by Eurostat indi-
cate a strong improvement in birth rates over the last two-three years in some cases. This is particularly the case in the Czech Republic, Estonia,
Sweden and the United Kingdom. New projections will be published by Eurostat in 2008 which may take into account such recent developments
and may lead to some revision in the projected situation of Member States.
working-age population (of the
order of 4–9%) as well as more mod-
erate rises in the share of older work-
ers in that population. In contrast,
Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta
and Sweden should all see increases
in the overall working-age popula-
tion, although for the former two the
rise in the share of older workers
should also be substantial. Sweden is
in the fortunate position of expect-
ing growth in the working-age popu-
lation combined with only a very lim-
ited increase in the share of people
aged 55–64, although this partly
reflects the fact that currently the
share in Sweden (20%) is the highest
of all Member States. This shows that,
although a matter of concern to all
countries, some Member States will
face a greater challenge from work-
force ageing than others, implying
that the scale of the adjustment
measures necessary will vary across
countries.
2.1.2. Labour market exit and
life expectancy in retirement
The numbers of workers leaving the
labour force and going into retire-
ment will increase markedly over the
coming years as a result of the ageing
of the EU population and the baby-
boom generation (i.e. those born
between 1946 and 1965) reaching
retirement age, to be replaced by
much less populace generations born
in the 1970s onwards. This will lead
to important changes in the size and
age structure of the labour force (i.e.
those who are economically active),
although the negative effects may be
temporarily offset during the coming
decade with the support of specially
adapted employment and pensions
policies. Indeed, recent projections
9
suggest that although the working-
age population will begin to fall from
just after 2010 onwards, the total
number of persons in employment in
the EU-25 would continue to increase
until around 2017. However, increas-
ing employment rates can only offer
a temporary respite, and the full bur-
den of the demographic changes
would subsequently be felt. 
Figures on the age at which people
exit the labour market and become
economically inactive show that, on
average, people within the EU-25
withdrew from the labour force at
the age of 60 in 2001. Yet due to
improvements in health and living
conditions, by the early 2000s life
expectancy at the age of 60 had risen
on average to around 20 years for
men and 24 years for women (Chart
5). This means that people can expect
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9 Economic Policy Committee and European Commission (2006), ‘The impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU-25 Member States
on pensions, healthcare, long-term care, education and unemployment transfers (2004-50)’ in European Economy Reports and Studies, No. 1.
Table 3: Projected change 2005–2050 in the WAP and the share of older people 
(55–64) in the WAP
Change in the size of the working age population
Increase Limited decline(<10%)
Medium decline
(10-20%)
Strong decline
(>20%)
Increase in
the share of
older people
aged 55-64 in
the WAP
Low (< 2%) SE DK FI
Moderate
(2–5%) LU, MT
BE, FR, NL,
UK IT
Medium
(5–10%) CY, IE AT
CZ, DE, EE, EL,
ES, LV, HU, PT,
SI
Strong
(> 10%) LT, PL, SK
Source: Eurostat, population projections (2004, baseline variant).
to live substantially beyond the age
at which they withdraw from the
labour market, which modifies enor-
mously the meaning of retirement,
especially as further improvements in
longevity will increase the post-exit
years even further. Indeed, it is pro-
jected that a European reaching the
age of 65 in 2050 could expect to live
on average some four to five years
longer than those reaching 65
today
10
. In a context where people
live on average a further 20 years or
more after withdrawing from active
life, increasing participation and
delaying the exit from the labour
force will be essential to support eco-
nomic growth and ease the mount-
ing pressure on social protection sys-
tems, in particular regarding pen-
sions and healthcare systems. There
is, therefore, growing public aware-
ness of the need to delay the age at
which people exit the labour market,
with the results from a recent Euro-
barometer survey
11
indicating that
45% of EU-25 citizens aged 15 or
older believe that their fellow citi-
zens retire too early.
2.1.3. Impact on economic
growth, social security and
public finances
Economic growth rates are set to
decline with the ageing of the popu-
lation, mainly due to the effect on
overall employment levels of the
reduction in the working-age popu-
lation. The Economic Policy Commit-
tee and European Commission 2006
projections forecast that, if current
trends and policies remain unaltered,
annual GDP growth for the EU-25 will
fall systematically from 2.4% over the
period 2004–2010 to only 1.2%
between 2030 and 2050. Over time,
Europe will increasingly have to rely
on productivity gains as a main
source of economic growth. At the
same time, older workers will consti-
tute an increasingly important ele-
ment of EU labour resources. 
Based on current policies, ageing
will lead to ever greater pressures
on public spending, although the
situation varies widely from one
country to another. For the EU-25, it
is projected
12
that age-related
expenditure will rise by around 4%
of GDP up to 2050, representing an
increase of 10% in public spending.
The upward pressure will be felt
from 2010 onwards, with about half
of the projected increase in public
spending used on pensions and the
other half on healthcare and long-
term care. As a result, overall public
finances risk becoming unsustain-
able in many countries, thereby
compromising the future equilibri-
um of pension and social security
systems in general. Indeed, as
reported in the Communication to
the 2006 Spring European Council
13
,
based on current policies there is a
medium to high risk to the sustain-
ability of public finances in a major-
ity of EU countries. At the same
time, as highlighted by the 2007
Joint Report on Social Protection
and Social Inclusion, current public
pension reforms would often trans-
late in the long term into declines in
pension levels at a given retirement
age and a given career length (as
measured by theoretical replace-
ment rates
14
) in most countries,
notably in those which have enacted
comprehensive reforms (and
improved sustainability). In parallel,
Member States are projecting to
compensate for this decline in order
to ensure future adequacy by
extending working lives or increas-
ing supplementary pension savings. 
In order to tackle these challenges
the EU Member States need to imple-
ment structural reforms so as to
restrain the long-term expenditure
trends and to raise potential growth,
notably by raising employment rates
and the effective retirement age.
Reforms are thus needed to redress
past reductions in the effective retire-
ment age, and to cope with the baby-
boom generation retiring and the
increases in the dependency ratio, so
as to ensure, in particular, adequate
and sustainable retirement provision.
EU governments have, in general, not
remained inactive and recent
reforms, especially in the fields of
public pensions, health, employment
and education systems, have begun
to pay off, as evidenced in particular
by the employment rate for older
workers, which has been rising rapid-
ly since 2000.
2.2. Policy context
2.2.1. Stockholm and
Barcelona targets
Demographic ageing and its impact on
employment in Europe is widely recog-
nised as one of the main challenges
facing the EU. This is clearly reflected
in the fact that the EU has set itself
two key objectives with regard to
employment of older people. In 2001,
the Stockholm European Council set
a target that, by 2010, at least half of
the EU population aged 55–64
should be in employment. This was
then followed by the conclusion of
the 2002 Barcelona European Coun-
cil that ‘a progressive increase of
about five years in the effective aver-
age age at which people stop work-
ing in the EU should be sought by
2010’, the aim being to step up
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13 Communication from the Commission to the Spring European Council, implementing the renewed Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs, ‘A year
of delivery’, 2006
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earnings and career profile (and a corresponding affiliation to pension schemes) and by taking into account enacted reforms of pension systems.
 
efforts to allow older workers to
remain longer in the labour market. 
In its synthesis report to the 2004
European Spring Council
15
, the Com-
mission identified active ageing as
one of the three priority areas for
which swift action is needed to deliv-
er the Lisbon Strategy. It highlighted
that efforts to promote active ageing
must be pursued vigorously, particu-
larly in those Member States with low
employment rates for older workers
and low average exit ages, and called
for action on four fronts combined
with pension reforms: removing dis-
incentives for workers to work
longer, discouraging early retire-
ment, stimulating lifelong learning
to avoid skills obsolescence, and
improving working conditions and
maintaining the overall health status
of the mature population. In line
with this it proposed the following
actions for Member States and the
social partners:
• Removing financial disincentives
for workers to retire later and for
employers to hire and keep older
workers. This includes adjusting
specific tax-benefit mechanisms
and employment and pension
legislation, to reduce provisions
discouraging older workers from
staying longer in employment
and to discourage early exits
from the labour market. Efforts
to discourage early retirement
should be pursued in all Member
States.
• Promoting access to training for
all and developing lifelong learn-
ing strategies, particularly for
older workers who are under-
represented in training.
• Improving quality in work to pro-
vide an attractive, safe and
adaptable work environment
throughout working life, includ-
ing the provision of part-time
and career breaks.
More recent key communications
from the European Commission on
the issue of Europe’s demographic
future
16
have again highlighted the
major challenge of coping with an
ageing population in Europe and its
consequences for the labour market.
2.2.2. Employment Guidelines
(2005 to 2008)
Within the European Employment
Strategy, the need to improve the
labour market situation of older
workers is fully taken into account in
the Employment Guidelines (2005 to
2008) adopted by the Council in July
2005. These emphasise that strategies
for the management of an ageing
workforce must necessarily extend
over several dimensions, and high-
light that as part of a new intergen-
erational approach particular atten-
tion should be paid to promoting
access to employment throughout
working life. 
One overall aim of the guidelines is
attracting and retaining more people
in employment, increasing labour
supply and modernising social pro-
tection systems. In this context it is
emphasised that promoting an
increased labour supply in all groups
together with a new life-cycle
approach to work, and modernising
social protection systems to ensure
their adequacy, financial sustainabili-
ty and responsiveness to changing
needs in society, are all the more nec-
essary because of the expected
decline in the working-age popula-
tion. The low employment rate of
older workers is specifically men-
tioned as an issue requiring special
attention and emphasis is put on the
need for the right conditions to be
put in place to facilitate progress in
employment, including for those
wishing to prolong working lives. 
Specific actions targeted at older
people are called for under several of
the guidelines. Guideline 17 (Imple-
ment employment policies aiming at
full employment, improving quality
and productivity at work, and
strengthening social and territorial
cohesion) recalls, among other
things, that policies should con-
tribute to achieving an average EU
employment rate for older workers
of 50% by 2010, and to reducing
unemployment and inactivity. Under
Guideline 18 (which concerns the
promotion of a lifecycle approach to
work) specific measures called for
include:
• ‘support for active ageing,
including appropriate working
conditions, improved (occupa-
tional) health status and ade-
quate incentives to work and dis-
couragement of early retirement’
• ‘modern social protection sys-
tems, including pensions and
healthcare, ensuring their social
adequacy, financial sustainability
and responsiveness to changing
needs, so as to support participa-
tion and better retention in
employment and longer working
lives’.
Furthermore, although not specifical-
ly mentioned, older workers are also
concerned by measures under several
of the other guidelines. For example,
Guideline 19 (Ensure inclusive labour
markets, enhance work attractive-
ness, and make work pay for job-
seekers, including disadvantaged
people, and the inactive) concerns
facilitating access to employment
and requires breaking down barriers
to the labour market by assisting
with effective job searching, facilitat-
ing access to training and other
active labour market measures and
ensuring work pays, including
through a continual review of the
incentives and disincentives resulting
from tax and benefits systems. Guide-
line 21 (Promote flexibility combined
with employment security and
59
Chapter 2 Active ageing and labour market trends for older workers
15 Delivering Lisbon – Reforms for the Enlarged Union’, report from the European Commission to the Spring European Council, COM(2004) 29.
16 European Commission, ‘Confronting demographic change: a new solidarity between the generations’ COM(2005) 94 final, and ‘The demograph-
ic future of Europe – from challenge to opportunity’ COM(2006) 571 final.
reduce labour market segmentation)
concerns the need to improve the
adaptability of workers and enter-
prises to better anticipate, trigger
and absorb economic and social
change, and calls for employment-
friendly labour costs, modern forms
of work organisation and well func-
tioning labour markets, allowing
more flexibility combined with
employment security. The promotion
and dissemination of innovative and
adaptable forms of work organisa-
tion with a view to improving quality
and productivity at work (including
health and safety) and support for
transitions in occupational status
(including training) are two of the
measures highlighted.
Furthermore, the measures under the
guidelines which fall within the over-
all objective of improving human
capital through better education and
skills also apply to older workers. It is
clearly recognised that the EU needs
higher and more effective investment
in human capital and lifelong learn-
ing in order to enhance access to
employment for all ages, raise pro-
ductivity levels and improve quality
at work. In response, efficient life-
long learning strategies are called for
with a view to enhancing participa-
tion in continuous and workplace
training throughout the life cycle,
especially for the low-skilled and
older workers.
2.2.3. Active ageing
The EU policy response is therefore
based on a comprehensive and sus-
tainable approach known as ‘active
ageing’, which employs a range of
tools beyond just retirement reforms.
This recognises that in order to be
able to seriously consider working
longer, people must be in good phys-
ical and mental health and have
good prospects of remaining so for
longer, they must have access to
more flexible retirement schemes
and working arrangements as well as
appropriate working conditions, they
must have the opportunity to, and be
prepared to, update and make the
most of the skills they have gained,
and they must have access to avail-
able employment opportunities and
not be faced with discriminatory
prejudices.
As part of the new intergenerational
approach advocated by the European
Employment Strategy, it is recognised
that particular attention should be
paid to promoting access to employ-
ment throughout working life. In its
Communication on ‘Increasing labour
force participation and promoting
active ageing’
17
, the European Com-
mission emphasised that ‘the objective
of a comprehensive strategy should be
to maximise each individual’s capacity
to participate over his or her whole life
cycle. Prevention is the key to a suc-
cessful integration and retention of
people in the labour market. The aim
is to ensure the positive interaction of
economic, employment and social pol-
icies with the view to supporting a
long-term sustainable working life in
which all human resources in society
are fully utilised.’ As part of this, rais-
ing the basic educational level and
preventing the erosion of skills
throughout adult working life are
seen as key to raising participation and
employment. Furthermore, the report
states that ‘high employment and
activity rates among the prime age
group could be translated into signifi-
cantly higher employment rates for
older workers up to a decade later if a
dynamic approach is taken to retain
these workers longer in the labour
market through better working
arrangements and quality in work’,
and that ‘appropriate incentives and
services at decisive stages in life, for
example the provision of childcare
facilities for parents and better recon-
ciliation between work and family
responsibilities, will avoid early exits
from the labour market’.
As the results in the next section
show, there has been a substantial
improvement in the labour market
situation of older people in recent
years, suggesting that recent policy
developments in the area of active
ageing are starting to pay off. 
3. CURRENT LABOUR
MARKET SITUATION AND
RECENT EMPLOYMENT
TRENDS FOR OLDER
WORKERS
3.1. Labour market
characteristics and
comparisons with
other age groups
According to the EU Labour Force Sur-
vey (LFS), of the 56.6 million people
aged 55–64 in the EU-27 in 2006, 
24.6 million were in employment, 1.6
million were unemployed and 30.4
million were inactive. In terms of the
share of total employment, those
aged 55–64 accounted for 11.5%, or
just over one in nine, while they
accounted for just over 17% of the
total working-age population (aged
15–64). For the group aged 65 and
over, amounting to 81.0 million, only
3.5 million were in employment
(accounting for below 2% of total
employment) while the rest were
essentially inactive.
The employment rate for those aged
55–64, at 43.5% in 2006, is around
half that of the prime working-age
(25–54) population (78.1%) and one
third less than that for the working-
age population as a whole (64.4%).
Furthermore, there are strong gen-
der differences in the employment
rates of people aged 55–64, with the
rate for older men averaging 52.6%
and that for older women only
34.8%, although this gender gap
(17.8 percentage points) is not sub-
stantially different from that for
prime-age men and women (15.7
percentage points). Nevertheless, dif-
ferences in employment rates for
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older workers according to gender
are substantial in most Member
States (Chart 6), and indeed the low
employment rate for older workers
is, to a large extent, a result of the
relatively low rates for older women.
As shown later this is due at least in
part to lower levels of female partici-
pation in general, including at
younger ages, the lower skill levels of
older women, and lower statutory
retirement ages for women com-
pared to men in many Member
States.
A comparison of the characteristics of
the population in employment aged
55–64 with other age groups indi-
cates some of the more typical fea-
tures of older workers’ employment
(Table 4). Firstly, larger shares of
older people in employment are men
(59%) compared to the younger age
groups (55%), i.e. there is a relatively
lower involvement of older women
in employment (41%). Similarly part-
time employment is a more promi-
nent feature of older workers’
employment (22%) compared to
prime-age workers (16%), while, in
contrast, fixed-term employment is
relatively rare in this age group.
Another key feature is the prevalence
among older workers of self-employ-
ment, which accounts for almost a
quarter of all employment among
55–64 years olds compared to only
15% of prime-age workers. 
The sectoral composition of employ-
ment of older workers within the EU-
27 is also quite distinctive (Chart 7 -
see page 62). Although, as for the
young and prime working-age
groups, two-thirds of older workers
are employed in the services sector,
there are significant differences in
the shares employed in industry
(mainly composed of manufacturing
and construction) and agriculture. A
higher share of older workers’
employment is in agriculture com-
pared to the other age groups (8.6%
compared to around 5% for young
and prime-age workers), while the
share in industry is lower (24.5% ver-
sus 28%). 
Furthermore, while employment of
older workers in agriculture repre-
sents only 8.6% of total employment
for that age group, it accounts for
around 17% of all agricultural
employment, showing the relative
importance of older workers to this
sector in particular. Education is the
only other sector where older work-
ers account for a similarly high share
(over 15%) of total sectoral employ-
ment, the share in most other sectors
being broadly around the 10% level.
At EU level, older workers are rela-
tively over-represented in know-
ledge-intensive sectors, such as edu-
cation and health and social work,
compared to the younger age
groups, and, with the clear exception
of agriculture, under-represented in
those sectors where the work gener-
ally involves more physical than men-
tal effort (such as manufacturing,
construction, wholesale and retail
trade and repair, and hotels and
restaurants). This structural composi-
tion of older workers’ employment
appears relatively positive in light of
major underlying trends, such as the
general shift towards a more know-
ledge-based economy and popula-
tion ageing, which are likely to create
greater demand and employment
opportunities in those sectors (apart
from agriculture) where older workers’
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Table 4 - Characteristics of older workers' (aged 55–64) employment in the EU-27
compared to other age groups, 2006 
(shares (as %) of employment within the age group by sex and type of employment )
Age group Men Women
Sex 15–24 55.0 45.0
25–54 55.1 44.9
55–64 58.7 41.3
Total Men Women
Part-time 15–24 25.3 18.5 33.7
25–54 15.8 4.8 29.4
55–64 22.0 10.6 38.2
Total Men Women
Fixed-term 15–24 40.9 41.0 40.7
25–54 11.4 10.8 12.2
55–64 6.7 6.5 6.9
Employee Family worker Self-
employed
Professional status 15–24 92.9 3.1 4.0
25–54 83.9 1.4 14.7
55–64 74.5 2.6 22.9
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, 2006 annual average.
Note: French and German data for 2006 are provisional.
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employment is more typical (e.g.
education, and health and social
work).
In terms of occupational structure,
although the employment structure for
older workers and people of prime
working age are broadly similar, and
both markedly different from that for
youth, older workers are slightly more
concentrated in the skilled non-manual
and elementary occupations than
prime working-age people, but less so
in the low-skilled non-manual occupa-
tions (Table 5). Employment shares in
the skilled manual occupations are simi-
lar for older and prime working-age
workers, due to the higher share of
older people employed in ‘skilled
agricultural and fisheries workers’
occupations compensating for lower
shares in ‘craft and related trades
workers’ and ‘plant and machine
operators and assemblers’ occupa-
tions (Chart 8). Within the skilled
non-manual occupations, older
workers have relatively greater
shares of employment in the highest
skilled occupations (i.e. in the ‘legis-
lators, senior officials and man-
agers’ and ‘professionals’ cat-
egories).
Looking also at the occupational
employment structure from a gen-
der perspective (Table 5 and Chart
9), for older male workers, there is a
higher share of employment in
skilled non-manual occupations
than for their prime working-age
counterparts, partly reflecting the
tendency for higher skilled people
to remain longer in employment
than the low-skilled. In contrast,
older female workers are less con-
centrated in the skilled non-manual
occupations than those aged 25–54,
and relatively more concentrated in
the elementary occupations, partly
reflecting the lower skill levels of
the older generation of female
workers and the improvements in
education for the younger cohorts
of females in recent decades. Com-
paring older men and older women
directly, there are large differences
in occupational employment struc-
ture between the sexes. While
employment shares in the skilled
non-manual occupations are broad-
ly similar, employment of older men
is relatively much more concentrat-
ed in the skilled manual occupa-
tions, while older women are rela-
tively more concentrated in the low-
skilled non-manual and elementary
occupations.
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Table 5 - Occupational employment structure in the EU-27, 2006,
as % shares of total employment in age group
15–24 25–54 55–64
All
Skilled non-manual 19.1 40.0 41.6
Low-skilled non-manual 38.9 23.5 19.6
Skilled manual 29.2 27.3 27.4
Elementary occupations 12.8 9.2 11.4
Men
Skilled non-manual 15.5 38.0 43.3
Low-skilled non-manual 23.0 13.2 9.9
Skilled manual 46.1 40.9 37.9
Elementary occupations 15.4 7.8 8.8
Women
Skilled non-manual 23.3 42.4 39.2
Low-skilled non-manual 58.0 35.9 33.4
Skilled manual 8.9 10.8 12.4
Elementary occupations 9.8 10.9 15.1
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, 2006 annual average. 
Note: Excludes employment in the armed forces.
3.2. Recent labour
market trends and
progress towards the
targets
3.2.1. Recent overall trends
for older workers
One of the most salient features of
developments in the EU labour mar-
ket in recent years has been the sharp
rise in the employment rate of older
workers since 2000 (Chart 10 - see
page 65), even more remarkable as
this has taken place during a period
that, for a large part, (over the years
2001 to 2004) was characterised by
sluggish economic and employment
growth. While for the EU
18
as a
whole, progress in raising the
employment rate of older people was
rather slow during the 1990s, since
2000 the increase in the employment
rate of those aged 55–64 has general-
ly accelerated, outpacing the rises for
the working-age population as a
whole (Chart 11 - see page 65). Post
2000, the improvement in the
employment rate for older workers
has been markedly better than that
for both people of prime working
age (25–54) and youth (15–24),
reversing the situation prior to 2000.
As a result, along with the rise in
female participation, employment of
older workers has been one of the
most dynamic components of the EU
labour market in recent years, with
the employment rate rise for older
workers accounting for a substantial
share of the rise in the overall
employment rate (Box 1 - see page
64).
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Chart 9: Occupational employment structure in the EU-27 of prime-age and older
worker age groups, by sex, in 2006
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Source:  Eurostat, EU LFS, 2006 annual average.
18 As mentioned previously, the focus is on the EU-25 aggregate rather than the EU-27, due to the marked break in series for Romania between
2001 and 2002.
3.2.2. Progress towards the
Stockholm target
In total, between 2000 and 2006, the
employment rate of people aged
55–64 rose by 7 percentage points at
EU-25 level, taking the average rate
from 36.6% to 43.6%, and with the
increase higher for older women (up
8 percentage points) than for older
men (up 5.9 percentage points). This
reflects marked increases in almost all
Member States (Chart 12), with only
Poland and Portugal recording
declining rates, although for the lat-
ter the rate is already relatively high
and just above the 2010 target. How-
ever, despite the substantial rises of
recent years, there is still a gap of 6.5
percentage points to the Stockholm
target for older people. Furthermore,
there remains large variations in
employment rates for older people
aged 55–64 at the level of individual
Member States, which in 2006
ranged from as low as 28% in Poland
to as high as almost 70% in Sweden,
and with, in general, a situation of
high rates in northern Member
States and low rates in southern
European countries.
In 2006, nine of the EU Member
States (Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land, Ireland, Latvia, Portugal, Swe-
den and the United Kingdom) had
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Box 1 – The impact of rises in older people’s employment and participation on overall employment 
and participation rates in the EU-25
It is interesting to see what impact the changes in employment for older workers between 2000 and 2006 has had
on the overall employment rate (i.e. for the population aged 15–64) in the EU. For this purpose, changes in the
employment rate can be broken down into a population composition effect (representing the change in employ-
ment rates attributable to changes in population structure, assuming that employment rates per age group
remained the same) and an employment rate effect (representing the change in the employment rate had the pop-
ulation structure remained the same). This can also be done for participation rates. 
This shift share analysis of the contribution of different age groups to the changes in the overall participation and
employment rates (Table 6), together with the contribution provided by the demographic component, reveals that
the increase in activity and employment rates between 2000 and 2006 was essentially driven by net rate increases
for prime-age females and older workers. Almost half of the improvement in the EU employment rate was due to
the shift in the employment rate for older workers. The impact of the demographic effect (i.e. the shift in the rela-
tive share of different age and gender groups, which is a pure compositional effect) was slightly negative for the
working-age population as a whole, due to the reduction of the young and prime-age groups. In contrast, the
demographic effect was substantially positive for the older workers age group, with the improvement in the over-
all participation and employment rate therefore due in part (around one-seventh for employment rates) to the
increasing share of older workers.
Table 6 - Contribution to changes in activity and employment rates in the EU-25 between 2000 and 2006 by age group
Percentage point change 2000–2006 Activity Rates Employment Rates
Total (for WAP) (= 1 + 2 + 3) 1.8 100% 2.5 100%
Contribution from shift in rate
Total WAP (1) 1.9 108% 2.6 104%
15–24 -0.3 -16% -0.1 -4%
25–54 1.1 60% 1.5 61%
55–64 1.1 64% 1.2 47%
Men 0.4 20% 0.6 23%
15–24 -0.1 -8% -0.1 -3%
25–54 0.0 2% 0.2 6%
55–64 0.5 26% 0.5 20%
Women 1.5 87% 2.0 81%
15–24 -0.2 -9% 0.0 -1%
25–54 1.0 58% 1.4 55%
55–64 0.7 38% 0.7 27%
Contribution from demographic effect
Total WAP (2) -0.2 -12% -0.2 -6%
15–24 -0.3 -14% -0.2 -8%
25–54 -0.3 -19% -0.3 -12%
55–64 0.4 21% 0.3 14%
Interaction effect (residual effect)
Total WAP (3) 0.1 4% 0.1 2%
15–24 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
25–54 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
55–64 0.1 4% 0.1 3%
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat, LFS 2000 spring data and 2006 second quarter data.
already achieved the 2010 Stockholm
employment rate target for older
workers, but only three others were
within 3 percentage points of it,
although this does include the largest
Member State, Germany. While sub-
stantial gaps remain for many Mem-
ber States (being of the order of
between 15 and 22 percentage
points in nine cases), substantial
progress has been made towards the
target in many countries since 2000.
In particular, 20 of the EU-25 have
achieved increases of around 5 per-
centage points or more, with espe-
cially strong rises (in excess of 10 per-
centage points) in Estonia, Finland,
Germany, Hungary, Latvia and Slo-
vakia. Apart from Poland and Portu-
gal, only Greece and Malta have had
relatively limited success in raising
their employment rates for older
workers.
In terms of skill levels, employment
rate increases for those aged 55–64
have been greatest for the medium-
skilled, for whom rates have
increased 7.2 percentage points
between 2000 and 2006, this increase
even exceeding that for the high-
skilled (up 5.8 percentage points). In
contrast, the improvement has been
more limited for low-skilled older
workers for whom employment rates
have risen less than 5 percentage
points. This has somewhat dampened
the overall rise for older workers,
especially given the high share of
low-skilled in the population aged
55–64.
Underlying the rise in older workers’
employment rates has been a sharp
increase in their labour market par-
ticipation, with their activity rates
also having risen on average by 7 per-
centage points in the EU-25 between
2000 and 2006. This reflects not only
strong increases in activity rates for
older women (up 8.2 percentage
points), but also, although to a lesser
degree, in the participation rate of
older men (up 5.8 percentage points)
(Chart 13 - see page 66). For older
women this is largely a consequence
of the longer-term trend of rising
female participation in general, with
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Chart 10: Year-on-year change in employment rates for older workers (aged 55–64)
in the EU, 1994–2006
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Chart 11: Year-on year change in employment rates in the EU-25 by age group,
1997–2006
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Chart 12: Changes in employment rates across EU-25 Member States for older
workers (aged 55–64) from 2000 to 2006
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Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, annual averages.
Note: French and German data for 2006 are provisional.
higher participation in successive
cohorts of better educated younger
women progressively feeding
through into improved participation
in older age groups, while for older
men it marks a turnaround in the
long-term trend of falling partici-
pation rates observed since the
1970s. Strong rises in participation
for women have also occurred for the
age group 45–54, which should have
a positive impact in the medium term
as this cohort moves into the older
workers’ age group.
It is also interesting to note that
developments in employment rates
for the age group 65 and over also
show rises in the vast majority of
Member States since 2000, suggest-
ing a move towards more people
staying longer in work, even beyond
the bounds of what is currently con-
sidered normal working age (Chart
14), although the overall change at
EU level is limited.
3.2.3. Progress towards the
Barcelona target
The Stockholm and Barcelona targets
are complementary in that they both
require an increase in the labour mar-
ket participation of older workers.
However, achieving the Barcelona
target would contribute to achieving
the Stockholm target only in as much
as increased labour force participa-
tion leads to employment rather than
unemployment, i.e. by keeping older
people in the labour force longer and
ensuring that they remain in, or can
enter, work. Nevertheless, it is clear
that countries with high employment
rates for older workers generally
tend to be those with high average
exit ages
19
(Chart 15).
Based on figures for 2005
20
, EU Mem-
ber States can be placed into three
main groupings according to the
combination of exit age and older
workers’ employment rate: one in
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Chart 13: Change in activity rates for the EU-25 between 2000 and 2006
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Chart 14: Changes in employment rates between 2000 and 2006 for the population
aged 65 and over 
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Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, 2000 spring and 2006 second quarter results.
Note: French and German data for 2006 are provisional.
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19 Exit age figures are derived from a model using activity rates by individual year Labour Force Survey data to calculate probabilities for individuals
in each same age cohort to stay active in period ‘t’ compared to period ‘t-1’. For a full description of the model see the annex to EiE 2003, Chap-
ter 5. The results from the model do not refer to the effective retirement age but rather provide an estimate for the average exit age from the
labour force for an active person aged 50–70, regardless of whether they are receiving a pension or not.
20 Exit age data for 2006 was not available in time for inclusion in this report.
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, 2005 results.
Note: Average exit age for CY and DE refers to 2004.
 
which employment rates for older
people are high and at or above the
Stockholm target, and for which exit
ages are generally in excess of 61
years (this group includes the Scandi-
navian countries, Estonia and Latvia,
Ireland and the United Kingdom, and
the Mediterranean countries of
Cyprus and Portugal); a second in
which employment rates are well
below the 50% target and exit ages
are generally below 60 years (this
group includes most of the central
and eastern European Member
States, Italy and Malta, and Belgium,
France and Luxembourg); and a third
intermediate group where rates are
around the EU average and exit ages
are centred around the 61 years mark
(among this group are Germany and
Spain).
Figures covering the period 2001 to
2005 indicate there has been an over-
all, although limited, increase in the
EU-25 in the average age at which
older workers exit from the labour
force (i.e. transit from active to in-
active life purely in labour market
terms) (Table 7). By 2005 the average
exit age had risen to 60.9 years com-
pared to 59.9 years in 2001, and with
the vast majority of Member States
having experienced increases over
this period. Nevertheless, there
remains a wide variation in exit ages
across Member States, ranging from
as low as 58.5 years in Slovenia to
64.1 years in Ireland in 2005. It is still
the case that no Member State has an
exit age above the Barcelona target,
equivalent to around 65 years. Strong
efforts are therefore still needed to
encourage older people not to with-
draw from the labour force at rela-
tively early ages and to increase
opportunities for them to remain in
the labour market.
In the context of retaining older peo-
ple in employment longer, it is inter-
esting to examine the employment
rate profile across specific ages. In
the EU, the employment rate of peo-
ple aged 50–69 decreases with age
but not in a uniform manner (Chart
16), while men tend to stay in
employment to later ages than
women. In 2006, between the ages
of 50 and 54 years, the employment
rate declined on average by close to
2 percentage points per year, but
picked up to 4.6 points per year on
average from 54 to 59. Between 59
and 60 there was a much more
marked decline, in that employment
rates fell sharply by 9 percentage
points between these two years of
age, indicating that this is a key deci-
sion point for exiting the labour mar-
ket. Although an important feature
for both sexes, the effect at this age
was more pronounced for women
than men, reflecting the prevalence
across several Member States of 60
years as the official retirement age
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Table 7 - Labour market indicators for older 
workers and changes since 2000 
Labour Market indicators for older Change between 2000 and 2005 
people aged 55–64, 2005 (percentage point change)
AR ER Exit age1 AR ER Exit age1
BE 33.3 31.8 60.6 6.2 5.5 3.8
CZ 46.9 44.5 60.6 8.7 8.2 1.7
DK 62.8 59.5 60.9 4.6 3.8 -0.7
DE 52.0 45.4 61.3 9.1 7.8 0.7
EE 59.0 56.1 61.7 7.7 9.8 0.6
IE 53.1 51.6 64.1 6.6 6.3 0.9
EL 43.2 41.6 61.7 2.7 2.6 0.4
ES 45.9 43.1 62.4 5.0 6.1 2.1
FR 40.0 37.9 58.8 7.9 8.0 0.7
IT 32.6 31.4 59.7 3.6 3.7 -0.1
CY 52.4 50.6 62.7 1.1 1.2 0.4
LV 53.8 49.5 62.1 14.1 13.5 -0.3
LT 52.8 49.2 60.0 7.7 8.8 1.1
LU 32.4 31.7 59.4 5.4 5.0 2.6
HU 34.3 33.0 59.8 11.4 10.8 2.2
MT 31.9 30.8 58.8 2.3 2.3 1.2
NL 48.1 46.1 61.5 9.1 7.9 0.6
AT 33.0 31.8 59.8 2.5 3.0 0.6
PL 30.5 27.2 59.5 -0.8 -1.2 2.9
PT 53.8 50.5 63.1 1.4 -0.2 1.2
SI 32.1 30.7 58.5 8.1 8.0 1.9
SK 35.0 30.3 59.2 10.7 9.0 1.7
FI 56.6 52.7 61.7 10.7 11.1 0.3
SE 72.6 69.4 63.7 4.0 4.5 1.9
UK 58.5 56.9 62.6 5.6 6.2 0.6
EU-25 45.5 42.5 60.9 6.0 5.9 1.0
Source: Eurostat QLFD and Structural Indicators.
Note: 1. Changes in the exit age refer to changes since 2001 for all Member States except for EL and SI which refer
to 2002, and CY and DE for which the latest data refers to 2004.
German data for 2005 are provisional.
for women. Between 60 and 64,
rates returned to a slower rate of
decline of 5 percentage points per
year, but again fell more sharply
between 64 and 65 due to a strong
adjustment for men. Beyond 65 the
rate tends to flatten out, decreasing
by a more subdued 1.6 percentage
points per year on average until 69. 
The employment rate profiles for
2000 and 2006 indicate that older
men have tended to stay longer in
work compared to 2000, the fall in
rates being at a slower pace, and
with a slightly less strong adjustment
when reaching 60. It is also apparent
that the change in employment rates
has been more marked for men aged
60 to 64 than the younger age group
55–59, but that for women the oppo-
site has occurred (i.e. the rate adjust-
ment is more concentrated in the
older age group for men and in the
younger group for women). This sug-
gests that recent policy changes to
encourage later withdrawal from the
labour market may particularly have
influenced participation of older
men. In contrast, developments for
women reflect more the importance
of cohort effects on their employ-
ment rates, as women of succeeding
generations more likely to be in
employment than their predecessors
enter the ranks of older workers.
The pattern in the decline in
employment rates with age shows
considerable variation across Mem-
ber States (Chart 17). In several
(Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Poland, Slovakia and
Slovenia) there are strong declines
(of the order of 25 percentage
points or more) in employment
rates between age groups 50–54
and 55–59, indicating that many
people leave employment relatively
early in these countries. In contrast
Member States such as Denmark,
Estonia, Lithuania and Sweden
show little decline between these
age groups, which is also relatively
limited in the large Member States
of Germany, Spain and the United
Kingdom. The overall decline in
employment rates from 50–54 to
60–64 is substantial, indicating that
stemming the exit from employ-
ment at early ages would have a
large impact on the supply of labour
in the 55–64 age group, especially in
countries such as Austria, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia and France.
3.3. Main features of
the rise in employment
of older people since
2000
According to the EU Labour Force
Survey, of the 13 million total rise in
employment in the EU-25 between
2000 and 2006, around 5.3 million or
41%, was due to the substantial rise
in employment of those aged 55–64,
and a further 0.5 million from those
aged over 65. This compares with a
total rise in employment for the
prime working-age group (covering
the wider age range 25–54) of 7.5
million and a decline in youth
employment of 0.4 million.
Furthermore, relative to the level in
2000, employment of the age group
55–64 has increased markedly (by
30%), much more than the growth
for the prime working age (up 5%)
and youth (down 1–2%) age groups.
Employment levels for those aged 
65 and over have increased by
around 20%.
3.3.1. Changes in employment
according to gender and type
of employment
Unlike the rise among prime-age
workers, which has been dominated
by the increase in employment of
women, the rise in older workers’
(55–64) employment has been fairly
evenly split between the sexes (48%
being older men and 52% older
women) (Chart 18). The vast majority
of the net increase in employment is
associated with a rise in employment
of older workers who are working as
employees rather than as self-
employed (around 84% versus 16%),
and similarly in permanent rather than
fixed-term employment (93% versus
7% of the rise in employees aged
55–64). While part-time employment
accounted for a substantial element of
the overall employment increase
(28%), highlighting the importance of
the growing number of people who
opt to continue longer in employment
but with a reduced number of hours at
work, a much greater share was associ-
ated with older people in full-time
employment. Hence the recent rise in
employment of the 55–64 age group
as a whole has not been heavily associ-
ated with increased prevalence of
fixed-term nor self-employment, nor
overwhelmingly with part-time
employment, but rather with the more
traditional or standard types of
employment.
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Chart 17: Decline in employment rates across EU Member States between age
groups 50–54, 55–59 and 60–64, 2006
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Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, 2006 annual results.
Note: French and German data for 2006 are provisional.
However, this result, covering the
whole 55–64 age range, may hide the
possibility that the more flexible types
of employment become more import-
ant as age increases. Indeed, when the
characteristics of the rise in employ-
ment of still older workers (aged 65
and over) since 2000 (Chart 19) are
considered, then the importance of
the availability of more flexible types
of work arrangement in encouraging
extended work attachment becomes
more evident. Part-time employment
and self-employment have been
important elements in raising the
employment levels of people aged 65
and over, although temporary employ-
ment does not seem to play a major
role, and does suggest that the avail-
ability of such flexible forms of
employment has an increasingly
important influence on older workers’
employment as age rises. The low inci-
dence of fixed-term employment in
the expansion of older workers’
employment suggests that the recent
improvement for older workers has
not been associated with a rise in the
precariousness of their employment.
3.3.2. Sectoral employment
changes
As for other age groups, the vast
majority of the overall rise in employ-
ment for older workers has been in
the services sector, which has risen by
around 4.6 million for this age group
since 2000 (accounting for around a
third of the net employment creation
in the sector). The largest increases in
employment for older workers have
occurred within the ‘health and social
work’ sector (up 1 million) and the
‘education’ and ‘real estate, renting
and business services’ sectors (both
up around 0.75 million), all relatively
knowledge-intensive sectors (Chart
20 - see page 70). ‘Public administra-
tion and defence’ and ‘wholesale and
retail trade’, both up around 0.5 mil-
lion, were also relatively important
service sectors for increases in older
workers’ employment. Overall
employment of people aged 55–64
declined in the agriculture sector, as
it did for youth and prime working-
age people, but rose in the manufac-
turing sector (up 0.5 million), in con-
trast to the strong declines in
employment for those aged 15–24
and 25–54. Furthermore, the
absolute rise in employment levels
for older workers even outpaced that
of prime-age workers in the ‘trans-
port, storage and communication’,
‘financial intermediation’ and ‘public
administration and defence’ sectors.
In light of the above developments, it
is clear that the recent rise in employ-
ment for older workers has, to a
large extent, taken place in expand-
ing sectors rather than in declining
economic activities, and with much of
the employment growth in relatively
higher-skilled, knowledge-intensive
sectors. This tends to suggest that
older workers’ employment is bene-
fiting from the ongoing trends of
population ageing and the shift to a
more knowledge-based economy.
3.3.3. Changes in
occupational employment
structure
In terms of occupations, the expan-
sion in employment of older workers
has mainly been due to a substantial
increase in their employment in the
skilled non-manual occupations,
which together account for over half
69
Chapter 2 Active ageing and labour market trends for older workers
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
Men Women Employee Self 
employed
Permanent Fixed term Full time Part time
Total Sex Employment status
Permanency of 
employment* Working hours
Chart 18: Characteristics of the rise in employment of older workers (aged 55–64)
in the EU-25 between 2000 and 2006 
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Source: Eurostat, EU LFS spring 2000 and second quarter 2006 results. 
Note: *Figures for permanency of employment refer to employees rather than employment.
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Chart 19: Characteristics of the rise in employment of older workers aged 65+ in
the EU-25 between 2000 and 2006 
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Source: Eurostat, EU LFS spring 2000 and second quarter 2006 results. 
Note: *Figures for permanency of employment refer to employees rather than employment.
(56%) of the overall rise in employ-
ment among older workers in the EU-
25 between 2000 and 2006 (Chart
21). Nevertheless, employment of
older workers also rose in almost all
other occupational categories, the
only exception being the ‘skilled agri-
cultural and fishery workers’ cat-
egory. For both older men and older
women the main increase in employ-
ment has been in the skilled non-
manual occupations, accounting for
over half in both cases but slightly
higher for men. However, while the
share of the increase in employment
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Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, spring 2000 and second quarter 2006 results.
in elementary occupations has also
been broadly similar for both sexes
(11% for older men and 14% for
older women), the rest of the rise in
employment for older men (around a
quarter) has almost all been in the
skilled manual occupations while for
women the remainder (a third) has
almost entirely been in the low-
skilled non-manual occupations.
These developments have led to sig-
nificant changes in the occupational
structure of older workers’ employ-
ment (Table 8 and Chart 22), with the
share of older people employed in
the skilled non-manual occupations
rising by 4 percentage points, driven
by strong rises in the shares in the
‘professionals’ and ‘technicians and
associate professionals’ categories. In
contrast, the share of older workers
in the skilled manual occupations has
declined by 4 percentage points,
mainly reflecting the downwards
adjustment in the ‘skilled agricultural
and fishery workers’ and ‘craft and
related trades workers’ occupations.
Overall the occupational employ-
ment structure for older workers has
therefore moved towards a higher
skill profile of employment, with a
shift away from the more manual
occupations towards the non-manual
and more knowledge-intensive occu-
pations.
4. INACTIVITY AMONG
OLDER PEOPLE AND
THEIR LABOUR MARKET
TRANSITIONS
4.1. The extent and
gender-related aspects
of inactivity among
older people
Increasing labour force participation
through mobilising the potential
labour supply of inactive people is a
key requirement for achieving the
employment rate targets set by the
Lisbon and Stockholm European
Councils, and has a major role to play
in attenuating the negative impact of
population ageing on economic
growth. This will necessarily mean
getting more people into the labour
force by reducing the level of inac-
tivity, and older workers will have a
key part to play in this since, in
absolute terms, economically inac-
tive people
201
in the age group 55–64
account for close to one third of all
inactive people of working age in the
EU-27 (Chart 23 - see page 72). Across
Member States, the importance of
the share of older inactive people
aged 55–64 in the total inactive
working-age population (15–64)
varies considerably, with the inactive
population noticeably more concen-
trated in the older age group than
average in Belgium, Denmark, Fin-
land, France, Slovenia and especially
Austria and the Netherlands (with
older people accounting for over
40% of the total inactive population
of working age in both), but general-
ly less so in most of the new Member
States, Ireland, Spain and Sweden
(Chart 24 - see page 72).
Despite the positive developments in
older workers’ employment in recent
years, participation rates among older
people in the EU generally remain
71
Chapter 2 Active ageing and labour market trends for older workers
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Legislators, senior officials and managers
Professionals
Technicians and associate professionals
Clerks
Service workers & shop and market sales workers
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers
Craft and related trades workers
Plant and machine operators and assemblers
Elementary occupations
% of total employed population aged 55–64
2006 2000
Chart 22: Developments in occupational employment structure of older workers
(55–64) in the EU-25 between 2000 and 2006
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS spring 2000. and 2nd quarter 2006 results. 
Table 8 - : Changes in occupational structure for older workers (55–64) 
in the EU-25 between 2000 and 2006 by main occupational grouping 
(as % shares of total employment (excl. armed forces))
Main occupational grouping 2000 2006 Change
2000–2006
Skilled non-manual 38.5 42.5 4.0
Low skilled non-manual 20.5 20.2 -0.4
Skilled manual 30.0 25.9 -4.1
Elementary occupations 11.0 11.4 0.4
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS spring 2000 and second quarter 2006 results. 
21 An economically inactive person is broadly defined as someone outside the labour force (neither employed nor unemployed) who is not actively
seeking employment or is not immediately available for work. For a more detailed review of some definitional issues connected with economic
inactivity, see Employment in Europe 2005, p. 211.
low, with over half of 55–64 year olds
currently inactive. International com-
parison of activity rates for the popu-
lation aged 55–64 in 2006 indicates
that the average rate for the EU-27 of
46.3% is substantially below that of
many other similarly advanced
economies; this is also the case with
the individual rates for men and
women (Chart 25). Activity rates of
older people in the United States are
around 17 percentage points higher,
and in Japan 21 percentage points,
while within Europe the rate for
Switzerland is almost 22 percentage
points higher. This highlights the rela-
tively low level of labour market par-
ticipation of people in this age group
in the EU, and suggests that, in spite
of recent progress, there is still consid-
erable scope for raising the participa-
tion of older people appreciably. 
Focusing on gender, it is interesting to
note that the difference between the
EU and Japan in activity rates for older
men is close to 28 percentage points,
although this partly reflects the
extremely high participation rate of
older men in Japan (around 84%),
while the difference in rates for older
women is much less (14 percentage
points). In contrast, the gap for older
women is more pronounced com-
pared to the United States, where the
activity rate for women aged 55–64
(58%) exceeds even that for older
men in the EU.
Within the EU, the degree of participa-
tion of older people aged 55–64 in the
labour market varies considerably
across Member States, ranging from as
low as 31% in Poland to close to 73%
in Sweden. Furthermore, despite the
greater rise in participation of older
women than older men, substantial
gaps remain in the gender-specific
activity rates across most Member
States, with rates generally much lower
for older women than for older men
(Chart 26). Indeed, in almost half the
Member States, less than one in three
women aged 55–64 participates in the
labour market. 
This highlights that, for many coun-
tries, further efforts to reduce the gen-
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Chart 23: Share of different age groups in the total inactive population aged 15–64
in the EU-27, 2006
Source: Eurostat, EU Labour Force Survey, 2006 annual average.
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der gap in activity will necessarily be a
key element of any strategy to increase
the labour supply of older people. In
particular, the low participation rate of
older women, which averages 37% for
the EU as a whole (compared to 56%
for older men), is a feature of all the
new Member States (other than the
Baltic States), although not solely a fea-
ture of these since EU-15 countries such
as Austria, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Lux-
embourg and Spain also record weak
participation of women aged 55–64.
Nevertheless, being of the order of
20% or below, the activity rates of
older women in Malta, Poland, Slo-
venia and Slovakia, as well as Italy, are
particularly low.
While activity rates in the EU-27 are
broadly similar for the prime working-
age groups 25–34, 35–44 and 45–54 (at
around the 85% level), for those aged
55–64 the rate falls to 46% (Chart 27),
only slightly above that for youth.
Lower activity among women is a fea-
ture common to all age groups, but is
most pronounced for the 55–64 group
where the gender difference in activity
rates is close to 20 percentage points. 
By comparing activity rates for the age
group 55–64 with those for the age
group 25–54 across Member States, it is
possible to see whether cross-country
differences in rates of older men and
women are more a result of differences
between countries in participation
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Chart 27: Activity rates in the EU-27 by age group and gender, 2006
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Chart 28: Activity rates for older people (aged 55–64) versus those of prime working-age people (aged 25–54) 
across EU Member States, 2006
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rates in general (Chart 28, see page 73).
For men there is only a weak correla-
tion between activity rates for the
prime working-age and the older age
group, suggesting that cross-country
variations in the participation of
older men is mainly the result of dif-
ferences in the characteristics of the
labour market for older workers.
However, for women, higher activity
rates at younger ages is strongly asso-
ciated with higher participation at
older ages, as evidenced by the rea-
sonably strong (and statistically sig-
nificant) positive correlation
between the rates for the two age
groups. This therefore suggests that
differences across Member States in
activity rates for older women reflect,
to a significant degree, the differ-
ences in participation of women in
general. Indeed, developments in
activity rates for older women reflect
both the effect of rising activity rates
for subsequent generations of
women as well as changes in their
behaviour at advanced ages. There-
fore, apart from addressing the vari-
ous factors affecting older workers’
participation, strategies to respond
to the low activity rates among older
women also need to address the rea-
sons for low participation of women
in the younger age groups. 
4.2. Reasons for
inactivity among older
people
The reasons for inactivity clearly
change with age (Chart 29). For the
working-age population as a whole,
the main reason for inactivity is edu-
cation and training, which accounts
for around a third of the inactive
population aged 15–64. However,
much of this is due to the importance
of education and training as the main
reason for inactivity among youth
aged 15–24, for whom it accounts for
85% of the inactive population. The
importance of this reason clearly
declines substantially for older age
groups, and for people aged 55–64 is
negligible, covering only about 0.3%
of the inactive population in this age
group. For older people it is retire-
ment which is the main reason for
inactivity, accounting for 55% of all
the inactive population aged 55–64
(and the second most important rea-
son for the inactive working-age
population as a whole, at just under
20%). The very high share of retired
people in this age group explains
why the relative importance of other
reasons, including illness or disability
and the belief no work is available,
declines after 55, since early retire-
ment schemes are partly taken up by
disabled or discouraged individuals.
Nevertheless 14% of inactive 55–64
year olds still specifically mention ill-
ness or disability as the reason for
their inactivity, and 3% the belief
that no work is available. Although
family responsibilities appear to be
cited much less as a reason for in-
activity among older workers com-
pared to prime working-age people,
this still accounts for a significant
share (9%) of the inactive population
aged 55–64.
Focusing on the gender perspective
for men aged 55–64, retirement is the
main reason given for being
economically inactive (Chart 30).
Around 29% of men in this age group
(or 65% of inactive men aged 55–64)
are retired. The second most common
reason is own illness or disability,
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Chart 29: Reasons for inactivity by age group in the EU-27, 2005
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Chart 30: Shares of the EU-27 population aged 55–64 by sex and reason for not
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accounting for 8% of older men (or
almost 18% of inactive older men),
while personal or family responsibil-
ities hardly feature at all as a reason
for older men being inactive,
accounting for under 0.5% of all
men aged 55–64. In contrast, while
retirement is also the main reason
for older women being outside the
labour market, accounting for 31%
of women in this age group (or 49%
of all inactive women aged 55–64),
the second most common reason is
personal or family responsibilities at
9% (or 14% of inactive older
women), followed by own illness or
disability at 7.5% (or 11.6% of inac-
tive older women). Hence the preva-
lence of reasons for inactivity is
broadly similar between the sexes, with
the exception of those inactive due to
personal or family responsibilities. 
At the level of individual Member
States, although retirement is the
main reason for older men to be out-
side the labour market in almost all
countries (the exceptions being Fin-
land, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden
where illness or disability accounts
for a higher share), the picture is
more mixed for older women (Chart
31). In several (Cyprus, Greece, Ire-
land, Luxembourg, Malta and Spain),
personal or family responsibilities are
a more important reason for the non-
participation of older women than
retirement, while in Sweden it is ill-
ness or disability. This highlights the
importance of the availability of flex-
ible working arrangements and care
facilities which can enable older
female workers to achieve a better
balance between private responsibil-
ities and work, as well as action to
address regulations on retirement
and health issues, such as health and
safety at work. As discussed later,
personal and family responsibilities
could increase substantially in the
future as a potential cause of inactiv-
ity among 55–64 year olds, especially
if sufficient support facilities are not
made available.
4.3. Older inactives
who are willing to
work
Many older people might consider
themselves effectively trapped out-
side the labour market due to bar-
riers – real or perceived – even
though they are in fact willing to
work. Overcoming these obstacles to
participation requires addressing the
barriers to employment (including
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the attitudes of employers to older
workers), facilitating integration into
the labour market and increasing the
rewards from work as compared to
inactivity, as well as implementing
economic policies geared to creating
sufficient jobs appropriate for those
older inactive people who are willing
to work.
According to the EU Labour Force
Survey, in 2005 around 7% of the
inactive population aged 55–64 in
the EU-27 would have liked to work,
with more inactive older men willing
to do so than older women (8.5% of
inactive men aged 55–64 versus 6.2%
of inactive women in the same age
group). This ‘labour force reserve’ of
older workers corresponds to 1 mil-
lion men and 1.1 million women.
Among these people, the main
impediment to labour force partici-
pation is ‘own illness or disability’,
accounting for almost 2% of inactive
55–64 year olds, while the belief that
no work is available and retirement
account for 1.5% and 1.3% respec-
tively. Looking at this from another
perspective, of those inactive 55–64
year olds who are willing to work, a
quarter are prevented from doing so
by constraints related to their own ill-
ness or disability, and close to one in
five due to the belief that no work is
available or due to retirement (Chart
32). The latter suggests that even
among those who are in a situation
normally where they have definitive-
ly left the labour market there are
some who would nevertheless be
willing to work, and hence raises
questions regarding such practices as
compulsory retirement. Among older
inactive women who are willing to
work, around 14% are prevented
from doing so by personal or family
responsibilities. 
The above suggests that helping ill or
disabled older people to better inte-
grate into the labour market, termin-
ating the practice of compulsory
retirement, providing greater care
support facilities (especially for older
women) and addressing the negative
perceptions of certain older workers
about their labour market prospects
while ensuring the creation of suitable
jobs, could result in significant increas-
es in the participation of older people.
Indeed, based on the situation in
2005, if all those inactive older people
who are willing to work were to enter
the labour force the activity rate for
older people in the EU would increase
by 4 percentage points. At the same
time in 2005 there were around 1.6
million unemployed older people
aged 55–64 who were actively seek-
ing employment and immediately
available for work. If both these
groups (amounting to almost 4 mil-
lion) would have been in employ-
ment, this would have resulted in an
increase of 7 percentage points in the
employment rate for older workers,
taking the rate up to within a percent-
age point of the Stockholm target. 
The increase needed in participation
to reach the employment rate target
by 2010 does not necessarily rely so
much on bringing already inactive
older people into the labour force,
but is probably more a question of
retaining those older workers
presently active in the labour force
for longer, by delaying the age at
which they withdraw from the labour
market, and helping them to remain
in employment for longer. Indeed, if
around four-fifths of the 50–59 age
group who were in employment in
2005 would remain in employment
for a further five years (until 2010,
when they would be 55–64) then the
50% Stockholm target would be met.
However, this would require a signifi-
cant improvement on past perform-
ance. For example, between 2000
and 2005 the employment rate for
the cohort aged 55–64 in 2005 was
70% of the rate for that cohort in
2000, when they were aged 50–59. 
The next section on older workers’
transitions examines, among other
things, why older workers leave
employment in order to identify the
main drivers of moving from employ-
ment into inactivity.
4.4. Labour market
transitions of older
people
It is important to examine the transi-
tions between economic statuses
(employment, unemployment and
inactivity) for older workers, since
increasing the labour market participa-
tion and employment rates for older
people will require both reducing the
flows into inactivity (by delaying their
exit from employment and the labour
market) and raising the outflows from
inactivity and unemployment into
employment. Figures from the EU
Labour Force Survey for transitions
between 2005 and 2006 (Table 9) indi-
cate the following within the EU:
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• For the working-age population
as a whole, the transition rates
from work into unemployment
(2.5%) or inactivity (2.9%) are
broadly similar. However, for
those aged 55–64 the risk of mov-
ing from employment into unem-
ployment is lower (1.5%), but
there is a much higher chance of
moving from work into inactivity
(8.2%). The main reason for leav-
ing employment and transiting
into inactivity for this age group
is retirement.
• For people aged 55–64, the flows
into work are much lower than
for other age groups. Under 3%
of inactive people aged 55–64
enter work within a year. Fur-
thermore, unemployed people
aged 55–64 are much less likely
to find work, with only around
13% succeeding compared to
32% of those of prime working
age and 39% of young un-
employed. Older workers there-
fore face a much greater chal-
lenge to get back into work if
they lose their job.
• The older unemployed are twice
as likely as other age groups to
drop out of the labour force al-
together. Around half of unem-
ployed older people exit the
labour market within a year,
compared to only one in five
people of prime working age.
Many leave the labour market
through edging into retirement
(8%), or due to becoming dis-
couraged through the belief that
no work is available (9%) or due
to illness or disability (5%),
although a large share also leave
for undefined ‘other’ reasons.
• For older people the transition
into inactivity is essentially a path
of no return. Under 4% of in-
active people aged 55–64 re-enter
the labour market within a year, in
contrast to around 20% of people
of prime working age. The main
reason older people remain inac-
tive is retirement (51% of inactive
people who were also inactive
one year later), but illness or dis-
ability (13%) and personal and
family responsibilities (8%) are
also important factors.
Beyond this overall situation at EU
level, transition rates for older people
between economic statuses show
considerable variation across Mem-
ber States (Table 10 - see page 78):
• Rates of moving out of employ-
ment range from over 15% in the
Czech Republic, France and Lux-
embourg to less than half of this
in Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Portu-
gal, Romania and the United
Kingdom. 
• In several (Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece and Poland), only
about 10% of older people who
were unemployed a year earlier
reported being in employment
when surveyed, while it was even
lower in Belgium (less than 2%)
and Slovenia (around 7%). This
contrasts with rates of around
30% or more in Cyprus, Estonia,
Latvia and the United Kingdom. 
• At the same time, in all Member
States, there tends to be very little
return to the labour market fol-
lowing exit into inactivity. Further-
more, in most countries very few
inactive older people manage to
return to employment – in most
cases less than 2% of inactive peo-
ple aged 55–64 are in jobs one
year later. However the rate is con-
siderably higher than the EU aver-
age in Austria, the Czech Republic,
Finland, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia
and the United Kingdom.
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Table 9 - Transitions by economic status and reasons for inactivity in the EU-27* between 2005 and 2006 (row percentages)
Economic status in 2006
Employed Unemployed Inactive
Economic Illness / Education Personal / Retirement Discouraged Other Total 
status in 2005 disability or training family (Belief no work) Inactive
responsibilities
Total WAP
Employed 94.6 2.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.8 0.1 1.4 2.9
Unemployed 31.2 43.4 2.2 1.3 2.3 1.1 5.2 13.4 25.4
Inactive 10.4 4.3 8.9 30.7 8.0 15.8 1.6 20.3 85.3
15–24
Employed 89.9 5.6 0.2 1.6 0.3 0.0 0.2 2.1 4.4
Unemployed 38.9 40.4 0.8 3.4 1.3 0.0 4.2 11.0 20.7
Inactive 13.0 5.2 1.0 73.3 1.1 0.2 0.4 5.9 81.8
25–54
Employed 95.7 2.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.2 2.0
Unemployed 32.3 45.2 2.1 0.9 2.3 0.1 4.7 12.4 22.5
Inactive 13.8 6.3 14.4 6.1 15.9 4.4 2.9 36.2 79.9
55–64
Employed 90.3 1.5 0.7 0.0 0.2 5.4 0.2 1.8 8.2
Unemployed 12.8 37.7 4.8 0.7 3.5 8.1 9.4 22.9 49.4
Inactive 2.9 0.7 13.3 0.4 8.1 50.7 1.9 21.9 96.4
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, 2006 annual results.
Note: * EU-27 covers the EU Member States excluding BG, IE, NL and SE, for which data is not available in 2006 on status one year earlier.
Row percentages = ‘of those in this activity status one year before, x% are now in status ‘
These results highlight the fact that,
although older workers in the EU gen-
erally face a lower risk of moving
from employment into unemploy-
ment than those in younger age
groups, in many Member States the
consequences of job loss for older
workers can be more serious. Indeed,
older workers are subject to signifi-
cant difficulties if they lose their job,
as evidenced by the relatively high
incidence of long-term unemploy-
ment. Although, with the notable
exception of Germany, unemploy-
ment rates are lower for older people
aged 55–64 than for younger age
groups (in 2006 the unemployment
rate in the EU averaged 6.2% for
those aged 55–64, compared to 8.3%
for the working-age population as a
whole), this partly reflects the greater
tendency for older people to leave
the labour market altogether at older
ages, and older persons who are
unemployed generally face longer
periods of time in unemployment than
their younger colleagues. Around 63%
of the older unemployed experience
periods of unemployment lasting 12
months or more, a third more than the
average for the working-age popula-
tion as a whole (46%).
These comparisons of transition rates
between statuses tend to suggest that
in countries where employment rates
among older people are particularly
low, the labour market is not very
accommodating or dynamic for older
people, in that older people are
retained less in employment and find
it harder to get into employment
when out of work (e.g. Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Luxembourg, Poland
and Slovenia). The risk of moving out
of employment is higher than in most
other Member States, and the chances
of older unemployed people returning
to work are low. Early retirement may
be the only alternative for older work-
ers in these countries following the
loss of a job. In contrast, the labour
market for older workers in countries
such as Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia,
Latvia and the United Kingdom
appears to be more dynamic and
accommodative, with older people
more likely to remain in employment,
and with the probability of unem-
ployed older people returning to work
being much higher than average
(Chart 33).
Given the generally low chance in the
EU of moving back into a job once
older workers leave employment, it is
worthwhile exploring further the spe-
cific feature of the transition out of
employment. The vast majority of
older workers who leave employment
move into inactivity within a relative-
ly short space of time, essentially exit-
ing the labour market altogether.
Over the period 2001 to 2005, among
those aged 55–64 in the EU-25 who
were not in employment when sur-
veyed and who had left their last job
during the previous 12 months, less
than one in five were unemployed,
i.e. still active in the labour market.
While in some Member States the
share of recently out-of-work older
people who are unemployed rather
than inactive was around 25% or
more (Finland, Lithuania, Spain and
Sweden), it was in the region of 10%
or below in several countries, includ-
ing Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg
but also the large Members States of
France, Italy and Poland (Chart 34),
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Table 10 - Transitions between economic statuses for older workers (55–64) between 2005 and 2006
(as % of status one year previously) across EU Member States
Status in 2005 Employed Unemployed Inactive
Status in 2006 Employed Unemployed Inactive Employed Unemployed Inactive Employed Unemployed Inactive
BE 88.8 0.4 10.8 1.8 13.3 84.9 1.3 0.4 98.3
CZ 84.0 2.1 14.0 17.7 48.6 33.8 8.7 1.3 90.0
DK 90.8 1.5 7.8 23.5 34.9 41.6 1.4 0.4 98.2
DE 91.5 2.7 5.8 12.2 54.9 32.9 2.7 1.2 96.1
EE 91.9 1.6 6.5 38.7 39.4 22.0 2.2 0.6 97.2
EL 93.8 0.6 5.6 10.1 65.3 24.6 0.3 0.2 99.6
ES 92.5 1.0 6.5 13.6 35.9 50.5 1.3 0.9 97.8
FR 84.2 1.5 14.4 8.4 20.7 70.9 0.9 0.5 98.6
IT 90.6 0.6 8.9 19.7 19.3 61.0 1.5 0.3 98.1
CY 92.6 1.5 5.9 29.2 39.1 31.7 1.4 0.4 98.1
LV 92.7 1.9 5.4 28.9 28.2 42.9 5.4 1.5 93.1
LT 91.0 1.8 7.2 18.1 36.6 45.3 1.1 1.8 97.1
LU 84.8 0.3 14.9 : : : 0.1 0.0 99.9
HU 88.4 1.1 10.5 17.4 24.7 57.9 1.3 0.5 98.1
MT 88.4 0.6 11.0 : : : 0.1 0.3 99.6
AT 85.8 1.0 13.2 14.5 27.7 57.8 5.4 0.1 94.4
PL 88.6 1.0 10.4 10.5 35.3 54.2 2.9 1.1 96.0
PT 94.1 1.4 4.5 12.8 64.5 22.7 0.4 0.1 99.4
RO 94.4 0.5 5.1 14.2 45.6 40.3 13.3 0.3 86.4
SI 89.1 0.5 10.4 6.9 12.8 80.3 0.3 0.0 99.6
SK 89.9 0.9 9.2 15.4 55.4 29.2 5.2 0.9 93.9
FI 89.6 2.4 8.0 10.0 26.6 63.4 6.0 0.5 93.6
UK 92.4 1.4 6.2 30.2 36.0 33.8 3.9 0.8 95.3
EU-27* 90.2 1.5 8.3 12.8 37.7 49.4 3.0 0.7 96.3
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, 2006 annual results. 
Note: * EU-27 covers the EU Member States excluding BG, IE, NL and SE, for which data is not available in 2006 on status one year earlier. 
':' means results unreliable due to too small sample (for LU and MT).
indicating that in the latter countries
few older people remain active once
they exit from a job.
In the context of retaining people in
the labour market longer, and given
that when older people leave employ-
ment they, for the most part, transit
into inactivity, it is important to identi-
fy the reasons why older people who
recently left work and who are out of
the labour market left their last
employment. For the majority (close to
two-thirds) the main reason is retire-
ment, either through normal retire-
ment (i.e. the normal retirement age),
accounting for around half, or
through early retirement, which
accounts for around a fifth (Chart 35).
Just over 10% leave employment and
transit into inactivity for reasons of
their own illness or disability, while
close to 10% end up inactive following
separation from their job due to dis-
missal or redundancy. This would indi-
cate that more could be done to help
ill or disabled people and those who
leave work involuntarily to find new
jobs, including through improved assis-
tance programmes and assistance from
employment services, as well as reduc-
ing separations by improving health
and safety provisions, and conditions
of work. Relatively few (around 2%)
recently jobless inactive older people
specifically cite personal or family
responsibilities as the reason for leav-
ing their last employment. It is inter-
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Chart 33: Employment rates across EU Member States of those aged 55–64 versus shares of those (a) employed one year 
previously but currently not in employment and (b) unemployed one year previously and currently in employment, 2006
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Chart 34: Economic status of those aged 55–64 who left their last job within the
previous 12 months and are not in employment, pooled results for 2001–2005
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esting to note that, other than a slight
decline in the shares exiting through
normal retirement and a moderate rise
in the share of exits due to lack of
employment (highlighting the need to
address employment opportunities for
older workers), the distribution of rea-
sons has not changed substantially
since 2000.
The importance of the various routes
for exiting early from the labour mar-
ket differs across Member States. Over
the period 2001 to 2005, of those peo-
ple aged 55–64 who reported leaving
their last job in the previous 12 months
and when surveyed were inactive, the
main reason for leaving the last job
across all Member States was retire-
ment (Chart 36). It is of concern that
even though the official retirement
age is 65 in many Member States, with-
in a year of leaving employment such a
large share of people definitively quit
the labour market at relatively young
ages in order to enter retirement. For
example, in Luxembourg and the
Netherlands, more than 80% of inac-
tive people aged 55–64 who left their
job in the previous 12 months did so
for reasons of retirement, while in Fin-
land, Portugal and Spain less than 40%
did so, even though the official retire-
ment age is 65 for both men and
women in all these Member States. In
some Member States, especially Esto-
nia, Finland, Spain and Sweden, a rela-
tively high share (around 30% or
more) of recent job leavers who end
up inactive give being dismissed, made
redundant or the expiry of a limited
duration job as the reason for leaving
their last job, these being more associ-
ated with indications of involuntary
separation on the part of the individ-
ual workers themselves. 
In Finland, Germany, Malta, Ireland,
Portugal and the United Kingdom,
around one in five declare that their
own illness or disability was the main
reason for separating from their last
job, although this may also indicate
the importance of alternative path-
ways into retirement other than offi-
cial retirement schemes, in particular
sickness and disability benefit
schemes. Indeed, the high share of
older job leavers shifting into retire-
ment well before the official retire-
ment age reflects a variety of alterna-
tive early retirement schemes. Finally,
job separation among older inactive
people for reasons of personal or
family responsibilities appears to be
relatively limited in most Member
States, but seems to be a much more
significant reason in Cyprus, Ireland,
Latvia, Sweden and the United King-
dom, where the shares range from
5% to 11%, well above the EU aver-
age of around 2%.
5. FACTORS AFFECTING
OLDER PEOPLE’S LABOUR
MARKET SITUATION
5.1. Background
There are various reasons why
employment rates for older workers
are relatively low in Europe, but it
basically reflects a lack of incentives
for employers to retain or hire older
people and a lack of incentives for
older workers to remain in the labour
force (European Commission, 2002).
High separation costs may discourage
employers from employing older
people in the first place. Organisa-
tional features, such as employers’
policies, technological division of
labour, and fellow workers and man-
agers’ attitudes, are also known to
influence the ability of older workers
to remain in employment (Taylor,
2002). At the same time there are
often penalties or low rewards in old-
age pensions and other parts of the
tax and welfare system for individ-
uals to carry on working, with early
retirement schemes, social security
benefits and disability benefits often
used by both employees and employ-
ers as exit routes from the workplace.
In this regard, Gruber and Wise
(2002) report that incentives stem-
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ming from social security systems
have a strong effect on retirement
decisions, irrespective of cross-country
differences in cultural norms and
labour market institutions.
Older workers are generally consid-
ered to be one of the most vulner-
able groups in the labour market
(others being, for example, youth,
women and disabled workers). One
reason for this is that they are often
viewed as being more costly than
their younger counterparts, due
mainly to the prevalence of age-
related remuneration systems and
seniority wages, and as having lower
productivity due to both outdated
skills and more frequent physical limi-
tations resulting from ageing. As a
result older workers, especially the
low-skilled ones, have often been
among those employees released
first when employers need to reduce
staff levels. This was particularly the
case during the period of industrial
restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s
and, more recently, in the new Mem-
ber States when older workers were
encouraged to exit the labour market
through redundancy and early retire-
ment schemes. One legacy of this is
that older workers may still expect to
retire at relatively early ages, while
the view may persist among employ-
ers that older workers remain a rela-
tively dispensable element of their
workforce. However, as shown previ-
ously, once out of work, older work-
ers in particular often face difficulties
in re-entering employment.
Existing research has classified the
factors that influence the exit of
older workers from the labour mar-
ket into ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors
(OECD, 2006). From the perspective
of employers, push factors include
negative perceptions about the
capacities of older workers and the
labour costs relative to their product-
ivity. From the perspective of individ-
ual older workers, they include poor
health and disability, work-related
issues (including negative attributes
of their present employment and
unsatisfactory working conditions),
and the obsolescence of skills as a
consequence of technological change
and lack of opportunities to update
skills. Pull factors essentially consist of
financial incentives which encourage
older workers into retirement and
factors associated with the attractive-
ness of life in retirement, such as
opportunities to take up a secondary
career, undertake voluntary work, or
to enjoy new hobbies (Taylor, 2002).
In the context of raising older people’s
labour market participation, much
analysis and debate has taken place
on reviewing financially related
aspects (such as pension provisions
and increasing the retirement age to
receive a pension), while less atten-
tion has been given to creating
appropriate employment opportuni-
ties and the right working and
employment conditions to encourage
older workers to remain in work for
longer. However, recent studies
(Haider and Loughran, 2001: Taylor,
2001) emphasise that financial incen-
tives and social security regulations
are not the only determinant of older
people’s labour supply – non-pecuniary
factors also play an important role in
their decision to remain in or re-enter
the labour market.
22
Steps to limit
access to early retirement must there-
fore be backed up by removing barri-
ers and disincentives which prevent
older people from working longer,
and through providing better and
more appropriate employment
opportunities for ageing workers.
The employability of older people
also needs to be addressed, focusing
on the improvement of types and lev-
els of skills that are often a major
obstacle to hiring older workers.
It is also becoming increasingly clear
that the work-life balance is an
important factor in job satisfaction
and the planning of ageing staffs’
careers in particular. Employers must
consider the overall pattern of their
older employees’ wishes and expecta-
tions towards work. With advancing
age, these increasingly encompass
their personal lives outside work,
such as their family care responsibili-
ties. In this regard, flexible working
arrangements, particularly part-time
work and self-employment, have
been promoted as an important
mechanism for ‘active ageing’.
Some of the key factors which influ-
ence the labour market participation
of older people are examined in
more detail in the following sections.
These are addressed under three
broad headings which generally
reflect the main areas for action iden-
tified in the Commission’s synthesis
report to the 2004 European Spring
Council, namely:
• Retirement, pensions and the
balance of financial incentives.
• Factors affecting the availability
of jobs for older workers and
their employability.
• Conditions and attractiveness of
work.
Before exploring further, a few words
are necessary on the need for a broad
supportive environment to underpin
active ageing strategies. For many
people, being able to work may
depend heavily on factors such as cul-
tural aspects relating to the participa-
tion of certain elements of the popu-
lation in the labour market, their
general health and the availability of,
and access to, good quality care facil-
ities and employment services. All
these can be seen as components of a
more general environment which will
encourage, or not, the labour market
participation of older workers.
Cultural aspects and the general atti-
tudes of business and society towards
the labour market participation of
older workers have a role to play. For
example, older women have low par-
ticipation rates in many Member
States, reflecting the more tradition-
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22 Haider and Loughran (2001), in a study of American labour supply for elderly people aged 65 and older, find that ‘non-pecuniary factors domin-
ate the labour supply decisions of the elderly’ who ‘are particularly willing to purchase jobs that they enjoy and allow them the flexibility they
desire at the expense of low financial returns’. The authors therefore conclude that ‘policies that affect the financial return to work for the eld-
erly will have less impact on labour supply in this population than policies targeted at improving the non-pecuniary returns to work’.
al cultural roles for elderly women in
those countries. At the same time,
attitudes of employers and staff
towards older workers are an import-
ant issue. Raising awareness is a nec-
essary measure to change attitudes
and reduce discrimination against
older workers and has been used
quite extensively in the United King-
dom and Sweden. 
In its Communication to the 2006
Spring European Council (European
Commission, 2006c) the Commission
highlighted that Member States
increasingly recognise that improving
health and the access to medical and
preventive care and rehabilitation
services are also key dimensions of a
strategy to increase labour supply in
a sustainable manner. OECD (2006)
also emphasises that prevention is an
important means for promoting
longer working lives, not just by
reducing the risk of occupational
injuries and diseases but also by tack-
ling those factors outside of work
which may be leading to poor health,
such as obesity and tobacco and alco-
hol consumption. In this context,
measures aimed at stepping up life-
long preventive health policies
should have an important influence
on extending working lives. 
Recent research (Ghosheh Jr. et al,
2006; EFILWC, 1999) highlights that
the need for better reconciliation of
work and family life is likely to rise sig-
nificantly for older workers in the
future. Such responsibilities are likely
to become more demanding, as older
people try to cope with balancing pro-
fessional responsibilities with address-
ing the needs not only of elderly rela-
tives, but also of elderly or infirm part-
ners, adolescent children who remain
in the family home, or even of grand-
children for whom the grandparent
may provide the majority of childcare.
Indeed, as the current demographic
trend for women to have children later
in life continues, together with the
postponement of departure from the
family household by adolescent or
adult children, and with the older ele-
ments of the population living to ever
older ages, the 55–64 age group may
well increasingly face a rising chal-
lenge of reconciling work and family
life. Policies and work arrangements
will need to be developed to take this
into account if older workers’ partici-
pation is not to be adversely affected.
In particular, raising the labour market
participation of older women aged
55–64, upon whom the care responsi-
bilities principally fall rather than upon
older men, will require improvements
in the provision of care and assistance
services for dependent members of
their families. 
The availability and quality of local
employment services, and in particu-
lar the level of assistance available
related to non-passive labour market
policy measures, may have an impact
on the possibility for older workers to
find appropriate employment.
Indeed, comparing across countries,
those Member States with higher
spending on such measures tend to
have higher employment rates
among older workers
23
(Chart 37).
Well-designed non-passive labour
market policies, generally covering
job placement services and measures
such as vocational training, job
search or hiring subsidies, can help to
reduce unemployment through
improving the skills of the un-
employed as well as achieving more
efficient job matching. Conversely,
insufficient availability of good qual-
ity employment services will impact
negatively on the ability of older
workers to enter or re-enter employ-
ment. Indeed, low rates of transition
from unemployment to employment
for older workers may partly reflect
the lack of support provided by pub-
lic employment services, including
that provided through active labour
market policy measures. Moreover,
OECD (2006) reports that older job
seekers are under-represented in
active labour market programmes in
nearly all Member States, suggesting
that active labour market policy is
not very active towards older workers
and that there is scope for improve-
ment in the employment services
offered to them. 
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23 Lack of data on ALMP spending specific to those aged 55-64 means it is not possible to clearly show an association between ALMP spending on
older people and their labour market outcomes. 
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Chart 37: Employment rates for older workers (55–64) versus spending on 
non-passive labour market policy measures
Source:  Eurostat, EU Labour force survey, 2006 annual average for employment rate 55–64 and LMP database,
2005 for expenditure on non-passive measures (categories 1-7) as % of GDP.
 
5.2. Retirement,
pensions and the
balance of financial
incentives
As shown previously, the main reason
people aged 55–64 exit the labour
market into economic inactivity is
retirement, while an important trend
in recent decades has been the
decline in the effective retirement
age in many EU Member States.
Reaching the Lisbon and Stockholm
targets will clearly require a reversal
of this long-term trend. The previous
results on employment rates by indi-
vidual year of age, which show a
sharp reduction in rates between 59
and 60 and between 64 and 65 (Chart
16 - see page 67), together with
research findings (Gruber and Wise,
2002), indicate that many workers
leave employment as soon as they
reach the age at which they are enti-
tled to draw a pension. This is partly
due to the influence of customary
social practice, but may also reflect
the case that people may not be
allowed to continue working beyond
the statutory retirement age. A num-
ber of European countries still cur-
rently maintain a mandatory retire-
ment age, although this practice 
is increasingly being questioned
24
(OECD, 2006).
In the context of the OMC on pensions,
the issue of promoting longer working
lives and how reforms of pension and
social protection systems can con-
tribute is essential. Recent studies from
the Social Protection Committee
25
highlight in particular that a number
of Member States are currently review-
ing or reforming the conditions for
taking up pensions, by introducing
more flexibility in the choice of the
path from work to retirement. This can
be achieved through more flexibility in
the age at which people may retire
and appropriate incentives to prolong
working lives, but also through partial
pensions and possibilities to combine
pensions and earnings. 
At the same time, the general public is
becoming increasingly aware of the
need to remain longer in the labour
force. Results from a recent Euro-
barometer survey
26
indicate that 45%
of EU-25 citizens aged 15 or older
believe that their fellow citizens retire
too early. Furthermore, persons aged
55 years and over were the only age
group in which a majority believe that
people retire too early, while half of
retired persons also agreed with this
statement. These results suggest that
‘older people and the retired would
probably favour extending their work-
ing lives for various reasons, including
social integration and the mainte-
nance of the standard of living they
enjoy when in employment’.
5.2.1. Standard and early
retirement
There is substantial variation across
Member States in the age at which
people are eligible to standard pen-
sion benefits (Table 11 - see page 84),
although to a certain extent this
reflects the variation in life expectancy
across countries (with lower retire-
ment ages tending to be found in
countries with lower life expectancy, as
is the case in Eastern Europe). In most
Member States the age at which
people are entitled to a public pension
has remained fixed over recent
decades, despite the fact that life
expectancy has increased substantially.
For most the age of eligibility for men
is 65, but ages of eligibility are consid-
erably below this in some Member
States (the Baltic States, the Czech
Republic, France, Hungary, Malta,
Slovenia and Slovakia). Differences are
wider with respect to standard retire-
ment ages for women, despite the fact
that a number of Member States are in
the process of bringing female eligibil-
ity ages into line with those for men. 
The availability of early retirement
schemes and minimum ages of eligibil-
ity to these also shows wide variation
across countries, with no such schemes
being available in seven Member
States, while several others allow
access to early retirement benefits
from ages around the mid-50s mark.
At the same time, occupational or pri-
vate pension schemes play a large role
in pension provision in a number of
Member States and thus can potential-
ly have an important impact on retire-
ment decisions. As for public pension
schemes, the way these are set up can
encourage or discourage retirement at
an early age.
In response to the need to raise the
labour market participation of older
workers, many Member States have
carried out, or are in the process of car-
rying out, pension reform. These have
included increases in the age of eligibil-
ity for a full pension, bringing retire-
ment ages for women into line with
those for men, increases in the mini-
mum contribution period required to
acquire full pension rights, switching
from pay-as-you-go to funded schemes
and tightening the eligibility to early
retirement and sickness and invalidity
schemes, although in many cases the
increase in the statutory retirement age
will be implemented over a long time
period to prevent sudden changes.
In addition to necessary and ongoing
state pension reforms, there is wide
recognition of the increasing impor-
tance of work-based and private vol-
untary pensions and other forms of
long term savings and investments
that will help to ensure adequate
levels of income in retirement.
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24 The practice of mandatory retirement in firms is questionable, on the basis that it is incompatible with a general policy thrust towards removing
age barriers to employment and offering greater choice to workers over the work-retirement decision.
25 SPC (2004), Promoting longer working lives through better social protection systems, (available at http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_pro-
tection/docs/working_longer_en.pdf), and SPC (2007, forthcoming), Promoting longer lives through pension reforms (first part): flexibility in retire-
ment age provision.
26 Special Eurobarometer 261, European Employment and Social Policy, October 2006.
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Table 11 - Ages of entitlement to standard and early retirement pensions across EU Member States, 2006
Men Women Comments
Standard pension
Belgium 65 64 For women the age will be raised to 65 in 2009.
Czech Republic 61,5 59 years and 8 months* *Women's retirement age depends upon the number of children raised, and ranges from 55 
years and 8 months (5 or more children) to 59 years and 8 months (no children). The retirement age shall be
gradually increased by 2 months for men and 4 months for women each year until it reaches 63 years 
for men and women without children and 59–62 years for women with children.
Denmark 65 65 Social Pension (Folkepension): 65 (67 for those who had reached the age of 60 on 1.7.1999).
Germany 65 65
Estonia 63 59,5 Pensionable age is gradually increasing and shall be equalised for men and women by 2016 at the age of 63.
Ireland 65 65
Greece 65 60 Persons insured before 1.1.1993: Men 65 years, women 60 years. Persons insured since 1.1.1993:
Men 65 years, women 65 years.
Spain 65 65
France 60 60 General scheme for employees (Régime général d'assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salariés, RGAVTS):
60 years.
Italy 65 60 Persons insured before 1.1.1996: men 65 years, women 60 years. Persons insured since 1.1.1996:
Flexible retirement age between 57 and 65 years.
Cyprus 65 65
Latvia 62 60,5 For women, 60.5 years by 1 July 2005 (gradually increasing by 6 months every year until it reaches 62 years).
Lithuania 62,5 60
Luxembourg 65 65
Hungary 62 62
Malta 61 60
Netherlands 65 65
Austria 65 60 Progressive increase of age limit for women until the same retirement age as for men will have been
reached, i.e. between the years 2024 and 2033.
Poland 65 60
Portugal 65 65
Slovenia 61 60 Due to a gradual increase the final retirement age will be reached in 2008 for women at 61 and in 2009 
for men at 63. In 2005 the full retirement age was 60/61.
Slovakia 62 60* Old-age Pension (Starobny Dôchodok): 62 years retirement age will be reached in 2014 for all population 
groups. Retirement ages for women currently vary according to the number of children raised 
(from a current age of 60 for those with no children to 56 years for those with 5 or more children).
Finland 65 65 National pension (Kansaneläke): 65 years.
Sweden 61-67 61-67 Flexible retirement age from 61 to 67 years. Possibility to work thereafter with employer's consent.
United Kingdom 65 60 State pension age: men 65 years, women 60 years (gradually rising to 65 over period 2010 to 2020).
Early retirement pension
Belgium 60 60 After 35 years of professional activity.
Czech Republic 58,5 56 years and 8 months* Permanently Reduced Early Pension available up to three years prior to the normal retirement age.
The claimant must have an insurance record of at least 25 years.
Denmark none none No retirement possible before the statutory pensionable age of 65 years.
Germany 63 63 From the age of 63 (or 60 for severely handicapped persons) after 35 years of pension insurance periods.
from 60 for those born before 1952 under specific conditions.
Estonia 60 56,5 Early Retirement Pension (ennetähtaegne vanaduspension): Available up to three years before the legal 
retirement age.
Ireland none none No early pension.
Greece 55 55 Varies according to specific conditions.
Spain 60 60 60 years of age for certain persons who were insured according to the system abolished on 1 January 1967.
61 years of age for employees in certain cases.
France 56 56 General scheme for employees (Régime général d'assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salariés, RGAVTS):
From the age of 56 for the insured who started their professional activity at the age of 14 and under a triple 
condition (duration of insurance, duration of contribution and retirement age). From the age of 55 
for the insured with severe disabilities who fulfil the minimum periods of insurance and contribution.
Italy 57 57 Early retirement pension (pensione di anzianità): at the age of 57 with 35 years of contributions or after 
37 years of contributions regardless of age. Pensions awarded to employees of companies in economic 
difficulties (pre-pensionamento). Early retirement is possible up to 5 years before normal retiring age.
Cyprus 63 63
Latvia 60 58,5 Early pension available 2 years before standard pensionable age.
Lithuania 57,5 55 Persons are eligible for early retirement pension if they have an insurance period of 30 years,
they are registered as unemployed for at least 12 months, and the age is less than 5 years to retirement age.
Luxembourg 57 57 Early retirement pension (pension de vieillesse anticipée): From 60 years of age (on condition that 480 months 
of effective insurance or assimilated periods can be proved). From 57 years of age (on condition 
of 480 months of effective insurance).
Hungary varies varies Varies according to specific conditions.
Malta none none No early pension.
Netherlands none none No early pension.
Austria 62 62 General legislation: 62 years for men and women. 60 years of age for heavy workers at the earliest 
(depending on the number of months doing heavy work).
Poland 60 55 Persons born before 1.1.1949, early pensions for specific cases. Person born after 1.1.1949, no provisions.
Portugal 55 55 Unemployed: from the age of 60. For those who have contributed 20 calendar years and are aged 50 
or more when unemployed, it is also possible from the age of 55. In the case of heavy or unhealthy work,
as a rule from the age of 55 (but only for professions legally foreseen).
Slovenia none none No special early pension. Possibility of exceptions (no malus) in the case of retirement at the age 
of 58 provided that a person has completed 40 years (men) or 38 (women) years of service.
Slovakia varies varies Varies according to specific conditions, but not related to any age limits.
Finland 62 62 National pension (Kansaneläke) and statutory earnings-related pension (Työeläke): Early old-age pension 
from the age of 62 (60 if born in 1944 or earlier).
Sweden none none No early pension.
United Kingdom none none No early State Pension.
Source: MISSOC (Mutual information system on social protection, situation as at 1/1/2006) database, DG Employment, social affairs and equal opportunities, 
and national sources.
5.2.2. Balance of financial
incentives
Choosing to participate in the labour
market depends critically on individ-
ual financial circumstances and the
alternatives available. Individuals will
make judgements based on income
from work and that from other
sources, such as pensions. A key deci-
sion often facing older workers is
whether or not they can afford to
retire, taking into account the differ-
ent characteristics of the old-age
pension system, such as the age of
entitlement to benefits and the
benefit level, as well as the expected
gain from continuing to work (from
increasing future benefits) and
indeed whether it pays to stay in
work. Women are often most con-
cerned with the work-or-retire calcu-
lation as they may not have worked
in the paid labour market continu-
ously, thus diminishing their retire-
ment income. Financial incentives in
pensions systems and other welfare
benefits can therefore have an
important influence on older work-
ers’ retirement decisions.
The effects of pensions and benefit
systems have been covered extensive-
ly in many other publications and will
not be the subject of a detailed
analysis here
27
. Indeed, it is not the
aim of this chapter to address in
detail the issue of pension reforms
and their significance in meeting the
known budgetary challenges associ-
ated with demographic change.
Nevertheless, a short overview of the
main research findings, which draws
heavily on OECD research in this area
(in particular OECD, 2005 and Duval,
2003), are summarised in this section.
The OECD’s findings suggest that the
wide variability in employment rates
of older workers across countries is
mainly due to disincentives to work-
ing longer embedded in public pol-
icies rather than different attitudes
towards retirement age. Strong
financial disincentives to remain in
the labour market after 55 often
arise from the design of pension sys-
tems and from other benefit pro-
grammes (particularly those concern-
ing unemployment and disability),
which can be used as pathways to
early retirement rather than for the
purposes for which the programmes
were designed. This suggests that
better designed policies can help
increase employment of older work-
ers, especially in those countries
which have low employment rates
for those aged 55–64.
A useful indicator of pension levels
and hence financial incentives to retire
is the replacement rate
28
(the ratio of
annual benefits compared to earnings
just before retirement), which can be
obtained from pension systems and,
where relevant, other social transfer
programmes (such as early retirement
schemes and unemployment and dis-
ability benefits)
29
. However, compara-
bility between the different Member
States’ levels depends very heavily on
whether the hypothetical cases calcu-
lated are similarly representative, and
this can vary considerably across Mem-
ber States. Nevertheless, based on
recent data from the Indicators Sub-
Group of the Social Protection Com-
mittee
30
, for the case of a single person
in full-time work and retiring at 65
with a career length of 40 years and on
average earnings, there does appear
to be considerable variation in replace-
ment rates across Member States.
More importantly, there appears to be
a reasonably strong negative correl-
ation with employment rates for older
workers (Chart 38). While replacement
rates are relatively low in the Baltic
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27 For detailed analyses of pensions see for example Economic Policy Committee and European Commission (2006), ‘The impact of ageing on public
expenditure: projections for the EU-25 Member States on pensions, healthcare, long-term care, education and unemployment transfers (2004-50)’
in European Economy Reports and Studies, No. 1., SPC(2004), Promoting longer working lives through better social protection systems, and Euro-
pean Commission (2006), Adequate and sustainable pensions – synthesis report 2006.
28 Replacement rates show the level of pensions as a percentage of previous individual earnings at the moment of take-up of pensions. Public pen-
sion schemes and (where appropriate) private pension arrangements are included, as well as the impact of taxes, social contributions and non-
pension benefits that are generally available to pensioners. Theoretical replacement rates are calculated for a hypothetical worker, with a given
earnings and career profile, and by taking into account enacted reforms of pension systems. Comparison of levels of replacement rates between
Member States should be made with caution as the base case will vary in how representative it is in different countries.
29 This indicator serves as the base for a key indicator in the field of pensions, which is the change of replacement rates over time (between 2005
and 2050). The Indicator Subgroup of the Social Protection Committee has adopted a report describing this indicator in 2006: 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_protection/docs/isg_repl_rates_en.pdf
30 The data reflect current situations (data are for 2004 or 2005), i.e. the situation of people who retire today.
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Chart 38: Employment rates for the age group 55–64 versus net pension 
replacement rates
1
at age 65 across EU Member States
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS 2006 for employment rates 55–64; Report by the Indicators Sub-group (ISG) 
of the Social Protection Committee (SPC), 19 May 2006, for replacement rates 2004/2005.
Note: 1. Base Case: Career length 40 years, age at retirement 65, full-time work, single person, average 
earnings.
* indicates statistically significant at the 10% level.
and Nordic Member States, and also
Germany, they are high in almost all
the Mediterranean countries (Greece,
Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain) and
Hungary, Luxembourg and the Nether-
lands.
The OECD has also calculated expect-
ed replacement rates in old-age pen-
sions systems (over a five-year horizon
and at ages 60 and 65), but as aver-
ages across a range of cases of people
with different characteristics
31
(Duval,
2003). These figures for replacement
rates also indicate that expected
replacement rates at ages 60 and 65
vary considerably across Member
States, with particularly marked vari-
ations across countries in replacement
rates at 60, for which figures range
from zero in those Member States
where the earliest age of eligibility is
65 to over two-thirds in those coun-
tries where people can become eli-
gible for generous old-age pension
benefits in their early 60s.
Older workers’ retirement decisions
may depend not only on the replace-
ment rate but also on the implicit tax
on continued work
32
. The OECD has
carried out calculations
33
to combine
implicit taxes arising from old-age
pension schemes and other social
transfer programmes into a single
implicit tax rate, which sums up retire-
ment incentives embedded in the
social system (Chart 39). The results
from these calculations ‘underscore
the strong incentives to retire in many
countries’ (OECD, 2005). Indeed, the
OECD reports that at age 55, the over-
all implicit tax rate is considerable
across many EU Member States even
though old-age pension schemes on
their own do not provide a strong
incentive for retirement.
The OECD reports therefore that the
implicit tax on continued work has a
clear influence on older workers’
retirement behaviour, with a strong
correlation between the level of
implicit tax on continuing working
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Chart 39: Implicit tax rates on continued work (for a single worker with average
earnings at age 60) over the next five years in social transfer programmes, 1999
Source: Brandt et al. (2005).
Note: The implicit tax on continued work refers to an "early retirement route" and is defined as the change in
pension/social wealth (i.e. the present value of the future stream of pension/social benefits), net of additional
contributions paid, resulting from a decision to postpone retirement from age 60 to age 65. The calculations
are made for a single worker with average earnings.
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Chart 40: Decline in male labour force participation between five-year age groups
55–59 and 60–64 versus implicit tax rates on continued work, 1999
Source: Source: Brandt et al. (2005) for implicit tax rates on continued work, Eurostat, EU LFS, for activity rates
for five-year age groups.
Note: The implicit tax on continued work refers to an "early retirement route" and is defined as the change in
pension/social wealth (i.e. the present value of the future stream of pension/social benefits), net of additional
contributions paid, resulting from a decision to postpone retirement from age 60 to age 65. The calculations
are made for a single worker with average earnings. * denotes significant at 10% level.
31 Calculated before tax and representing an average across six different stylised workers (corresponding to three earnings levels and two marital
situations), assuming the person enters the labour market at 20 and has an uninterrupted full-time career until retirement. Calculations are based
on currently legislated pension systems. See Duval (2003), Appendices 1 and 3, for details.
32 If the cost of remaining in employment in terms of foregone pensions and contributions paid exceeds the expected gain from the rise in future
benefits of delaying retirement, there is an implicit tax on continued work. As such the implicit tax on continued work is a summary indicator of
retirement incentives embedded in pension systems and early retirement schemes, and provides a representation of the balance between eco-
nomic costs and benefits of continued work, and also some of the effects of eligibility ages and the level of benefits.
33 Implicit tax rates on continued work are calculated for a ‘typical early retirement route’, taking into account that a person will eventually move
onto old-age pensions. It measures the costs of continuing to work in terms of contributions paid and foregone benefits, and is defined as the
average annual change in pension/social wealth (i.e. the present value of the future stream of pension/social benefits), net of additional contri-
butions paid, resulting from a decision to postpone retirement.
for five more years and changes in
the labour force participation of suc-
cessive five-year age groups of older
male workers (a measure of labour
market withdrawal) (Chart 40). This
suggests that in some continental
European Member States where
employment rates for older workers
are relatively low (such as Austria,
Belgium, France, Italy, and Luxem-
bourg), the comparatively high levels
of implicit tax on continued work
have a considerable impact on retire-
ment behaviour, and that the labour
force participation of older workers
could be boosted by a reduction in
the implicit tax on continued work.
5.3. Factors affecting
the availability of jobs
to older workers and
their employability
The availability of suitable jobs is a
key factor influencing older people’s
decisions to enter, re-enter or remain
in the labour market. On the other
hand, the perception that no jobs are
available, or that other elements of
the population are given preference
for the jobs that are available, may
discourage older people from even
looking for work in the first place. At
the same time, while the general
macro-economic situation will influ-
ence the overall level of demand for
labour in the economy, underlying
trends in the structure of employ-
ment and the functioning of the
labour market, including wage rates
and the relative ‘employability’ of
specific elements of the population,
will determine the extent to which
employers will offer jobs and to
whom. 
The possibility for older workers to
integrate, and remain, in the labour
market, and particularly their attract-
iveness to employers (or their
‘employability’), are key issues. To
maintain an increasing number of
older people in work and to prevent
their exclusion from the labour mar-
ket, it is crucial to preserve and
improve their employability, a term
which covers such aspects as their
health, skills, motivation, productivity,
relative costliness and mobility/adapt-
ability.
As highlighted previously, evidence
indicates that older jobseekers within
the EU are likely to experience signi-
ficant barriers to entering or re-
entering employment, as exemplified
by the fact that older workers are
over-represented among the long-
term unemployed and their low tran-
sition rate from unemployment into
employment. In almost all Member
States, the hiring rate
34
for older
workers is well below that for people
of prime working age, and for the EU
as a whole is only around half that
for the 25–54 age group (Chart 41).
This indicates that older workers are
at a clear disadvantage when it
comes to hiring. In terms of the gap
between hiring rates for these two
age groups, the biggest differences
are observed in Denmark, Finland
and Spain, but in contrast the rates
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Chart 41: Hiring rate* of older and prime-age workers across EU Member States,
2005
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, 2005 annual results.
Note: * Hiring rate means the ratio of all those in employment with a job tenure of 12 months or less (in the
age category) relative to the total employment (in that age group).
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Chart 42: Gap in hiring rates between older workers (55–64) and prime age work-
ers (25–54) across EU Member States by skill level, 2005
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, 2005 annual results.
34 The ratio of all those in employment with a job tenure of 12 months or less relative to total employment.
are in fact very similar in Bulgaria,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Romania
and Slovakia. The latter Member
States are also those where the hiring
rates for older people are highest,
with Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and
the United Kingdom also having
rates well above the EU average.
However, in several countries, such as
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg
and Portugal, the hiring rate of older
workers is particularly low at under
4%, although this seems to reflect to
a certain extent that the labour mar-
ket in these countries is generally less
dynamic, since rates for prime-age
workers are also relatively low.
It is interesting to observe that the
differences in hiring rates between
prime-age and older workers remains
substantial in most Member States
even when comparisons are made for
the same skill level (Chart 42 - see
page 87), hence indicating that older
workers are still at a clear disadvan-
tage in most countries even when
adjustment is made for the skill com-
position of the different age groups.
5.3.1. Demand changes due
to sectoral employment
developments
Since the 1970s, economic and struc-
tural changes have had a major
impact on the sectoral employment
structure within Europe, leading to
declines in the importance of trad-
itional industries, such as agriculture,
manufacturing and mining, and
expansion in the services sector, lead-
ing to the demand for different skills
and abilities. Technological innov-
ation and different ways of organis-
ing production have led to changes
within the labour process and
brought about new patterns of work-
ing. All this has resulted in a redistri-
bution of jobs across the working
population, with losses among some
groups and new opportunities for
others. For example, the shift in
employment from manufacturing
and agriculture towards services is
related to technological change
which requires more flexibility in
acquiring new skills and wider knowl-
edge of new technologies, which, it
can be argued, probably weakens
elderly people’s position in the
labour market relative to younger
groups. However, the ongoing shift
in employment towards the services
sector and away from manufacturing
and agriculture may well benefit
older workers for several reasons. 
Firstly, in general it would be expect-
ed that service sector jobs would
require less in the way of physical
effort compared to those in manufac-
turing and agriculture. Manual work
has increasingly been replaced by
non-manual work, so that the share
of older workers in physically
demanding activities has probably
declined over time, while the
reduced physical strains may allow
them to remain in employment
longer. Secondly, some service sector
jobs may require interpersonal skills
that are accumulated with experi-
ence. Indeed, in some cases it may be
preferable to employ older workers
than younger employees. This is par-
ticularly true in those sectors with an
ageing customer base or that supply
products or services more specific to
the older generation, for example in
the health services sector. Thirdly,
service sector jobs tend to be more
female employment-intensive, and
this is a main demand-related factor
behind the rise in older female
employment, which has risen more
strongly than for older men. A cross-
country comparison of employment
rates for the age group 55–64 versus
the share of overall employment
35
in
the services sector suggests that rates
for older workers indeed tend to be
higher in those Member States where
the share of employment in services is
higher, although the correlation is
not particularly strong (Chart 43).
5.3.2. Age discrimination by
employers
A key issue affecting employment
prospects for older workers is the
attitudes of employers, which will
affect the real availability of job
opportunities for this age group.
O’Cinneide (2005) highlights that the
negative impact of age stereotypes
and prejudice is particularly marked
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Source: Eurostat, EU labour force survey, 2006 annual average. 
Note: Sector share refers to employment by main employment, resident concept.
35 By main employment and resident concept.
in the context of employment.
Unjustified age discrimination, par-
ticularly of older people, often
deprives individuals of equal access
to work opportunities and hinders
the development of the Lisbon
Agenda by preventing particular age
groups from participating fully in the
labour market.
Taylor (2001) reports that research
carried out among older job-seekers
has found evidence of widespread
experience of age discrimination by
employers in the recruitment process,
highlighting that while only a minor-
ity of older people in employment
report experiences of age discrimina-
tion, older persons seeking employ-
ment are likely to encounter signifi-
cant barriers. Ghosheh Jr. et al (2006)
also identify age discrimination as
one of the greatest obstacles to entry
or re-entry of older workers in the
labour market, concluding that ‘age
discrimination based on social and
cultural perceptions that stereotype
or generalise the capabilities and
capacities of older workers, creates
enormous obstacles for older workers
to constructively participate in the
paid labour market’.
The prevalence of age discrimination
among employers is supported by the
results of the 57th Eurobarometer sur-
vey carried out in 15 EU Member
States, which indicated that workers
aged 45–64 years were found to be
more likely to report discrimination
when looking for work (Marsh and
Sahin-Dikmen, 2002). Furthermore,
regarding general perceptions towards
discrimination of older people, when
questioned on attitudes to discrimi-
nation, 71% of respondents of all
ages thought that those over 50
would have less chance of getting a
job, training or promotion (com-
pared to others with the same skills
or qualification), varying from 17% in
Greece to 83% in Finland (Marsh and
Sahin-Dikmen, 2003). More recently,
the results from the special Euro-
barometer 273 (from 2007) shows
that perceived age discrimination
remains a reality in the European
labour market, with age felt to be
the most telling factor affecting a
person’s perceived chance of finding
a new job (requiring the same skills
and experience) should he or she be
laid off.
Older people are also more subject to
discrimination when they are in
work. This is illustrated, for example,
by the fact that older workers in
employment have fewer opportun-
ities for vocational training than their
younger colleagues. Furthermore,
results from the 4th European Survey
on Working Conditions (Parent-
Thirion et al, 2007) show that 4.6% of
people in employment in the EU-25
aged over 55 report being personally
subject to age discrimination at work,
compared to 1.9% of those aged
25–54. While the average is fairly low,
perceptions of discrimination are
more substantial in particular Mem-
ber States, especially Austria, the
Czech Republic, Lithuania and Lux-
embourg, where a much higher share
(over 10% of workers aged over 55)
report being personally subject to
age discrimination in the workplace
(Chart 44). The large variation across
Member States may, however, reflect
to a certain degree differences in the
level of public awareness of age dis-
crimination issues, for example due
to recent age awareness campaigns
or well publicised changes in age dis-
crimination legislation, rather than
indicating concrete differences in the
prevalence of discrimination. 
In light of the above, it is evident that
employer reluctance to hire and
retain older workers partly reflects
age discrimination and, hence, in
addition to efforts to modify employ-
er attitudes through information
campaigns and guidelines, there is
also a need for appropriate age dis-
crimination legislation. Within the
EU, the need for widespread legisla-
tion to address, among others, dis-
crimination on the basis of age has
been addressed through the adop-
tion in 2000 of the Employment
Framework Directive
36
, which has cre-
ated a completely new legal context
in most Member States. The directive
outlaws discrimination on grounds of
age (as well as a number of other cri-
teria) in terms of employment, self-
employment and occupation, voca-
tional training and guidance, and in
the membership of organisations. In
conformity with the directive, all EU
countries were obliged to have put in
place legislation banning age dis-
crimination with regard to employ-
ment by the end of 2006, and the
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Chart 44: Shares of older people aged 55 and over reporting being personally sub-
ject to age discrimination at work, 2005
Source: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 4th ESWC.
Note: Figures show the proportion of respondents answering positively with don't knows/refusals ommitted
from calculations.
36 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.
2007 European Year of Equal Oppor-
tunities for All will be an occasion to
evaluate its implementation.
5.3.3. Age-related wages and
productivity
An issue of particular relevance with
regard to older workers is the com-
mon view that workers become more
expensive and less productive as they
get older, pointing to a cost disad-
vantage to hiring or retaining older
workers. Indeed, one of the factors
seen as a main obstacle for improving
the labour market participation of
older workers is the perceived dis-
crepancy between declining produc-
tivity, as a result of deteriorating
physical and mental capacities, and
increasing labour costs at older ages,
especially in the context of seniority-
based wage systems. In this perspec-
tive older workers are seen as too
expensive in relation to their
productivity, which explains why
employers have a preference to get
rid of older workers in periods of eco-
nomic slowdown or recession. 
In line with this, OECD (2006) reports
empirical evidence that higher wage
and non-wage costs act as barriers
on employment opportunities for
older workers, with some evidence
of a negative impact of seniority
wages on employment opportunities
for older male workers.
37
Another
finding is that employers appear
more likely to hire and retain older
male workers, all else being equal, in
countries where wages rise less
steeply with age than they are in
those countries where wages rise
more steeply. This reinforces the
view that relatively high wages for
older workers may well be placing
important constraints on labour
demand for older workers. 
Data from the 2002 EU Structure of
Earnings Survey shows that, in a num-
ber of Member States, earnings of
employees in industry and market
services sectors (NACE sectors C to K)
normally increase until a certain age,
generally peaking in the 40s or 50s,
before falling for the subsequent age
group(s) (Chart 45). However, there
are notable exceptions to this hump-
shaped profile, especially Austria,
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Hungary,
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, where
earnings continue to rise even into
the 60 and over age group. A further
group of countries (the Czech Repub-
lic, Finland, Malta and the Nether-
lands) show relatively little decline in
earnings for the older age group. 
Examining the impact of relative
wages for older workers on their
employment outcomes across Mem-
ber States reveals there is a strong
(and statistically significant) negative
correlation between employment
rates for the age group 55–64 and
the ratios of mean annual earnings of
the older age groups (50–59 and 60
and over), compared to both the
young (under 29) and 40–49 age
groups (Chart 46). In those countries
where older workers’ earnings are
highest relative to the younger age
groups, older workers’ employment
rates tend to be lower, this being
clearly the case in Austria, Belgium,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Slovenia and
Poland. This indicates that the rela-
tive cost of older workers compared
to younger ones is indeed a key fac-
tor affecting employers’ willingness
to hire or retain older workers. It
therefore seems likely that more flex-
ible pay systems, and in particular
moving away from seniority-based
wage systems, could enhance the job
security and employability of older
workers by reducing their relative
cost. However, based on an assess-
ment of recent developments for
older workers in Belgium, Denmark,
Germany and the Netherlands, Tros
(2005) reports that currently there
appears to be little policy interven-
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Chart 45: Earnings profiles of employees in industry and market services by age across EU Member States, 2002
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37 There is a negative relationship observed across OECD countries between the employment rate of men aged 55–64 and the extent to which wages
for male workers aged 55–59 are higher than those aged 25–29.
tion to improve wage flexibility in
order to enhance employment securi-
ty for older workers. 
Apart from earnings, high non-wage
costs can also act as a barrier to
employing older workers and affect
an employer’s willingness to hire and
keep older workers. In this context,
more general labour market institu-
tions, such as the tax wedge
38
, can
also help explain differences in the
labour market performance of older
workers across countries. Bassanini
and Duval (2006) find that, in com-
mon with outcomes for other age
groups, high tax wedges in general
are associated with lower employ-
ment prospects for older workers.
They report that a reduction of 1 per-
centage point in the tax wedge leads
to a rise of 0.3 percentage points in
the older worker’s employment rate.
On whether older workers have suffi-
ciently high productivity to merit their
relatively high costs compared to
younger workers, available evidence
does not suggest that older workers
are necessarily less productive than
their younger counterparts, and that
an older labour force and longer
working lives need not necessarily
imply less productive labour overall.
Auer and Fortuny (2000) emphasise
that while it is true that wages and
fringe benefits often rise with age,
there is no reason to believe that per-
formance and accumulated know-
how of older workers does not com-
pensate for the higher cost. As
emphasised by Naegele and Walker
(2006) ‘both practical experience and
research demonstrate, older employ-
ees – deployed in the right posts for
their individual skills – are highly pro-
ductive’. Moreover, Taylor (2002)
argues there is evidence that older
workers’ higher earnings may be com-
pensated for by their accumulated
experience and greater know-how
resulting in higher levels of job per-
formance, and reports that while
studies show that when objective
measures of productivity are used per-
formance increases with age, super-
visor ratings tend to indicate instead a
negative relationship (Taylor, 2001).
Even if individual productivity does
decline in some dimensions (e.g.
physical and mental capacity) this can
be reduced by changes to work
organisation, ensuring older workers
receive appropriate training to
update skills
39
, preventive health poli-
cies and more effective use of work-
related technologies, and may be
partly offset by typical characteristics
of older workers such as greater
experience, stability and reliability,
and better people skills. 
5.3.4. Employment protection
legislation
Apart from seniority-based wage sys-
tems, strict employment protection
legislation
40
(EPL) may also make it
more expensive to employ older
workers (for example it may be more
expensive to lay-off older workers
because of higher severance pay).
However, the overall effect on
employment is not straightforward,
since strict EPL can have two oppos-
ing effects on labour market out-
comes for workers. On the one hand,
it tends to reduce the separation rate
from employment since it raises firing
costs, while on the other it decreases
the exit rate from unemployment
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38 The tax wedge (the difference between the labour cost to the employer and the corresponding net take-home pay of the employee) is an indi-
cation of the distortions created by the tax system. Labour taxes may affect employment if they alter labour costs and modify the incentive for
job creation at given after–tax wages. Changes in taxes affect labour-supply decisions when they alter the gap between in-work and out-of-work
income. 
39 Data from the OECD’s International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) suggests literacy skills are a key determinant of worker’s productivity and that these
improve with practice and deteriorate if not used. This suggests the productivity potential of older workers is not impaired by age but rather by
skills obsolescence – something that can be overcome through training.
40 EPL covers legal and administrative restrictions on worker dismissals as well as severance payments for dismissed employees.
into work since, in anticipation of
possible future costs on labour force
adjustment, firms may become more
cautious about hiring.
Empirical evidence generally indi-
cates a weak negative correlation
across Member States between the
OECD calculated indicator of the
overall strictness of EPL
41
and the cor-
responding employment rate for the
55–64 age group (Chart 47). However,
by focusing on outcomes for older
men and the employment ratio
specifically of employees aged 50–64
to the population of the same age
(hence excluding the self-employed),
the OECD (2006) finds much stronger
evidence that strict EPL is a barrier to
employment of older workers. In par-
ticular, it appears to be associated
with lower labour mobility in a num-
ber of countries, especially in terms
of lower hiring rates. Results from
the EU Labour Force Survey for 2006
confirm the stronger nature of the
negative relationship for male
employees (Chart 48), although the
correlation in this case is not statistic-
ally significant.
However, recent research by Bassanini
and Duval (2006) using cross-country
and time-series econometric tech-
niques
42
finds that stringent EPL may
in fact benefit older workers. They
find that, although EPL is likely to
reduce the opportunities of older job
seekers through its negative impact
on hiring rates, this may be more than
offset by the lower risk that already
employed older workers are laid off. 
5.3.5. Health, disability, and
health and safety at work
Health often declines with age, and
the onset of health problems affects
the timing of retirement for a signifi-
cant number of workers unless it is
possible for them to adapt work
activities.
43
Research (Bound et al.,
1998) and results shown earlier indi-
cate that poor health and disability
are among the most common factors
leading people to withdraw from the
labour market and are a very import-
ant determinant of labour force par-
ticipation for older people. Indeed,
employment rates for the age group
55–64 tend to be higher in those
Member States where the share of
people in this age group reporting
self-perceived health as good or very
good is greater (Chart 49).
Persons with long-standing health
problems or disability (LSHPD) are
much more likely to be inactive than
the able-bodied as a result of difficul-
ties in entering the labour market
and remaining there. Results from
the 2002 LFS ad hoc module
44
indicate
that 45% of people in the EU-25
aged over 15 and with some disability
are inactive compared to 27% of the
non-disabled. Furthermore, only
around 50% of disabled people are in
employment, compared to 68% of
the non-disabled. Since the incidence
of long-standing health problems or
disability increases with age (Chart 50),
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41 The OECD calculates a summary indicator of the overall strictness of EPL as a weighted average of three components: 1. regular employees, 2. tem-
porary employees and 3. collective dismissals. The summary indicator ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating greater strictness of EPL.
42 They explore the policy and institutional determinants of employment rates through pooled cross-country/time series regressions, including for
the older workers age group.
43 Bound et al (1998) find that changing jobs appears to be an important method adopted by older workers to enable continued labour force 
participation.
44 The 2002 LFS module focused on the topic of the employment of disabled people. Results refer to persons aged 16–64 living in private 
households. Disabled persons are those who stated that they had a longstanding health problem or disability (LSHPD) for six months or more or
expected it to last for six months or more.
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Chart 48: Ratio of male employees aged 55-64 to the male population of the same
age versus EPL strictness
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS second quarter 2006 results for male employee ratio, Employment Outlook 2006 and
OECD.Stat for EPL strictness (2003)
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Chart 47: Older workers employment rates across EU Member States versus 
strictness of EPL
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS for ERs 55-64 (2006 annual averages), OECD Employment Outlook 2006 and OECD.stat
for EPL strictness, 2003
the impact on inactivity among older
people is even more pronounced.
Almost one in three people aged
55–64 suffers from a longstanding
health problem or disability (LSHPD),
and more than two-thirds of those
aged 55–64 with some form of dis-
ability are inactive. 
Figures on the standardised preva-
lence rate
45
of work-related health
problems from the 1999 LFS ad hoc
module on work-related health prob-
lems and accidental injuries indicate
that the most frequent health prob-
lems for older workers concern mus-
culoskeletal disorders (Chart 51). This
highlights the importance of reducing
the physical strain on ageing workers,
which can be achieved through vari-
ations in working time, work organi-
sation and job design. However,
stress, depression and anxiety are also
relatively important causes of health
problems as workers get older. 
Despite the significance of health
problems with regard to labour force
participation, figures from the latest
European Working Conditions Survey
indicate that around one in three
(35.4%) workers in the EU-27 feel
that their work affects their health,
while around one in four (28.6%)
consider their health and safety to be
at risk because of their work,
although this share has been declin-
ing in recent years. Corresponding
figures for workers aged 55 and over
are broadly similar (33% and 24.9%
respectively). However, the true
impact of health-related issues is like-
ly to be greater, since data from the
survey does not cover people no
longer in work, many of whom may
have exited the labour market due to
health problems. All this reinforces
the importance of measures to
improve working conditions and to
pay particular attention to health
and safety in the workplace, as well
as general measures to improve the
overall health of the population.
5.3.6. Skill levels and lifelong
learning
Older workers are often perceived as
being less well educated than
younger age groups, having obsolete
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Chart 49: Employment rates for the age group 55-64 across EU Member States 
versus self-perceived health status of this group 
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, annual averages 2006 for ERs 55-64, and Health Interview Survey 2004 round
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Chart 50: Percentage of EU-25 population aged 16–64 with a long-standing health
problem or disability, 2002
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS ad hoc module 2002
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Chart 51: Standardised prevalence rate of work-related health problems 
by diagnosis group and age in the EU* in 1999
Source:  Eurostat, EU LFS ad hoc module 1999
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45 The prevalence rate is the number of workers suffering from the health problem during the last 12 months per 100 000 employed workers. A
work-related health problem covers all diseases, disabilities and other physical or psychological health problems, apart from accidental injuries,
suffered by the person during the last 12 months, and caused or made worse by the work.
 
skills and being less able to adapt to
rapid technological change. Indeed,
Taylor (2001) reports that a perceived
lack of appropriate skills among
older workers, lack of qualifications
held and the low return on training
investment due to a truncated pay-
back period are often cited by
employers as factors which might dis-
courage them from recruiting and
employing older people. If workers
are to remain and progress in work
they need to update skills regularly,
as skills and competences determine
not only the extent to which those
entering or returning to the labour
market can take up the jobs on offer,
but more crucially, the extent to
which those already in work can keep
their jobs in a changing technological
and economic environment. Skills
are, indeed, a key dimension of
employability, but evidence suggests
that older workers in particular face a
lack of opportunities to update their
skills.
Figures from the EU Labour Force
Survey confirm that older people are,
on average, less well educated
46
than
other age groups (Chart 52). Howev-
er, more effective lifelong learning
strategies, as well as the fact that
younger cohorts are better educat-
ed
47
and will eventually filter through
to the older age groups, should lead
to a continuing improvement in the
skill composition of the 55–64 year
old group in coming years. 
As the existing literature shows
(Employment in Europe 2003; OECD,
2006: Leombruni and Villosio, 2005),
educational attainment is a particu-
larly important factor in the employ-
ment of older workers, and their par-
ticipation and employment rates. At
all ages, activity rates are significant-
ly higher the more educated the
work force, with the importance of
skill level to labour market participa-
tion more pronounced for women
than for men (Chart 53). For men the
difference in activity rates between
the low and high-skilled generally
increases with age, being greatest for
the age groups 55–59 and 60–64
where the difference exceeds 20 per-
centage points. This age effect is less
pronounced for women, as differ-
ences between activity rates for low
and high-skilled are generally sub-
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46 In this chapter, ‘low-skilled’ refers to those with education at lower secondary level or below (ISCED 0-2), ‘medium-skilled’ to those with upper
secondary education (ISCED 3-4), and ‘high-skilled’ to those having completed tertiary education (ISCED 5-6).
47 In 2006, within the EU-25, the age group 25–54 comprised 25% high-skilled and only 27% low-skilled compared to 17% and 43% respectively for
those aged 55–64.
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Chart 52: Skill structure of the population aged 15–64 in the EU-27 
by age group, 2006
Source: Eurostat, EU Labour force survey, 2006 spring results
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stantial at all ages below 65,
although the difference is most pro-
nounced for the older age groups
50–54 and 55–59.
Older people in the highest educa-
tion category (those having complet-
ed tertiary education) are almost
twice as likely to be in employment
as those in the lowest category (those
with education only at lower second-
ary level or below), with the differ-
ence more pronounced for women
than for men. This difference in
employment rates for people aged
55–64 between the high and low-
skilled (64% versus 34%) is much
greater than that observed for the
prime working-age population (88%
versus 66%), indicating the greater
importance of skill level to older
people’s employment attachment.
Indeed, higher qualified people gen-
erally remain in the labour market to
older ages than the less qualified, but
this may also be partly explained by
the fact that the less educated gener-
ally begin their working lives earlier
and consequently exit the labour
market earlier
48
.
There are large differences across
Member States in the skill composi-
tion of the population aged 55–64.
For example, while the share of low-
skilled in this age group averages
43% for the EU-25 as a whole, in
Greece, Italy and Spain the share is
over two-thirds and is even higher in
Malta and Portugal at over 80%.
These marked differences in skill
composition account for a substantial
part of the variation in overall
employment rates for older people
across Member States (Chart 54), with
high (and statistically significant)
negative correlation between the
employment rates for those aged
55–64 and the combined share of low
and medium-skilled in the popula-
tion of the same age. Indeed in many
Member States the low employment
rate for the age group 55–64 is due
to the combination of the high share
of older people with lower levels of
education and the tendency for the
less skilled to have lower employ-
ment rates. 
Continuing to update skills during
working life to respond to the chang-
ing needs of the labour market is crit-
ical if older workers are to remain in
work longer. Indeed, access to train-
ing and lifelong learning has been
identified as a key factor for extend-
ing working life (OECD, 2006: Euro-
pean Commission, 2006c), and there
is a positive and statistically signifi-
cant correlation across Member
States between the incidence of
training for older workers
49
and the
employment rate for this age group
(Chart 55). Adult learning and train-
ing can also play a key role in over-
coming the lack of formal education
or in the acquisition of basic skills,
and are important for both equity
and efficiency, not least to re-engage
the low-skilled in learning and help
them to become better adapted to
the changing labour market (Euro-
pean Commission, 2006d). Further-
more, as Auer and Fortuny (2000)
point out, while the ‘educational
upgrading’ in younger generations
should provide the basis for younger
cohorts to eventually enter the older
age group relatively well equipped,
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48 See Employment in Europe 2003, Chapter 5.
49 Based on data from the EU Labour Force Survey on the share of older people aged 55–64 in the labour force who received education or training
in the four weeks preceding the survey.
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Chart 54: Skill composition of population aged 55–64 and overall employment
rates for the age group 55–64, 2006
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, annual average 2006 for ER 55–64, second quarter 2006 results for skill composition.
Note: * indicates significant at the 1% level.
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longer duration of schooling cannot
be a substitute for lifelong learning.
They emphasise that ‘without life-
long learning, the incoming cohorts
of younger workers will continue to
have educational advantages com-
pared with older cohorts, especially
since their education may be per-
ceived to be more relevant to the cur-
rent job market’.
However, the evidence indicates that
older workers participate in training
and lifelong learning activities less
than their younger colleagues do,
with most surveys clearly showing an
age gap in participation in continu-
ing education and training. Accord-
ing to the EU LFS, only in Austria, the
Nordic Member States, Slovenia and
the United Kingdom does the share
of older workers in training in the
last four weeks exceed 10%, while in
most southern and eastern Member
States the levels of training are very
low at fewer than 5%. In addition, a
recent study by EIM and SEOR (2005)
reports that not only does the inci-
dence of job-related training tend to
decline with age but also the average
duration of training for older work-
ers is shorter compared to younger
trainees. Furthermore, analysis per-
formed on the results of the third
European Working Conditions Survey
(Molinié, 2003) highlights the fact
that the older workers get, the more
they feel that their work does not
enable them ‘to learn new things’
and task rotation between col-
leagues becomes considerably rare
over the age of 45.
While it still remains the case that
older workers receive less training
than their younger counterparts,
there is nevertheless some evidence
of an improvement between 2000
and 2006 in the share of the labour
force participating in education and
training for all age groups, including
older workers (Chart 56). Further-
more, the improvement for those
aged over 50 has generally been of
the same order as that for the
younger groups aged over 30. The
absolute situation for older workers
has therefore improved but not the
situation relative to younger age
groups, and the differences between
ages still persist. Indeed, the trend of
declining participation in education
and training with age, which starts
early on in working life, remains a
strong feature in most Member
States and much remains to be done
to address this.
Furthermore, little attention continues
to be paid to training for low-skilled
older workers. It remains the case that
the low-skilled receive considerably
less training than the high-skilled
across all adult age groups, including
the older workers age group (Chart
57). According to the EU LFS, in 2006
less than 4% of low-skilled 55–64 year
olds in the labour force received train-
ing in the four weeks preceding the
survey, while the share was around
four times higher(around 15%) for
high-skilled older workers. Given that
the share of low-skilled in the 55–64
age group is much greater than that of
the high-skilled, and that in principle it
is the low-skilled that have the greater
need for training if they are to adapt
to and stay in the changing labour
market, the large difference in the
incidence of training among older
people according to skill level is an
issue of concern.
In an economy in which jobs require
an increasingly high level of technical
skills and knowledge, the lack of
major improvements in the relative
position of older workers with
respect to lifelong learning, especial-
ly the less skilled ones, is a concern.
As pointed out by Taylor (2001 and
2002), with the application of new
technologies over recent years there
have been marked changes in the
skills requirements within many
industries and organisations, while
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Chart 57: Percentage of the EU-25 labour force in training during previous four
weeks by educational attainment level and age group, 2006
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS second quarter 2006 results.
the reorganisation of work also
brings with it potential challenges for
older workers. If new technologies
change job and skill requirements,
older workers will be affected differ-
ently to prime-age workers because
of their older skills and because they
have less education on average.
Behaghel and Greenan (2007) con-
firm that technical change is biased
against older low-skilled workers, but
also find that old age does not consti-
tute a systematic barrier to training
and that the difficulties faced by
older low-skilled workers may be due
rather to the lack of basic computer
literacy. It is therefore essential that
older workers are provided with the
skills required of the new economy,
in particular through greater involve-
ment in lifelong learning, if inactivity
of older people due to skill deficits is
to be reduced (Box 2). 
However, in the general debate on
the need for increased training for
older workers some caveats are ne-
cessary. Mayhew and Rijkers (2004)
point out that while education and
training on the whole improve indi-
viduals’ labour market prospects, not
all education and training is equally
effective in achieving this. They
report that training programmes on
their own are of limited value in get-
ting people out of unemployment or
inactivity and into work, and that
indiscriminately providing training in
the absence of other linked initiatives
(for example, active labour market
measures such as job search assis-
tance and ensuring that it pays to
work) would be wasteful. OECD
(2006) argues that the attractiveness
of training and its potential returns
for older workers can be improved by
adapting teaching methods and con-
tent to their needs by the provision
of short, modular courses and
through the recognition of prior
learning and experience. Older work-
ers are found to be more likely to
participate in training if they have
access to shorter courses that build
on existing skills and experience and
which have a stronger link to the
workplace, suggesting that training
which is targeted and has a strong
on-the-job element is most likely to
be successful.
As Auer and Fortuny (2000) point
out, the move towards lifelong
learning will be a gradual process,
but in the meantime there is still an
urgent need to help the present
‘stock’ of older workers. Therefore,
both stock (the current problems of
older workers) and flow (to seriously
start a policy of lifelong learning for
younger cohorts) policies have to be
pursued at the same time. A means
of compensating for low educational
attainment among today’s older age
groups is through adult key skills
programmes, in addition to address-
ing some of the barriers that seem to
prevent many people from engaging
in job-related learning later in life. In
a longer-term perspective, what is
needed is a lifelong learning strategy
for working-age people, not just
focusing on the needs of workers
when they reach the later ages of
55–64 but addressing their needs
throughout their entire working life.
5.4. Attractiveness (and
conditions) of work
In order to raise employment among
older people it is not just a case of
making older workers more attrac-
tive to employers, but also of making
the sort of jobs available to older
97
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Box 2 – Skill deficits and inactivity
A major factor in the inactivity of older people is their lack of preparedness for continuing their working career. Par-
ticipation in adult learning in the EU is currently low and unequally distributed. In all countries, participation
decreases sharply with age after the age of 34. Also older workers are less likely to benefit from workplace training
opportunities than their younger colleagues, while those with the lowest levels of skills and of initial education are
least likely to participate; thus many older workers are at a double disadvantage as they also belong to that part of
the workforce considered to be low-skilled workers.
Cedefop advocates a new mindset among policy-makers and social partners in relation to working, learning and
ageing, and the links between them
50
. Older people may be less able to do physically demanding work, for example,
but they do have something different to contribute – experience, reliability, a longer term view (providing a bal-
ance between ‘younger’ and ‘older’ perspectives – intergenerational learning). However, their skills need to be
adapted and developed in order for them to fill a new role in the workplace, and currently lifelong learning strat-
egies are failing to cover their needs.
Cedefop’s work concludes that key policy changes are required in relation to older workers based on:
• New thinking about the contribution of older people in a ‘life-course’ perspective, which means understanding
the phases of one’s life as the taking on of new challenges, i.e. active ageing
• Creation of ‘sustainable work environments’ that provide flexible and quality work for older people.
50 Promoting lifelong learning for older workers: an international overview (2006), Cedefop, edited by Tarja Tikkanen and Barry Nyhan.
 
people more attractive to them.
Indeed, the quality of work is a key
element in retaining older workers in
employment or encouraging them to
return to work; the number of older
workers in jobs of low quality leaving
the labour market is up to four times
higher than that of older workers in
jobs of higher quality
51
. Furthermore,
results from the 4th European Work-
ing Conditions Survey indicate that,
although for the EU-27 as a whole
85% of older people aged 55 and
over in employment report being sat-
isfied or very satisfied with their
working conditions, satisfaction
varies substantially across Member
States, from as low as around the
50% level in Greece and Romania to
98% in Denmark (Chart 58).
Research (Haider and Loughran, 2001;
Ghosheh Jr. et al, 2006) has shown
that the attractiveness of work and
working conditions
52
are significant
factors affecting older workers’ labour
market attachment. The overall
attractiveness of a job covers a num-
ber of dimensions such as pay and
working conditions, training opportun-
ities and career development, health
and safety at the workplace, and flex-
ible work organisation and working-
time arrangements that allow for a
better reconciliation between work
and family responsibilities. Issues
which can act as disincentives to
remaining in work include low job sat-
isfaction, occupational stress, poor
working conditions, work which is
physically demanding, a lack of variety
and autonomy in work tasks, a lack of
challenge and development opportu-
nities, and an inability to reconcile
work and personal responsibilities.
Furthermore, appropriate adjust-
ments at the workplace are crucial for
allowing workers with disabilities or
declining physical capacities to enter
or stay in the labour market. The abil-
ity of the European labour market to
address these issues and offer good
quality jobs will determine the extent
to which older workers will take up
the jobs on offer or remain in their
current employment for longer.
5.4.1. Working time
An issue of particular relevance to
older workers may be the desire to
withdraw gradually from the labour
force by reducing working hours
towards the end of their working
lives. Rather than having to end their
participation in the labour market
abruptly, arrangements which allow
people to withdraw gradually from
employment could potentially better
meet the wishes of older workers and
consequently help raise their employ-
ment rates. Conversely, a lack of pos-
sibilities to shift to part-time work
would limit the scope for a more
phased transition to retirement.
There are broad indications that
reduced working hours would gener-
ally help to raise employment levels
98
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Chart 59: Part-time employment share and employment rates for older workers 
(55–64) across EU Member States, 2006
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, 2006 annual average.
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Chart 58: Satisfaction* with working conditions among employed older workers
(aged 55–64) in the EU Member States, 2005
Source: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 4th EWCS
Note: * Share of older people in employment declaring they are satisfied or very satisfied with working 
conditions.
51 European Commission, ‘Improving quality in work: a review of recent progress’, COM(2003) 728.
52 The importance of health-related issues has already been addressed earlier in the chapter. Here it is just necessary to emphasise again that, given
that many older workers cite health problems as one of the reasons for withdrawing from the labour market, improving working conditions will
play a key role in encouraging longer working lives.
among older people. Older people are
already over-represented in part-time
work, and Member States with
greater shares of older workers in
part-time employment tend to have
higher overall employment rates for
the 55–64 age group, although the
relationship is not particularly strong
(Chart 59). Furthermore, the propor-
tion of involuntary part-time workers
(i.e. those that are employed part time
because they could not get a full-time
job) in the EU is low for older workers
(at around 12%, compared to 20% for
the working-age population as a
whole (2004 figures)), clearly indicat-
ing that part-time work meets the
wishes of a large majority of older
workers in such employment.
Working-time reduction therefore
merits special attention as a poten-
tially useful measure to improve the
attractiveness of work for older work-
ers, and Member States have been
experimenting with and implement-
ing measures on gradual retirement
in which older workers decrease their
working hours whilst being granted
some form of income support. How-
ever, while increasing the availability
of arrangements allowing for
reduced working hours for older
workers appears a positive step in
principle, Jolivet and Lee (2004) high-
light that it may have unintended
consequences such as inducing those
who would otherwise stay in full-time
work to take part-time employment,
or even marginalising older workers
in the workplace. With take-up rates
of progressive retirement among
older workers still very low in Euro-
pean countries, Taylor (2002) points
out that a problem for gradual retire-
ment appears to be that part-time
employment may be seen as unusual
or of lower status. OECD (2006) also
points out that if reductions in work-
ing time are heavily subsidised, there
is a risk that they could involve reduc-
tions rather than increases in effective
labour supply of older workers, and
warns that measures to promote a
more phased transition between
work and retirement – especially if it
involves a public subsidy to reduce
working time – should be carefully
evaluated in terms of its expected net
impact on the effective labour supply. 
Contrary to what might be expected,
results from the EU Labour Force Sur-
vey indicate that the average usual
weekly working hours for older
workers aged 55–64 are not substan-
tially lower than those of prime
working age (25–54). Those aged
55–59 work on average 38 hours per
week, essentially the same as the
hours worked by the age groups in
the range 25–54, and with only a
slight overall reduction to 36 hours
for those aged 60–64 (Chart 60). The
downward trend for the 60–64 age
group is due in large part to the high-
er share of part-time workers among
those in employment in this particu-
lar age group. It is interesting to note
that average working hours for those
in full-time employment show an
upward trend for older workers,
while those for part-time workers
tend to decline. This opposite move-
ment in working hours for part-time
and full-time employment points to a
diversification in working hours for
older workers. Looking at the range
in average working hours for the dif-
ferent age groups across individual
Member States (Chart 61) indicates
that there is greater variability across
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Chart 61: Cross-country variation in average usual weekly working hours across EU
Member States for different age groups, 2005
Source:  Eurostat, EU LFS, annual average data for 2005.
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Chart 60: Average usual working hours in the EU-25 by age and full-time versus
part-time distinction, 2005
Source:  Eurostat, EU LFS, annual average data for 2005
countries in average working hours
for older workers than for prime-age
workers. In some Member States,
ageing is associated with longer aver-
age working hours, while in others
the opposite situation applies, and
there is less commonality in the over-
all average number of hours for this
group.
Jolivet and Lee (2004) also find that
working time for older workers does
not differ significantly from that for
other age groups, although one of
the key reasons suggested for this is
that many of those workers who did
not want the prevailing working time
patterns may have already exited the
labour market. This is supported by
their finding that the preferred
length of working time for inactive
older people is much shorter than
that for employed people. They con-
clude that working-hour constraints
for inactive older people may be
responsible, to some extent, for their
inactivity. The rise in availability of
part-time work over recent years
would therefore appear to be an
important factor in addressing the
working-hour desires of older work-
ers who might otherwise be inactive.
5.4.2. Working-time
organisation and atypical
working hours
Apart from the length of working
time, an important issue is how that
time is organised. Access to jobs with
a flexible organisation of working
hours (such as flexible work sched-
ules), which better suit employees’
needs, is a potentially important ele-
ment in raising employment among
older people, since it can facilitate
their remaining in employment
longer, together with reconciling
their work and family responsibilities.
For example, recent research (Leom-
bruni and Villosio, 2005) has shown
that in countries where the employ-
ment rate of older workers is lower,
the burden associated with family
responsibilities in terms of care of
children or other members of the
family is higher. Haider and Loughran
(2001) find that individuals over the
age of 65 clearly prefer flexibility at
the expense of low wages.
However, while the 2005 European
Working Conditions Survey indicates
that flexibility of work schedules
appear to be gradually increasing,
some two-thirds of employees in the
EU-25 still have schedules fixed by
their employer with no possibility for
change, and only around a quarter
can adapt their working times to suit
their needs, in some cases within limits.
The situation for older workers is
only marginally better, with around
61% of employees aged 55 or over
still having schedules fixed by their
employer with no possibility for
change, and only around 28% able to
adapt their working times to suit
their needs, suggesting that much
scope still remains to improve the
prevalence of more flexible working-
time arrangements among older
employees. 
With regard to the more atypical
forms of working-time arrangement,
such as shift work and night work,
available evidence (Ghosheh Jr. et al,
2006; Spurgeon, 2003) suggests that
these forms of arrangement are less
suitable for older workers. Indeed,
Spurgeon (2003) reports that a series
of studies in the late 1990s indicate
that from around the late 40s and
early 50s, ageing results in a decreas-
ing ability to cope with shift work.
Explanations put forward for this
include the shortening and fragmenta-
tion of sleep with age and the slower
circadian rhythm of older workers.
Despite the concerns with regard to
unsocial working hours for older work-
ers, Jolivet and Lee (2004) conclude
that these concerns are not necessarily
reflected in actual working time pat-
terns and that evidence does not indi-
cate that older workers are in a clearly
more favourable position with regard
to how working time is organised com-
pared to other age groups. They find
that overall within the EU, apart from
some greater influence on starting and
finishing times, older workers appear
to be equally exposed to unsocial
working hours and irregularity of daily
and weekly working hours as other
groups. Results from the EU LFS con-
firm that the incidence of night and
shift work among older employees is
not dramatically lower than that
among younger employees (Chart 62).
5.4.3. Work organisation,
ergonomics and job design
Raising the employment rate of older
workers must be counterbalanced
with the aim to avoid pushing employ-
ees to their physical and mental limits.
Steps must therefore be taken with
regard to organisational, ergonomic
and job design aspects. For example,
100
EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE 2007
0
5
10
15
20
25
15–24 25–49 50–64
%
 o
f 
em
p
lo
ye
es
Shift work Night work
Chart 62: Prevalence of shift work and night work among employees in the EU-25
by age group, 2005
Source:  Eurostat, EU LFS, 2005 results. 
Note: Indicence of night work refers to the share of employees usually doing night work.
work organisation that increases vari-
ety and autonomy in work tasks, and
provides a challenge and development
opportunities, could encourage older
workers to remain longer in employ-
ment. Physical strain can be lessened
though appropriate job design and
working-time organisation. Modern
technology and ergonomics can
increase the productivity of older
workers, compensating for physical
decline, while improving the work
environment would contribute to
extending healthy life and support
active ageing.
With regard to organisational aspects,
it might be expected that a work
organisation in which employees enjoy
a high degree of autonomy would
have high levels of employee job satis-
faction, and consequently this would
encourage workers to want to remain
in work longer. In line with this, Peulet
(2006) finds that work organisations in
which employees enjoy greater auton-
omy favour an extended career. This is
generally confirmed by the reasonably
strong correlation between employ-
ment rates for older workers and an
autonomy index
53
developed by the
European Foundation for the Improve-
ment of Living and Working Condi-
tions based on several indicators of
work autonomy from the 4th European
Working Conditions Survey (EWCS)
(Chart 63). Denmark and Sweden,
which have high shares of older work-
ers in employment, enjoy a largely
autonomous work organisation
model, while Member States with tra-
ditionally less autonomous models
generally have lower employment
rates for older workers. Overall, it
seems that there is indeed a positive
relationship between work organisa-
tions that provide more autonomy to
employees and the prolonging of
older workers’ professional lives.
Another issue of particular concern to
older workers is physical working con-
ditions, especially for those whose jobs
entail sustained physical effort. How-
ever, while advances in production
technology have led to a correspon-
ding lessening of the physical demands
in the workplace, as evidenced by the
decrease in blue-collar jobs, it is note-
worthy that a growing body of
research has identified the phenom-
enon of work intensification
54
and that
consequently the level of non-physical
demands faced by older workers (e.g.
intense concentration and stress) may
have increased significantly. Tros
(2005) argues that the job and employ-
ment security of older workers is under
pressure due to trends like work inten-
sification, leading to loss of soft jobs
and bridge jobs.
Various ergonomic and job design
measures can be implemented to
address the specific work-environment
needs of older workers, including
those which prevent work-induced ill-
ness or disability and compensate for
the decline in physical capabilities that
comes with age. This may include, for
example, the provision of better light-
ing and seating, removing the need
for heavy lifting or violent twisting
movements, and arranging worksta-
tions to avoid tiring movements and to
improve working postures. Further-
more, older people can be reassigned
to less physically demanding activities
or their task organisation structured to
allow more intervals between the
more physically demanding tasks.
However, Ghosheh Jr. et al (2006) point
out that while measures specific to
improving the working environment
of older workers are often introduced
in workplaces, it should be borne in
mind that older workers’ health is a
function of past as well as current
working conditions, which means that
the best approach lies in a policy of
improving working conditions
throughout working life.
6. A TYPOLOGY OF
APPROACHES TO ACTIVE
AGEING IN EU MEMBER
STATES
The previous analysis has highlighted
some of the main factors which may
influence the labour market attach-
ment of older people and which
either encourage or prevent them
from extending their working lives.
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Chart 63: Employment rates for people aged 55–64 across EU Member States  
versus autonomy in the workplace
Source: : Eurostat, EU LFS annual averages 2006 for ERs 55–64, European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions, 4th EWCS for autonomy index (2005) (Figures apply to employees only). 
Note: * indicates significant at the 10% level. 
53 The autonomy index is a composite indicator constructed from five variables in the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS), namely whether
people are able to choose or change (a) the order of tasks, (b) the methods of work, (c) the speed of work, (d) whether they have influence over
the choice of working partners and (e) whether they are able to take a break when desired. It refers to employees only.
54 See, for example, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Condition’s publication (2006), Fifteen years of working
conditions in the EU: Charting of the trends.
These fell into the broad categories
of retirement, pensions and the bal-
ance of financial incentives, which
focused on various disincentives or
penalties to carry on working
embedded in each country’s pension
system and in other aspects of the
tax and social welfare system, the
factors affecting the availability of
jobs to older workers, the employa-
bility of older workers, and the con-
ditions and attractiveness of work, as
well as the existence of a supportive
environment.
In this context it is interesting to exam-
ine the existence of different types of
approach to active ageing within the
EU Member States, in terms of the
combination of policy-relevant meas-
ures aimed at addressing some of the
key factors already identified as influ-
encing the labour market participation
of older workers. This provides an indi-
cation of the similarities and differ-
ences across countries in terms of how
active-ageing strategies are imple-
mented, and in particular how groups
of Member States stand with respect to
various factors that are recognised as
being of particular importance to the
employment of older people, which
can then be linked to their present
position with regard to older workers’
labour market outcomes such as their
employment rates.
An initial examination has been car-
ried out on the basis of a select set of
factors which, based on the preceding
review, appear particularly important
with regard to the labour market situ-
ation of older workers. The approach
focuses on a cluster analysis of vari-
ables which are representative indica-
tors
55
of the factors thus identified,
and for which data are available for a
large majority of the EU Member
States. The variables concerned are the
following:
• AV ORA: The standard retirement
age as a simple average across
male and female statutory ages
for entitlement to a standard pen-
sion. Source: MISSOC 2006.
• NRR at 65: The net pension
replacement rate at age 65.
56
This
is a straightforward indicator of
pension levels (the ratio of annual
benefits to earnings just before
retirement) which influences older
workers’ decisions to remain in
work, depending on whether they
consider their benefits to be high
enough. Source: Report by the
Indicators Sub-group (ISG) of the
Social Protection Committee (SPC),
19 May 2006.
• ERN ratio: The ratio of average
earnings for the age group 50–59
compared to those aged under 29,
for NACE sectors C to K, as a proxy
for the influence of seniority
wages. Source: Eurostat, Structure
of Earnings Survey, 2002.
• Tax wedge: The tax wedge on
labour costs,
57
as a proxy for the
influence of distortions created by
the tax system on older workers’
employment prospects. Source:
Eurostat, Structural Indicators.
• EPL: The strictness of EPL, as given by
the overall OECD indicator (2003
data). Source: OECD (OECD. stat
database), plus figures for Bulgaria,
Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia
from S. Cazes and A. Nesporova
(2007), Flexicurity: a relevant
approach in Central and Eastern
Europe, International Labour Office.
• ALMP (excl PES): Total expendi-
ture on active labour market pol-
icy measures (active spending
excluding public employment
services)
58
as a percentage of GDP,
as an indicator of the relative
importance given to ALMP in
general in Member States. It cov-
ers active interventions that aim
to help the unemployed and
other disadvantaged groups to
prepare for or enter work,
including training, job rotation
and job sharing, employment
incentives, integration of people
with disabilities, direct job cre-
ation and start-up incentives.
(Figures are the average over the
years 2003–2005 where data is
available, otherwise 2005 fig-
ures.) Source: Eurostat, Labour
Market Policy database.
• LLL: Life-long learning, as the per-
centage of the population aged
25–64 participating in education
and training. (This is very highly
correlated (0.98) with the lifelong
learning figures for the age group
55–64, and available for more
countries.) Source: Eurostat, EU
Labour Force Survey.
• Flex-work hours: Working-hour
flexibility, as the percentage of
employees aged 55+ who can adapt
working hours to suit their needs
(i.e. working hours entirely deter-
mined by them or can adapt work-
ing hours within certain limits).
Source: European Foundation for
the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions, 4th EWCS.
• Flex-autonomy: Autonomy in
work arrangements, as an index of
the extent of autonomy in the
workplace for employees. This
index covers work organisation
including control over order,
methods and speed of tasks and
ability to rest when desired.
Source: European Foundation for
the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions, 4th EWCS.
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55 A number of indicators are used to characterise the labour market institutions and other factors affecting labour market performance to reflect
the complex network of interrelations, although the choice of particular indicators may be open to debate.
56 Data refers to the base case of a single person with a career length of 40 years, age at retirement 65, in full-time work and on average earnings.
57 Defined as income tax on gross wage earnings plus employee’s and employer’s social security contributions, expressed as a percentage of the total
labour costs of the earner, defined as gross earnings plus the employer’s social security contributions plus payroll taxes (where applicable). Here
data for the tax wedge refers to that for a single low-wage earner (earning 67% of the average worker earnings), without children. Employment
in Europe 2004 reports that the cross-country correlation of the tax wedge between the categories ‘single worker with no children’ and ‘married
couple with two children’ is high and stable over time.
58 This correlates very highly with active expenditure including PES (correlation coefficient 0.94).
 
• Health (perc 55–64): Self-perceived
health status among the older
population (the percentage of
older people aged 55–64 declaring
their health as good or very good).
Source: Eurostat, Health Interview
Surveys, 2004 round.
6.1. Cluster analysis on
EU Member States 
Based on the 10 variables mentioned
above, hierarchical clustering
59
, which
is a common and well-established stat-
istical technique
60
, allows six main
groupings of Member States to be dis-
tinguished (Table 12). A robustness
check was also carried out using the k-
means clustering technique with the
same number of clusters. The composi-
tion and characteristics of these six
groups are (Chart 64, see page 104,
arranged to distinguish indicators pos-
itively associated with older workers’
employment rates (lhs) and those neg-
atively associated (rhs)):
• Group 1: Consists of the ‘western
continental’ countries of Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany and
Italy, with the group characterised
by intermediate standard retire-
ment ages and pension replace-
ment rates, together with inter-
mediate work flexibility and life-
long learning participation, but
relatively high EPL, tax wedge and
relative earnings for older work-
ers. The average (unweighted)
employment rate of older workers
is second lowest for this group.
• Group 2: Consists of the ‘Central
European’ Member States of the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovenia and Slovakia, with the
group characterised on the one
hand by relatively low perceived
health and standard retirement
ages, together with relatively low
ALMP spending, lifelong learning
participation and work flexibility
(i.e. low scores on all indicators
positively associated with older
workers’ employment rates), but
on the other hand by compara-
tively low relative wages for older
workers and EPL, and intermedi-
ate tax wedges. This group has the
lowest (unweighted) employment
rate for older workers.
• Group 3: This cluster includes the
‘Nordic’ countries of Denmark,
Finland and Sweden, plus the
Netherlands. It is characterised on
the one hand by intermediately
low pension replacement rates,
relative costs of older workers and
EPL, but on the other by high per-
ceived health and standard retire-
ment ages, together with substan-
tially higher ALMP spending, life-
long learning participation and
work flexibility. It scores relatively
highly on all indicators positively
associated with older workers’
employment rates, and has the
highest average (unweighted)
employment rate for older work-
ers.
• Group 4: In this group are the
‘Baltic States’ of Estonia and
Lithuania, which although broadly
similar to the Central European
grouping of countries (Group 2)
are distinguished from the latter
by much lower pension replace-
ment rates and relative earnings
of older workers, and higher EPL
and autonomy in the workplace.
The average (unweighted)
employment rate for older work-
ers in this group is the third high-
est.
• Group 5: This group consists of the
‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries of Ireland
and the United Kingdom, and is
strongly differentiated from other
clusters by the much lower EPL
and tax wedge combined with rel-
atively high lifelong learning par-
ticipation and perceived levels of
health, and intermediate flexibil-
ity, retirement ages, pension
replacement rates and relative
earnings of older workers. The
average (unweighted) older work-
ers’ employment rate is the second
highest for this group.
• Group 6: The ‘Mediterranean’
countries of Greece, Portugal and
Spain make up this cluster, charac-
terised by relatively high pension
replacement rates, relative earn-
ings of older workers and EPL but
comparatively low tax wedges,
lifelong learning participation and
work flexibility. This cluster forms
the central group in terms of older
workers’ average (unweighted)
employment rates.
It is to be noted that for some group-
ings (mainly group 1 and group 2) a
similar ‘policy mix’ (i.e. combination
of active ageing relevant factors) may
lead to significantly different out-
comes (i.e. older workers’ employ-
ment rates) across the countries
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59 Using both complete linkage and Ward’s method of agglomeration. Only those Member States where data was available on all factors were
included in the cluster analysis (21 of the 27 EU countries, excluding BG, CY, LU, LV, MT and RO).
60 A word of caution is required on the application of such techniques. Cluster analysis uses the country scores on the various factors to come up
with groupings of countries based on some measure of ‘distance’. Results can be sensitive to the specific agglomeration methodology used and
the particular parameters chosen for the clustering exercise. For a description of cluster analysis see Employment in Europe 2006, p. 109.
Table 12 - Results of clustering analysis (6 groups)
Group Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5 Group 6
Composition BE CZ DK EE IE EL
DE HU NL LT UK ES
FR PL FI PT
IT SI SE
AT SK
Average 37.2 34.5 58.1 54.1 55.3 45.5
(unweighted) ER 55-64
belonging to the same group (this
being notably the case for example
for the Czech Republic and Germany
in their respective groupings).
6.2. Principal
components analysis
on EU Member States 
A principal components analysis
(PCA)
61
allows identification of the
main underlying dimensions or ‘fac-
tors’ which explain a large part of
the differences across countries. Such
a preliminary factor analysis (Table
13), based on the 10 variables men-
tioned above as the active variables
in the PCA, reveals that the first
three principal components account
for 77% of the overall variability in
the data. The characteristics of the
three principal components are:
Factor 1: has high correlation with
the standard retirement age, partici-
pation in lifelong learning, spending
on active labour market policy meas-
ures, work flexibility (covering work-
ing-hours organisation and job auton-
omy), and health of older people. It
can be interpreted as a ‘supportive
active ageing system’, as it covers key
aspects related to encouraging older
workers to remain in the labour mar-
ket and maintaining their employa-
bility.
Factor 2: has high correlation with
the net pension replacement rate
and the relative cost of older work-
ers compared to youth. It can be
interpreted as a kind of indicator of
the ‘financial pressure’ on older people
to exit the labour market (covering
both the financial incentives for
older workers to retire and the cost
pressure on employers to hire
younger rather than older workers).
Factor 3: is highly correlated with
the tax wedge and EPL, which can
be seen as general labour market
institutions potentially reducing
the adaptability of companies and
the labour market in general,
rather than aspects specific to older
workers.
Chart 65 shows the plots of country
scores along the three principal com-
ponents axes, with shaded areas
highlighting where the groupings
identified in the cluster analysis are
clearly evident. Much of the cluster-
ing can be observed from the combi-
nation of just the first two factors,
but the third factor is important
with regard to the grouping of the
Baltic States into a specific cluster
separate to the Central European
Member States. The Nordic group of
countries (including the Nether-
lands) scores comparatively highly
with regard to support to active age-
ing (factor 1), as does, although to a
lesser degree, the Anglo-Saxon
grouping, which combines this with
low scores on general labour market
institutions which potentially reduce
adaptability of companies (factor 3).
The Central European, Baltic States
and Mediterranean countries’
groupings score relatively low on
support to active ageing, with the
latter group also scoring high on the
financial pressure factor, for which
the score is also comparatively high
for the western continental country
grouping.
6.3. Labour market
outcomes in relation to
the principal
components
In addition to the 10 ‘active variables’
used to classify countries, some sup-
plementary variables were included
in the analysis to provide some indi-
cation of the effects of the compo-
nents of the different active-ageing
approaches on relevant labour mar-
ket outcomes (based on the correla-
tions of these key outcome variables
with the principal components),
especially those of concern to older
workers. The supplementary vari-
ables are the activity and employ-
ment rates for the 55–64 age group,
overall unemployment and long-
term unemployment rates, the exit
age, and measures of job satisfaction
among workers aged over 55 and the
reduction in the risk of poverty for
those aged over 65
62
. 
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Chart 64: Profiles of cluster means, 6 groups
Source: various sources
61 PCA is a multivariate analysis technique, the aim of which is to reveal how different variables change in relation to each other, or how they are
associated. This is achieved by transforming the original variables into a new set of uncorrelated ones using the correlation matrix. The new vari-
ables are linear combinations of the original ones, and usually the correlations among original variables are large enough for the first few new
variables to account for most of the variance in the dataset, thus helping to clarify the structure of the relationships. For further description of
PCA see Employment in Europe 2006, p 102.
62 An indicator for the reduction in the risk of poverty for those aged over 65 due to the impact of social transfers, including pensions. It is equiva-
lent to the percentage point difference between the risk of poverty (defined as the share of persons with an equivalised income below 60% of
the national median) before and after social transfers. (Source: DG EMPL calculations based on Eurostat data.)
In order to enhance the interpretabil-
ity of the results, a varimax
63
rotation
on the PCA results was also carried
out. The results (Table 14) indicate
that the factor interpretations
remain similar to that before rotation
for factors 1 and 2, but that the third
factor now is only highly correlated
with the tax wedge. Comparing the
correlations of the supplementary
variables with the principal compo-
nents after rotation (D1, D2 and D3)
indicates the following:
• A ‘supportive active-ageing sys-
tem’ (factor D1) has a broad pos-
itive effect on labour market out-
comes for older people. It has a
noticeable positive correlation
with older workers’ activity and
employment rates, and also with
the age at which older people
exit the labour market. At the
same time there is a strong posi-
tive correlation with job satisfac-
tion among older employed peo-
ple, and a negative correlation
with the level of unemployment
and long-term unemployment.
• The ‘financial pressure’ on older
people to exit the labour market
(factor D2) is negatively correlat-
ed with activity and employment
rates for older workers.
• Tax distortions (factor D3), as rep-
resented by the tax wedge, is
negatively correlated with the
exit age, and more weakly with
older worker’s employment and
activity rates, but is associated
with a reduced risk of poverty in
later life.
The preceding results highlight the fea-
tures of those systems which are more
successful in encouraging active age-
ing, namely good levels of general
health for older people and reasonably
high standard retirement ages; rela-
tively high spending on active labour
market policy measures and participa-
tion in lifelong learning; flexibility with
regard to working hours and work
organisation; and reduced financial
pressures on older workers to leave the
labour market, both in terms of the
financial incentives for older workers
to retire and the cost pressure on
employers to hire younger rather than
older workers. In this regard, the
Nordic group of countries (including
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Table 13 - Main results of the PCA
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Variability (%) 40.1 21.8 15.1
Cumulative % 40.1 61.9 77.0
Correlation between variables and factors
AV ORA 0.65 0.42 -0.01
NRR at 65 -0.21 0.82 -0.19
Tax wedge 0.18 -0.17 0.80
ERNRatio -0.09 0.93 0.05
EPL -0.20 0.41 0.77
LLL 0.80 -0.14 -0.17
FLEX–work hours 0.92 -0.02 0.02
FLEX–autonomy 0.88 -0.26 0.10
Health (perc ) 55-64 0.69 0.36 -0.35
ALMP (excl PES) 0.86 0.24 0.27
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on data from Eurostat, DG EMPL, EFILWC, OECD and ILO
Note: High and moderate correlations (>0.5) are highlighted and indicate how variables are 
related to the principal components
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Chart 65: Country scores along the principal factor axes
Observations (axes F1 and F2: 61.87 %)
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63 Varimax rotation is a technique used to maximise the correlation of a number of original variables with principal components.
the Netherlands), but also to a lesser
degree the Anglo-Saxon grouping,
appears to have implemented a more
integrated approach to active ageing,
and to have been relatively more suc-
cessful in integrating and retaining
older workers in the labour market
compared to the other Member States.
7. REASONS FOR THE
RISE IN EMPLOYMENT
OF OLDER PEOPLE
SINCE 2000
This section briefly examines some
of the main drivers or causes under-
lying the improvement in the
employment situation of older
workers in recent years. On the
demand side, macro-economic sta-
bility and tight labour demand have
been put forward as contributory
causes in some Member States such
as the United Kingdom, where there
were historically relatively few
redundancies post-2000, a factor of
major significance to older workers
since they tend to lose out most
when workers need to be made
redundant. Attitudes of employers
may also be beginning to change, as
a consequence of economic neces-
sity but also the recent implementa-
tion of anti-age discrimination legis-
lation and age-awareness cam-
paigns.
On the supply side, recent pension,
tax and welfare reforms may have
had an effect on older workers-
labour market attachment. Problems
in the equity markets in the early
2000s and the effect on private pen-
sion schemes may also have resulted
in some older people deferring early
retirement during this period. At the
same time, long-term societal trends
in labour market participation, such
as increasing female participation,
and the improvement in skill levels
of the workforce can have eventual
effects on the older workers’ age
group. 
Some of these issues are examined in
the following sections, but the lack of
detailed data on changes in relevant
labour market institutions for many
Member States covering the period in
question precludes any detailed
analysis at this stage. 
7.1. Factors related to
demographic and long-
term societal changes
7.1.1. The demographic effect
within the older workers-age
group
Part of the improvement in the
employment rate of older workers
can simply be attributed to the shift
in the relative shares of different
ages within the older worker popula-
tion, reflecting a pure composition
effect. Since people at the lower ages
within the older age group tend to
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Table 14 - Correlations between principal components and active 
and supplementary variables (after Varimax rotation)
D1 D2 D3
AV ORA 0.73 0.12 -0.42
NRR at 65 -0.11 0.88 -0.14
Tax wedge 0.16 -0.10 0.89
ERNRatio 0.03 0.94 0.00
EPL -0.09 0.20 0.24
LLL 0.76 -0.16 0.00
FLEX–work hours 0.89 -0.03 0.24
FLEX–autonomy 0.84 -0.35 0.15
Health (perc ) 55-64 0.71 0.35 -0.18
ALMP (excl PES) 0.90 0.05 0.11
Correlations of supplementary variables with principal components after varimax rotation
Employment rate 55–64 0.54 -0.39 -0.33
Activity rate 55-64 0.53 -0.41 -0.32
Unemployment rate (overall) -0.43 0.04 0.14
Long term UR (overall) -0.55 0.00 0.13
Exit age 0.43 -0.04 -0.66
Job satisfaction 55+ 0.63 -0.21 -0.01
Reduction in poverty risk for 65+ 0.23 -0.16 0.60
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on data from Eurostat, DG EMPL, EFILWC, OECD and ILO
Note: High and moderate correlations (around 0.4 or higher) are highlighted and indicate how variables are 
related to the principal components.
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Chart 66: Age structure of the age group 55–64 by individual year of age 
in 2000 and 2006
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS spring data (2000) and second quarter data (2006).
have higher employment rates, a
shift in the balance or composition of
the individual year of age popula-
tions will have an influence on the
employment rate for the overall
55–64 age group. This is especially
important in the context of sharp
demographic changes such as the
approaching retirement of the baby-
boom generation. 
The single year age distribution with-
in the overall older worker popula-
tion has changed noticeably between
2000 and 2006, with a higher share of
people in the lower age range 55–59
and relatively fewer in the range
60–64 (Chart 66). A simple shift-share
analysis on the employment rate
changes between 2000 and 2006 indi-
cates that of the overall increase of
around 7 percentage points, around
one-fifth (1.3 percentage points) was
due to this change in the older work-
ers’ population structure
64
, with a
slightly greater contribution of this
composition effect for men than
women (Table 15). Nevertheless, the
net contribution from the shift in
employment rates was clearly more
substantial. 
The contribution from the shift in
age structure, although positive for
the EU-25 as a whole, varies marked-
ly across countries, with a significant
negative effect in Austria, the Czech
Republic, Denmark and Sweden con-
trasting with strong positive contri-
butions in Finland, France and Poland
(Table 16). In France and Greece, the
impact from the change in the age
structure accounts for an important
element of the overall rise in older
workers’ employment rates (around a
third and a half respectively), and in
Poland it helped dampen consider-
ably the decline in employment rates;
but in all the other Member States it
is much less than the effect from the
rise in employment rates net of any
demographic effects. 
The rise in employment rates net of
any demographic effects (i.e. the
pure ‘non-composition’ effect) was
almost 6 percentage points, this time
with a greater net contribution for
women than men (3.5 versus 2.4 per-
centage points), and has been sub-
stantial in almost all Member States
65
.
Net increases have been particularly
strong in the Czech Republic, Finland,
Germany and Hungary, all with net
rises in excess of 10 percentage
points. Only in Poland and Portugal
was there a negative contribution
from the net shift in employment
rates.
7.1.2. Long-term trends – the
importance of gender and
cohort effects
Another underlying reason for the
rise in employment rates of older
workers is the long established
‘cohort effect’ in the labour market
participation of women, i.e. the
impact of younger female cohorts,
who are better integrated into the
labour market, filtering through
with time into the older workers’
age group. The pattern of labour
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Table 15 - Contribution of demographic
composition to changes in employment
rates 55-64 between 2000 and 2006
Percentage point change 2000-2006
Total
(= 1 + 2 + 3) 7.2
Contribution from shift in employment rate
Total (1) 5.9
Men 2.4
Women 3.5
Contribution from demographic effect
Total (2) 1.27
Men 0.70
Women 0.57
Interaction effect (residual effect)
Total (3) -0.03
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, 2000 spring data
and second quarter 2006.
Table 16 - Contribution to changes in employment rate of 55-64 year old age
group between 2000 and 2006
EU-25 7.2 5.9 1.3 0.0
BE 5.4 4.2 1.3 -0.1
CZ 9.3 10.3 -0.9 -0.1
DK 6.3 8.2 -1.9 0.1
DE 10.8 10.1 1.6 -0.9
EL 3.0 1.1 1.6 0.2
ES 7.3 6.7 0.4 0.1
FR 8.4 5.1 2.8 0.5
IE 8.3 8.0 0.2 0.1
IT 5.4 4.2 0.9 0.3
CY 4.0 3.8 -0.2 0.4
LT* 8.4 7.5 1.1 -0.2
HU 11.7 11.7 0.1 0.0
NL 9.5 9.2 0.1 0.2
AT* 6.1 8.1 -1.2 -0.8
PL -1.7 -4.3 2.6 0.0
PT -1.1 -1.8 0.5 0.1
SI* 11.3 8.7 0.9 1.7
FI 13.0 10.9 2.3 -0.2
SE 5.2 6.0 -1.3 0.5
UK 6.9 6.6 0.2 0.1
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS spring data (2000) and second quarter data (2006).
Note: *Figures for AT, LT and SL not fully reliable due to small sample sizes. For EE, LV, LU, MT and
SK figures not publishable due to samples per individual year of age being too small.
Total change 
in employment rate 
( = (1) + (2) + (3) )
Contribution from 
shift in employment
rate ( (1) net of
demographic effects)
Contribution from 
demographic effect
(2)
Interaction effect
(residual effect) (3)
64 The demographic effect within the older workers age group is a dynamic phenomenon. The positive impact reported is transitory and over the
coming years the baby-boom generation will shift towards the upper end of the age group, and the effect may be reversed.
65 Results are only displayed for those Member States for which sample sizes per individual year of age are sufficiently large.
 
force participation has changed
markedly over recent decades and
within the EU-15
66
the participation
of women between the ages of 25
and 60 has increased substantially,
reflecting steadily rising participa-
tion, while that of men has changed
little for those of prime working age
but has declined markedly at the
lower and upper end of the age dis-
tribution
67
(Chart 67). The major
increase in participation of women
in the prime working-age group
(25–54) means that the pattern of
female participation is now much
more similar to that of men, and
with the participation of young
women now barely below that of
young men. 
The general trend towards higher
participation in successive cohorts of
women means that rises in participa-
tion rates in the younger age groups
have subsequently fed through to an
increase in the older age groups. For
example, within the EU-15, for the
age group 55–59, the cohort of
females born between 1936 and 1940
had an activity rate of 39.8%, those
born between 1941 and 1945 had a
rate of 44.7%, and those born
between 1946 and 1950 one of 52%
(Chart 68), with rises in the order of
5–7 percentage points over each five-
year period. For men, on the other
hand, activity rates for the age
groups 50–54 and 55–59 are rather
similar for all three years, reflecting
the fact that prime-age male partici-
pation in the labour market has been
fairly constant at relatively high 
levels, and devoid of any substantial
cohort effect.
The cohort effect on participation
rates for women has subsequently
fed through into employment rates,
as can be seen from the profile of
employment rates by individual year
of age in the EU-15 for the years
1995, 2000 and 2005 (Chart 69). There
is clearly a general upward shift in
employment rates for women of all
ages between 50 and 59, with the
employment rate profiles broadly
parallel and with rates only converg-
ing from around 60 onwards. The
employment rates at age 50 for
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Chart 67: Activity rates by gender in the EU-15, 1970 and 2005
Source: OECD, OECD.Stat database
1995 2000 2005 1995 2000 2005
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
50–54 55–59 60–64
%
 o
f 
ag
e 
g
ro
u
p
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
%
 o
f 
ag
e 
g
ro
u
p
 p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
50–54 55–59 60–64
Chart 68: Cohort comparison of activity rates of older people in the EU-15 for the years 1995, 2000 and 2005
Older Men
Cohort born between 1936 and 1940
Cohort born between 1941 and 1945 
Cohort born between 1946 and 1950
Older Women
Source: Eurostat, EU LFS, annual results for 1995, 2000 and 2005.
66 The EU-15 is referred to here since long-time series data for the EU-25 is not available back to 1970, but this nevertheless gives a good represen-
tation of developments for the EU as a whole.
67 Participation rates of men begin to decline rapidly for the age group 55–59 onwards, compared with the first marked declines for the 60–64 age
group in 1970. Those for women start to decline earlier, in the 50–54 age group, but decline less rapidly, and activity rates for women aged 50–60
are higher than they were in 1970. 
Age groupAge group
women were 57% in 1995, 62% in
2000 and 67.7% in 2005. For the age
group 55–59 they averaged respect-
ively 36.1%, 40.7% and 48.5% – the
rises of around 5–8 percentage points
between each five-year reference
point strongly mirroring the increase
in corresponding participation rates
and suggesting that the cohort effect
largely accounts for the overall rise in
employment rates for women aged
55–64. 
Again, for men little cohort effect is
visible due to the filtering through of
younger cohorts into the older work-
ers’ age group. The employment
rates at age 50 are very close across
all three years (84.8% in 1995, 86.1%
in 2000 and 86.2% in 2005). However,
while the employment rate profiles
for 1995 and 2000 are very similar,
between 2000 and 2005 there has
been an upwards shift in the year-
specific employment rates beyond
the age of 52, reflecting a shift
towards men staying longer in
employment post 2000.
The rise in participation of older
women aged 55–64 appears there-
fore to be due in large part to the
increasing trend in the involvement
of women in general in the labour
market. This has been the result of
several factors, including the reduced
social barriers to female participa-
tion in the labour market, higher
skill levels among women, delays in
the age at which women have chil-
dren and greater possibilities to rec-
oncile work and personal responsibil-
ities. The change in cultural attitudes
and social norms regarding gender
roles has clearly had a major influ-
ence on female participation, but the
increase in female education in
recent decades also appears to be a
major determinant of the positive
trend in female labour force partici-
pation
68
. 
7.2. How governments
and employers are
responding to the
challenge of an ageing
labour force
While composition and cohort effects
can explain a significant part of the
rise in older workers’ employment
rates since 2000, especially with regard
to the rise in rates for older women,
policy measures and reforms enacted
in the past five to ten years, such as
pension reforms and the tightening of
early retirement schemes, have also
contributed towards encouraging
older workers to enter or remain
longer in the labour market, especially
with regard to older male workers. 
Recent research has confirmed the
important effect such measures can
have on older workers. Based on data
covering the period 1982 to 1999,
Bassinini and Duval (2006) find that,
among other factors, generous un-
employment benefits, high tax wedges
and high implicit taxes on continued
work act as disincentives to older
workers remaining in the labour mar-
ket and reduce employment rates for
older workers, while high statutory
retirement ages have the opposite
effect. They highlight, in particular,
that a reduction of 1 percentage point
in the implicit tax on continued work
leads to a rise of 0.1 percentage point
in the older workers’ employment
rate, while a one-year increase in the
statutory retirement age increases the
older workers’ employment rate by
around 0.6 percentage points. They
conclude that changes in policies and
institutions account for a substantial
share of the change in employment
rates for older workers across OECD
countries during the 1980s and 1990s.
Similarly, the findings of a recent inter-
national research project (Gruber and
Wise, 2002) indicate that changing
pension plan provisions can have large
effects on the labour force participa-
tion of older workers. However, as
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Chart 69: Employment rate profile of older men and women aged 50–69 in the EU-15 by sex and individual year of age in 1995,
2000 and 2005
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Source:  Eurostat, EU LFS, 1995 and 2000 spring data, and 2006 Q2 data
68 Results from the EU LFS for 2006 clearly show the importance of skill level to labour market outcomes particularly for women; a woman with ter-
tiary-level education is more than twice as likely (80%) as a woman with lower-secondary level or below (39%) to be in employment.
 
highlighted previously in this chapter,
non-pecuniary factors such as working
conditions, skills and training, and
health are also important determi-
nants of older people’s labour market
attachment.
7.2.1. How governments are
responding
Member States have been develop-
ing strategies to react to the ageing
population and its impact on the
labour market. As part of this, many
are adapting social protection sys-
tems to encourage workers to pro-
long their working lives and improve
the labour market participation of
older workers. 
Pension reform has received much
attention from policy-makers in
recent years and a number of Mem-
ber States have adopted substantial
reform programmes to pension and
benefit systems (for a detailed review
across Member States see Annex 2).
These include increasing statutory
retirement ages and the earliest ages
at which retirement can take place;
bringing retirement ages for women
into line with those for men; increas-
ing the minimum contribution period
required to acquire full pension rights;
reductions in pension replacement
rates; implementing actuarial adjust-
ments for pension benefits for early
and late retirement; switching from
pay-as-you-go to funded schemes; and
tightening eligibility to early retire-
ment and sickness and invalidity
schemes, as well as unemployment
benefits for older jobseekers. The
reforms are mainly focused on
strengthening incentives to extend
working lives, tightening the link
between contributions and benefits,
and modernising pension systems by
making them more adaptable to struc-
tural change (Box 3). They generally
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Box 3 – Main features of recent pension reforms
As reported in the 2006 Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion
69
, there has been substantial progress
in reforming pension systems in recent years. Disincentives to work longer have been reduced and incentives
strengthened, links between contributions and benefits have been tightened, and life expectancy has been further
taken into account in pension systems. Moreover, the provision of supplementary pensions has been promoted and
legislative frameworks improved.
Strengthening incentives to extend working lives
In nearly all Member States, recent reforms have strengthened incentives to extend working lives (especially for
statutory schemes), and reduced access to early retirement. Working longer is generally encouraged by pension sup-
plements and leaving earlier discouraged by actuarial reductions. Furthermore, greater flexibility is provided in the
timing of retirement, for example combining employment and partial retirement. In addition, access to disability,
sickness and incapacity schemes are being reviewed to eliminate other paths to early exit. Reforms of statutory
schemes have often led to a decrease of individual replacement rates, while many Member States have increased
the accrual of pension rights if people work longer, which should act as incentives to work longer.
Strengthening the link between contributions and benefits
A number of recent reforms have strengthened the benefit/contribution link of pension systems. This has occurred,
firstly, through the introduction of longer contribution periods required for a full pension. Secondly, by calculating
full pensions on the basis of lifetime earnings instead of final salary, thus reflecting the contributions more accu-
rately over an entire career, rather than just wage progression in later years. Thirdly, applying actuarial
reductions/increases for early/deferred retirement also contributes to a culture in which early retirement is less
prevalent (this has occurred in a number of Member States, like AT, FR, FI, ES, PT, NL and IT, while the link was
strengthened by previous reforms in many Member States, such as DE, BE, LU, HU, EE, LV, LT, PL, SK, SI and SE).
Modernising pension systems by making them more adaptable to structural change
New labour-supply structures require adaptable pension systems (more and more people do not follow the standard
career of full-time, lifelong employment). Member States have started to review pension provisions for workers with
atypical careers and for the self-employed, with a view to easing access to statutory and supplementary pension
schemes. For example, some Member States allow people to acquire pension credits for periods of short-term contracts,
part-time and voluntary work as well as for some breaks in the work career such as for child and old-age care, educa-
tion and unemployment. Most of the Member States are gradually phasing out differences in legal retirement ages
between men and women. Given the rising importance of supplementary schemes some Member States (DK, DE, NL
and UK) have improved the portability of supplementary pension rights which pose obstacles to workers’ mobility.
69 Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion 2006 - Synthesis report on adequate and sustainable pensions (COM(2006) 62 final).
result in a reduction of the implicit
taxes on continued work (OECD, 2005),
which are particularly noticeable in
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany
and especially Italy (Chart 70, but note
that the 2003 results reflect currently
legislated systems once fully imple-
mented, which for some Member
States could take a considerable time).
A number of Member States have or
will raise the statutory retirement age,
although in many cases the increase
will be implemented gradually over a
long time period to prevent sudden
changes. For example, in the United
Kingdom the age at which women can
receive a state pension will be gradual-
ly equalised with men’s beginning in
2010 and reaching 65 by 2020. 
OECD (2006) reports that a number
of countries have introduced various
types of wage subsidies which are
intended to align older workers’
labour costs more closely with their
productivity. In addition, countries
have adopted a wide range of meas-
ures promoting greater participation
in learning across the adult popula-
tion. Several Member States have
focused on the promotion of key
basic skills and compensatory educa-
tion with, for example, some Nordic
countries systematically offering
adults courses that allow older
people to gain equivalent qualifica-
tions to youth. Different methods for
maintaining skills have also been
developed, which form part of the
EU’s general principle of lifelong
learning. For example Germany’s
AQTIV programme aims to improve
qualifications of the over 50s in small
and medium-sized companies. In
Sweden, the programme ‘100 steps
to safety and development with an
ageing population’ offers public
study grants and individual skills
assessments to help older workers
access the labour market. 
In parallel, programmes are being set
up to encourage companies to pro-
mote better health in the workplace,
the general aim being to maintain
the health of employees and avoid
premature fatigue. The Finnish
national TYKY campaign is the most
far-reaching. It aims at protecting
employees’ physical and psychological
capacities to avoid them deterior-
ating with age. In the Netherlands,
several collective labour agreements
cover reduction or adaptation of the
workload for older workers as well as
adapting working hours.
Major restructuring of the public
employment services (PES) and boost-
ing of activation measures also took
place in a large number of Member
States over the period 2000–2006,
with a rationalisation of the services
provided by the PES in the direction
of more individualised and better tar-
geted activation measures, improved
coordination of different actors, and
the modernisation and expansion of
the training on offer, including the
development of continuous and
vocational training systems.
In line with the Employment Frame-
work Directive adopted in 2000, EU
Member States have also been put-
ting in place legislation banning age
discrimination with regard to
employment, self-employment and
occupation, vocational training and
guidance. Some Member States have
also implemented awareness-raising
campaigns among employers in order
to modify attitudes of employers and
staff towards older workers. For
example, the United Kingdom has
issued a set of guidelines to help
employers recognise the business
benefits of an age-diverse workforce
and to promote best practice, while
in Sweden a lot of work has also been
done on changing attitudes and neg-
ative perceptions towards older
workers
70
.
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Chart 70: Implicit tax rates on continued work (for a single worker with average earnings at age 55 and 60) 
over the next five years in social transfer programmes, 1999 and 2003 
At age 55 At age 60
Source: Brandt et al. (2005).
Note: The calculations are made for a single worker with average earnings. For 2003, they reflect the steady-state of currently legislated systems once they have fully
matured and once recent reforms have been fully phased in, which in some cases (e.g. Italy) will take several decades.
.70 For further details on actions at country level see, for example, the synthesis report ‘Attracting more people to the labour market’, July 2005
(produced in the framework of the mutual learning programme of the European Employment Strategy) and related reports on active ageing 
(see http://www.mutual-learning-employment.net/)"
 
7.2.2. How employers are
responding
Apart from government action,
employers have important contri-
butions to make by developing ini-
tiatives in the workplace related to,
for example, the work environment
and the quality of work, in particu-
lar by creating conditions that
allow and encourage older workers
to stay longer in work. There is a
growing awareness among employ-
ers that, by artificially limiting the
field of candidates, age barriers
may prevent an organisation from
maximising its recruitment poten-
tial. Furthermore, some enterprises
are recognising that the organisa-
tion with a diverse age base is like-
ly to be able to respond best to rap-
idly changing circumstances. In the
service sector in particular, employ-
ers are seeing the benefits of
adjusting the age range of their
employees to reflect the age com-
position of their customers better.
However, much still remains to be
done to convince companies in
Europe to establish a sustainable
age management policy. An exten-
sive project funded by the Euro-
pean Commission has examined
how companies are beginning to
address the issue of managing an
ageing workforce (Box 4).
Other recent research reveals that
many cases of good practice in age
management aimed at improving job
opportunities and working condi-
tions for older workers already exist.
Based on a follow-up in 2005
72
of case
studies from a project first carried out
in the mid-1990s, and an examination
of developments over the past 10
years, Taylor (2006) reports on how
employers are so far responding to
the challenge of an ageing labour
force. Among the key findings from
this analysis is that, in general, there
has been an overall increase in the
complexity of organisations’
approaches to age management.
While training and development
remains by far the most common
measure, followed by flexible work-
ing, and with the incidence of both
having risen over time, there has also
been a gradual change in the types
of measures adopted by organisa-
tions, with health and well-being
growing in importance. In addition
there has been a general move away
from focusing on one age group
towards measures involving all staff.
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Box 4 – Study on the identification of good practice to increase job opportunities 
and maintain older workers in employment
A recent report on ageing and employment
71
, resulting from a project funded by the European Commission, consid-
ers measures designed to help maintain and improve the employment opportunities of older workers. Based on case
studies of 41 companies in 11 EU Member States (the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy,
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom), covering a range of sectors and company
sizes, the report provides important empirical findings that demonstrate how some companies are beginning to
address the issue of managing an ageing workforce. 
The report highlights that age management can be observed within a variety of contexts and involves a broad range
of measures. With regard to the latter, in an attempt to achieve the right balance between an individual’s abilities
according to their age and the tasks to be fulfilled, the case-study companies have introduced a range of practices
aimed at: 
• improving working conditions and workers’ abilities 
• promoting health 
• greater internal flexibility and mobility
• career development for all age groups
• establishing mixed age groups and the promotion of knowledge transfer
• flexible working-time practices
• avoiding physically demanding working hours and using older workers at non-stressful periods 
• changing wage structures and pension provisions to reduce incentives for early retirement. 
In terms of positive outcomes, respondents of the case studies mainly referred to the cost-effectiveness of such
measures. The most notable savings were in reduced severance pay, lower absenteeism rates and a decline in staff
turnover. In addition, companies also reported an improvement in workers’ motivation and productivity; however,
the report suggests that measuring the degree of improvement with regard to these two factors proved difficult.
71 ‘Ageing and employment: Identification of good practices to increase job opportunities and maintain older workers in employment’, study for
the European Commission by the Warwick Institute for Employment Research, University of Warwick and Economix Research and Consulting,
Munich, in collaboration with various other research institutes, 2006.
72 Case studies from a project (Combating age barriers), first carried out in the mid 1990s by the European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions, were followed up in 2005. New data was collected from over 100 companies, all of which exemplified long-standing
documented good practice in age management and which covered a broad range of industries overall, in 11 Member States from the former EU-
15.
The results from the analysis point to
a range of benefits for staff and
organisations in implementing effec-
tive age management. For indivi-
duals, these include improved health
and well-being, more satisfying work
and the prospect of continuing
employment. Benefits for organisa-
tions include securing labour supply,
maximising workforce utility and
hence increased productivity and
competitiveness, and improved com-
pany/industrial relations.
The findings from the above project,
together with further research cover-
ing the new Member States
73
(Mandl
et al 2006), have contributed to the
development of a European guide on
good practice on age management
74
.
Aimed primarily at the organisational
level, the guide is designed to assist
all those who are responsible for
employment to ensure that work-
place ageing is managed successfully
and that older workers are enabled
to fulfil their potential, and that age
does not become a barrier to employ-
ment.
8. PROSPECTS OF
MEETING THE TARGETS,
AND LONGER TERM
PROSPECTS
8.1. Prospects of
meeting the Stockholm
and Barcelona targets
Despite the considerable recent
improvements in employment of
older people, the employment rate
of older workers in the EU (43.5 % in
2006) is still a long way from the tar-
get of 50% established by the Coun-
cil of Stockholm in 2001. It is estimat-
ed that between 2006 and 2010
employment of those in the age
group 55–64 would need to increase
by around 6 million in order to reach
the target, equivalent to an employ-
ment growth of around 5.5% per
year. This should be seen in the con-
text of employment creation for the
older workers age group of around
5.3 million between 2000 and 2006,
with an average annual growth rate
of 4.2% over this period. 
Increases in the employment rate
depend on both employment
growth and population growth. The
effort needed to achieve the 50%
employment rate target by 2010 is
magnified by the fact that the popu-
lation in this age group is projected
to increase by close to 8% between
2006 and 2010. It is estimated that
around 2 million of the employment
increase necessary to reach the tar-
get would be needed just to balance
this effect of population ageing. Fur-
thermore, while for the EU as a
whole the composition effect of the
older workers’ population age group
on the employment rate has been
positive over the first half of the
decade, the gradual ageing of the
baby-boom generation will result in
a shift in the distribution towards
older ages and consequently a nega-
tive contribution to employment
rates by 2010. Assuming that year-of-
age specific employment rates
remain unchanged from those in
2006, it is estimated
75
that the effect
of the shift in the age structure alone
would result in a decline in the aver-
age employment rate between 2006
and 2010 of almost 1 percentage
point (i.e. the overall employment
rate would be 1 percentage point
lower due to the composition effect),
meaning that the rise in employment
rates net of any demographic effects
would have to be higher to meet the
2010 target.
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73 The guidelines are derived mainly from the findings of a project looking at developments in employment initiatives for an ageing workforce
across 11 EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, Spain and the United Kingdom). 
Further information comes from new research across the EU including the new Member States. Throughout, the guide makes reference to a wide
spectrum of organisations: small and large, in the public and private sectors, in services and manufacturing.
74 G. Naegele and A. Walker. (2006), ‘A guide to good practice in age management’, research project for the European Foundation for the Improve-
ment of Living and Working Conditions.
75 By applying the year-of-age specific employment rates for 2006 (using data for the second quarter of 2006 from the EU Labour Force Survey) to
the projected single-year population totals for 2010, using data from the Eurostat population projections (baseline variant).
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Chart 71: Projected employment rates of older workers (55–64) across EU Member
States in 2010
Source: EPC and European Commission, 2005 EPC budgetary projection exercise.
Nevertheless, recent trends in the
employment rate for older workers
suggest the chances to make substan-
tial progress towards the 2010 target
are encouraging, even if the target is
not reached. The recent labour force
projections prepared by the Commis-
sion and the Ageing Working Group
attached to the Economic Policy Com-
mittee
76
foresee the older workers
employment rate for the EU-25 sub-
stantially up at 47% in 2010, with 11
Member States having rates above
50% by that time (Chart 71, see page
113), and with the target actually
being reached in 2013. Simple esti-
mates based on recent employment
growth rates for older workers con-
firm that even if the strong accelera-
tion in employment growth of older
workers observed since 2000 would
continue over the next four years, the
EU employment rate for older work-
ers would (at 47.5%) still be below
the 50% target in 2010.
Concerning the Barcelona target of
an increase of about five years in the
effective average age at which people
stop working in the EU, develop-
ments in the exit age indicator over
recent years suggest that it is rather
unlikely that the target will be
achieved by 2010. Between 2001 and
2005, the average age at which older
workers exited from the labour mar-
ket rose by just one year, suggesting
that strong efforts are still needed to
encourage older people not to with-
draw from the labour force at rela-
tively early ages and to increase
opportunities for them to remain in
the labour market.
8.2. Longer - term
prospects
Over the next decade the working-
age population will start to decline as
a large number of ‘baby-boomers’
retire. This can be partially offset by
increasing rates of employment.
Recent projections
77
show that
although the working-age popula-
tion will begin to fall from 2010
onwards, the total number of people
in work in the EU-25 will continue to
increase until around 2017. It is esti-
mated that between 2004 and 2017
employment will increase by some 20
million. More than two-thirds of this
increase will be the result of a higher
number of women in work. A sub-
stantial amount is also accounted for
by the increase anticipated in the
employment rate for older workers.
Indeed, the employment rate for
those aged 55–64 is projected to con-
tinue to increase sharply after reach-
ing the target in 2013, rising to close
to 57% by 2025 and then subse-
quently levelling off at around 59%
up to 2050, and hence eventually sur-
passing the Stockholm target by a
very wide margin (Chart 72).
9. SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSIONS
The EU is facing a substantial chal-
lenge due to population ageing, the
result of low fertility rates and
increasing life expectancy. As a conse-
quence of these trends the popula-
tion is expected to become much
older, with a marked change in the
age structure of both the overall and
working-age populations, and with
the labour market increasingly influ-
enced by the activity patterns of the
older generation. Although a matter
of concern to all, some Member
States will face a greater challenge
from workforce ageing than others.
In a context where people can live
on average a further 20 years or
more after withdrawing from active
life, increasing participation and
delaying the exit from the labour
force will be essential to support
economic growth and ease the
mounting pressure on social protec-
tion systems. Demographic ageing
therefore calls for strategic impor-
tance to be given to increasing the
participation of men and women
aged over 55. Indeed the problem is
not higher life expectancy and age-
ing as such, but rather one of inap-
propriate retirement behaviour
given the demographic context. On
the positive side, ongoing develop-
ments will mean that the older ele-
ment in the labour force will in
future be better educated and in
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Chart 72: Projected developments in employment rates for older workers 
(aged 55–64) in the EU from 2005 to 2050
Source: EPC and European Commission, budgetary projections AWG variant scenario, 2005
76 A long-run labour force projection was recently prepared by the Commission and the Ageing Working Group (AWG) attached to the Economic
Policy Committee as part of the project to produce common age-related expenditure projections. Using a baseline population projection supplied
by Eurostat, the labour force projections are based on an age-cohort methodology developed by the OECD and refined by DG ECFIN and the AWG.
Projections reflect the observed increase in employment rates of older workers in recent years and also the expected positive effects of enacted
pension reforms. See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2005/eespecialreport0405_en.htm
77 Economic Policy Committee and European Commission (2006), 'The impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the EU-25 Member
States on pensions, healthcare, long-term care, education and unemployment transfers (2004-50)' in European Economy Reports and Studies, No. 1.
better health, and contain an
increasing share of women.
Increasing labour force participation
through mobilising the potential
labour supply of inactive people has a
major role to play in attenuating the
negative impact of population ageing
on economic growth. Older people
aged 55–64 will have a key part to
play in this since they account for close
to a third of all inactive people of
working age in the EU. However, cur-
rently over half of 55–64 year olds in
the EU are inactive, mainly for reasons
of retirement but also poor health or
due to personal or family responsibili-
ties, or the belief that no work is avail-
able, and the transition into inactivity
is essentially a path of no return. At
the same time, older workers are sub-
ject to significant difficulties if they
lose their job, as evidenced by the
relatively low hiring rates and the
high incidence of long-term un-
employment for this age group. 
The European Employment Strategy,
as a key element of the overall Lisbon
Strategy for Growth and Jobs, calls
on Member States to develop and
implement comprehensive and
effective active-ageing strategies,
which must address the main barriers
affecting the labour market partici-
pation of older people. This includes
far-reaching reforms to remove
incentives for early exit from the
labour market and to encourage
employment of senior citizens,
together with ensuring that it is
effectively possible to work for
longer and that employment policies
as a whole create more job opportun-
ities for older workers. While more
still needs to be done, recent results
indicate that efforts by Member
States to implement measures in sup-
port of active ageing are bearing
fruit. Employment rates for older
workers have risen substantially since
2000 (up 7 percentage points), even
though this was a period for a large
part characterised by sluggish eco-
nomic and employment growth.
Indeed, along with the rise in female
participation, employment of older
workers has been one of the most
dynamic components of the EU
labour market in recent years. 
The recent rise in employment of
older workers has not been clearly
associated with a rise in the precari-
ousness of their employment (i.e. the
share of fixed-term employment) or
with self-employment, nor is it over-
whelmingly associated with
increased prevalence of part-time
employment, but rather with the
more traditional forms of employ-
ment. In addition, much of the rise in
older workers’ employment has been
in relatively higher-skilled, know-
ledge-intensive sectors. Furthermore,
the occupational employment struct-
ure for older workers has moved
towards a higher skill profile of
employment, with a shift away from
the more manual occupations
towards the non-manual and more
knowledge-intensive occupations.
These trends suggest that older
workers’ employment is benefiting
from the ongoing trends of popula-
tion ageing and the shift to a more
knowledge-based economy.
Much of the rise in employment rates
for older workers is due to the
increase in rates for older women,
which is due in turn mainly to the
knock-on effect of increasing partici-
pation over time of women in gener-
al (women of younger generations
have higher age-specific participa-
tion rates than women of older gen-
erations). This is a result of changes in
cultural attitudes and social norms
regarding female participation, high-
er skill levels among women and
greater possibilities to reconcile work
and family responsibilities. In con-
trast, for men the rise in employment
rates is a result of the rising delay in
exiting the labour market, this being
more due to such factors as reforms
of pension and social protection sys-
tems and other recent measures asso-
ciated with active ageing. Around a
fifth of the overall rise is due specifi-
cally to the shift in age structure of
the population aged 55–64. 
Despite the recent increase in their
employment, labour market partici-
pation of older people in Europe
remains low by international stand-
ards, and many workers still exit the
labour market at relatively early
ages. Efforts to promote active age-
ing must therefore still be pursued
vigorously, particularly in those Mem-
ber States with low employment
rates for older workers. Indeed,
despite having risen markedly since
2000, the employment rate for older
people aged 55–64 remains over 6.5
percentage points from the Stock-
holm target. Nevertheless recent
trends in the employment rate for
older workers suggest the chances to
make substantial progress are
encouraging, even if the target is not
reached.
Further increasing the labour market
participation of older workers will
require measures to overcome the
continuing barriers and disincentives
they face employment. Existing
research on older workers and ana-
lysis in this chapter has highlighted
that the low labour market participa-
tion of older people is the result of a
combination of factors, among which
the following appear to be of partic-
ular importance:
• The balance of financial incen-
tives, including those to discour-
age early retirement and to make
employment financially more
attractive. There is evidence that
incentives embedded in tax and
benefit systems, in particular
public pension systems and other
social transfer programmes (such
as sickness and invalidity
schemes), provide strong incen-
tives for older workers to with-
draw relatively early from the
labour market. Addressing this
will require reducing the attract-
iveness and availability of early
pathways into retirement and
appropriate adjustment of the
value of pension benefits in case
of anticipated and deferred
retirement. 
• Reducing the obstacle older people
face through age discrimination
and negative perceptions of their
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capabilities. This is a key element
in improving the employment of
older workers, both through leg-
islation and age-awareness cam-
paigns to educate people about
the need for age diversity. A shift
in attitudes towards working at
older ages will be necessary by
employers, older workers and
society as a whole. 
• Helping disabled older people to
better integrate into the labour
market. This is also important
and particular attention must be
paid to health and safety in the
workplace, as well as maintain-
ing the health and working
capacity of workers as they age.
• The relative cost of older workers
compared to younger people is a
key factor affecting employers’
willingness to hire or retain older
workers. More flexible pay sys-
tems, in particular moving away
from seniority-based wage sys-
tems, could enhance the job
security and employability of
older workers.
• Training is essential to improving
the employability of older work-
ers, through addressing inade-
quate skills and competences.
However, low participation of
older workers in lifelong learn-
ing, especially the low-skilled,
remains a feature in the large
majority of Member States. Spe-
cific measures are needed to help
upgrade the basic skills of the
present stock of older workers,
but, in a longer term perspective,
what is needed is a lifelong learn-
ing strategy for working-age
people that addresses their needs
throughout their entire working
life.
• Attractiveness of work and good
working conditions are signifi-
cant factors affecting older work-
ers’ labour market attachment.
Increasing the opportunities for
reduced working hours and par-
ticularly more flexible working-
time arrangements appear to be
especially important. More flexi-
ble work organisation, ergonom-
ics and job design are also very
relevant for encouraging older
workers to remain longer in
employment.
• Active ageing must be supported
by an appropriate general sup-
port framework. For many older
people, being able to work may
depend heavily on factors such as
cultural aspects relating to their
participation in the labour mar-
ket, their general health and the
availability of, and access to,
good quality care facilities and
employment services.
A broad range of factors therefore
needs to be addressed. Pension sys-
tems can encourage later retire-
ment, but without suitable access
for older workers to appropriate
employment, they may not be par-
ticularly effective. Apart from
addressing financial incentives, gen-
eral challenges therefore include
changing attitudes to older workers,
maintaining and promoting the
health and working capacity of
workers as they age, developing the
skills and employability of older
workers, and providing suitable
working conditions together with
employment opportunities for an
ageing workforce. It is also necessary
to provide the necessary general
supportive environment for this.
Addressing gender-related issues is
also important. Differences in
employment rates for older workers
according to gender are substantial
in most Member States, and indeed
the low employment rate for older
workers in Europe is, to a large
extent, a result of the relatively low
rates for older women and, in a
broader perspective, of women in
general. Further efforts to reduce
the gap in activity between men and
women will necessarily be a key ele-
ment of any strategy to increase the
labour supply of older people, as
family-friendly employment policies
which encourage younger women to
participate in the labour market may
also eventually lead to increased par-
ticipation of older women. In this
context, a lack of sufficient support
for women in combining work and
family responsibilities continues to
be an important factor limiting their
participation.
As women’s labour market participa-
tion increases, it will be important to
develop mechanisms, or even extend
existing work and family policies, to
ensure adequate coverage of older
female workers’ needs. In particular,
it is likely that women’s growing par-
ticipation in the workforce will
increasingly impact on their availabil-
ity to carry out their traditional role
of providing care for family and rela-
tions, which may require a substan-
tial expansion in formal care facil-
ities. The increasing importance of
the older female component in the
workforce may also present employ-
ers with a number of challenges as
women’s employment goals, career
patterns and work styles may be dif-
ferent to those of men. 
Different types of approach to active
ageing currently exist across Mem-
ber States. Features of those systems
which are more successful in sup-
porting active ageing include good
levels of general health for older
people and reasonably high stan-
dard retirement ages; relatively high
spending on active labour market
policy measures and participation in
lifelong learning; flexibility with
regard to working hours and work
organisation; and reduced financial
pressures on older workers to leave
the labour market, both in terms of
the financial incentives for older
workers to retire and the cost pres-
sure on employers to hire younger
rather than older workers. In this
regard, the Nordic group of coun-
tries (including the Netherlands),
but also to a lesser degree the
Anglo-Saxon grouping, appear to
have implemented a more integrat-
ed approach to active ageing and
have been relatively more successful
in integrating and retaining older
workers in the labour market com-
pared to the other Member States.
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Addressing the challenge of demo-
graphic ageing and its impact on the
workforce will require the wider
implementation of more integrated
strategies than have been the case to
date. Measures are needed both in
the labour market and in the work-
place, which emphasise the integra-
tion of older workers and improve
their employability, as well as closing
off routes for early exit from the
labour market.
Member States have been develop-
ing strategies to react to the ageing
population and its impact on the
labour market. A number have
adopted substantial reform pro-
grammes to pension and benefit sys-
tems, others have strengthened their
efforts, while some remain at an
early stage of the reform process. In
the general move to tighten up early
retirement schemes it will neverthe-
less be necessary to ensure that such
systems can still address the needs of
those genuinely requiring support. In
addition to pension reform, improve-
ments in participation of older work-
ers in lifelong learning, promotion of
better health in the workplace,
improvements in public employment
services, and implementation of
stricter legislation banning age dis-
crimination in employment and age
awareness campaigns have been
among the recent approaches imple-
mented in a number of Member
States.
Although much remains to be done,
there are also some indications that
companies are beginning to address
the issue of managing an ageing
workforce. In this area further
progress needs to be made with
regard to better working conditions,
greater availability of flexible work-
ing time and work-organisation prac-
tices, more flexible wage-setting that
is less linked to seniority, and chang-
ing attitudes of managers and staff
towards older workers. Access to com-
pany training will also play a key role,
since continued vocational training
offers a tremendous opportunity for
older workers to acquire new skills
and to update qualifications through-
out their professional lives.
As a final point, as part of the new
intergenerational approach advocat-
ed by the European Employment
Strategy, it is recognised that particu-
lar attention should be paid to pro-
moting access to employment
throughout working life. Indeed
active ageing must not start with eld-
erly people but rather requires much
earlier intervention throughout an
entire career: a lifecycle perspective is
essential. For example, improving
occupational health and safety for
workers of all ages and emphasising
the prevention of age-related work
problems (such as the de-skilling of
older workers and work-related
health problems) will assist future
generations of older workers to
remain in employment longer. There-
fore a comprehensive active-ageing
strategy must focus on the entire
working lifespan and all age groups,
not just older workers. 
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ANNEX 1: DECOMPOSING CHANGES IN PARTICIPATION AND
EMPLOYMENT RATES
By applying a simple shift-share analysis, the change in the overall participation rate (PR) can be algebraically decom-
posed into changes over time (from time 0 to time 1) in its three main components, a population composition effect,
a participation rate effect and an interaction effect:
where PR = Participation rate, p = share of population
Thus, adding 
and rearranging one obtains:
where the first part is the population composition effect, due to changes in the demographic structure, had the par-
ticipation rate remained constant; the second part is the participation rate effect, due to changes in participation rate
of specific cohort, keeping constant the population structure; and the third represents the effect due to the interac-
tion of the changes in the two components. Even if the participation rate effect is assumed to be zero (when PR1=PR0),
the overall participation rate may change because of changing demographic structure (changes in pi,). The same
decomposition can be applied to the overall employment rate (ER). 
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Main features of recent pension reforms
Country Main features of the reforms implemented
BE The standard retirement age for women will increase gradually from age 63 in 2003 to 64 in 2006 and will be 65 in 2009
2003 in the general schemes for wage-earners and self-employed. Early-retirement (seniority pension) is still possible, but the
required contribution period has been increased from 32 years in 2003 to 35 years in 2005. Also, the ‘older workers’
unemployment scheme’ has been recently reformed and is under discussion for further reforms.
CZ Before the pension reform in 2003, men retired at the age of 60 and women at 53–57, depending on the number of
2003 children (one year less per child). Since January 2004, the age of retirement is increased constantly over time (2 months
per year for men and 4 months per year for women) to reach 63 years for men and 59–63 for women (still depending on
the number of children) in 2013. The so-called ‘temporarily reduced pension’, an early retirement scheme, has been
abolished, while the so-called ‘permanently reduced pension’ scheme (allowing early retirement up to three years
before the normal retirement age) is still in place but with a stronger reduction of the pension benefit (0.9% for each
90 calendar days from the statutory retirement age).
DK In 2003, eligibility to disability pensions was redefined so that, instead of defining the disability degree, the work ability
2003 degree is defined. Persons with some work ability are directed to subsidised jobs (and if unemployed, to special
unemployment benefit) instead of granting a disability pension.
2004 As of 1 July 2004, the statutory retirement age is 65 instead of 67. At the same time, the voluntary early retirement
pension was made less attractive with the aim of increasing the effective retirement age.
DE An increase of the statutory retirement age to 65 was legislated in 1992. The transition period of the increase of the
1992–2001 statutory retirement age was fixed several times (1996, 1999, 2001 and 2004) and will be completed by 2012 for those
born in 1952 or later. The statutory retirement age for women and the unemployed will rise from 60 to 65 by 2011. For
those born in 1952 or later, early retirement will be possible at the age of 62 with the condition of at least 35 years of
contribution. In addition, pensions are reduced by 3.6% per year in the case of early retirement, while a bonus of 6%
per year is granted for deferred retirement. The reduction for disability pensions before the age of 62 is up to a
maximum of 10.8%.
2002, 2004 The 2001 reform aimed at promoting the development of supplementary pension schemes whilst slightly reducing the
target replacement ratio in the social security scheme. The 2004 old-age pension insurance Sustainability Act introduced
a sustainability factor in the pension indexation formula. This requires maintaining the set of quantitative ratio between
the numbers of beneficiaries and contributors (dependency ratio). This sustainability factor led to no index adjustments
in pensions in 2004 and 2005.
Time spent in school and university will no longer be counted as years worked. The possibility of leaving the labour
market at the age of 58 while receiving unemployment benefits until pension retirement (so-called 58er regulation) will
be abolished in 2008.
EE Changes in the PAYG system include raising the retirement age for females to 63 by 2016 and revising the benefit
2001 formula. Legislation passed in mid-September 2001 set up mandatory individual accounts for the funded tier, allowing
to switch a part of the statutory social security pension into private pension funds. Since 2002, over half the labour force
has joined funded schemes.
ES The mandatory retirement age (65) was abolished, while the accrual of pension rights after 65 was increased by 2% per
2002–2005 year and the contributions abolished. Early retirement is discouraged by the reduction of contributions rates (50% at
the age of 60, increasing by 10 pp. by each additional year) and made possible only from the age 61 provided that
contributions have been paid for at least during 30 years and the person has been unemployed at least 6 months.
Moreover, the pension is reduced by 6–8% p.a., depending on the number of contribution years. Pensions have also
been made compatible with part-time work; the pension benefit is reduced according to the length of the working day.
FR The main measures of the reform implemented as of 2004 include a prolongation of the contribution period for a full
2004 pension from 37.5 to 40 years for public sector employees a further increase to 41 years for all employees between
2009 and 2012 and to 41.75 in 2020. Thereafter, further gains in life expectancy (at 60) will prolong the contribution
period by two-thirds of the increase in life expectancy. Moreover, retirement was made more flexible but bonus/malus
adjustments will be applied to deferred/earlier retirement. In the case of postponement, the bonus is 3% per year. As of
2006, the amount of the penalty (‘la décote’; applied if retired before 40 years of contributions) will decrease gradually
from 10% to 5% of pension per year of anticipation in 2015 for the private sector and will increase from 0.5% to 5%
for civil servants). Furthermore, pensions were indexed to prices only and the contribution rate will be increased by 0.2
of a percentage point as of 2006.
IE The National Pension Reserve fund was established in 1999 with the aim of pre-funding in part the future Exchequer
1999 cost of social welfare and public service pensions. A statutory obligation has been placed on the government to pay a
sum equivalent to 1% of GNP from the Exchequer into the fund each year until at least 2055.
2000 A series of significant tax incentives have been introduced for the purpose of promoting pension provision amongst the
self-employed, employers in non-pensionable employment and proprietary directors. These incentives aim at
encouraging individuals to plan for the pension provision early on in their careers.
2003 Personal Retirement Savings Accounts which seek to promote supplementary pension coverage were introduced.
Reforms of the public pension system implemented to date have allowed for the raising of the minimum pension age
and the removal of a compulsory retirement age for most public servants. A cost-neutral early retirement scheme with
actuarially reduced benefits has been introduced.
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ANNEX 2: SUMMARY OF RECENT PENSION REFORMS IN EU MEMBER STATES
 
IT As of 2008, regardless of the regime (earnings-related, mixed, contribution-defined), the take-up of early pensions will
2004 be tightened. To take-up a pension at an age lower than 65 for men (60 for women) is allowed only to those with 40 or
more years of contributions or to those with 35 years of contributions and the age of 60 for the employed (61 for the
self-employed), instead of the flexible age range of 57–65 before the reform. Furthermore, the age limits will be raised by
one year in 2010 and 2014, thus reaching 62 for the employed and 63 for the self-employed. A further postponement of
pension is envisaged with respect to the moment at which the requirements are met through the so-called ‘exit
windows’ (finestre).
During the period 2008–2015, the take-up of seniority pensions for those having met the requirements of the legislation
before 2004 (at least 35 years of contributions and the age of 57 for the employed/58 for the self-employed) is limited to
women who accept the pension calculation according to a less-favourable contribution method.
During the period 2004–2007, those employed in the private sector and having satisfied the requirements for a seniority
pension may opt for a different regime providing: 9 (i) an additional pay corresponding to the whole pension
contribution (32.7% of gross wages), 9 (ii) the total tax exemption of this additional income and 9 (iii) pension amount
calculated according to the contribution years matured at the date of the option and indexed to inflation for the period
until old-age retirement.
HU The standard retirement age for women will increase to 60 by 2005, 61 by 2007 and 62 by 2009; before the reform it
1997 was 57).
A funded tier was introduced in 1997, allowing to transfer an 8% contribution (26.5% of the total social security
pension contribution) into private pension funds. This funded tier is mandatory to all new entrants to the labour
market. In 2005, already 62% of the labour force have joined funded schemes.
LV The Latvian social security pension system was reformed into a notional defined-contribution scheme in 1996 and
1996 complemented with the introduction of a funded tier in 2001, allowing to transfer a part of the contribution into
private pension fund: the contribution is currently 2% but is to be raised to 10% (50% of the total contribution) by 2010.
Furthermore, the standard age requirement for women (60.5 years until July 2006) will increase by 6 months each
year to reach 62 by 2008. Those for men reached 62 in 2003. Early retirement up to two years before the standard
retirement age remains possible until July 2008.
LT The standard minimum retirement age for women (55 years in 1995, 58.5 years in 2003) will increase by 6 months each
1995 year to reach 60 years in 2006. The retirement age for men was gradually increased (2 months per year) from 60 years
in 1995 up to 62.5 in 2003.
2004 A funded tier was introduced in 2004, allowing a transfer of a part of the statutory social security pension contribution (to
rise to 5.5% in 2007) into private pension funds. The switch is voluntary to all.
NL Decisions have been taken to reduce the incentives for the take-up of early retirement pensions (VUT), mainly via the
2006 reduction of the favourable tax treatment of such pensions.
AT The minimum retirement age for men will increase from 61.5 years to 65 years; for women the age will rise from 56.5 to
2003, 2004 60 years. The increase will be phased in gradually beginning in July 2004 and by 2017 early retirement will be
eliminated. The statutory retirement age for women will be increased gradually between 2019 and 2034 to reach the
retirement age for men at 65.
The 2003 reform abolished early retirement schemes and linked benefits more closely to contributions. The 2004 reform
introduced significant improvements for the financial sustainability of the pension system via a better transparency
between contributions and benefits; bonus/malus adjustments (4.2% p.a.) are applied for deferred/earlier retirement
and a longer contribution period (45 years) is required for a full pension (80%) at the age of 65. Also, a switch to the
price indexation of pensions as of 2006 has already been decided. Furthermore, an alignment between different
sectoral schemes has been undertaken. From January 2005, harmonised guaranteed pension accounts will be
established (the Act on the harmonisation of pension system was approved in November 2004). In the new system, 
individual, transparent pension accounts will be kept to report of benefits accrued from contributions paid in and other 
credits acquired, such as from active child and elderly care.
PL The Polish general social security pension system was reformed into a notional defined-contribution scheme in 1999,
1999 with the introduction of a funded tier at the same time, allowing the transfer of a part of the contribution (7.3%) into
private pension funds. The switch is mandatory to people born after 1969. Those born before 1948 remain in the old
defined-benefit scheme. People born 1949–1968 could choose whether they joined the NDC scheme or split the
contributions between NDC and the fully funded scheme. Farmers are not included in the reformed NDC scheme.
The standard retirement age remains 65 for men and 60 for women. There will be no early pension for those born after
1948 and retiring after 2006.
PT The general social security pension scheme was reformed in 2002, changing the calculation rules of pensions to be
2002 based on lifetime earnings (max. 40 years) instead of the best 10 years over the last 15 years’ wages. However, this is
2005 being phased in over a long transition period.
The 2005 reform aligned the public sector employees’ pensions with the general pension scheme (previously aligned
only to those who had entered the labour market after 1993), raising the statutory retirement age from 60 in 2005 to 65
by 2015, raising the length of the contribution period required for a full pension from 36 to 40 years by 2013 and 
applying bonus/malus adjustments for deferred/earlier retirements.
SK The standard retirement age will increase from 60 to 62 for men (9 months per year) by 2007 and from the former 57
2004 (reduced by 1 year per child, to reach age 53) to 62 for women by 2016. A worker can still retire earlier if the combined
benefit from the first and the newly introduced second pillar equal at least 60% of the minimum living standard
determined by the government. In this case, the pension is reduced by 6% per year while a bonus of 6% is introduced
for those postponing retirement. It is also possible to get pension benefit while working.
A funded tier was introduced in 2005, which is mandatory to the new entrants to the labour market, allowing the
transfer of half the statutory social security pension contribution (9) into private pension funds.
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SI The standard retirement age has been increased. It is now possible to retire between 58 and 63 for men and 61 for
2000 women (the minimum retirement age was 53 for women and 58 for men before the reform). Women who worked
before the age of 18 can retire earlier (but not before the age of 55). Special regulations reduce the age of retirement
to 55 in certain cases (before the reform it was possible even below 50). The minimum retirement age is raised from 53
to 58 for women (the same as for men). The accrual rate has been reduced from 2% to 1.5% since 2000. Later
retirement has been encouraged: a person who fulfils the requirement for pension but continues to work beyond the age
of 63/61 will receive an additional pension increase (3.6% the first additional year, 2.4% the second year and 1.2% in
the third, plus the normal rate of accrual, 1.5% p.a.).
The indexation of pensions has varied from year to year. During the period of 2000–2004, it was 50% to wages and in
2005 80% to wages. Prices were taken in to account only when the result of the indexation was below the price
increase in 2001–2005. As of 2006, it will be fully to wages.
A new supplementary pre-funded pension insurance was introduced. It is mandatory for early pensions in heavy and
unhealthy work and voluntary for collectively agreed pension insurance.
FI The 2003–2005 revisions of the pension scheme aim to raise the effective retirement age (by two years by 2025) by
2003–2005 removing the unemployment pension scheme (between 2009–2014) and removing the individual disability (early
retirement) scheme whilst allowing flexible retirement between 63 and 68 years and an early retirement at the age of 62.
The accrual rate is increased to 4.5% for those continuing to work beyond the age of 63 (previously 2.5% for those
working beyond 60) and an actuarial reduction of 0.6% per month is applied to those retiring prior to 63. The ceiling
on the maximum pension is abolished. Pension benefits are calculated on the basis of life-time earnings. Also, a life
expectancy coefficient will be implemented in the system as of 2009, adjusting future old-age and survivors’ benefits to
the increase in life expectancy.
SE Under the new notional defined contribution system it is possible to retire from age 61 onwards, with an actuarially fair
1998 compensation for those who stay on in the labour force. Every year of contributions is important for the pension
benefit. A person with an average wage will increase his yearly pension benefit by nearly 60% if he postpones his
retirement decision until age 67 compared to leaving at age 61. Yearly ‘statement of account’ informs the individual of
costs and benefits of retirement. The new system is being phased in gradually for generations born between 1938 and 
1953, and will fully affect generations born after 1953.
UK Between 2010 and 2020, women’s pensionable age will gradually rise from 60 to 65, as for men.
2002–2003 In 2002, the State Second Pension was introduced (replacing the earlier State Earnings-related Pension), resulting in
time in higher benefits. In 2003, the Pension Credit was introduced, increasing income-related benefits to people over
60. Also, the basic state pension has been increased more than what the statutory indexation rule (with prices) requires.
Source: Reproduced from European Economy, Special Report No 1/2006, 'The impact of ageing on public expenditure: projections for the 
EU-25 Member States on pensions, healthcare, long-term care, education and unemployment transfers' (2004–50), European Commission.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In spite of country differences, Euro-
pean Union (EU) Member States are
facing a number of common chal-
lenges, such as demographic ageing,
together with still relatively low aver-
age employment rates and high
structural unemployment, which put
at risk the sustainability of social pro-
tection systems
1
. Europe's social reali-
ty is becoming more complex
2
, while
the 'European social model' has been
subject to a 'globalisation shock'
(BEPA, 2007). Globalisation is accen-
tuating Europe's rapid trajectory
towards a post-industrial knowledge
and service economy. This requires a
highly educated work force and the
modernisation of institutions to
avoid the development of segmented
labour markets in many Member
States, where both relatively protect-
ed and unprotected workers coexist
(i.e. 'insiders' and 'outsiders'), and
where long-term poverty can be
especially problematic among certain
groups having limited access to voca-
tional training opportunities (Esping-
Andersen, 2002; Employment in
Europe, 2004). 
Articulated sets of policies, which
simultaneously address the require-
ments of flexibility in the labour mar-
kets, provide flexible forms of work
organisation and improved labour
relations, and increase employment
and social security, are necessary in
order to achieve the objectives of the
renewed Lisbon Strategy. This means
in particular more and better jobs,
while modernising the European
social models at the same time. 
Flexicurity is such an integrated strat-
egy
3
. Flexibility, on the one hand, is
about successful transitions during the
life cycle (e.g. from school to work,
from job to job). It is about upward
mobility and the development of tal-
ent, and fostering flexible work organ-
isations capable of rapidly adapting
and effectively mastering new produc-
tivity processes. It is about facilitating
the combination of work and individu-
al preferences. Security, on the other
hand, is more than just the security to
sustain a job. It is about equipping
people with the skills that enable them
to progress in their working lives, and
help them to find new jobs. It is also
about adequate unemployment bene-
fits to facilitate transitions, and it also
encompasses training opportunities
for all workers, especially the low-
skilled and older workers
4
.  
Both internal (within the firm) and
external (between firms) forms of
flexibility are necessary
5
. In addition,
all forms of flexibility should be
accompanied by secure transitions
from job to job, thus they should be
supported by: 
• modern labour laws
• effective active labour market 
policies
• modern social security systems
• comprehensive lifelong learning
policies
6
.  
Concerning, internal flexibility, high-
quality workplaces with capable
leadership, good organisation of
work, and continuous upgrading of
skills should be an integral part of
any successful flexicurity strategy. 
Wilthagen and Tros (2004) argue that
the notion of flexibility should by no
means be reduced to the ease or dif-
ficulty in hiring/firing workers and in
making use of non open-ended
employment contracts, such as fixed-
term contracts, temporary work
agencies, on-call work, etc. (i.e. exter-
nal numerical flexibility). In fact,
flexibility requirements can also be
fulfilled within the firm (i.e. internal
flexibility). This internal flexibility
may involve either quantitative
and/or qualitative features (Wiltha-
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1 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions, 'Towards common principles of flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility and security', COM(2007) 359. 
2 Member States face common challenges such as demography, increased ethnic and cultural diversity, and the individualisation of values.
3 A successful flexicurity strategy has [also] to balance carefully the income insurance function of an unemployment benefit system with the 
appropriate 'activation' strategy designed to facilitate transitions into employment and boost career development.
4 On the effectiveness of human capital policies in general, see Heckman (2000), and for active labour market policies in particular, see Employment
in Europe 2006, Chapter 3. 
5 In this chapter and consistent with the common use of the terms, 'functional flexibility' or 'internal qualitative flexibility' is defined as forms of
work organisation that use an employee's capacity to perform different tasks when required, through job rotation and teamwork. Advanced
forms of functional flexibility are associated with multitasking, skills development (training), job enrichment (complexity), and involvement of
workers in planning or budgeting (team autonomy). 'Internal numerical flexibility' is defined as the amount of flexibility firms can achieve by
varying labour input through the use of flexible working-time arrangements, atypical working hours, part-time work, etc.
6 These are the four policy components of flexicurity. They are affected by considerable policy complementarities.
 
gen, 1998; Wilthagen and Tros, 2004;
Hurley and Vermeylen, 2007;
Goudswaard and de Nanteuil, 2000).
Quantitative forms of internal flexi-
bility refer to different working-time
arrangements, such as the use of
overtime, part-time, weekend work,
or the implementation of flexible
working-time schemes. Qualitative
forms of internal flexibility refer to
the adoption of work organisation
methods that enhance the adaptabil-
ity to change, including such prac-
tices as job rotation, multitasking and
increased employees' responsibilities
in decision—making. 
The recently adopted Commission's
Communication on flexicurity recog-
nises that flexibility is also about
'flexible work organisations, capable
of quickly and effectively mastering
new productivity needs and skills and
about facilitating the combination of
work and private responsibilities'.
Within the set of common principles,
which are proposed in order to facili-
tate national reform debates, it calls
on Member States to enhance inter-
nal and external flexibility simultan-
eously
7
.  
Depending on particular institutional
arrangements and/or social dialogue
practices, social partners are likely to
be able to agree on internal flexib-
ility combinations that respond bet-
ter to both market pressures and
workers demands for an improved
work-life balance (i.e. are win-win
solutions). 
This chapter is divided into three
main sections. The first section uses
both micro and macro data sources
to describe some of the stylised facts
that characterise working-time
trends and patterns in Europe. It
also presents information on the
typology and incidence of working-
time arrangements. Labour Force
Survey (LFS) data is used to present
detailed information on the distri-
bution of working hours. The Euro-
pean Foundation's European Work-
ing Conditions Survey (EWCS) is used
to calculate a composite indicator of
total working time, and assess the
impact of working time on health,
the work-life balance and job satis-
faction. 
The second section surveys the litera-
ture on new forms of work organisa-
tion, and discusses its rationale. It
also describes the main facts regard-
ing the incidence of such innovative
practices across the EU and estimates
some probit regressions. The EWCS is
used to describe the main stylised
facts regarding work organisation
practices in Europe, including auton-
omy at work, task rotation and team-
work, task complexity, problem solv-
ing and communication structures 
at work, complementary human
resource management (HRM) pol-
icies, work organisation and job satis-
faction. Using the EWCS, probit
regressions are estimated for the
determinants of the pace of work,
the incidence of performance-based
pay schemes, the health risks of work,
the work-life balance, job satisfac-
tion, controlling for wages
8
, worker
and establishment characteristics, dif-
ferent work organisation practices
and country-fixed effects. The second
section also presents a typology of
work organisations in Europe in the
context of innovation systems
(Lorenz and Valyere, 2003). 
The third section builds upon the evi-
dence presented in the previous two
sections to calculate two composite
indicators of flexibility within the
firm: internal and functional flexibil-
ity. This represents a considerable
improvement upon the analysis car-
ried out in the 2006 Employment in
Europe (EiE) report, where flexibility
was entirely identified with the
notion of external flexibility as meas-
ured using the OECD's Employment
Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator.
In contrast, this chapter uses a com-
prehensive measure of flexibility,
including indicators on external,
internal and functional flexibility.
These two new composite indicators
are then added to the usual set of
labour market indicators to redo a
principal components analysis (PCA)
of labour market/flexicurity systems
and refine the taxonomy presented
in last year's EiE report.
However, given the nature of
flexicurity, it is important to mention
that this chapter does not analyse in-
depth security aspects. A more in-
depth investigation of the security
dimension of flexicurity would
require use of more recent longitudin-
al data, which are currently unavail-
able on a harmonised basis across 
EU Member States. Longitudinal data
are necessary to assess individuals'
transitions between different labour
market statuses and pay levels. The
reader is referred to Employment in
Europe 2004, Chapter 4, for an ana-
lysis of the latest figures available on
labour market transitions in EU Mem-
ber States.  
2. WORKING TIME -
QUANTITATIVE FLEXIBILITY
This section describes some of the
stylised facts that characterise 
working-time trends and patterns in
Europe in order to provide a picture
of the development of quantitative
internal flexibility. Annual average
hours worked per worker have
declined considerably in recent
decades; in the literature two com-
peting explanations are advanced for
this. The first explanation is based on
preferences for fewer working hours,
partly resulting from changes in the
composition of the workforce
9
, and
126
EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE 2007
7 This type of discussion is not new at EU level. In 1997, the European Commission issued a Green Paper that examined new forms of work organisation
and public policy options for increasing their utilisation (European Commission, 1997).
8 Using wage deciles. 
9 In recent decades, the trend increase in female labour force participation led to a reduction in the total preferred  number of working hours, because
of the need of women to reconcile work with family responsibilities. 
the second due to the effects of insti-
tutional factors that create disincen-
tives to work. Disentangling these
two hypotheses is relevant for policy.
For example, on the one hand, if the
declining trend in working hours
reflects individual/family preferences
for voluntary part-time work, there
might be no societal problem per se.
On the other hand, if low working
hours are due to institutional fea-
tures that create disincentives to
work, such as high tax wedges and
unemployment benefits in a context
of inadequate 'activation'
10
policies,
there might be room for policy inter-
vention. 
A number of surveys suggest that
actual participation rates, particularly
among women, are below individu-
als' desired levels (Jaumotte, 2003).
There are large differences across
countries because the labour force
participation of women is mainly
determined by their level of educa-
tion, policies and cultural attitudes,
although the male-breadwinner
model is no longer the predominant
one in Europe. The Labour Force Sur-
vey (LFS) indicates that the percent-
age of inactive women that would
like to work in EU Member States is,
on average, above 10%. 
This section uses data mainly from
the following sources: the Groningen
Growth and Development Centre,
Eurostat's Labour Force Survey (LFS),
and two surveys of the European
Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions
11
. 
2.1. Downward trend in
average working hours
All sources of information used indi-
cate that average working hours per
worker have declined significantly in
all developed countries since the
early 1970s (Leiner-Killinger et al.,
2005). Over the long term, labour
utilisation
12
decreased at a faster pace
in the EU
13
than in the United States
(Chart 1, Panel 1), although the situa-
tion has improved in the former since
the mid 1990s as a result of policy
reforms (Chart 2, Panel 1, see page
128). 
Data from the Groningen Growth
and Development Centre (GGDC) are
used to breakdown labour utilisation
in three main components: 
• the change in average annual
hours worked per worker
• the change in the employment rate 
• the change in the ratio of the
working-age population in the
total population. 
Over the long term, Chart 1 suggests
that the diverging trend in labour
utilisation between the EU and the
United States is explained by stronger
declines in average annual hours
worked per worker (Panel 2) and in
the employment rate (Panel 3) in the
former relative to the latter. 
Since the second half of the 1990s,
labour utilisation has grown at a
faster pace in Europe than in the
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10 'Activation' policies attempt to coordinate active with passive labour market policies (or active labour market policies with the administration of
public unemployment benefits). The 'mutual obligations' principle plays a central role in activation strategies. On the one hand, public employment
services should provide quality counselling and job brokerage services, while on the other the unemployed should comply with the obligations to
actively search for a job and to accept suitable job offers (EiE 2006, Chapter 3).
11 The Establishment Survey on Working Time (wave 2004-2005), and the European Working Conditions Survey (waves 1991, 1995, 2000-01 and 2005).
12 The total number of hours worked divided by the total population is commonly referred to as the labour utilisation indicator.
13 EU-15: BE, DK, DE, EL, ES, FR, IE, IT, LU, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE and UK.
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A country is dropped from the index when data are not available.
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Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre Total Economy Database, January 2007; DG ECFIN, 
Ameco Database, Autumn 2006 Economic Forecatsts
United States (Chart 2). This reflects
the remarkable turnaround in the
employment rate in the former
(Panel 3), which more than offsets
the uninterrupted decline in the
average number of hours worked per
worker (Panel 2). 
In recent years, there has been a sig-
nificant rise in the EU average
employment rate (or in the extensive
margin of labour market adjust-
ment), largely reflecting the rise in
female labour-force participation. A
large proportion of women that
joined the labour market have opted
for working part-time or a reduced
number of hours (Chart 3), explaining
the cross-country strong negative
correlation between the incidence of
part-time work and the average
annual number of hours of work per
worker (Chart 4). 
Econometric analyses using micro
data were used to investigate the
determinants of an individual's deci-
sion to work part-time (Jaumotte,
2003; Buddelmeyer et al., 2005). The
analyses reveal that preferences for
individual's part-time work depend
on a number of factors, such as gen-
der, education, household composi-
tion (e.g. number of children), gov-
ernment policies (e.g. taxation, child
benefits/childcare subsidies) and the
country's characteristics that may
reflect cultural factors as well as
national differences in labour market
institutions (Algan and Cahuc, 2005). 
Overall, the analysis suggests that part-
time jobs provide an opportunity for
parents, particularly women, to recon-
cile work and family demands. Never-
theless, part-time work for women can
be associated with negative future
career prospects, particularly in the pri-
vate sector of the economy, for exam-
ple in terms of lower wages, social
security coverage, less training and
fewer transitions to full-time jobs
(Buddelmeyer et al., 2005; ESWT). 
2.2. Working-time
arrangements
In 2004, the European Labour Force
Survey
14
(EU LFS) included an ad hoc
module on work organisation and
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Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre Total Economy Database, January 2007; DG ECFIN, Ameco
Database, Autumn 2006 Economic Forecatsts
14 The EU LFS is a large household sample survey providing quarterly results on labour participation of people aged 15 and over, as well as on people out-
side the labour force. The survey is conducted in the 27 Member States of the European Union and 3 countries of the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) in accordance with Council Regulation (EEC) No. 577/98 of 9 March 1998. The Labour Force Surveys are conducted by the National Statistical
Institutes across Europe and are centrally processed by Eurostat, using the same concepts and definitions, i.e. following the International Labour Organ-
isation (ILO) guidelines, and using common classifications, such as NACE(rev1), ISCO-88(COM), ISCED and NUTS.
In all of the countries providing quarterly data, the quarterly sample is spread uniformly over all weeks of the quarter. The data collection covers in
total the years 1983 to 2006. In spring 2007, the LFS sample size across the EU was about 1.5 million individuals. The EU LFS covers all industries and
occupations.
15 The European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) is carried out simultaneously by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Work-
ing Conditions (hereafter the European Foundation) in all EU Member States, and also Candidate and EFTA countries. It only covers individuals in
employment. The survey questionnaire asks more than 100 questions, including questions on household characteristics, time use, work organisation,
perceived health hazards and access to training. The survey methodology is based on a multi-stage random sampling method involving face-to-face
interviews conducted at the respondent's principal residence. The fourth EWCS was carried out in each of the 27 Member States between 19 Septem-
ber and 30 November of 2005. Approximately 30 000 workers were interviewed. The survey questionnaire was directed at approximately 1 000 
workers per country with the exceptions of Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia which had only 600 respondents each. The European
Foundation is an autonomous EU agency with a tripartite governing board based in Dublin (i.e. includes representatives of European Social Partners
and of EU bodies). It was set up by the European Council Regulation No. 1365/75 of 26 May 1975 in order to contribute to the planning and design of
better living and working conditions in Europe. 
16 In 2004 (EU15) and 2005 (NMS 6), the European Foundation carried out the European Establishment Survey on Working Time (ESWT). It was 
conducted in over 21 000 establishments with 10 or more employees, covering both the private and public sectors. Personnel managers and, where
available, employee representatives were interviewed about working time arrangements and work-life balance in their workplaces.
working-time arrangements. The
European Foundation's EWCS
15
and
ESWT
16
have also detailed informa-
tion that can be used to identify and
investigate different patterns of
working-time arrangements. Table 1
(see page 130) presents comparative
information taken from these three
surveys on work organisation and
working-time arrangements. 
Using these three surveys, Member
States were ranked according to the
percentage of workers/establish-
ments using one of the various flex-
ible working-time arrangements
(types 2 to 5 in Table 1, see page 130).
The resulting Spearman's
17
rank cor-
relation coefficient is relatively high
and the correlations are significantly
different from zero (Table 2, see page
130). Twenty-one EU Member States
are present in all three surveys
18
. 
The section following will focus
mainly on the ESWT survey, because
this survey can give us insights as to
the reasons for the introduction of
various types of working-time
arrangements, the take-up rates of
the different regimes, and the assess-
ment of results from the perspectives
of both managers and employee rep-
resentatives. 
In the context of flexicurity policies, it
is important to evaluate to what
extent the adoption of working-time
arrangements deviating from the
standard norm result from employees'
personal needs and preferences or
from employers' optimisation behav-
iour
19
. Obviously, the introduction of
flexible working-time arrangements,
either on the basis of work-life balance
or of efficiency criteria, are not neces-
sarily incompatible, but there is also
room for potential conflict. 
The ESWT distinguishes four types of
flexible working-time arrangements
according to the time horizon given
for the balancing of time accounts
(European Foundation, 2006b).
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Chart 3: Total employment rate (LHS) and part-time employment rate (RHS)
in the EU-12 (percentages)
Female employment rate (LHS) and part-time employment rate (RHS) 
in the EU-12 (percentages)
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Chart 4: The annual average of hours worked per worker and the average 
part-time rate, 1995–2005
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and Eurostat.
17 Spearman's rank correlation coefficient is equivalent to (Pearson) correlation coefficient but on ranks. 
18 AT, BE, CY, CZ, DE, DK, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IE, IT, LU, LV, NL, PL, PT, SE, SI and UK.
19 For example, adapting working time patterns to workload fluctuations and/or reducing costs by limiting the use of overtime.
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Ranked in an increasing degree of
flexibility (Chart 5):
• Schemes that only allow the
starting and finishing times of
each day to vary, without the
possibility of accumulating credit
or debit hours (16% of all estab-
lishments surveyed);
• Schemes that allow for the accu-
mulation of credit and debit
hours, over longer periods of
time (such as a week or a month),
but do not allow credit hours to
be compensated by full days off
(7% of all establishments sur-
veyed);
• Schemes that permit employees to
take full days off to compensate
for accumulated credit hours (13%
of all establishments surveyed); 
• Schemes that allow employees to
take longer periods of time off.
Such schemes are often referred
to as 'working time accounts' or
'annualised working hours' (13%
of all establishments surveyed).
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Table 1 - Typology of working-type arrangements
Survey
Question/variable
Types:
1
2
3
4
5
Labour Force Survey ad hoc module
on work organisation and working-
time arrangements, 2004 (Eurostat)
Variable working hours 
(VARWKHRS) 
Fixed start and end of working day
Staggered working hours, banded
start/end
Working-time banking with 
possibility only to take hours off
Start and end of working day 
varying by individual agreement
Determines own work schedule 
(no formal boundaries)
Establishment Survey on Working
Time, 2004-2005 (European 
Foundation)
Flexible working-time arrangements
(MM300, MM305, MM306a,
MM306b)
No flexible working-time 
arrangements
Possibility to vary the start and end
of daily work, but no accumulation
of hours
Possibility to accumulate hours, but
no compensation by full days off
Possibility to use accumulated hours
for full days off
Possibility to use accumulated hours
for longer periods of leave
Fourth European Working 
Conditions Survey, 2005 (European
Foundation)
How are your working-time
arrangements set? (Q17a)
They are set by the company/
organisation
You can choose between several
fixed working schedules determined
by the company/ organisation
You can adapt your working hours
within certain limits
Your working hours are entirely
determined by yourself
Source: Eurostat and the European Foundation.
Table 2
Spearman’s correlation coefficient for the
relevant questions on work organisation
and working time arrangements (t-statistic
in parenthesis)
LFS EWCS ESWT
LFS 1 0.84 (6.6) 0.52 (2.6)
EWCS - 1 0.71 (4.3)
ESWT - - 1
Source: DG EMPL calculations.
Possibility to vary the start and end of daily work, but no accumulation of hours 
Possibility to use accumulated hours, but no compensation by full days off 
Possibility to use accumulated hours for full days off, but no accumulated longer periods of leave
Possibility to use accumulated hours for longer periods of leave 
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Chart 5: Incidence of different forms of flexible working time arrangements 
by country
Source: European Foundation, ESWT 2004-2005; DG EMPL calculations. Management interviews; establishments
having answered the question on flexible working time arrangements (mm300).
Chart 5 highlights the existence of
significant differences in flexible
working-time arrangements across
the 21 EU Member States covered by
the survey. The EWCS also indicates
the existence of significant differ-
ences in working-time arrangements
across country groupings (Chart 6),
which contrast with the relatively
uniform patterns for working hours
(Chart 7). Opportunities to make use
of the various types of flexible work-
ing-time arrangements are higher in
the service sector (Chart 8). The size
of firm also matters for the adoption
of working-time arrangements, par-
ticularly for the most 'advanced' type
(Chart 9, see page 132). In fact, the
proportion of establishments offer-
ing the possibility to take long peri-
ods of leave in exchange for accumu-
lated hours to at least some of their
employees rises with the size of the
workforce. 
The European Foundation (2006b)
advances a number of explanations
for this. Firstly, there may be fixed
costs for setting and managing flexi-
time schemes. Secondly, the manage-
ment of time accounts requires a cer-
tain degree of formalisation in order
to protect accumulated rights. Third-
ly, in small and medium-size enter-
prises it might be difficult to replace
workers taking long periods of leave. 
Using the ESWT, the European Foun-
dation (2006b) makes an important
distinction between entitlement to
flexible working-time arrangements
at establishment level and the take-up
rate at the worker level. Nevertheless,
the data suggests that there is a posi-
tive correlation between these two
measures (Chart 10, see page 132).  
The ESWT asks both managers and
employee representatives the reasons
for the introduction of flexible 
working-time arrangements (Chart 11,
see page 132). It is remarkable to
notice that the rankings given largely
coincide. The first reason, with more
than 70% of positive answers (among
valid responses), is to enable employ-
ees to better combine work and fami-
ly life. The second reason, with slightly
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Chart 8: Flexible working–time arrangements by sector of activity
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculation.
Note: Establishments with flexible working-time arrangements (management interviews).
Source: European Foundation, EWCS 2005 (question Q17a); DG EMPL calculations.
more than 50% of positive answers, is
to better adapt working hours to the
variations in the workload. 
As regards the perceived effects of
introducing flexible working-time
arrangements, both managers and
employee representatives most fre-
quently report higher job satisfaction
as an outcome of the introduction of
flexible working times, followed by a
better adaptation of working hours
to the workload. Between both
groups of respondents there is only a
small minority which perceives nega-
tive effects (Chart 12). 
Results from the ESWT suggest that
the greater the working-time flexibil-
ity allowed, the more positive tends
to be the management's evaluation
(Chart 13). The reduction in paid
overtime hours, lower absenteeism,
higher job satisfaction and better
adaptation of the working hours to
the workload are more often consid-
ered by managers to have positive
effects in establishments with more
'advanced' forms of flexibility (Euro-
pean Foundation, 2006b). 
2.3. Part-time work
A large proportion of workers seem
to be willing to participate in the
labour force because of the availabil-
ity of a number of non-standard
working-time arrangements, particu-
larly part-time work, which offers
them the possibility to combine mar-
ket work with family responsibilities
or education. Flexible working-time
arrangements have a more positive
impact on the participation rates of
certain disadvantaged groups in the
labour force, such as low-skilled,
female and young workers. 
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a
turnaround in labour utilisation in
Europe (Chart 2, see page 128). This
results from two offsetting trends. On
average in the EU, positive employ-
ment growth, resulting from successful
reforms and societal trends, more than
compensated for the decline in the
number of hours worked per worker. 
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Chart 10: Share of companies offering flexible working–time arrangements 
and the average share of employees entitled to make use of them by country
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Chart 11: Reasons for introducing flexible working times by type of interview
Source: European Foundation, ESWT 2004–2005; DG EMPL calculations.
Establishments with flexible working–time arrangements (both types of interviews).
Note: Results exclude answers of the type ‘Don’t know/No answer’.
Source: European Foundation, ESWT 2004–2005; DG EMPL calculations.
Management interviews; establishments having answered the question on flexible working–time 
arrangements (mm300).
Source: European Foundation, ESWT 2004–2005; DG EMPL calculations.
Management interviews; establishments having answered the questions on flexible working–time arrangements
(mm300) and on the proportion of employees entitled to use flexitime in the establishment (mm302).
These combined trends reflect the
rapid development of part-time
work, particularly for women (Chart
3, see page 129). Indeed, in recent
decades female participation trends
have largely shaped overall develop-
ments. A number of analyses find
that policies that remove barriers to
part-time work increase female par-
ticipation (Jaumotte, 2003; OECD,
2005). The mechanical effect on the
rise in the female employment rate
20
within the total employment rate is
high across countries (Chart 14, see
page 134), while the development of
female part-time seems to have con-
tributed to the rise in female employ-
ment rate across EU Member States
(Chart 15, see page 134). Therefore,
the more intensive recourse to part-
time arrangements contributed to
the increase in both employment
growth and labour utilisation. 
Part-time work is largely voluntary
(Chart 16, see page 134). In addition,
rates of involuntary part-time work
are particularly low in countries that
also have low levels of average hours
worked per worker (Chart 17, Leiner-
Killinger, 2005, see page 135), sug-
gesting again that preferences play
an important role in the choice of
part-time work. 
Using LFS data (on usual weekly
hours of work in the main job), the
reduction in average hours of work
between 1985 and 2005 is broken
down between composition effects
(i.e. full-time versus part-time) and
pure effects (Chart 18, see page
135)
21
. The data covers eight EU Mem-
ber States for which data is avail-
able
22
. The results suggest that about
two-thirds of the overall reduction in
average usual hours of work can be
attributed to the rise in part-time
employment.  
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Chart 12: Effects of introducing flexible working time by type of interview
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Graph 13: Effects of introducing working hours by type of arrangement
Source: European Foundation, ESWT 2004–2005; DG EMPL calculations.
Establishments with flexible working–time arrangements (both types of interviews).
Note: Results exclude answers of the type ‘Don’t know/No answer’.
Source: European Foundation, ESWT 2004–2005; DG EMPL calculations.
Establishments with flexible working–time arrangements (management interviews).
20 The change in the female employment rate between 1995 and 2005 weighted by the fraction of the female working-age population in the total 
working-age population in 1995. 
21 where     stands for the variation between an initial (0) and final (1) periods                  ;    for average hours;
for full-time average hours; p for part-time average hours; F for the full-time employment ratio (i.e. full-time employment over total employment);
and P the part-time employment ratio. The total effect îh  is the sum of a pure effect:                          and a composition effect:                               . 
22 The period 1985–2005 was used in order to calculate a longer medium-term trend, but at the cost of including only nine countries in the analysis (BE,
DE, DK, FR, EL, IT, LU, NL and UK). It should also be mentioned that there is a potentially significant break in series due to German unification. 
Table 3 : Breakdown of the variation in the average number of usual weekly 
hours of work in the main job between 1985 and 2005
Total variation Full-time Part-time Composition effect
working hours working hours
-2.6 -0.9 0.0 -1.7
Source: Eurostat and DG EMPL calculations.
2.4. Distribution 
of working hours
LFS data is used to characterise the dis-
tribution of working hours by main
classification variables (e.g. country,
gender, type of employment), while,
due to the availability of longer time
series, GGDC data is used to identify
the major factors explaining the
declining trend in labour utilisation. 
Again it can be seen that the declining
trend in average hours of work (Table
4, Panel 1) is, to a large extent, the
result of composition effects (i.e. the
shift from full-time to part-time work).
Using only data for full-time employ-
ment (Panel 2), average weekly hours
of work have remained relatively
unchanged in the major continental
EU Member States in the last 10 years
(1995–2005). Moreover, the average
full-time weekly hours of work have
increased in Germany, Italy and Spain,
albeit marginally, and more substan-
tially in France since 2002 (Chart 19,
see page 136). 
Data from both the GGDC and Euro-
stat's LFS suggest that while labour
utilisation indices declined significantly
in Europe until the early 1990s, they
have since largely stabilised, particular-
ly after correcting for composition
effects. Chart 20 (see page 136) uses a
boxplot
23
graph to analyse the distri-
bution of usual weekly hours of work
in eight EU Member States for which
data is available from 1985. The mes-
sage is again one of a significant
decline in average working hours until
the early 1990s followed by a relative
stabilisation, but also of a convergence
in full-time working hours post 2000. 
The LFS distinguishes between the
number of hours usually worked and
the number of hours actually worked
(Table 5, see page 137). The former
should correspond to the number of
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Chart 14: Change in the total employment rate and the mechanical effect 
induced by variations in the female employment rate in the period 1995–2005 
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Chart 15: Changes in the female employment rate and in the female share 
of part-time work in total female
employment in the period 1995–2005 (percentage points)
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Chart 16: The part-time employment rate and the percentage of involuntary 
part-time (averages 1995–2005)
(percentages)
Source: Eurostat.
23 A boxplot graph summarises the distribution of a set of data by displaying measures of localisation and spread. The box portion of a boxplot repre-
sents the first and third quartiles (i.e. the middle 50% of the data). The difference between the first and third quartile represents the interquartile
range (IQR). The median is depicted using a horizontal line through the box, while the mean is drawn using a dot symbol. The inner fences are defined
as the first quartile minus 1.5*IQR and the third quartile plus 1.5*IQR. The graphical elements known as whiskers and staples delimit the values that
are outside the first and third quartiles, but within the inner fences. The staple is the horizontal line delimiting the inner fences. Whiskers are the 
vertical lines linking each hinge to the corresponding staple. 
Source: Eurostat.
Source: Eurostat.
hours a person normally works, while
the latter should correspond to the
number of hours a person actually
worked during the reference week
24
.
The LFS also includes information con-
cerning the existence of more than one
job
25
per person. Although only about
3.5% of EU workers have a second job,
these people work, on average, a con-
siderable number of hours in their sec-
ond job. 
The distribution by gender of working
hours in part-time and full-time employ-
ment is shown in Chart 21 (see page
136). Despite the high incidence of
female part-time work (Table 6), aver-
age weekly hours (in part-time work) are
not significantly different across gender
(Chart 21, upper panel, see page 136). As
regards full-time employment, there is a
significantly positive difference in the
average number of weekly hours
between men and women (Chart 21,
bottom panel, see page 136). 
The distribution of weekly hours of work
by gender for the full-time workers
employed in 1985 and 2005 is presented
in Charts 22 (see page 137) and 23 (see
page 138). These Charts suggest a gener-
al shift to shorter working hours.
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24 Possible reasons for a difference include: a) slack for technical or economic reasons; b) labour dispute; c) maternity or parental leave; d) overtime. 
25 Multiple (or second jobholders) decide for themselves which job is to be considered as the first job. In doubtful cases the first job should be the one
with the greatest number of hours usually worked.
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Chart 17: Total annual hours worked per worker and the percentage 
of involuntary part-time (averages 1995–2005)
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Chart 18: Breakdown of the variation in the average number of usual weekly hours
of work in the main job (period between 1985–2005)
Source: Eurostat LFS, DG EMPL calculations. 
Note: average for BE DE DK FR EL IT LU NL and UK.
Source: Groningen Growth and Development Centre and Eurostat.
Table 4 : Average number of usual weekly hours of work in the main job 
Panel 1 : Total employment Panel 2: Full-time employment
Country Gender 1985 1990 1995 2002 2005 2006 Country Gender 1985 1990 1995 2002 2005 2006
DE F 35.8 33.5 33.1 31.4 30.3 30.2 DE F 42.2 40.8 40.1 40.1 40.0 40.4
M 42.6 41.3 40.8 40.6 40.2 40.1 M 43.1 42.0 41.7 42.1 42.3 42.4
F+M 39.9 38.2 37.6 36.5 35.7 35.6 F+M 42.8 41.6 41.2 41.4 41.5 41.7
ES F 38.4 37.3 36.7 35.5 35.6 ES F 41.2 41.1 40.5 40.7 40.5
M 42.4 42.2 41.8 42.1 42.1 M 42.8 42.8 42.4 43.1 43.1
F+M 41.1 40.5 39.9 39.4 39.4 F+M 42.3 42.3 41.8 42.3 42.2
FR F 36.3 35.5 34.8 33.4 34.3 34.4 FR F 40.2 39.7 39.8 37.7 39.0 39.2
M 42.1 41.6 41.4 38.9 41.2 41.2 M 42.6 42.2 42.4 39.8 42.2 42.2
F+M 39.6 38.9 38.4 36.3 38.0 38.1 F+M 41.7 41.2 41.3 38.9 41.0 41.0
IT F 36.9 36.6 35.9 35.3 34.1 34.0 IT F 38.2 38.0 37.9 37.8 38.4 38.5
M 41.2 41.4 41.3 41.4 41.6 41.5 M 41.5 41.7 41.7 41.9 42.6 42.5
F+M 39.8 39.8 39.4 39.1 38.6 38.5 F+M 40.5 40.5 40.4 40.5 41.2 41.1
UK F 30.1 30.8 30.7 31.2 31.3 31.3 UK F 40.4 40.8 41.1 40.8 40.4 40.4
M 44.5 45.1 44.5 42.9 42.0 41.8 M 45.8 46.8 46.8 45.5 44.7 44.5
F+M 38.5 38.9 38.3 37.4 37.0 36.9 F+M 44.2 44.9 44.9 43.9 43.2 43.0
EU-15 F 33.7 32.9 32.6 EU-15 F 40.0 39.6 39.8
M 41.8 40.9 41.1 M 43.0 42.4 42.9
F+M 38.4 37.4 37.3 F+M 42.0 41.4 41.8
Source: Eurostat Source: Eurostat
Chart 24 (see page 139) presents, side-
by-side, the distributions of weekly
hours of work for total employment
for both women and men. It identifies
the following stylised facts: a) the high
incidence of part-time work for
women; and b) men working full-time
work longer hours than women work-
ing full time. 
According to the LFS, the distinction
between full-time and part-time
work is made based on the 
spontaneous answer given by the
respondent. However, excluding
implausible answers, it should be
expected that full-time work should
start at about 30 hours, while part-
time work should hardly exceed 35
hours. Such outcomes would secure
the necessary consistency with the
notions of full and part-time. Chart
25 (see page 139) presents the distri-
butions of part and full-time side-by-
side, roughly corroborating such
expectations. 
2.5. A composite
indicator of total
working time
Labour force surveys normally report
working time as time spent on the
main job. They exclude commuting
time and time spent at home in various
household duties or non-workplace
activities, such as caring for children
and adults. By totalling the time spent
on workplace and household work,
time-diary or time-budget data sets
can be used to calculate measures of
total work. Comprehensive measures
of working time are particularly rele-
vant to assess the effects of work
(intensity) on (perceived) health haz-
ards, the work-life balance and overall
satisfaction with working conditions. 
Using this type of data sets for the
United States and three EU Member
States, Burda et al. (2006) find that
workers in the United States work
more than in Europe: i) in the work-
place; ii) in total (i.e. both in the
workplace and at home); and iii) at
unusual times of the day and on
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Chart 21: Average number of usual weekly hours of work in the main job
Source: Eurostat and DG EMPL. calculations.
Source: Eurostat.
Source: Eurostat and DG EMPL. calculations.
Note: EU–8: BE LU NL IT FR DE UK EL
weekends. Total time committed to
all work activities can result in the
worker perceiving a 'time shortage'
or 'time stress' (Hamermesh and Lee,
2003). Time shortage has some simi-
larity with poverty: 'both reflect the
scarcity of resources, time in the for-
mer case, goods in the latter'
26
.
Hamermesh and Lee (2003) find that
women perceive to be more affected
by time stress than men after control-
ling for observable characteristics. 
The fourth EWCS can be used to cal-
culate a broader measure of working
time that includes time spent in paid
jobs other than the main one, com-
muting time (i.e. time spent 
travelling to and from work), and
time spent working at home on non-
workplace activities. 
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Table 5 : Average number of weekly hours of work in the main and second jobs in 2005
Country Gender Main job Main job Second job Percentage of second  
usual hours actual hours actual hours job holders in
total employment
DE F 30.3 30.9 8.4 3.3%
M 40.2 41.6 10.2 3.4%
F+M 35.7 36.8 9.4 3.3%
ES F 35.5 34.6 14.1 3.3%
M 42.1 41.3 16.3 2.5%
F+M 39.4 38.6 15.3 2.8%
FR F 34.3 33.0 11.2 4.1%
M 41.2 39.9 15.5 1.9%
F+M 38.0 36.8 12.6 2.9%
IT F 34.1 33.5 11.8 1.7%
M 41.6 41.0 15.2 1.5%
F+M 38.6 38.1 13.8 1.6%
UK F 31.3 30.2 10.0 4.7%
M 42.0 40.4 11.6 3.0%
F+M 37.0 35.7 10.7 3.8%
EU-15 F 32.6 32.1 10.8 3.9%
M 41.1 40.7 13.2 3.3%
F+M 37.3 36.9 12.0 3.5%
Source: Eurostat and DG EMPL.
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Chart 22: Distribution of usual weekly hours of work
- female full-time employment in the EU-8 in 2005 and 1985
Source: Eurostat and DG EMPL calculations.
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26 The only difference is that in a growing economy the goods constraint will relax over time, while the time constraint cannot.
 
Although the EWCS has been carefully
designed in order to replicate some of
the sampling characteristics of the LFS,
the small sample of the former when
compared with the latter (roughly 20
000 versus 1.5 million cases respective-
ly), together with the fact that the
EWCS only covers people in employ-
ment and not the entire labour force,
warrants some care when using the
EWCS to infer results, particularly at
country level. In fact, the EWCS has
been designed primarily with a view to
obtaining results at the EU level. More-
over, the monitoring of the European
Employment Strategy (EES) largely
relies on the use of Eurostat data in
general, and LFS data in particular. 
The EWCS includes a question on the
number of usual weekly hours of work
in the main job. This allows comparing
the results obtained using the EWCS
with the LFS for the average (Chart 26)
and the coefficient of variation
27
(Chart
27, see page 140) of usual weekly
hours of work in the main job. For the
EU as a whole (or even just the EU-15),
the results obtained using the EWCS
are close to those obtained using the
LFS (for both the mean and the coeffi-
cient of variation). 
For the EU as a whole, the results sug-
gest that the EWCS closely repro-
duces the distribution of weekly
usual hours of work in the main job
calculated using LFS data. This,
together with the availability of
other indicators in the fourth EWCS,
makes it possible and justifies the cal-
culation of a more comprehensive
measure of total time use in work.
This comprehensive measure includes
a) time spent in paid jobs other than
the main one, b) commuting time,
and c) time spent at home on non
workplace (and unpaid) activities
28
. 
Chart 28 (see page 140) presents the
breakdown of the composite indicator
for weekly working hours. The compos-
ite indicator is calculated as the sum of: 
a) hours usually worked per week in
the main job (Q8a)
b) hours worked on average per
week in job(s) other than the main
paid job (Q9b)
c) commuting time to work
(Q8b*Q13/60)
d) time spent in some non-workplace
activities, such as caring for and edu-
cating children (EF4.1c), cooking and
housework (EF4.1d), and caring 
for elderly or disabled relatives
(EF4.1e)
29
. 
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Table 6: Part-time workers in percentage of total employment
Country Gender 1992 1995 2002 2005
DE F 30.9 33.7 39.5 43.8
M 2.7 3.6 5.8 7.8
F+M 14.5 16.3 20.8 24.0
ES F 13.8 16.4 16.8 24.2
M 2.2 2.9 2.6 4.5
F+M 6.0 7.5 8.0 12.4
FR F 25.2 29.1 29.8 30.7
M 3.8 5.1 5.2 5.7
F+M 13.1 15.8 16.4 17.2
IT F 12.7 16.9 25.6
M 2.9 3.5 4.6
F+M 6.3 8.6 12.8
UK F 43.8 44.4 43.8 42.7
M 6.3 7.8 9.6 10.4
F+M 22.9 24.1 25.4 25.4
EU-15 F 28.8 31.0 33.3 36.3
M 4.2 5.2 6.6 7.7
F+M 14.2 15.8 18.1 20.3
EU-27 F 28.5 31.0
M 6.6 7.4
F+M 16.2 17.8
Source: Eurostat
27 The coefficient of variation is the standard deviation divided by the mean. 
28 Because the EWCS only includes people who were in (paid) employment in the reference week, unpaid work carried out by non-employed people,
with a high proportion of women, are not considered. Therefore in the EWCS, unpaid (or non-workplace) working hours represent working hours 
carried out exclusively by people already in (paid) employment (Parent-Thirion et al.,  2007). 
29 Using the nomenclature in the questionnaire of the fourth EWCS (http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/docs/ewco/4EWCS/ENFINALquestion-
naire2005.pdf), the composite indicator is calculated as:                                                                                    . Extreme values are trimmed as follows:
Q8a at 120 hours per week, and EF4.1c, EF4.1d and EF4.1e each at 10 hours per day. 
Parent-Thirion et al. (2007) highlight
the fact that such a composite 
working-time indicator gives impor-
tant insights (Chart 29 and 30, see
page 140 and 141). Specifically, after
combining time in paid work with time
in non-workplace activities, women
spent considerably more time working
than men, reversing the rankings
obtained when only paid (or 
workplace) work is considered. More-
over, even women working part-time -
a form of work organisation widely
believed to favour the work-life bal-
ance or the reconciliation of work with
family responsibilities - work longer
total hours than men in full-time jobs. 
However, contrary to this result, Burda
et al. (2006) find that total work (i.e.
the sum of workplace and household
work) tends to be equal for men and
women at a point in time, even while
it may change over time and differ
across countries. These authors call it
the stylised 'iso-work' fact
30
. Since eco-
nomic theory offers little explanation
for the rationale of such a coordina-
tion mechanism, the authors propose
the existence of social norms to
explain the 'iso-work' fact. 
Another aspect worth mentioning is
the high cross-country variability in
total working hours as measured by
the coefficient of variation of the com-
posite working-time indicator (Chart
31, see page 141). Moreover, the vari-
ability of working hours is highly corre-
lated with the percentage of employ-
ees working 'long' hours (i.e. more
than 48 hours per week) (Chart 32, see
page 141). 
However, Parent-Thirion et al. (2007)
suggest that the variability of working
hours (relative to the national average)
might per se be more detrimental to
the perceived work-life balance than
long hours, because workers working
atypical hours cannot benefit from a
number of societal services which have
normal opening hours. However, the
negative impact of atypical working
hours can be mitigated if couples are
able to coordinate their tasks. 
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30 The 'iso-work' stylised fact is challenging for economic theory for a number of reasons: firstly, it requires explaining why total work differs so little
between genders when there is so much variation within gender; and secondly, total work is the sum of different types of work with distinct produc-
tivity levels, therefore there is no reason for their sum be equal across gender, without regard to the mix. 
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of work in the main job in 2005
Source: Eurostat, LFS; European Foundation, EWCS.
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2.6. The impact 
of working time
Research suggests that despite a con-
tinuous shift towards a service econo-
my, some trends observed in recent
decades in employment relationships
and working conditions have led to an
overall intensification of work in some
sectors and/or occupations, having a
negative impact on the (perceived)
health and safety of workers (see 3.3).
Across EU countries, total working
time is positively correlated with the
percentage of employees who per-
ceive work to represent a health or
safety risk (Chart 33, see page 142). 
Chart 34 and 35 (see page 142) also
illustrate the fact that the total time
spent working is one of the principal
factors influencing, on the one hand,
the work-life balance (or the ability
of workers to reconcile satisfactorily
family and social commitments out-
side work with their careers) and, on
the other hand, satisfaction with
working conditions. 
In addition to drawing scatter plots
with cross-country averages, another
way to illustrate the effects of total
working time on (perceived) job satis-
faction and/or on the work-life bal-
ance is to partition survey respon-
dents into different groups and then
to compare their respective average
answers. Following Parent-Thirion et
al. (2007), the sample was divided
between a working group having
'normal' working hours and another
having 'long' hours; the threshold is
48 usual weekly hours of work in the
first job. Such a descriptive approach
suggests again that working long
hours is negatively correlated with
the (perceived) work-life balance
(Chart 36, see page 143) and job sat-
isfaction (Chart 37, see page 143). 
However, as regards the effects of
total working time on job satisfaction,
there is a significant degree of hetero-
geneity across EU Member States
(Chart 38, see page 144). Obviously,
numerous other factors influence job
satisfaction, such as positive wage dif-
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Chart 29: Working hours composite indicator
– employees in the EU-15 in 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
Source: Eurostat, LFS; European Foundation, EWCS.
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
ferentials, offsetting unpleasant work-
ing conditions; different models of
work organisation, empowering work-
ers with a high degree of autonomy;
and various (flexible) working-time
arrangements, facilitating the reconcil-
iation of professional demands with
personal needs and preferences. 
3. WORK
ORGANISATION
3.1. Introduction 
Market pressure and technological
innovation foster flexible work
organisations
Increasing international competition
and the faster pace of technological
progress have led many firms, particu-
larly in developed countries, to adopt
new and more flexible forms of work
organisation in order to increase com-
petitiveness through cost reduction
and strengthen the firms' ability to
adapt to change. In developed coun-
tries, enterprises increasingly need to
compete in terms of product quality,
innovation, responsiveness to cus-
tomers' demands, rather than on price
competitiveness alone, especially when
competing against some labour and/or
resource rich economies, such as BRIC
countries
31
(Appelbaum and Batt, 1994;
Appelbaum and Berg, 1997). 
3.2. The adoption of
more flexible work
practices
A number of literature surveys sug-
gest that work organisation changed
significantly in the 1980s and 1990s
(Ichniowski et al., 2000; Godard and
Delaney, 2000), moving away from
the traditional or 'Tayloristic' organi-
sational form
32
. Companies have re-
organised their workplaces, adopting
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Chart 32: Variability of working hours and work intensity 
– employees in 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
31 Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
32 The 'Tayloristic' work organisational model is characterised by the standardisation of production processes, the narrow definition of a job's content, 
a clear differentiation between rights and duties of employees and management, and the use of formal procedures and hierarchical structures for 
internal communication and conflict management (Ichniowski et al., 1996). 
Average Coeff cie t of variation
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
Note: Long working hours ie. more than 48 hours per week.
what has been termed 'new', 'flexi-
ble', 'lean', 'high-performance' or
'high involvement' work systems
(Becker and Huselid, 1998; OECD,
1999; Appelbaum et al., 2000; Oster-
man, 1994).
New work practices tend to be more
participatory, horizontal and cooper-
ative  
Examples of innovative forms of
work organisation (Bauer, 2004;
OECD, 1999; Parent-Thirion et al.,
2007; Appelbaum and Berg, 1997;
Ichniowski et al., 1996) include
greater workers' 'autonomy' in set-
ting the pace and methods of work
as well as the flattening of hierarch-
ical structure and command chains,
which play a crucial role by moving
decision-making closer to workers,
thus allowing them to make use of
their specific knowledge and experi-
ence of their own job in order to
design their tasks in the most effec-
tive way. 
By enhancing communication and
information sharing - among workers
and between workers and manage-
ment - new work practices create the
conditions for teamwork, and task
rotation or multi-tasking. Multi-
tasking, together with the increasing
use of information and communica-
tion technologies (ICTs), enriches job
content, leading to more complex
and less repetitive tasks with greater
cognitive demands for discretionary
efforts at problem solving.  
New work practices also include total
quality management (TQM) methods,
which focus on continuous product
quality improvements, customer sat-
isfaction and prompt product deliv-
ery, and just-in-time methods, which
emphasise swift responsiveness of
production processes to market
changes through, for instance, short-
er delivery times, minimisation of
buffer stocks of products and 
rapid response to changes in taste
(Askenazy and Caroli, 2006). 
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Chart 33: Impact of work on health 
– employees in the EU in 2005
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Chart 34: The work-life balance 
– employees in the EU in 2005
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Chart 35: Satisfaction with working conditions 
– employees in the EU in 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
These innovative workplace systems
are often accompanied by comple-
mentary human resource manage-
ment policies (see Section 3.5.6),
such as increased provision of 
training as well as incentive-based
compensation plans (Black et al.,
2003)
33
.
Innovative forms of work organisa-
tion should enhance productivity…
The theory of 'high-performance'
work organisations predicts that such
practices increase firms' productivity
through their effect on workers'
behaviour. Specifically, they encour-
age workers both to work harder, by
making their job more interesting
and rewarding, and to work smarter,
by allowing them to express and
share their views and experience,
participate in decision-making and
define their tasks accordingly (Appel-
baum and Batt, 1994).
…both by making firms more effi-
cient directly…
On the other hand, they should also
enhance a firm's performance - at a
given level of workers' involvement -
by improving the efficiency of the
production process
34
(Ichniowski et
al., 1996; Levine, 1995; Appelbaum et
al., 2000). 
…and by their effects on workers'
behaviour
As regards behavioural and motiva-
tion effects, a richer job content and
greater autonomy in carrying out
tasks are expected to have positive
effects on productivity, and decrease
absenteeism and turnover rates
(Hackman and Oldham, 1980
35
;
Appelbaum and Berg, 1997). 
A complementary explanation for
the existence of positive motivation
effects is based on the concept of
procedural utility, which means that
individuals care not only about the
outcomes usually considered in eco-
nomic theory (e.g. pay and hours of
work), but also about the conditions
and processes leading to such out-
comes (Frey and Stutzer, 2002)
36
.
According to this idea, all the rest
being equal, workers prefer auton-
omy and networking to being subject
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33 The main feature of these 'high-performance' practices is the change from a Tayloristic work organisation, characterised by task specialisation, a pyram-
idal hierarchical structure, and a centralisation of responsibilities, to a holistic organisation featuring flat hierarchical structures, job rotation, self-
responsible teams, multitasking, a greater involvement of lower level of employees in decision-making, and the replacement of vertical by horizontal
communication channels (Bauer, 2004). However, the large number of terms used to designate these new forms of work organisation reflects both the
diversity of such practices and a lack of consensus on the set of work practices that characterise these new forms of work organisation (Ichniowski et
al., 1996; Bélanger, 2000).
34 Examples of such effects are: job rotation, which reduces the costs of absenteeism; flatter hierarchical structures, which reduce the number of super-
visors; and training, which increases the returns of ICT investments.
35 The job characteristics model (Hackman and Oldham, 1980) identifies five core task attributes as factors leading to increased motivation and job satis-
faction: i) the job requires different skills (skill variety); ii) the job requires completion of an identifiable piece of work (task identity); iii) the job has a
significant impact on others (task significance); iv) the job provides the worker with discretion and independence (autonomy); and v) the job provides
the worker with information about performance (feedback).
36 This is related to the research on the measurement of 'happiness' seen as a comprehensive and thereby more meaningful measure of well-being than
traditional measures based on income and leisure (Layard, 2005).
to a traditional Tayloristic pyramidal
decision-making structure. There-
fore, 'high-performance' organisa-
tions should have a positive effect
on job satisfaction to the extent
that they flatten hierarchical 
structures, giving workers more con-
trol over their work as well as
enriching its content by making it
more complex and intellectually
challenging
37
. 
Moreover, organisational theory
underlines that workers have infor-
mation and knowledge about their
jobs, which management does not
have. Therefore high involvement
and high participation practices are
also justified as a way to allow work-
ers to use this information in order to
improve the efficiency of the produc-
tion process and the quality of prod-
ucts (Bailey, 1993). 
3.3. The effects of
flexible work practices
More flexible work organisation
tends to improve firm's performance
An extensive body of empirical litera-
ture suggests that new forms of work
organisation have positive effects on
various performance indicators (Ich-
niowski et al., 1996; Becker and
Huselid, 1998; Bauer, 2003). Increas-
ing product-market competition
leads firms to adopt 'better' manage-
ment practices, which are significant-
ly associated with higher productiv-
ity, profitability, sales growth rates,
firm-survival rates and product qual-
ity (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2006a).
38
However such empirical tests are
often subject to a number 
of methodological caveats and so
their results need to be taken with
great caution. These caveats concern
the measurement and specification 
of variables associated with 
high-performance work-organisation
(HPWO) practices, the assessment of
the magnitude of their effects (Becker
and Huselid, 1998), the understand-
ing of the processes by which HPWO
practices impact on firms' perform-
ance (Edwards and Wright, 2001),
and the correction of potential
sources of estimation bias, which
make it difficult to establish robust
causal relationships or to generalise
results across firms and industries
(Bauer, 2003
39
; Cappelli and Neumark,
2001a).   
…but can they provide win-win solu-
tions for both workers and firms?
More problematic is the link between
such flexible practices and the well-
being of workers. The question arises
whether increasing organisational
flexibility, being mainly driven by the
interests of the employers, might
eventually be detrimental for work-
ers or whether, instead, innovative
practices can be designed and imple-
mented in such a way as to provide
'win-win' solutions for both firms and
employees (Berg and Kalleberg,
2002; Bélanger, 2000).
The analysis carried out in this chap-
ter assesses the links between a num-
ber of new work practices and HRM
policies and a selected few outcome
variables, such as work intensity, per-
ceived physical and mental health 
of workers, and the degree of satis-
faction with working conditions. 
Theoretical arguments highlight
both positive and negative effects of
HPWO practices and HRM policies on
workers' health, and job satisfaction,
therefore not allowing for clear-cut
results.
New work practices may increase job
satisfaction… 
As argued above (see 3.2), innovative
forms of work organisation com-
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Chart 38: Satisfaction with working conditions 
– employees in 2005
Source: European Foundation, Fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
37 Evidence that supports this hypothesis is provided by Frey et al. (2002), who compare the job-satisfaction of self-employed and dependent employees
using data from Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. They show that individuals value independence and dislike hierarchy over and above
the outcomes associated with the employment status.
38 The quality of management concept used by Bloom and Van Reenen (2006a) is a broad concept comprising both aspects related to new forms of work
organisation and human resource management policies.
39 Bauer (2003) suggests that some empirical work yielding positive effects of HPWO practices on labour efficiency may be misleading due to three poten-
tial sources of bias: i) unobserved heterogeneity in cross-section studies (omitted variable bias); ii) potential endogeneity of HPWO; and iii) hetero-
geneity in the returns from HPWO, making the generalisation of results across industries and countries problematic. Bauer's analysis – based on panel
data for Germany – makes use of a number of techniques to correct for different sources of bias. Results show positive effects of HPWO on productiv-
ity, but no increase in labour efficiency because the increase in labour productivity is accompanied by a rise in wages. This in turn implies that the effects
on employment of HPWO are expected to be small. Cappelli and Neumark (2001a) also address methodological problems in estimations. Their results
suggest that work practices transferring power to employees tend to raise both productivity and labour costs, leading to a no-net-effect on labour effi-
ciency.
 
bined with complementary HRM pol-
icies should make the job more inter-
esting and rewarding, and increase
trust among colleagues and between
employees and management. This
should, in turn, enhance job satisfac-
tion and boost perceived well-being
of workers (Handel and Levine, 2006;
Appelbaum et al., 2000; Bauer, 2004;
Appelbaum and Batt, 1994). More-
over, emphasis on product quality,
optimisation of the production
process and improvement of infor-
mation flows should decrease the risk
of production failures and work acci-
dents, thereby leading to diminished
stress and work-related health prob-
lems
40
(Askenazy and Caroli, 2006).
…but they may also intensify work
pace and increase health-related
problems
A strand of the literature highlights
the risk that innovative forms of
work organisation may lead to a
deterioration in working conditions.
Continuous product quality improve-
ment
41
and the reduction of slack
time, which is a consequence of the
optimisation of the production
process
42
, may lead to an 'intensifica-
tion of work pace'
43
(Green, 2004b;
Green and Tsitsianis, 2004). Also job
rotation, greater task complexity and
increased responsibility may lead to
'higher stress, mental strain and job
dissatisfaction' (Bauer, 2004; Berg
and Kalleberg, 2002; Askenazy and
Caroli, 2003; Conti and Gill, 1998).
Teamwork may decrease an individ-
ual's control over his/her own job,
thereby triggering 'greater pressure
and conflict' with colleagues (Handel
and Levine, 2006; Askenazy and Car-
oli, 2003).   
A higher risk of work-related acci-
dents and illnesses may result from
new forms of work organisation due
to higher work intensity and greater
emphasis on quality which distracts
workers' attention from safety (Aske-
nazy and Caroli, 2003; Brenner and
Fairris, 2001). Moreover, job rotation
may prevent workers from develop-
ing safe work routines which are
associated with more stable job tasks
(Askenazy and Caroli, 2006).
Evidence confirms conflicting impact
of HPWO on working conditions  
Empirical analysis on these issues is
more limited than on the impact on
firms' performance (Bauer, 2004;
Bélanger, 2000). United States-based
investigations (Freeman et al., 2000;
Appelbaum et al., 2000) and similar
analysis on Canadian data (Godard,
2001) seem to find positive effects of
HPWO on self-reported job satisfac-
tion. Some evidence in the same
direction has been also provided for
the EU, based on the 2000 third wave
of the European Foundation's EWCS
(Bauer, 2004)
44
. This suggests that
greater autonomy, participation in
decision making and improved com-
munication can enhance trust, com-
mitment to the organisation, intrinsic
rewards and satisfaction from work,
and therefore innovative work
organisations can improve productiv-
ity without necessarily deteriorating
workers' welfare.
However, empirical evidence also
shows that HPWO may lead to greater
work effort and intensity. In particular,
practices such as quality norms, mini-
misation of buffer stocks, job rotation
and peer pressure within teams may
be associated with work intensifica-
tion, increased mental strain (Lewchuc
and Robertson, 1996; Brenner et al.,
2001; Askenazy and Caroli, 2006) as
well as a greater risk of health prob-
lems and work accidents (Brenner and
Fairris, 2001; Askenazy, 2001; Askenazy
and Caroli, 2003)
45
. 
A few words of caution are warrant-
ed here. In this type of research, it is
difficult to identify the direction of
causality. It is, for example, not clear
whether HPWO practices increase job
satisfaction or whether firms where
employees start with a high level of
job satisfaction can more easily adopt
HPWO practices. Furthermore, it
seems to be important to control for
wages, otherwise the estimates may
suffer from the omitted variable bias.
Win-win solutions can be reached by
combining employers' work demands
with employees' control over their
work
Empirical evidence seems to suggest
that no general conclusions can be
drawn on the impact of HPWO prac-
tices on workers' well-being. Existing
evidence suggests that the way
innovative work practices are designed
and implemented determines whether
they have a beneficial or detrimental
effect on employees' well-being. Prac-
tices that impose greater demands and
pressures on workers (such as just-in-
time, quality improvement, job rota-
tion, greater task complexity) without
simultaneously providing workers with
an increased control over their work
(by means of autonomy, participation
in decision–making and better com-
munication) may deteriorate their job
conditions (Green, 2004a; Green and
145
Chapter 3 Working time, work organisation and internal flexibility – flexicurity models in the EU
40 Monotonous and repetitive tasks may reduce alertness due to boredom and so increase the risk of workplace accidents. Hence a more diversified and
challenging job should be associated with higher job safety (Askenazy and Caroli, 2003).
41 Through the adoption, for instance, of total quality management methods.
42 Such as in the so-called ‘just-in-time methods’.
43 Green (2004b) argues that new forms of work organisation lead to greater work effort by two different channels. On the one hand, new practices
allow for tighter control of the work process by management so that inefficient workers can be traced back more easily. On the other hand, they yield
efficiency gains which can be fully reaped only if workers are motivated to increase their work effort.
44 Sponsored by the European Foundation, secondary analysis based on the 2005 fourth wave of the EWCS is currently ongoing. 
45 Based on an establishment-level survey, Brenner and Fairris (2001) find that quality circles are associated with higher risk of repeated traumas. 
Askenazy (2001) finds that total quality management methods increase the probability of work-related accidents and illnesses both in manufacturing
and in services. Askenazy and Caroli (2003) use data from a French survey on working conditions and find that the adoption of quality norms and job 
rotation enhance the risk of work accidents while, interestingly, autonomy does not have any significant impact. They also find rotation and quality
norms to be associated with indicators of mental strain.
Tsitsianis, 2004
46
). This is illustrated by
Karasek (1998) who develops the so-
called demand/control model accord-
ing to which the level of job strain and
work-related illnesses result from the
combination of two features of work
organisation: firstly, the psychological
demands on the worker (i.e. how hard
he/she has to work); and secondly, the
'decision latitude' (i.e. discretion)
granted to the worker in order to cope
with those demands. The best combi-
nations are obtained in active learning
organisations, where both demands
and control on the job are high. Such
organisational type allows workers to
cope with the job's challenges by
means of direct actions and effective
problem solving. 
The effects of new forms of work
organisation and/or good manage-
ment practices on the work-life bal-
ance have also been recently evaluat-
ed (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2006b;
Parent-Thirion et al., 2007). However,
no consensus seems to emerge regard-
ing the impact of new forms of work
organisation or the quality of manage-
ment on the work-life balance. Using
an international survey on medium-
sized manufacturing firms, Bloom and
Van Reenen (2006b) reject the view
that tougher competition reduces the
work-life balance. On the contrary, the
authors find that: i) work-life out-
comes are positively correlated with
better management, so that well-run
firms are both more productive and
offer better conditions for their
employees; and ii) tougher competi-
tion increases average management
quality but does not negatively affect
employees' working environment. 
3.3.1. Functional flexibility
and job stability
Internal and external flexibility may
substitute for each other…
Within the flexicurity debate, it is
important to assess the implications of
flexible workplace practices on the sta-
bility of jobs. Arguments can be put
forward to support the hypothesis that
internal and external flexibility are to
some extent substitutes. This would
mean that firms can adapt to changes
in product demand or technology,
either via reorganisation and realloca-
tion of a skilled workforce (i.e. being
'functionally' flexible) or by relying on
layoffs of workers whose skills are
obsolete and a larger use of 'contin-
gent' workers, such as fixed-term and
temporary (Cappelli and Neumark,
2001b; Atkinson, 1984). A parallel
argument (Kochan and Osterman,
1994; Osterman, 2000) highlights that
innovative work practices need work-
ers' commitment and active participa-
tion to trigger productivity improve-
ments, which will not arise if workers
feel that their suggestions and efforts
may threaten their jobs. Hence, firms
need to promise employment security
in order to make innovative practices
successful. These arguments were ori-
ginally made in the context of the
organisational model of large Japan-
ese firms, which combine lifetime
employment with flexible manage-
ment of the workforce (via job rota-
tion and other practices) to adapt to
cyclical and competitive conditions. 
…or they may be combined in order
to enhance a firm's adaptability
However, an alternative view points
to potential complementarities
between internal versus external
flexibility, saying that firms may find
it more efficient to combine both
types of flexible strategies in order to
enhance competitiveness and adapt-
ability. 
Empirical evidence is mixed…
Empirical evidence on the impact of
new forms of work organisation on
job stability is quite limited and tends
to deliver mixed results. Based on two
waves of an American employer-
based survey, Osterman (2000) finds
that the adoption of HPWO practices
raises firms' future layoff rates. Using
American data, Cappelli and Neumark
(2001b) investigate the link between
flexible work organisations, and vol-
untary and involuntary work turnover
(i.e. quits plus layoffs), finding that
internal flexibility reduces turnover in
manufacturing. Batt (2000) looks at a
sample of sales departments in the
American telecommunications indus-
try and finds that high involvement
practices, such as self-managed
teams, are associated with lower vol-
untary turnover of employees. Based
on a sample of Canadian firms, Moris-
sette and Rosa (2003) underline the
importance of sectoral differences,
concluding that HPWO practices are
more effective in reducing quit rates
in high-skill services. 
…and firms' restructuring may trig-
ger both layoffs and new work prac-
tices 
Firms in times of crisis may be more
willing to implement HPWO practices
because both the opportunity cost of
implementing such measures and the
resistance of the workforce to their
introduction are lower.
3.4. Typologies of work
organisation in Europe
3.4.1. Work practices need 
to be complementary 
to be effective
The theoretical discussion (Amable,
2003; MacDuffie, 1995) highlights the
existence of important complemen-
tarities between different work
organisation practices, so that the
performance of a firm can be
enhanced only if a coherent set or
'bundle' of practices is in place. 
Training and contingent pay support
work practices relying on workers'
efforts…
In particular, the synergies between
work organisation practices and
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46 Green (2004a) and Green and Tsitsianis (2004) investigate the reason for the fall in perceived job satisfaction in the United Kingdom in the 1990s. They
conclude that this can be accounted for by a parallel move towards work intensification and declining opportunities for task discretion at work.
human resource management pol-
icies should be explored in order to
lever out the desired motivational
and efficiency effects (Holmstrom
and Milgrom, 1994). In fact, the
forms of work organisation which call
for continuing learning, problem-
solving capabilities and active partici-
pation in decision making on the part
of the employees risk being ineffec-
tive if not accompanied by support-
ing HRM policies. The latter should
reward employees' discretionary
efforts and new ideas on the job (e.g.
by means of performance-based pay
systems), or help them acquire the
necessary skills, through larger
investments in training (Bailey, 1993;
Becker and Huselid, 1998; Ichniowski
et al., 1997; Levine and Tyson, 1990).
The empirical literature tends to lend
support to the hypothesis that sys-
tems of complementary organisation
and HRM policies tend to increase
firms' production (Ichniowski et al.,
1997; Ichniowski et al., 1996; Becker
and Huselid, 1998; Appelbaum et al.,
2000). Caroli and van Reenen (2001)
provide evidence that innovative
work organisations are complemen-
tary with highly skilled workers, a
notion which they term 'skill-biased
organisational change', signalling
the need to couple innovative work
practices with strengthened on-the-
job training.
…but work organisation also needs
to match the market's features and
business strategy
However, systems of work practices do
not only need to be consistent with
each other (what is often referred to
as 'internal fit', see Ichniowski et al.,
1997; Becker and Huselid, 1998) but
also to be aligned with other factors
such as the overall firm's structural and
production features, as well as its com-
petitive strategy and market environ-
ment ('external fit', see MacDuffie,
1995). Accordingly, a firm's strategy of
organisational change is influenced by
a number of structural economic vari-
ables, such as sector, establishment size
and the occupational distribution of
the workforce (OECD, 1999; Lorenz
and Valery, 2005). 
3.4.2. A typology of work
organisation in Europe 
EU Member States have adopted dif-
ferent work organisation models…
Using 2000 data from the third wave
of the EWCS, Lorenz and Valeyre
(2003) find evidence supporting the
institutional complementarities
hypothesis. By combining factor
analysis with clustering
47
, they pro-
pose a typology of four forms of
work organisation in Europe, which
are labelled as:
• learning
• lean
• Taylorist
• traditional
In this context, 'high-performance'
organisations can be loosely identi-
fied with the 'learning' and 'lean'
forms.
The learning form represents 39%
of employees. It is characterised by
high levels of autonomy, task com-
plexity, learning and problem solv-
ing; and by low levels of task
monotony, work-rate constraints,
teamwork and job rotation (Table 7).
The lean form accounts for 28% of
employees. It is characterised by
high levels of teamwork, job rota-
tion, and learning and problem
solving; and by low levels of auton-
omy and tight quantitative produc-
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47 Following the so-called Tandem Approach (Nardo et al., 2005), they apply to 15 organisational variables, a multiple correspondence analysis (MCA)
folowed by hierarchical clustering (HC).
Table 7: Work organisation clusters
(% of employees in each cluster)
Learning Lean production Taylorism Traditional organisation All
organisation
Autonomy fixing work methods 89.1 51.8 17.7 46.5 61.7
Autonomy setting work rate 87.5 52.2 27.3 52.7 63.6
Learning new things in work 93.9 81.7 42.0 29.7 71.4
Problem solving activities 95.4 98.0 5.7 68.7 79.3
Complexity of tasks 79.8 64.7 23.8 19.2 56.7
Responsibility for quality control 86.4 88.7 46.7 38.9 72.6
Quality norms 78.1 94.0 81.1 36.1 74.4
Teamwork 64.3 84.2 70.1 33.4 64.2
Job rotation 44.0 70.5 53.2 27.5 48.9
Monotony of tasks 19.5 65.8 65.6 43.9 42.4
Repetitiveness of tasks 12.8 41.9 37.1 19.2 24.9
Horizontal contraints on work rate 43.6 80.3 66.1 27.8 53.1
Hierarchical constraints on work rate 19.6 64.4 66.5 26.7 38.9
Norm-based constraints on work rate 21.2 75.5 56.3 14.7 38.7
Automatic constraints on work rate 5.4 59.8 56.9 7.2 26.7
Note: Table from Lorenz and Valeyre (2003).
Source: Third European Working Condition Survey (2000).
tion norms. The Taylorist form
accounts for 14% of employees. Its
characteristics are basically the
opposite of those defining the
learning model. Finally, the tradi-
tional form represents 19% of
employees. It is a residual category
that cannot be well characterised,
although it is associated with high
levels of task monotony. 
The results suggest that the learning
and lean organisational forms repre-
sent about two-thirds of the total
and that there are significant inter-
national differences in the preva-
lence of these advanced forms of
work organisation. The learning
form is more prevalent in the
Netherlands, the Nordic countries
and to a lesser extent Germany and
Austria. The lean form has a greater
presence in the United Kingdom,
Spain, Ireland and, to a lesser extent,
France (Table 8).
A major difference between the
learning and lean organisational
forms is that while both emphasise
the importance of promoting learn-
ing and problem solving on the part
of employees, the learning model of
work organisation is characterised by
a low level of teamwork and job
rotation, but displays a high degree
of employee autonomy in decision-
making. 
…and this is due to national factors
rather than different production
structures 
Lorenz and Valeyre (2005) also find
that the prevalence of different work
organisation models across EU Mem-
ber States cannot be exclusively
explained by different production
structures, measured by sector, occu-
pation, or the distribution of firms by
size or by different degrees of spe-
cialisation in the high technology
segment. Furthermore they find that
country effects play a significant role
in accounting for those differences. 
Organisations giving more discretion
to workers are more able to innovate
Lorenz and Valeyre (2003) and Arun-
del et al. (2006) suggest that there
are systemic links between the way
work is organised in a firm and its
capacity to innovate. Based on their
typology of work organisation 
models, they highlight that the
learning model is correlated with
the development of leading/innova-
tive technologies, while the lean
model is associated with preferences
for the adaptation/modification of
existing technologies. The positive
correlations between the learning
model and the frequency of leading
innovators provides support for the
hypothesis developed in the litera-
ture (Lam, 2005; Jensen et al., 2007)
that forms of work organisation
characterised by high levels of 
workers' discretion and by problem
solving create the necessary knowl-
edge base for the development of
new technologies.
Finally, they also provide evidence
that forms of work organisation
requiring considerable discretion and
problem-solving activity on the part
of employees tend to go together
with larger firms' investments in con-
tinuing vocational training. 
Similarly, Greenan et al. (2007)
48
argue that work organisation plays
a central role in the process of pro-
duction and absorption of new
technologies. 
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Table 8: National differences in organisational models 
(% of employees in each cluster)
Learning organisation Lean production Advanced forms Taylorism Traditional organisation
(1) (2) (1)+(2)
Belgium 38.9 25.1 64.0 13.9 22.1
Denmark 60.0 21.9 81.9 6.8 11.3
Germany 44.3 19.6 63.9 14.3 21.9
Greece 18.7 25.6 44.3 28.0 27.7
Italy 30.0 23.6 53.6 20.9 25.4
Spain 20.1 38.8 58.9 18.5 22.5
France 38.0 33.3 71.3 11.1 17.7
Ireland 24.0 37.8 61.8 20.7 17.6
Luxembourg 42.8 25.4 68.2 11.9 20.0
Netherlands 64.0 17.2 81.2 5.3 13.5
Portugal 26.1 28.1 54.2 23.0 22.8
United Kingdom 34.8 40.6 75.4 10.9 13.7
Finland 47.8 27.6 75.4 12.5 12.1
Sweden 52.6 18.5 71.1 7.1 21.7
Austria 47.5 21.5 69.0 13.1 18.0
EU-15 39.1 28.2 67.3 13.6 19.1
Source: Third European Working Condition Survey (2000).
Note: Table from Lorenz and Valeyre (2003).
48 A multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) is performed on a set of organisational variables, using the 2000 wave of the EWCS, to propose a taxonomy
of work organisation for EU Member States.
3.5. Evidence on new
work organisation
practices in the EU
Using data from the fourth wave of
the EWCS (2005), this section pro-
vides some descriptive evidence on
the incidence of new work organisa-
tion practices and human resource
management policies across the EU,
together with the results of a number
of probit
49
estimations. 
The descriptive analysis covers the
following aspects: 
• workers' autonomy
• task rotation
• teamwork
• work-rate constraints
• cognitive dimensions of work
(task complexity, learning and
problem solving)
• communication structures at work.
A note of caution is warranted con-
cerning descriptive analysis based on
simple correlations because they
often suffer from the well-known
problem of the omitted variable bias.
Therefore all statements made in this
section based on simple correlations
should not be used to infer causal
relationships. 
A number of probit regressions are
estimated to assess the correlations
between work organisation practices
and performance-based pay, pace of
work, health risks, work-life balance
and job satisfaction, respectively
50
.
These regressions control for wages -
using deciles– worker and establish-
ment characteristics, work organisa-
tion practices, and human resource
management policies. Results are
interpreted according to the hypothe-
ses commonly formulated by HPWO
and HRM theories. The reported coef-
ficients represent marginal effects and
not odds ratios
51
. 
Flexible work practices are quite
common across the EU-15…
The four waves of the EWCS (1990,
1995, 2000, and 2005) covering the
EU-15, give a time perspective for the
evolution of HPWO. Data for the new
Member States is only available for
the years 2001 and 2005. Chart 39
and 40 (see page 150) illustrate the
time patterns for the proportion of
workers involved in a number of new
work practices.
Chart 39 suggests that new work
practices are quite widespread in the
EU-15, particularly in meeting quality
standards, which in 2005 involved
around three-quarters of all workers,
workers' autonomy which involves
60-70% of all workers, and complex
tasks which concerned around 60%
of all workers. Adoption of team-
work and task rotation is somewhat
more limited involving slightly more
than half and 40% of all workers,
respectively. 
…and their adoption took place
mostly in the 1980s and early 1990s
(as in the US)
No clear overall time pattern emerges
for the evolution of work organisation
practices. Autonomy is somewhat on
the decline (after having increased
between 1990 and 1995), while quality
standards and task complexity have
first decreased and then increased.
These findings are in line with those of
Greenan et al. (2007) who, using syn-
thetic indicators based on EWCS fig-
ures, explore trends of work organisa-
tion change in the EU-15 between
1995 and 2000. They conclude that
complexity, learning opportunities and
discretion at work have decreased
between 1995 and 2000. 
The fact that various waves of the
EWCS do not show evidence of an
increase in the incidence of new work
practices suggests that their diffusion
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49 Probit models are part of a class of models that allow a combination of categorical and continuous independent variables to predict a dichotomous
dependent variable.
50 Chapter 4 of this report includes a similar probit analysis on the correlations of work organisation with training provided by the employer. 
51 An odds ratio indicates how the odd of observing Y=1 changes when X changes from 0 to 1 (equal to 1 if no change).
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Chart 39: Evolution of flexible forms of work organisation, EU-15
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
took place mainly between the 1980s
to the mid-1990s. The available evi-
dence suggests a relatively large pen-
etration of new work practices
already in the mid to late 1990s
across EU Member States, although
with significant cross-country differ-
ences. Evidence supporting this argu-
ment is relatively more detailed for
the United Kingdom (Green, 2004b;
ILO, 2002
52
) but is also available for
other EU Member States from a num-
ber of international comparisons
(MacDuffie and Pil, 1999; OECD,
1999; ILO, 2002; Askenazy and Caroli,
2003
53
). The incidence of these new
practices across Europe is more pro-
nounced in Nordic countries, and the
evidence also suggests that in some
cases Japan and Europe rank higher
than the United States.
54
Graph 40 suggests that in the 12 new
Member States which have joined the
EU since 2004 the extent that new
organisational forms have been adopt-
ed is quantitatively similar to that in
the EU-15. New work practices seem to
be on the rise in new Member States,
particularly quality standards, complex
tasks and task rotation.
OECD (1999) points out that a number
of firms' characteristics, such as size
and sector, may have an impact on the
likelihood of adopting new organisa-
tional practices. Larger establishments
tend to implement flexible practices to
a greater extent than smaller ones,
although the difference is not dramat-
ic. Chart 41 shows that the share of
workers involved in such practices
increases with firm size, with a more
pronounced increase for task complex-
ity and on-the-job learning. 
Larger firms may be more able to
exploit economies of scale in the set-
up of new forms of work organisation
and to support their costs. Further-
more, smaller firms may be, by their
nature, less hierarchical and more
informal, thereby making the adop-
tion of flexible practices less necessary. 
The remainder of this section presents
cross-country evidence on the diffu-
sion of new work practices across EU
Member States drawn from the most
recent wave of the EWCS (2005). 
3.5.1. Autonomy at work
The EWCS includes a large number of
indicators on autonomy/discretion at
work. In this section, the following
three indicators are considered.
Workers were asked about the possi-
bility to choose autonomously: 
• the order of tasks to be carried
out at work (Q24a);
• the methods of work (Q24b);
• the speed or rate of work (Q24c). 
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52 Green (2004b) considers three innovative practices, i.e. just-in-time production methods, total quality management and teamwork, arguing that each
of them has been adopted by at least 7 out of every 10 UK manufacturing sites by 1996. The ILO (2002) report results from the EPOC (Employee Direct
Participation in Organisational Change) study as well as from the Institute of Personnel and Development (IPD) training and development survey, which
illustrate an extensive use of individual flexible practices among British organisations.
53 OECD (1999) compares international figures drawn from the EPOC study and other sources which tend to refer to the mid-1990s and concludes that
'...there is a group of large firms in Europe which use flexible working practices to a roughly similar extent to large firms in North America'. Askenazy
and Caroli, (2003) point out that diffusion of HPWO has been rapid in France over the 1990s, reaching a level comparable to the one characterising the
United States in the early 1990s.
54 OECD (1999) suggests that significant cross-country variations exist in the uptake of flexible practices, including within the EU, and that, for instance,
job rotation is more frequent in EU Nordic countries and Germany, together with Japan, than in the United States. 
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Chart 40: Evolution of flexible forms of work organisation, New Member States
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
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Chart 41: Flexible work organisation by establishment size EU-27, 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
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55 Following a similar analysis carried out in the report of the fourth EWCS (Parent-Thirion et al., 2007), figures for autonomy as well as for other work prac-
tices in most of the remainder of this section are calculated using data for employees only. The self-employed are excluded because they tend to have
much different patterns of involvement in such practices (e.g. they enjoy much higher autonomy or do not participate in teamwork or task rotation).
56 These follow-up questions have only been put to the workers who say that they are involved in task rotation. 
57 As a percentages of the total number of workers.
58 As regards the choice of team leader, the decrease in incidence rates is not necessarily surprising. Even in organisations with flat hierarchical structures,
the management may prefer not to let workers decide for themselves on the team leader. For example, if a team leader receives a higher wage because
of his/her higher responsibility, the firm could use this wage differential as an incentive mechanism, requiring management (and not workers) to decide
on the appointment. Furthermore, a firm may have an incentive to provide their workers with a career path, which becomes more difficult in flat hier-
archies. The post of team leader can then be used as a substitute for a career path in flat hierarchical structures. 
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Chart 42: Autonomy at work (by country, 2005)
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
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Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
Table 9:
Pearson correlation coefficients between the three indicators 
of autonomy at work drawn from the EWCS:
Methods of work Order of tasks Speed of work
Methods of work 1 0.76 (***) 0.64 (***)
Order of tasks - 1 0.55 (***)
Speed of work - - 1
Source: DG EMPL calculations. 
(***) statistically significant at 1%
3.5.2. Task rotation and
teamwork 
Chart 43 shows the percentage of
workers rotating tasks with col-
leagues. Values range from a high of
almost 80% in Slovenia, and around
70% in the Netherlands and Den-
mark, to less than 40% in Spain,
France and Luxembourg, and around
30% in Portugal and Hungary. The
survey questionnaire uses follow-up
questions that allow qualifying the
kind of task rotation prevailing in dif-
ferent countries, namely do the tasks
require different skills (Q26a1), and
whether workers' teams are
autonomous in deciding the division
of tasks (Q26a2).
56
Graph 43 shows
also the percentage of workers rotat-
ing tasks that are involved in more
advanced forms of rotation.
57
Den-
mark, the Netherlands and Sweden
have the highest shares of workers
involved in 'advanced' forms of task
rotation, while in countries such as
Slovenia, Greece, Cyprus and Poland,
involvement in advanced forms of
task rotation is much lower.
Chart 44 (see page 152) plots the per-
centage of workers working in teams,
showing a large diversity across the
EU. Similar to the questions on task
rotation, the EWCS includes two fol-
low-up questions, namely on the
degree of autonomy granted to teams
with respect to the division of tasks,
and on the selection of their leader
(Q26B.1). The corresponding national
values are shown in Chart 44 (see page
152) and suggest that, by focusing on
autonomous teams, incidence rates
are greatly reduced in the EU. More-
over the national ranking is extensive-
ly modified with Sweden and Finland
moving to the top. Denmark and 
Austria also move to the high end of
the range.
58
Chart 42 illustrates that EU Member
States differ significantly in the extent
to which workers have leeway to carry
out their duties.
55
The data shows a rel-
atively strong positive correlation
across all the three indicators (Table 9). 
 
Chart 45 plots data on all forms of
task rotation and teamwork, suggest-
ing the existence of complementari-
ties across different flexible work-
place practices. 
Chart 46 plots data on advanced
forms of task rotation and teamwork
only, i.e. those that require different
skills and team autonomy to decide
the division of tasks.
59
3.5.3. Determinants 
of the pace of work
The EWCS also includes a set of ques-
tions on the factors that determine
the pace of work in European work-
places. Among others, such questions
capture the extent to which the work
pace is determined by the automatic
speed of a machine (Q21d), which can
be labelled the 'industrial constraint',
or the direct demands of people
(Q21b), such as customers or services
users, which can be labelled the 'mar-
ket constraint'. Chart 47 (see page
154) plots these two determinants of
the pace of work across the EU. 
Chart 47 (see page 154) suggests that
the direct demands of people play a
large part in determining work pace
across European countries, ranging
from less than 50% to around 70-
80%. On the other hand, industrial
constraints play a much less impor-
tant role ranging from less than 15%
to between 25% and 30%. Chart 47
(see page 154) also suggests the exis-
tence of a negative correlation
between the incidence of market (on
the vertical axis) and industrial con-
straints (on the horizontal axis), i.e.
countries where market constraints
are more prevalent tend to have a
lower fraction of workers affected by
the speed of machines and vice versa. 
Chart 48 (see page 154) plots the
shares of workers affected by the
direct demands of people and by the
direct control of a superior across EU
Member States. A negative relation-
ship seems to emerge, which is in line
with the notion that flexible work-
place practices reduce the number of
hierarchical levels. 
Table 10 presents selected results of
probit estimates for the industrial
and market determinants of the pace
of work
60
, controlling for worker and
establishment characteristics, work
organisation practices and including
country-fixed effects.
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Chart 44: Team work by country, 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
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Chart 45: Task rotation and team work by country, 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
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Chart 46: 'Advanced' forms of task rotation and team work by country, 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
59 Chart 45 and 46 reproduce similar material in the Parent-Thirion et al. (2007).  
60 The sample used in each probit regression is the number of employees in the 27 EU Member States with valid answers. Complete tables with the esti-
mation results are presented in the data annex.
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Table 10: Determinants of the pace of work
Industrial constraints Market constraints
Endogenous Q21d Q21b
Hours usually worked per week in the main job 0.001 0.010***
Working time arrangements
(reference: set by the firm)
Arrangements with different degrees of flexibility: i) choice between -0.057 0.035  
different fixed schedules; ii) flexitime; iii) entirely free
Sector
(reference: manufacturing)
Agriculture. hunting. forestry. and fishing -0.249*** -0.385***
Mining and quarrying 0.082 -0.265*
Electricity. gas. and water -0.627*** 0.109
Construction -0.576*** 0.222***
Wholesale and retail trade -0.629*** 0.607***
Hotels and restaurants -0.657*** 0.651***
Transport. storage and communication -0.431*** 0.357***
Financial intermediation and insurance -0.637*** 0.401***
Real estate. renting and business activities -0.562*** 0.242***
Public administration and defence. compulsory social security -0.632*** 0.079
Education -1.158*** 0.520***
Health and social security -0.788*** 0.545***
Other community. social and personal service activities -0.694*** 0.300***
Enterprise size
(reference: medium enterprises)
Micro-enterprise (fewer than 10 employees) -0.218*** 0.274***
Small enterprises (10–49 employees) -0.146*** 0.166***
Large enterprises (250+ employees) -0.029 -0.129***
Gender
(reference: male)
Female -0.178*** 0.087***
(reference: blue-collar high-skill)
White-collar high-skill -0.332*** 0.368***
White-collar low-skill -0.341*** 0.468***
Blue-collar low-skill 0.082* 0.188***
Workplace practices
Job rotation 0.162*** 0.120***
Team work 0.120*** 0.083***
Training paid by employer -0.021 0.065**
Quality norms 0.428*** 0.104***
Responsability for quality control 0.059 0.074**
Problem solving activities 0.028 0.300***
Monotony of tasks 0.312*** -0.092***
Complexity of tasks 0.075 0.147***
Learning new things at work -0.016 0.142***
Discretion in fixing task order -0.177*** 0.037
Discretion in fixing work methods -0.095** 0.045
Discretion in setting work pace -0.102*** -0.008
Repetitiveness of tasks (10 minutes) 0.288*** 0.150***
Observations 12822 12854
Pseudo R-squared 0.238 0.132
Source: European Foundation's fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
Notes: *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%. 5% and 1%. respectively.
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The economic sector plays an import-
ant role. Industrial constraints basic-
ally determine the pace of work in
the manufacturing sector, whereas
market constraints play a more cen-
tral role in services. Firm size is also
important: small firms are less subject
to industrial constraints, but more to
market constraints (than medium-
size firms) whereas large firms are
less subject to market constraints
(than medium-size firms). The gender
variable enters with a significant
coefficient in the regressions, mainly
reflecting the sharply different gen-
der breakdowns between manufac-
turing and services. 
The central element of interest in
these regressions is the identification
of a number of work organisation
practices having a significant impact
on the determinants of the pace of
work. Job rotation, teamwork, qual-
ity norms, and the repetitiveness of
tasks tend to increase both industrial
and market constraints. However, the
results presented in Table 10 suggest
that advanced forms of functional
flexibility - characterised by problem-
solving activities, complex tasks and
learning new things at work - are
associated with a higher incidence of
market constraints, whereas basic
forms of functional flexibility – char-
acterised by low levels of discretion –
are associated with a higher frequency
of industrial constraints. 
3.5.4. Job content: task
complexity and problem
solving
New work practices imply greater
involvement of workers in decision-
making and discretionary efforts at
work. They change the nature of
workers' tasks, becoming less stand-
ardised but more demanding in terms
of problem-solving efforts by the
workers. At least three indicators on
the complexity and learning dimen-
sions are provided by the EWCS: i)
solving unforeseen problems on their
own (Q23c); ii) learning new things
(Q23f); and iii) carrying out complex
tasks (Q23e). Chart 49 illustrates the
nature of cognitive demands in the
workplace across EU Member States,
based on these three indicators. It sug-
gests that a majority of European
workers considers that the nature of
their jobs is quite sophisticated and
intellectually demanding. 
One would also expect to find a neg-
ative correlation between task
monotony and its complexity and/or
problem-solving demands. Chart 50
plots the percentage of workers solv-
ing unforeseen problems on their
own at work (Q23c) against carrying
out monotonous tasks (Q23d). It sug-
gests the existence of a negative cor-
relation across European countries,
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Chart 47: Determinants of work pace: market constraints vs.
industrial constraints by country, 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
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Chart 48: Determinants of work pace: direct demands from people vs.
control of boss by country, 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
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Chart 49: Cognitive dimensions of work by country, 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
i.e. countries where the job demands
greater problem-solving efforts are
also those where workers' tasks are
less monotonous. 
3.5.5. Communication
structures at work
The EWCS also provides information
on the extent of informal communica-
tion between workers and manage-
ment in European workplaces. Key
features of new forms of work organ-
isation, such as increased employees'
involvement in decision-making and
flatter hierarchies, should go hand in
hand with improved communication
and consultation channels between
workers and management. 
Chart 51 plots the percentage of
workers discussing their performance
with their superior (Q30a) against the
percentage of workers being consult-
ed on changes in work organisation
and working conditions (Q30b). This
chart shows a positive correlation
across EU Member States, suggesting
that a higher tendency to discuss
workers' performance with superiors
goes together with enhanced vertical
communication on other matters,
such as work organisation, working
conditions and general work-related
problems. 
3.5.6. Complementary HRM
policies: training and pay
The information in the EWCS can be
used to provide an illustration of the
complementarities between new
forms of work organisation and
human resource management pol-
icies, such as training and per-
formance-based pay.  
Chart 52 illustrates how the fre-
quency of receiving training paid by
the employer (Q28a) is affected by
different forms of work organisation.
It suggests an increase in the provi-
sion of training across all forms of
flexible work practices considered
(particularly complex tasks and team-
work), providing some support to the
hypothesis that the adoption of new
forms of work organisation tends to
enhance the need for training. Howev-
er, this relationship appears not to be
particularly strong since the percent-
ages increase on average from around
20% for the workers without flexible
practices to around 33% for the work-
ers involved in flexible practices. 
A more detailed analysis of the deter-
minants of training financed by firms
is carried out in the fourth chapter of
the present edition of EiE. Probit
equations are estimated to explain
the occurrence of training paid by
the employer, using regressor vari-
ables for worker and establishment
characteristics, together with indica-
tors for different work organisation
practices. The results suggest that the
main practices characterising the new
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Chart 50: Cognitive dimensions of work by country, 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
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Chart 51: Communication structures at work by country, 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
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Chart 52: Work organisation and training EU-27, 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
forms of work organisation, such as
teamwork, job rotation, discretion in
fixing the work methods and the
complexity of tasks have a positive
impact in raising the probability of
training being paid by the employer. 
Chart 53 plots the percentages of
workers receiving compensation
61
that
are at least partly based on company
performance (EF6) against different
forms of flexible work practices. The
presence of flexible practices tends to
increase the occurrence of perform-
ance-based compensation schemes.
This result could be driven by the high
take-up rates of profit sharing schemes
among managers and professionals,
which are also more likely to adopt
flexible work practices
62
.
A probit regression is estimated to
explain the occurrence of perform-
ance based pay schemes, either based
on the overall performance of the
firm (EF6g) or on the overall perform-
ance of a group (EF6h), using wages,
variables for worker and establish-
ment characteristics, different work
organisation practices, and country-
fixed effects as regressors.
An interesting result is that per-
formance-based schemes seem to be
positively associated with flexible
working-time arrangements, and with
a number of new work organisation
practices, such as job rotation, 
teamwork, responsibility for quality
control and learning new things at
work. This seems to confirm the 
theoretical hypothesis that new
forms of work organisation are asso-
ciated with complementary human
resource management policies. 
The probit regression in Table 11 (and
Table 3a in the annex, page 189) fur-
ther suggests that performance-
based pay schemes are more com-
mon: 
• in manufacturing than in services
• in larger than in smaller firms
• in age cohorts younger than 40
years
• for workers in the top half of the
wage distribution
• for white-collar/high-skill workers
63
. 
3.5.7. Work organisation,
work intensity and job
satisfaction
Data from the EWCS can be further
used to shed light on the evolution of
perceived work intensity in the EU.
Graph 54 is based on two intensity
indicators
64
: the speed of work
(Q20Ba), and whether the worker has
to cope with tight deadlines (Q20Bb).
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Chart 53: Work organisation and performance-based pay EU-27, 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
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Chart 54: Evolution of work intensity EU-15 and New Member States
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
61 Shares of workers involved in profit-sharing schemes never exceed 11-12%. 
62 See European Foundation (2007). 
63 See Table 3a in the annex for a complete list of regressors. Occupation categories are recoded as follows. ‘White-collar high-skill’: (isco1) ’Legislators, sen-
ior officials and managers’, (isco2) ‘Professionals’, and (isco3) ‘Technicians and associate professionals’. 
‘White-collar low-skill’: (isco4) ‘Clerks’, and (isco5) ‘Service workers, shop and market sales workers’. ‘Blue-collar low-skill’: (isco6) ‘Skilled agricultural and
fishery workers’, and (isco7) ‘Craft and related trades workers’.
64 The two intensity indicators are calculated by recoding question Q20Ba ‘Does your job involve working at very high speed?’, and question Q20Bb, 'Does
your job involve working to tight deadlines?' Individuals are classified as working at high speed or subject to tight deadlines if their answers fall in one
of the following four categories: all the time; almost all the time; around three-quarters of the time; around half of the time. Otherwise they are classi-
fied as not being subject to high work-speed or tight deadlines.
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Table 11: Performance-based pay schemes
Endogenous EF6g + EF6h
Hours usually worked per week in the main job 0.003
Working-time arrangements
(reference: set by the firm)
Arrangemets with different degrees of flexibility: i) choice between  different 0.258***
fixed schedules; ii) flexitime; iii) entirely free
Sector
(reference: manufacturing)
Agriculture. hunting. forestry. and fishing -0.284**
Mining and quarrying -0.022
Electricity, gas and water -0.032
Construction -0.186**
Wholesale and retail trade 0.079
Hotels and restaurants -0.376***
Transport. storage and communication -0.107
Financial intermediation and insurance 0.332***
Real estate. renting and business activities -0.115*
Public administration and defence. compulsory social security -1.069***
Education -1.194***
Health and social security -0.865***
Other community. social and personal service activities -0.335***
Enterprise size
(reference: medium enterprises)
Micro-enterprises (fewer than 10 employees) -0.222***
Small enterprises (10–49 employees) -0.069
Large enterprises (250+ employees) 0.220***
Age
(reference: between 25 and 39 years old)
Less than 24 years old -0.028
Between 40 and 54 years old -0.120***
55 years old and over -0.186***
Indefinite/non indefinite
(reference: indefinite contract)
Fixed-term contract -0.106*
Agency contract -0.619***
Job tenure
(reference: between 2 and 6 years of job tenure)
Less than one year of job tenure -0.203***
Between 1 and 2 years of job tenure -0.115
Between 6 and 15 years of job tenure -0.087*
More than 15 years of job tenure -0.036
Income level from main paid job
(reference: 1st and 2nd deciles)
3rd and 4th deciles 0.018
5th and 6th deciles 0.129*
7th and 8th deciles 0.320***
9th and 10th deciles 0.546***
Occupation
(reference: blue-collar high-skill)
White-collar high-skill 0.264***
White-collar low-skill 0.202***
Blue-collar low-skill 0.143**
Workplace practices
Job rotation 0.107***
Teamwork 0.107***
Training paid by employer 0.192***
Quality norms -0.033
Responsability for quality control 0.130***
Problem solving activities 0.101*
Monotony of tasks 0.032
Complexity of tasks 0.049
Learning new things at work 0.147***
Discretion in fixing task order -0.009
Discretion in fixing work methods 0.055
Discretion in setting work pace 0.075*
Repetitiveness of tasks (10 minutes) 0.007
Observations 12916
Pseudo R-squared 0.238
Source: European Foundation's fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
Note: *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%. 5% and 1%. respectively.
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It illustrates that in the EU-15 some
intensification of the work pace has
taken place since 1990, which is in
line with conclusions reached in a
number of studies (Green and Mc-
Intosh, 2001; Burchell et al., 1999).
The EWCS will now be used to pro-
vide descriptive evidence of the link
between new work organisation
practices and three features that
characterise the quality of working
conditions: work intensity, job satis-
faction and workers' health. 
Based on the EWCS, Chart 55 relates
perceived work intensity to different
features of new forms of work organ-
isation. Some features, such as having
to meet precise quality standards,
rotating tasks, working in a team and
performing complex tasks are associ-
ated with greater work intensity. This
result is in line with theoretical
hypotheses arguing that new work
practices imply an increase in the
pace of work. On the other hand,
greater autonomy in setting the
order of tasks can give workers some
relief in terms of work intensity, sug-
gesting that organisations increasing
both demands on and control by
workers may not necessarily result in
(perceived) higher work stress. 
Chart 56 shows that new forms of
work organisation tend to raise (per-
ceived) job satisfaction (Q36)
65
, partic-
ularly autonomy in the tasks and
methods of work, and discretion in
task division within teams, but not
task rotation and team work. Every-
thing considered, the evidence sug-
gests that new forms of work organi-
sation may have conflicting effects
on work intensity, while being
favourable overall to job satisfaction. 
Chart 57 plots perceived health effects
against different forms of work organ-
isation
66
. Similarly to work intensity,
different features of new work 
practices have conflicting effects on
perceived health outcomes. 
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Chart 57: Work organisation and health at work,
EU-27, 2005
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
65 'On the whole, are you very satisfied, satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with working conditions in your main paid job?' Similar to work
intensity, the question has been recoded. Respondents are classified as being satisfied if they reply 'satisfied' or 'very satisfied', and as being not satisfied
if they reply 'not very satisfied' or 'not at all satisfied'.
66 ”Does your work affect your health, or not?” (Q33). The answer is recorded as a dichotomous variable. 
 
3.5.8. Probit regressions,
work-life balance and job
satisfaction
Two probit regressions are estimated
for perceived health risks (Q32) and
health effects (Q33) of work when
controlling for worker and establish-
ment characteristics and different
work organisation practices, includ-
ing country-fixed effects
67
.
The probit regressions in Table 12 (see
page 160) suggest that workers per-
ceive health outcomes to deteriorate
with the number of work hours, but to
improve with the availability of flexi-
ble working-time arrangements. Sec-
toral effects play an important role.
Workers in mining, construction,
hotels and restaurants, transport and
communication, education, and health
and social security report higher health
risks/effects (than in manufacturing),
while workers in wholesale and retail
trade report lower health risks/effects
(than in manufacturing). Women,
employees younger than 24 years, and
white-collar employees tend to report
lower health risks/effects from work
than men, employees aged 25-39 and
blue-collar workers, respectively. 
An interesting result is that new
work-organisation practices, prone
to raising work intensity (e.g. job
rotation, teamwork, problem-solv-
ing activities and complex tasks), to-
gether with monotonous and repet-
itive tasks, are perceived to increase
the health risks and the effects of
work on heath. Whereas, new 
work practices associated with 
more autonomy/discretion at work
are perceived to lower health
risks/effects. 
A probit regression is estimated to
explain the factors determining the
work-life balance (Q18), using the
following as explanatory variables:
worker and establishment character-
istics, different work-organisation
practices and country-fixed effects.
The probit regression in Table 13 (see
page 161) suggests that the per-
ceived work-life balance deteriorates
with the number of work hours, but
improves with the availability of flex-
ible working-time arrangements. Sec-
toral effects again play an important
role. Workers in wholesale and retail
trade, hotels and restaurants, trans-
port and communication, and health
and social security report lower levels
of satisfaction with their work-life
balance (than in manufacturing).
Unexpectedly, part-time work has a
negative impact on the work-life bal-
ance
68
. 
An interesting result again is that
new work-organisation practices
prone to raising work intensity (e.g.
job rotation, teamwork, problem-
solving activities and complex tasks),
together with monotonous tasks are
perceived to reduce the work-life bal-
ance. Whereas new work practices
associated with more autonomy/dis-
cretion at work are perceived to
increase the work-life balance.
A probit regression is estimated for
perceived job satisfaction (Q36),
using the following as explanatory
variables: worker and establishment
characteristics, different work-organ-
isation practices and country-fixed
effects.
The probit regression in Table 14 (see
page 162) suggests that perceived job
satisfaction deteriorates with the
number of work hours, but improves
with the availability of flexible work-
ing-time arrangements. With few
exceptions
69
, sector effects do not
play a role in determining job satis-
faction levels. 
It is interesting to note that even
after controlling for wage (deciles),
worker and establishment character-
istics, new work-organisation prac-
tices still have a significant impact,
although contradictory, on job satis-
faction. On the one hand, new work
practices associated with more
autonomy/discretion and learning
new things at work are perceived 
to increase job satisfaction. On the
other hand, problem-solving activ-
ities, and the monotony, repetitive-
ness and complexity of tasks are asso-
ciated with lower levels of job satis-
faction. 
4. MEASURING
FLEXIBILITY IN WORK
ORGANISATIONS
This section uses the fourth wave of
the EWCS (2005) to calculate some
country-specific indices of internal
and functional flexibility, using factor
analysis methods. These indices are
then added to a large set of socio-
economic policy and outcome vari-
ables to rework the taxonomy analy-
sis of European flexicurity systems
carried out in Chapter 2 of EiE 2006.
Different kinds of flexibility can be
identified…
In Chapter 2 of EiE 2006, a measure of
external (numerical) flexibility, namely
OECD's EPL indicator, was used to
measure the concept of flexibility. A
number of authors (Goudswaard and
De Nanteuil, 2000; Wilthagen, 2006)
have proposed mappings of types of
flexibility that involve various work-
organisation practices. 
Goudswaard and De Nanteuil (2000)
use a two-by-two matrix to classify
flexibility strategies, with a dimen-
sion discriminating between internal
and external, and another between
numerical and qualitative forms. 
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67 ”Do you think your health or safety is at risk because of your work?” (Q32). The answer is recorded as a dichotomous variable. 
68 This may reflect the fact that part-time work is more common in services, where workers perceive a less favourable work-life balance (compared to 
manufacturing).
69 The electricity, gas, water, hotel and restaurant sectors.
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Table 12: Health risks/effects
Health risks Health effects
Endogenous Q32 Q33
Hours usually worked per week in the main job 0.014*** 0.013***
Working-time arrangements
(reference: set by the firm)
Arrangemets with different degrees of flexibility: i) choice between  
different fixed schedules; ii) flexitime; iii) entirely free -0.084*** -0.092***
Sector
(reference: manufacturing)
Agriculture. hunting. forestry. and fishing 0.041 0.188**
Mining and quarrying -0.400*** 0.382**
Electricity. gas. and water 0.151 0.041
Construction 0.211*** 0.190***
Wholesale and retail trade -0.161*** -0.088*
Hotels and restaurants 0.181** 0.193***
Transport. storage and communication 0.203*** 0.152***
Financial intermediation and insurance -0.132* -0.039
Real estate. renting and business activities -0.024 -0.001
Public administration and defence. compulsory social security 0.219*** 0.058
Education 0.149*** 0.250***
Health and social security 0.509*** 0.296***
Other community. social and personal service activities 0.143*** 0.165**
Gender
(reference: male)
Female -0.175*** 0.037
Age
(reference: between 25 and 39 years old)
Less than 24 years old -0.140*** -0.198***
Between 40 and 54 years old -0.003 0.101***
55 years old and over -0.165*** -0.045
Indefinite/non indefinite
(reference: indefinite contract)
Fixed-term contract -0.076* -0.085**
Agency contract -0.175 -0.261**
Job tenure
(reference: between 2 and 6 years of job tenure)
Less than one year of job tenure -0.038 -0.029
Between 1 and 2 years of job tenure -0.046 -0.108**
Between 6 and 15 years of job tenure 0.088*** 0.077**
More than 15 years of job tenure 0.062* 0.080**
Income level from main paid job
(reference: 1st and 2nd deciles)
3rd and 4th deciles 0.022 0.001
5th and 6th deciles -0.010 -0.067
7th and 8th deciles -0.045 -0.028
9th and 10th deciles -0.041 -0.047
Occupation
(reference: blue-collar high-skill)
White-collar high-skill -0.481*** -0.345***
White-collar low-skill -0.453*** -0.393***
Blue-collar low-skill -0.162*** -0.121***
Workplace practices
Job rotation 0.113*** 0.132***
Teamwork 0.122*** 0.107***
Training paid by employer 0.020 0.060**
Quality norms 0.078** 0.067**
Responsability for quality control 0.005 0.030
Problem solving activities 0.192*** 0.106***
Monotony of tasks 0.256*** 0.222***
Complexity of tasks 0.205*** 0.175***
Learning new things at work -0.027 -0.003
Discretion in fixing task order -0.126*** -0.115***
Discretion in fixing work methods -0.009 0.012
Discretion in setting work pace -0.083*** -0.065**
Repetitiveness of tasks (1 minute) 0.116*** 0.146***
Observations 12735 12751
Pseudo R-squared 0.117 0.109
Source: European Foundation's fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
Note: *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%. 5% and 1%. respectively.
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Table 13: The work-life balance
Endogenous Q18
Hours usually worked per week in the main job -0.032***
Working-time arrangements
(reference: set by the firm)
Arrangemets with different degrees of flexibility: i) choice between  
different fixed schedules; ii) flexitime; iii) entirely free 0.134***
Sector
(reference: manufacturing)
Agriculture. hunting. forestry. and fishing -0.116
Mining and quarrying 0.204
Electricity. gas and water 0.189
Construction -0.023
Wholesale and retail trade -0.254***
Hotels and restaurants -0.352***
Transport. storage and communication -0.217***
Financial intermediation and insurance 0.148*
Real estate. renting and business activities -0.014
Public administration and defence. compulsory social security 0.045
Education 0.102*
Health and social security -0.246***
Other community. social and personal service activities -0.045
Enterprise size
(reference: medium enterprises)
Micro-enterprises (fewer than 10 employees) 0.063
Small enterprises (10-49 employees) -0.007
Large enterprises (250+ employees) -0.127***
(reference: full-time contract)
Part-time contract -0.112**
Job tenure
(reference: between 2 and 6 years of job tenure)
Less than one year of job tenure -0.033
Between 1 and 2 years of job tenure 0.070
Between 6 and 15 years of job tenure 0.054
More than 15 years of job tenure 0.106**
Income level from main paid job
(reference: 1st and 2nd deciles)
3rd and 4th deciles 0.069
5th and 6th deciles 0.112**
7th and 8th deciles 0.074
9th and 10th deciles 0.016
Occupation
(reference: blue-collar high-skill)
White-collar high-skill 0.025
White-collar low-skill 0.012
Blue-collar low-skill -0.090*
Workplace practices
Job rotation -0.120***
Team work -0.060*
Training paid by employer -0.006
Quality norms -0.018
Responsability for quality control 0.066**
Problem solving activities -0.118***
Monotony of tasks -0.191***
Complexity of tasks -0.110***
Learning new things at work 0.040
Discretion in fixing task order 0.188***
Discretion in fixing work methods 0.002
Discretion in setting work pace 0.155***
Repetitiveness of tasks (10 minutes) -0.033
Observations 12885
Pseudo R-squared 0.101
Source: European Foundation's fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
Note: *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%. 5% and 1%. respectively.
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Table 14: Job satisfaction
Endogenous Q36
Hours usually worked per week in the main job -0.010***
Working-time arrangements
(reference: set by the firm)
Arrangemets with different degrees of flexibility: i) choice between  different
fixed schedules; ii) flexitime; iii) entirely free 0.063*
Sector
(reference: manufacturing)
Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 0.213**
Mining and quarrying -0.172
Electricity, gas and water 0.489***
Construction -0.032
Wholesale and retail trade -0.024
Hotels and restaurants -0.193**
Transport, storage and communication 0.002
Financial intermediation and insurance 0.161*
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.053
Public administration and defence, compulsory social security 0.029
Education 0.000
Health and social security -0.037
Other community, social and personal service activities -0.052
Enterprise size
(reference: medium enterprises)
Micro-enterprises (fewer than 10 employees) 0.121***
Small enterprises (10–49 employees) 0.068*
Large enterprises (250+ employees) -0.024
Indefinite/non indefinite
(reference: indefinite contract)
Fixed-term contract -0.104**
Agency contract -0.032
Full-time/part-time
(reference: full-time contract)
Part-time contract -0.071
Job tenure
(reference: between 2 and 6 years of job tenure)
Less than one year of job tenure 0.133***
Between 1 and 2 years of job tenure 0.136**
Between 6 and 15 years of job tenure 0.055
More than 15 years of job tenure 0.062
Income level from main paid job
(reference: 1st and 2nd deciles)
3rd and 4th deciles 0.040
5th and 6th deciles 0.308***
7th and 8th deciles 0.249***
9th and 10th deciles 0.431***
Occupation
(reference: blue-collar high-skill)
White-collar high-skill 0.188***
White-collar low-skill 0.238***
Blue-collar low-skill 0.120**
Workplace practices
Job rotation -0.030
Teamwork -0.032
Training paid by employer 0.134***
Quality norms 0.078**
Responsability for quality control 0.094***
Problem solving activities -0.101***
Monotony of tasks -0.371***
Complexity of tasks -0.185***
Learning new things at work 0.209***
Discretion in fixing task order 0.163***
Discretion in fixing work methods 0.091**
Discretion in setting work pace 0.129***
Repetitiveness of tasks (10 minutes) -0.088***
Observations 12853
Pseudo R-squared 0.107
Source: European Foundation's fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
Note: *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Wilthagen (2006) proposes the fol-
lowing four-way classification of flex-
ibility: 
• External (numerical) flexibility
(e.g. types of employment con-
tracts, employment protection
legislation); 
• Internal (numerical) flexibility (e.g.
working-time arrangements); 
• Functional flexibility (e.g. work-
organisation practices such as
task rotation and teamwork); 
• Flexible or variable pay (e.g. profit-
sharing schemes). 
The EWCS can be used to build indi-
cators of internal and functional 
flexibility…
Internal flexibility involves working-
time arrangements (e.g. flexitime,
time accounts), atypical working
practices (e.g. overtime, irregular
work, variable hours, working during
weekends) and work intensity (e.g.
long hours). 
Indices on functional flexibility are
calculated using variables related to
work-organisation practices (e.g. job
rotation, multitasking, teamwork,
autonomy at work, complexity of
tasks, solving unforeseen problems
and learning new things). 
The multivariate methods used to
calculate country-specific indices are
based on the responses of 8 356
employees working in establish-
ments with at least 10 people in
both industry and services, but
excluding agriculture and fishing,
public administration and defence,
and education and health. In all cal-
culations, the cases are weighted
using the cross-national weighting
variable (w5_ewcs). 
4.1. Internal flexibility
In order to calculate internal flexibili-
ty indices for the EU Member States,
a factor analysis method is used,
based on nine questions from the
EWCS (see Box 1 for details). The nine
questions of the EWCS used to calcu-
late internal flexibility indices are as
follows (their respective numbers in
the questionnaire are shown in
parentheses):
• How many times a month do you
work at night for at least two
hours between 10 pm and 5 am?
(Q14a)
• How many times a month do you
work in the evening for at least
two hours between 6 pm and 10
pm? (Q14b)
• How many times a month do you
work on Sundays? (Q14c)
• How many times a month do you
work on Saturdays? (Q14d)
• How many times a month do you
work more than 10 hours a day?
(Q14e)
• Do you work the same number of
hours every day? (Q16a_a)
• Do you work the same number of
days every week? (Q16a_b)
• Do you work fixed starting and
finishing times? (Q16a_c)
• How are your working-time
arrangements set? (Q17a) This
question can be answered as
follows: 1) they are set by the
company/organisation with no
possibility for changes; 2) you
can choose between several
fixed working schedules deter-
mined by the company/organi-
sation; 3) you can adapt your
working hours within certain
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Box 1 – The factor analysis method
Categorical principal components analysis (CatPCA) is the method used to perform factor analysis. CatPCA, also
known as nonlinear principal component analysis, can be seen as a multivariate technique that is intermediate
between linear principal components analysis 
a)
(PCA) and nonlinear multiple correspondence analysis 
b)
(MCA)
(Greenacre and Blasius, 2006). CatPCA is ideal for datasets with variables having different measurement levels
(scale/numeric, ordinal or nominal) because it can both impose order constraints on the categories of ordinal
variables and allows their intervals to vary according to optimal quantifications. 
SPSS is the software package used. All syntax (program) files are available upon request. 
a) PCA is a linear method that transforms/reduces a number of possible correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called
principal components. The first principal component accounts for as much of the variability in the data as possible, and each succeeding com-
ponent accounts for as much of the remaining variability as possible.
b) Unlike principal components analysis, where the total variance of the data is broken down along the principal components, in MCA the total
variance of the data is measured by the chi-squared statistic for row-column independence, and it is the chi-squared statistic which is broken
down along the principal factors. It is common to refer to the percentage of the 'inertia' accounted for by a factor. Inertia is defined as the value
of the chi-squared statistic of the data matrix divided by the total number of observations. 
limits (e.g. flexitime); 4) your
working hours are entirely deter-
mined by yourself.
Chart 58 plots the first two factors of
the analysis on internal flexibility
(Table 15). The first factor, accounting
for 33% of the total variance, dis-
criminates according to work intensi-
ty and the irregularity of working
schedules
70
. The second factor,
accounting for 18% of the total vari-
ance, correlates positively with the
existence of flexible working-time
arrangements which allow workers
to adjust working hours to their
needs and negatively with forms of
atypical work
71
. Although the first
and second axes account for just
about half of the total variance, they
manage to organise (cluster) coun-
tries in neatly separated quadrants
that strongly resemble the results
obtained in Esping-Endersen's taxon-
omy exercises (e.g. Chapter 2 of EiE
2006). Nordic countries and the
Netherlands appear in the first quad-
rant (of Chart 58) with flexible work-
ing-time arrangements and relatively
high work intensity/irregularity; 
Central European Member States
tend to concentrate in the second
quadrant (i.e. relatively high work
intensity/ irregularity and relatively
low incidence of flexible working-
time arrangements), although 
some of them are in the third 
quadrant with Mediterranean Mem-
ber Sates, displaying relatively low
work intensity/irregularity but also
relatively low incidence of flexible
working-time arrangements and a
relatively high incidence of atypical
work; Continental Member States are
in the fourth quadrant, while Anglo
Saxon countries are close to the cen-
tre of gravity (origin). The standard-
ised average scores per country
72
for 
the two factors will be used as 
indices of internal flexibility in the
Principal Components Analysis (PCA)
carried out in section 4.3. 
In addition, three variables, showing
a moderate correlation with at least
one of the two main factors, are pre-
sented in Graph 58 in order to facili-
tate the interpretation of the
results
73
. The work-life balance
improves with less work intensity and
irregular schedules, and with more
flexible working-time arrangements
and less atypical work. A rise along
income/wage quartiles corresponds
to a simultaneous move towards
greater flexibility of work arrange-
ments and greater work intensity
/irregularity. The presence of shift
work entails a significant deteriora-
tion in the work-life balance. 
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Chart 58: Internal flexibility – 1st factor: work intensity and irregular schedules
2nd factor: flexible working-type arrangements and atypical work
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
70 Irregular working schedules are those characterised by people not working the same number of hours every day (Q16a_a), the same number of days
every week (Q16a_b), and not having fixed starting and finishing times (Q16a_c).
71 Atypical work includes tendency to work in the evening (Q14b), at night (Q14a), on Saturdays (Q14d), and on Sundays (Q14c). 
72 The centroid coordinates. 
73 In the terminology of these techniques, these are called supplementary or illustrative variables. 
Table 15: Internal Flexibility Index
Component Loadings Dimension
1 2
Q14a. Normally, how many times a month 0.55 -0.52
do you work at night, for at least 2 hours?
Q14b. How many times a month do you work in the evening, 0.68 -0.29
for at least 2 hours?
Q14c. How many times a month do you work on Sundays? 0.62 -0.48
Q14d. How many times a month do you work on Saturdays? 0.60 -0.38
Q14e. How many times a month do you work more than 10 hours a day? 0.59 0.26
Q16a_a. Do you work the same number of hours every day? 0.67 0.45
Q16a_b. Do you work the same number of days every week? 0.65 0.06
Q16a_c. Do you work fixed starting and finishing times? 0.61 0.55
Q17a. How are your working time arrangements set? 0.27 0.69
Source: European Foundation's fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
In colour values larger than 0.5 in absolute value.
4.2. Functional
flexibility
In order to calculate functional flexi-
bility indices for the EU Member
States, factor analysis is conducted
based on 11 questions of the EWCS.
These questions cover a number of
aspects related to functional flexibili-
ty, such as task rotation, teamwork,
autonomy at work, complexity of
tasks, need to solve unforeseen prob-
lems and learn new things. 
The 11 questions considered are the
following:
• Does your main paid job involve,
or not, solving unforeseen prob-
lems on your own? (Q23c)
• Does your main paid job involve,
or not, complex tasks? (Q23e)
• Does your main paid job involve,
or not, learning new things?
(Q23f)
• Are you able, or not, to choose or
change your order of tasks?
(Q24a)
• Are you able, or not, to choose or
change your methods of work?
(Q24b)
• Are you able, or not, to choose or
change your speed or rate of
work? (Q24c)
• Have you influence over the
choice of your working partners?
(Q25d)
• Can you take your break when
you wish? (Q25e)
74
• Are you able to apply your own
ideas in your work? (Q25j)
• Does your job involve rotating
tasks between yourself and col-
leagues? (Q26a)
• Does your job involve doing all or
part of your work in a team?
(Q26b).
Chart 59 plots the first two factors of
the analysis on functional flexibility.
The first factor, accounting for 31%
of the total variance, discriminates
according to work autonomy and the
complexity of tasks (Table 16, see
page 166). The second factor,
accounting for 14% of the total vari-
ance, discriminates according to the
existence or not of rotating tasks and
teamwork. The standardised average
scores per country will be used as
indices of functional flexibility in the
PCA carried out in section 4.3. 
It is apparent from Chart 59 that coun-
try clusters, similar to those obtained
in Chart 58, are more difficult to
obtain now. Hence, functional flexibil-
ity appears to be more heterogeneous
across countries than internal flexibili-
ty. However, internal and functional
flexibility, as measured using the first
factor of the respective analysis, are
significantly correlated (Graph 60). 
In addition, two outcome variables,
showing a moderate correlation with
at least one of the two main factors,
are presented in Chart 59 in order to
facilitate the interpretation of the
results. The work-life balance
improves with more autonomy/dis-
cretion at work and with the com-
plexity of tasks, and with less rotation
and teamwork. Higher income/wage
quartiles correspond to more auton-
omy/complexity at work. 
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74 Here we follow the approach of the European Foundation, which includes this question among the indicators of workers' autonomy (see Parent-
Thirion, 2007), rather than on flexibility of working time. 
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Chart 59: Functional flexibility – 1st factor: autonomy and complexity
2nd factor: rotation and teamwork
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
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Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations. 
Note: *** significant at 1%
4.3. A taxonomy 
of flexicurity regimes
in the EU 
Different policy regimes exist across
advanced economies…
The theory of institutional comple-
mentarity and diversity of modern cap-
italism (e.g. Amable, 2003) states the
existence of different socio-economic
systems/models that can be identified
according to prevailing combinations
of policies and/or institutions (EiE
2006, Chapter 2), the total forming a
coherent universe. However, these
models should be seen more as defin-
ing 'ideal-types' rather than character-
ising actual countries, mainly because
of the remaining heterogeneity across
countries classified in the same model,
and some evidence of model hybridisa-
tion, resulting from the impact of
globalisation and/or the adaptation of
domestic policies and/or institutions to
perceived best international practices
(Amable, 1999)
75
. 
Esping-Andersen (1990) carried out
the seminal work on the taxonomy of
socio-economic systems
76
. Most classifi-
cations developed since, including the
present one – covering a wide range of
subjects, such as welfare, labour mar-
ket, innovation and healthcare – seem
to confirm, by and large, the findings
of the original taxonomy. One prom-
inent finding that stands out is that
geographical and/or cultural proximity
matters, reflecting communalities,
such as historical heritage, values, legal
systems, integrated markets, etc. 
…and they may lead (although not
all of them) to good economic per-
formances
Hall and Soskice (2001) analyse which
differences in political economic con-
figurations are more relevant for
macro-economic performance, con-
cluding that different regimes are
equally compatible with economic suc-
cess. Muffels et al. (2002), Wilthagen
(2004), Auer (2005), and the European
Commission (EiE 2006, Chapter 2) char-
acterise different employment and
economic systems/models mainly
along two axes, which can be broadly
interpreted as representing flexibility
and security in the labour market. 
Using the transitional labour markets
framework (TLM)
77
, Muffels et al.
(2002) evaluate how the notion of
'employment regimes' defined by 
Esping-Andersen is related with the
concepts of labour market flexibility
and work security in European labour
markets. Based on evidence from the
European Community Household
Panel (ECHP), the authors propose a
four-way taxonomy of flexicurity (or
employment) regimes in Europe: the
liberal, the social-democratic, the 
corporatist or conservative and the
southern. The paper concludes that
'the liberal regime combines a high
level of labour mobility and flexibility
(although not much higher than 
the corporatist or social-democratic
regimes) with a low level of work
security, and that the social democratic
regime comes out with a high level of
work security but a (somewhat) lower
level of labour market mobility'
78
. 
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75 ”One should not expect a pattern of institutional convergence among developed economies or, to put it in a different way, economic convergence in
terms of GDP per capita and technological level does not imply a strict convergence among institutions or forms of organisation. But it may imply some
loose convergence, or at least that if some institutions are not exactly replicated across advanced economies, there exist functional equivalents.”
76 Using data from the 1980s, in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, G. Esping-Andersen classified the welfare systems of developed economies into
three models: the Liberal, the Conservative and the Social Democratic. 
77 The European Commission has been playing a leading role in financing research on the way TLM can cope with increasing social risks due to structural
socio-economic and social-cultural changes (network of researchers funded by the Fifth Framework Programme of the European Commission, running
from 2002–2005). The main focus of the TLM theory is on in-work transitions and transitions from work into other spheres of social life, like learning,
caring and retiring. Within the TLM framework, there are five main areas of research: 1) transitions within employment; 2) transitions between educa-
tion/training and the labour market; 3) transitions between employment and unemployment; 4) transitions between household activities and employ-
ment; and 5) transitions between retirement/disability and the labour market.
78 However, 'these regimes do not fit nicely in the ”ideal-type” models', particularly because 'countries under the liberal regime have also a fairly high level
of employment security and countries under the social-democratic regime have fairly high levels of labour mobility and flexibility'. The authors conclude
that these findings lend support to the convergence (or hybridisation) hypothesis.
Table 16: Functional Flexibility Index
Component Loadings Dimension
1 2
Q26a. Does your job involve rotating tasks between yourself and colleagues? 0.14 0.71
Q26b. Does your job involve doing all or part of your work in a team? 0.16 0.71
Q24a. Are you able to choose or change your order of tasks? 0.75 -0.22
Q24b. Are you able to choose or change your methods of work? 0.73 -0.19
Q24c. Are you able to choose or change your speed or rate of work? 0.65 -0.25
Q25d. You have influence over the choice of your working partners. 0.54 0.00
Q25e. You can take your break when you wish. 0.60 -0.30
Q25j. You are able to apply your own ideas in your work. 0.66 -0.02
Q23c. Does your main paid job involve: 0.52 0.21
solving unforeseen problems on your own?
Q23e. Does your main paid job involve: complex tasks? 0.49 0.34
Q23f. Does your main paid job involve: learning new things? 0.53 0.31
Source: European Foundation’s fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
In colour values larger than 0.5 in absolute value.
The liberal (Anglo-Saxon) and Nordic
regimes achieve good employment
outcomes
In its 2006 reassessment of the Job
Strategy, the OECD Secretariat identi-
fied four distinct labour market
regimes in the OECD area (OECD
2006a; OECD 2006b; Bassanini and
Duval, 2006). Two regimes are associ-
ated with high employment out-
comes: i) the mainly English-speaking
countries
79
, and ii) the mainly North-
ern European countries
80
. Two
regimes are associated with low
employment outcomes: i) mainly
Continental and Southern European
countries
81
, and ii) Eastern European
countries
82
. 
…the latter has budgetary costs; 
the former relatively higher poverty/
inequality
Looking at the two groups of coun-
tries with good labour market per-
formance, the Northern European
regime involves a clear budgetary
cost. In the countries adopting this
model, the governments spend about
2.5 times on average more on labour
market policies, as a percentage of
GDP, than in the group of mainly
English-speaking countries. On the
other hand, income inequalities as
well as poverty rates are lower in the
mainly Northern European group
than in the mainly English-speaking
group. The OECD Secretariat con-
cludes that the experience since the
early 1980s shows that there is no sin-
gle combination of policies and insti-
tutions to achieve and maintain good
labour market performance, but
rather that there have been different
roads to success. Respecting the prin-
ciples of subsidiarity, this allows some
scope to tailor policy packages to suit
national preferences with respect to
equity, risk-taking and other national
objectives. However, the OECD warns
that in practice there might be limit-
ed policy combinations available for
achieving good employment out-
comes.
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Chart 61: Job tenure
Box 2 – A job tenure index
The EWCS is also used to calculate a job tenure index for the EU 
Member States. A CatPCA is run on three questions of the EWCS. 
The questions considered are the following:
• How many years have you been in your company or organisation?
(Q2d)
• What kind of employment contract do you have? (Q3b) This variable
can be answered as follows: 1) an indefinite contract; 2) a fixed-term
contract; 3) a temporary employment agency contract; 4) an appren-
ticeship or other training scheme; 5) no contract. 
• What is the exact duration of the contract in number of years and
months? (Q3c)
Chart 61 plots the first factor of the CatPCA. It accounts for 43% of the
total variance, discriminating well between job tenure and the type of
labour contract. The standardised average score per country is reported
in the data annex. This index will be used as a supplementary/illustrative
variable in the PCA carried out in Section 4.3. In addition, two supple-
mentary variables, showing a moderate correlation with the first 
factor, are presented in Chart 61 in order facilitate the interpretation of
the results. It is particularly interesting to notice that young and low-
income workers tend to have relatively low job tenures.
Table 17: Job tenure index
Component Loadings Dimension
1
Q2d. How many years have you been in your company or organisation? -0.90
Q3b. What kind of employment contract do you have? 0.95
Q3c. Total time in temporary work (years) -0.70
Source: European Foundation’s fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
In colour values larger than 0.5 in absolute value.
79 This group includes Australia, Canada, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
80 This group includes Austria, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.
81 This group includes Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
82 This group includes the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia.
Sources: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.
 
Recently, working-time flexibility
across the EU has also been analysed
Recent attempts have also been made
to include the dimension of internal
flexibility in the analysis of labour mar-
ket regimes. Chung (2007) mentions
the fact that research to date tends to
depict labour market flexibility as
being solely in the interest of employ-
ers and to focus almost exclusively on
external numerical flexibility (and cor-
respondingly on the loosening of
employment protection legislation).
However, certain forms of flexibility,
especially flexible working-time
arrangements, can also be used to
accommodate workers' preferences
regarding, for example, the reconcilia-
tion of work with care or family
responsibilities, coping with the
increased diversification of individual
life-courses, and the need to enhance
an individual's employability via train-
ing or education breaks. Chung (2007)
uses company-level data from the
ESWT to group different flexible work-
ing arrangements based on whether
they are mainly in the interests of
employees, employers or both. The
analysis focuses on numerical flexibili-
ty, both internal (i.e. concerning work-
ing time
83
) and external
84
. The proce-
dure is similar to that followed in this
chapter, but performing instead a PCA
on company level data. Flexible
arrangements are then grouped across
three main factors, the first capturing
those which are mainly in the interests
of employees (e.g. leave schemes), the
second, those that are mainly in the
interests of companies (e.g. working at
unusual hours, and temporary 
contracts), and the third, those which
accommodate the needs of both (e.g.
part-time, flexible working-time
arrangements, early and phased retire-
ment). These three factors are then
narrowed down to two indices: one,
representing flexibility in the interests
of employees and the other, flexibility
in the interests of employers
85
. Coun-
tries are then clustered, based on the
scores obtained on the two indices.
The resulting classification is relatively
close to Esping-Andersen's welfare
state taxonomy, showing a positive
correlation between the two types of
flexibility. This conveys the important
message that flexibility strategies can
be designed in such a way as to recon-
cile employees and employers' inter-
ests.  
The EU flexicurity taxonomy pro-
posed in EiE 2006 is revised…
The present section improves on the
taxonomy analysis of European flexi-
curity systems carried out in the sec-
ond chapter of EiE 2006. It covers 22
countries
86
(four more than in 2006)
and corrects a major shortcoming of
last year's exercise by including forms
of flexibility which are enacted with-
in the firm (i.e. that are relative to
either work organisation or working
time practices). Hence, this is 
probably the most comprehensive
attempt to classify flexicurity regimes
to date, in terms of putting together
three fundamental dimensions of
flexibility: external, internal and
functional. 
As in EiE 2006, a few words of cau-
tion are warranted on the robustness
of the methods used and on the pol-
icy conclusions that can be derived.
First, the reliability of PCA in identify-
ing the major components of socio-
economic/flexicurity regimes depends
on the right choice of variables. The
problem with factor analysis meth-
ods, such as PCA, is that it is not pos-
sible to test the 'final' model against
alternative hypotheses. Second, the
success of PCA is largely measured on
its ability to reduce the initial set of
variables to a limited number of prin-
cipal components, accounting for a
large amount of the total variation in
the data. Therefore variables weakly
correlated (with others in the set)
might be wrongly discarded in order
to reduce the number of principal
components used
87
. Third, it has to be
remembered that PCA is based on
correlation coefficients and does not
provide evidence on the existence of
causal relationships. 
Finally, the taxonomy analysis carried
out in this chapter largely confirms the
one made in EiE 2006. However, a lack
of recent longitudinal data does not
permit a full consideration of all rele-
vant labour market transitions that are
needed for a holistic assessment of the
different security aspects of flexicurity. 
…by adding indicators on internal
and functional flexibility
Labour market/flexicurity systems are
described using seven (active) vari-
ables
88
, with every one of the four
flexicurity components
89
being cov-
ered by at least one variable each. 
The following seven
90
active variables
are used:
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83 This includes part-time, unusual working hours, overtime, flexible working-time schedules, parental and long-term leave, and phased retirement.
84 This relates to the use of non-standard employment contracts, such as fixed-term and temporary agency contracts.
85 Flexible arrangements which were previously included in the third factor are distributed in the two indices with weights corresponding to the aggregate
national scores on the ESWT question concerning the motivation for the introduction of the referred work-organisation practice.
86 EU-27 minus Luxembourg, Cyprus, Malta, Latvia and Romania. The four new EU Member States covered (relative to EiE 2006) are Bulgaria, Estonia,
Lithuania and Slovenia. 
87 It is conceivable that factors or principal components, even representing mainly just a single variable, may eventually be necessary to differentiate across
systems/models. 
88 Most data refers to 2005. EPL data for 2003 is the main exception. See the annex for a complete list of the (standardised) data and respective
sources/notes.
89 1) Modern labour laws allowing for sufficient flexible work arrangements; 2) effective active labour market policies supporting transitions between jobs,
as well as from unemployment and inactivity to jobs; 3) credible lifelong learning systems enabling workers to remain employable throughout their
careers, by helping them to cope with rapid change, unemployment spells and transitions to new jobs; and 4) modern social security systems combining
the need to facilitate labour market mobility with the provision of adequate income support during all absences from the labour market (from 'Towards
common principles of flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility and security', Communication from the Commission to the Council, the Euro-
pean Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2007) 359). 
• The EPL
91
indicator used as a
proxy for external numerical flex-
ibility (EPL)
• Percentage of participants in
education or training pro-
grammes
92
(ETP)
• Expenditure on labour market
policies as a percentage of GDP
(i.e. the sum of passive/unem-
ployment benefits and ALMPs)
93
(LMP)
• An indicator on work intensity
and the irregularity of working
schedules to measure aspects of
internal flexibility
94
(WII)
• An indicator on the existence or
not of flexible working-time
arrangements and forms of atyp-
ical work to measure aspects of
internal flexibility
95
(FWA)
• An indicator on the degree of
autonomy and complexity of
tasks to measure aspects of func-
tional flexibility
96
(WAC)
• An indicator on rotation and
teamwork to measure aspects of
functional flexibility
97
(RTW). 
Systems can be classified along three
axes, allowing for a richer interpreta-
tion…  
The three principal components
account for 85.4% of the overall 
variability in the data. Using the corre-
lation coefficients
98
between the seven
active variables and the three principal
components (Table 19, and Chart 62
and 63, see page 170), together with
the help of a selected number of 
supplementary/illustrative
99
variables,
allows for a rich interpretation of the
three principal axes, capturing a num-
ber of stylised facts. It is clear that con-
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Chart 62: Variables (axes D1 and D2: 67.2 %)
after Varimax rotation
Source: DG EMPL calculations using data from Eurostat, the European Foundation and the OECD.
Note: This graph plots the correlation coefficients of the variables being considered with the two principal com-
ponents. A variable close to the unitary circle has a high correlation with a linear combination of the the two
principal components.
Legend: EPL: Employment protection legislation; 
ETP: Education and training programmes; LMP: Labour market policies; WAC: Work autonomy/complexity; 
FWA: Flexible work arrangements; WII: Work intensity/irregularity; RTW: Rotation and team work; Part_time:
Part-time employment rate; Temp: Temporary employment rate; 
RedPov: Reduction in poverty rate;
Avg_tenure: Average tenure; LT_tenure: Long-term tenure.
90 One additional variable, i.e. the tax wedge (as a proxy for distortions created by the tax system, see p. 103 of EiE 2006), was also initially considered but
was ultimately discarded as an active variable for two main reasons. First, there is no compelling theoretical reason for its inclusion in the analysis (as an
active variable). Second, it has low correlations with the other variables (Table 18) and does not change either the interpretation or the total amount of
variation accounted for by the first two factors/axes. In addition, the theory recommends that the countries-to-variables ratio should be between 3 and
5 in order to avoid carrying out multivariate analysis with a too small sample compared to the number of indicators, which would lead to results not hav-
ing known statistical properties.   
91 The overall OECD indicator for 2003. Source: Cazes and Nesporova (2003) for SI, LT, EE and BG; OECD for all remaining Member States.
92 Percentage of population aged 25-64 participating in education or training programmes (Source: Eurostat).
93 Source: Eurostat's Labour Market Policy database.
94 The first factor of the analysis carried out in section 4.1 (on internal flexibility) using the EWCS. 
95 The second factor of the analysis carried out in section 4.1 (on internal flexibility) using the EWCS. 
96 The first factor of the analysis carried out in section 4.2 (on functional flexibility) using the EWCS. 
97 The second factor of the analysis carried out in section 4.2 (on functional flexibility) using the EWCS. 
98 When orthogonal rotation is used (here the Varimax method was used), the values of the correlation coefficients are identical to the regression coeffi-
cients of the factors on active variables (factor loadings). 
99 'Supplementary' or 'illustrative' variables are used only to better characterise factors/principal components not entering in their calculation.  
Table 18: Correlation matrix
EPL ETP LMP WII FWA WAC RTW TWED
EPL 1 -0.3 0.2 -0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.3
ETP - 1 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.1
LMP - - 1 0.0 0.7 0.6 -0.2 0.3
WII - - - 1 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.1
FWA - - - - 1 0.9 -0.3 0.3
WAC - - - - - 1 -0.1 0.2
RTW - - - - - - 1 -0.1
TWED - - - - - - - 1
Cronbach's alpha for the eight variables: 0.65
Cronbach's alpha for the first seven variables: 0.63
Source: DG EMPL calculations using data from Eurostat; the European Foundation and the OECD. 
In colour the correlations larger than 0.5 in absolute value.
Legend: EPL: employment protection legislation; ETP: participants in education or training programmes; 
LMP: expenditure in labour market policies. 
WII: work intensity/irregularity, first factor of the internal flexibility analysis (Section 4.1).
FWA: flexible working time arrangements, second factor of the internal flexibility analysis (Section 4.1).
WAC: work autonomy/complexity, first factor of the functional flexibility analysis (Section 4.2).
RTW: rotation and team work, second factor of the functional flexibility analysis (Section 4.2).
TWED: tax wedge on labour cost for single persons without children.
sideration of the aspects pertaining to
internal flexibility - or the work organ-
isation of firms - makes an enormous
difference, allowing for a much richer
and compelling characterisation of the
different labour market/flexicurity sys-
tems. The two principal components
are not identifiable anymore with: 1)
(external) flexibility; and 2)
income/employment security, respec-
tively, as in the analysis carried out in
the second chapter of EiE 2006. Now,
the two principal components simulta-
neously represent different aspects of
flexibility and security. Muffels et al.
(2002) also find evidence supporting
the convergence (or hybridisation)
hypothesis across different models/sys-
tems (i.e. both flexibility and security
can coexist in countries belonging to
different 'ideal-types', because they
are provided by different means). 
…although national groupings of EiE
2006 are largely confirmed
However, countries remain split into
different groups, which largely coin-
cide with the country taxonomy pro-
posed in EiE 2006. Visual inspection of
the PCA country scores (both along the
first and second dimensions – Chart 64,
and the first and third – Chart 65) is
highly suggestive of country group-
ings. A cluster analysis (CLA) on the
seven active variables, using the k-
means method
100
, confirms this impres-
sion (Table 20). Despite the substantial
changes in the interpretation of the
PCA factors, notice how Table 20 is
nearly identical to Table 3 on p. 107 of
EiE 2006 (reproduced in footnote)
101
.
The first principal component/axis,
accounting for about 46% of the total
variance in the data, can be named as
'advanced forms of internal flexibility
and security'. It is positively correlated
with flexible working-time arrange-
ments (FWA) and work autonomy/
complexity (WAC) (Table 19). As
regards the FWA variable, countries
that score high along the first axis
have high take-up rates of flexible
working-time arrangements (e.g. flex-
itime). The first component further
shows a low concentration of atypical
working practices (e.g. weekend
work). As regards the WAC variable,
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Table 19: PCA analysis
Percentage of variance after Varimax rotation:
D1 D2 D3 F4 F5 F6 F7
Variability % 46.1 21.1 18.2 6.0 4.7 2.7 1.3
Cumulative % 46.1 67.2 85.4 91.4 96.0 98.7 100.0
Factor loadings after Varimax rotation:
D1 D2 D3
EPL -0.02 -0.93 -0.09
ETP 0.80 0.34 0.06
LMP 0.81 -0.35 -0.13
WII 0.39 0.58 0.57
FWA 0.95 0.03 -0.13
WAC 0.92 0.19 0.02
RTW -0.17 0.07 0.95
ER_1564T 0.78 0.13 -0.01
ER_1564F 0.77 0.18 0.07
ER_5564T 0.53 0.19 -0.14
Part-time 0.76 0.01 -0.09
Temporary rate 0.12 -0.54 -0.08
Unemployment rate -0.46 -0.18 0.22
Labour productivity 0.65 0.05 -0.31
Unemployment trap 0.62 -0.34 0.14
Low wage trap 1 0.75 0.31 0.04
Low wage trap 2 0.65 0.14 0.20
Reduction in poverty 0.69 0.36 0.06
Long-term unemployment rate -0.58 -0.12 0.32
ALMP 0.85 -0.22 -0.03
PLMP 0.75 -0.39 -0.16
Average tenure -0.50 0.21 0.10
Work-life balance 0.73 0.18 -0.25
Health risks 0.46 0.20 -0.50
Health effects 0.39 0.09 -0.52
Job satisfaction 0.71 0.22 -0.19
R&D 0.86 0.10 -0.11
Patents 0.86 0.03 -0.07
Information technology 0.76 0.35 -0.09
IT exports 0.37 0.54 -0.43
Long term tenure -0.03 -0.62 0.19
School leavers -0.17 -0.53 -0.50
At least upper secondary 0.11 0.53 0.45
Vocational training paid by the employer 0.65 0.40 0.13
Human resources in science and technology (HRST) 0.81 0.24 0.07
Source: DG EMPL calculations.
‘The results corresponding to the supplementary variables are displayed in the second part of the table’.
In colour values larger than 0.5 in absolute value.
100 See Box 1 in EiE 2006, p. 109, for more details on the methodology of PCA and the cluster analysis k-means method.
101 Results obtained in EiE 2006 (Chapter 2, Table 3)
Continental Central and Eastern Nordic and the Netherlands Mediterranean Anglo-Saxon
AT CZ DK EL IE
BE HU FI PT UK
DE IT NL ES
FR PO SE
SK
Source: DG EMPL calculations using data from Eurostat, European Foundation and the OECD.
countries that score high along this
first axis have a high percentage of
their employees reporting advanced
functional flexibility practices
102
(e.g.
autonomy at work). The first axis is
also positively associated with lifelong
learning or competence building poli-
cies (ETP), active and passive labour
market policies (ALMP and PLMP,
respectively) and with a strong reduc-
tion in poverty (RedPov). 
The second principal component/axis,
accounting for about 21% of the
total variance in the data, can be
named as 'external flexibility'. It is
positively correlated with the work
intensity and irregular schedules
(WII) and negatively correlated with
EPL
103
. As regards the WII variable,
countries that score high along the
second axis have a high proportion of
their employees working irregular
schedules (e.g. irregular hours). As
regards EPL, countries that score high
along this second axis have low firing
restrictions and, therefore, high
external numerical flexibility. 
The third principal component/axis,
accounting for about 18% of the total
variance in the data, can be named as
'basic forms of functional flexibility'. It
is positively correlated with the work
intensity and irregular schedules (WII)
and rotation and teamwork (RTW). As
regards the RTW variable, countries
that score high along the third axis
have a high incidence of task rotation
and teamwork practices. 
4.3.1. The impact of different
types of flexibility on security 
Advanced internal arrangements
seem to capture 'negotiated' flexi-
bility…
The definition of all variables (active
and supplementary), including data
sources and notes, is given in the
Annex. The supplementary variables
plotted on Chart 62 (see page 169)
allow differentiating further between
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Chart 63: Variables (axes D1 and D3: 64.3%)
after Varimax rotation
Source: DG EMPL calculations using data from Eurostat, the European Foundation and the OECD.
Note: This graph plots the correlation coefficients of the variables being considered with 
the two principal components. A variable close to the unitary circle has a high correlation with a linear 
combination of the the two principal components.
Legend: EPL: Employment protection legislation; ETP: Education and training programmes; LMP: 
Labour market policies; WAC: Work autonomy/complexity;
WII: Work intensity/irregularity; RTW: Rotation and team work; Part_time: Part-time employment rate; 
FWA: Flexible work arrangements; RedPov: Reduction in poverty rates. Avg_tenure: Average tenure; 
Health effects: does work affect your health? (EWCS, Q33).
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Chart 64: Taxonomy of flexicurity regimes based on the k-means method
-Country scores on the first and second components
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.  
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Chart 65: Taxonomy of flexicurity regimes based on the k-means method
-Country scores on the first and third principal components
Source: European Foundation, fourth EWCS; DG EMPL calculations.  
102 As opposed to basic forms of functional flexibility: task rotation and teamwork. 
103 Recall that the EPL scale is reversed. Countries with low (high) EPL have high (low) external (numerical) flexibility.
 
the first and second axes. The inci-
dence of part-time work in percent-
age of total employment increases
along the first component, while the
percentage of employees with tem-
porary contracts decreases along the
second. In Section 2.3, it was men-
tioned that according to surveys,
part-time work is mainly voluntary,
whereas a high proportion of
employees with temporary contracts
would prefer to have a permanent
contract. Hence, the first axis, seems
to put together forms of flexibility
which allow mutually acceptable
compromises between workers and
employers, thereby suggesting that
the amount of negotiated
practices/social trust increases along
that axis.
…while external flexibility reduces
labour market segmentation
The temporary work variable,
together with active variables WII
and EPL, defining the second axis,
suggest that labour market segmen-
tation decreases along the second
axis. There is also evidence that aver-
age job tenure decreases along the
advanced internal flexibility axis,
while long-term tenure decreases
along the external flexibility axis. 
Advanced internal flexibility goes
together with increased income
security…
As regards (income) security, meas-
ured by the reduction in the poverty
rate resulting from government
transfers (RedPov)
104
, the evidence
suggests that it improves along both
the first and second axes, although
more firmly so along the first. As is
well known, only a few updated indi-
cators are available on labour market
transitions (e.g. from unemploy-
ment/inactivity to employment).
Therefore, the operational concept
of security used in this chapter is con-
siderably narrower in scope than the
meaning of the term in flexicurity
policy documents
105
. Expenditure on
labour market policies (LMP), espe-
cially if implemented under activa-
tion strategies to counterbalance dis-
incentive effects, and participation in
education and training programmes
(ETP) contribute favourably to overall
employment security. It should be
highlighted that both LMP and ETP
are (strongly) positively correlated
with the first axis, while the former is
(weakly) negatively correlated with
the external flexibility axis. 
…and activation policies to counter-
balance the disincentive effects of
passive measures 
Chart 66 shows a number of vari-
ables/indicators related to labour
market policies, namely expenditure
on labour market policies (both
active and passive)
106
and indicators of
low wage and unemployment traps,
which capture the financial disincen-
tives to progress towards better
(higher paid) jobs and to take up a
job when unemployed, respectively,
which are due to the combined effect
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104 i.e. the difference between the risk of poverty before and after social transfers divided by the former. 
105 'Towards common principles of flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility and security', Communication from the Commission to the Council,
the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM(2007) 359.
106 The reader is referred to EiE 2006, Chapters 2 and 3, for a discussion on the design and combination of passive and active labour market policies and
their impact on employment performance.
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Chart 66: Variables (axes D1 and D2: 67.2 %)
after Varimax rotation
Source: DG EMPL calculations using data from Eurostat, the European Foundation and the OECD.
Note: This graph plots the correlation coefficients of the variables being considered with the two principal 
components. A variable close to the unitary circle has a high correlation with a linear combination of the the
two principal components.
Legend: EPL: Employment protection legislation; ETP: Education and training programmes; LMP: Labour market
policies; WAC: Work autonomy/complexity; FWA: Flexible work arrangements; WII: Work intensity/irregularity;
RTW: Rotation and team work; UneTrap: Unemployment trap for a single person without children; 
LowWageTrap1: Low wage trap for a single person without children;
LowWageTrap2: Low wage trap for one earner couple with two children; ALMP: Active labour market polcies;
PLMP: Passive labour market policies.
Table 20
Results of the clustering analysis, using the K-means method
Continental Central, Eastern Nordic and the Mediterranean Anglo-Saxon
and Greece Netherlands
AT BG DK ES IE
BE CZ FI IT UK
DE EE NL PT
FR EL SE
HU
LT
PO
SK
SI
Source: DG EMPL calculations using data from Eurostat, European Foundation and the OECD.
of tax and social benefit systems.
Spending on both active and passive
policies rise along the first axis, which
is unsurprising given the correlation
of the latter with LMP. The same
applies to financial disincentives,
which attain a maximum for the
Nordic and the Netherlands group of
countries. This is also relatively unsur-
prising given that larger LMP tend to
be associated with larger transfers
and taxation/social contributions
which, in turn, tend to reduce the net
income associated with transitions
from unemployment to employment
and/or from low-paid to better-paid
jobs. However, financial disincentives
may be counterbalanced by appropri-
ate design of unemployment benefits
in terms of duration, sanctions, and
combining with effective job search
assistance and activation policies.
Comparable indicators on such
aspects are, though, currently not
available.   
Advanced internal flexibility is asso-
ciated with better innovation per-
formance…
As regards outcome variables, Chart
67 suggests that positive labour mar-
ket outcomes and labour productivity
increase along the first axis. Hence,
more advanced forms of internal
flexibility are associated with high
employment rates, high labour pro-
ductivity and lower unemployment
rates. An important dimension is also
the impact on a firm's ability to pro-
duce technological innovation. Sec-
tion 3.4.2 above discussed the four-
way typology of work organisations
elaborated by Lorenz and Valeyre
(2003), of which two are considered
to be 'advanced' forms: the 'discre-
tionary learning' (DL) and the 'lean'.
The DL work organisation is charac-
terised by high levels of autonomy in
work combined with high levels of
learning, problem solving and task
complexity. The lean form is also
characterised by high levels of learn-
ing and problem solving, but can be
distinguished from the DL form by
the relatively low levels of employ-
ment discretion in setting work pace
and methods, and by the greater use
of job rotation and teamwork. This
typology does not have a direct
equivalent in the three principal com-
ponents resulting from the PCA car-
ried out in this chapter.
…confirming the role of work auton-
omy/complexity for 'discretionary-
learning' organisations
However, the first principal compo-
nent – advanced forms of internal flex-
ibility and security – shares many fea-
tures of the discretionary learning
model (Chart 68 and 69, see page 174),
both as regards the definition of the
axis (e.g. work autonomy and task
complexity) and outcomes in terms of
innovation efforts and performance
(e.g. a strong correlation with R&D 
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Chart 67: Variables (axes D1 and D2: 67.2 %)
after Varimax rotation
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Chart 68: Variables (axes D1 and D2: 67.2%)
after Varimax rotation
Source: DG EMPL calculations using data from Eurostat, the European Foundation and the OECD.
Note: This graph plots the correlation coefficients of the variables being considered with the two principal 
components. A variable close to the unitary circle has a high correlation with a linear combination of the two
principal components.
Legend: EPL: Employment protection legislation; 
ETP: Education and training programmes; LMP: Labour market policies; WAC: Work autonomy/complexity; FWA:
Flexible work arrangements; WII: Work intensity/irregularity; RTW: Rotation and team work; VT_employer:
Vocational training paid by the employer; Inform_tec: Expenditure on information technology; HRST: Human
resources in science and technology as a share of labour force; IT_exports: High-tech exports; Patents: Patent
application to the European Patent Office; R&D: Gross domestic expenditure in R&D; School_leavers: People
aged 18-24 with only lower secondary education not in education; >=Upper_secondary: Population aged 25 to
64 having completed at least upper secondary education.
Source: DG EMPL calculations using data from Eurostat, the European Foundation and the OECD.
Note: This graph plots the correlation coefficients of the variables being considered with the two principal 
components. A variable close to the unitary circle has a high correlation with a linear combination of the two
principal components.
Legend: EPL: Employment protection legislation; 
ETP: Education and training programmes; LMP: Labour market policies; WII: Work intensity/irregularity; 
RTW: Rotation and team work; ER_1564T: Total employment rate; ER_1564F: Female employment rate;
ERT–5564T older worker employment rate; LabProd: Labour productivity per employee; UR: Unemployment
rate; LTUR: Long-term unemployment rate.
 
spending, patent application, the
share of human resources in science
and technology areas, and provision of
employer-paid training). The second
and third principal components
defined as, respectively, 'external flexi-
bility' and 'basic forms of functional
flexibility' are poorly characterised in
terms of technology/innovation-relat-
ed variables. Chart 68 (see page 173)
suggests that external flexibility is pos-
itively correlated with the percentage
of high technology exports and the
fraction of employees receiving voca-
tional training paid by the employer. 
Advanced internal flexibility and
security is associated with improved
working conditions…
The supplementary variables plotted
on Chart 70 allow differentiating
between the first and third axes
based on a few measures of the qual-
ity of working conditions, such as job
satisfaction, work-life balance and
health outcomes
107
. Although both
'advanced forms of internal flexibility
and security' (the first axis) and 'basic
forms of functional flexibility' (the
third axis) are positively correlated
with work intensity and irregular
schedules (WII), the perceived effects
of working conditions depend on the
type of flexibility. Advanced forms of
internal flexibility and security are
associated with positive health out-
comes, improved levels of job-satis-
faction and work-life balance. This
suggests that work autonomy, job
enrichment and flexible working-
time arrangements more than coun-
terbalance the intensification of
work, leading to improved working
conditions in organisations with
advanced forms of internal flexibility
and security. Conversely, basic func-
tional flexibility, i.e. task rotation and
teamwork, is perceived as increasing
health risks, decreasing job satisfaction
and worsening the work-life balance.
…hence it may represent a win-win
solution for both workers and firms
This supports the arguments devel-
oped earlier (in Section 3.3) that
work organisations accommodating
greater demands on the workforce
(in terms of increased responsibilities,
problem-solving activities, discre-
tionary efforts, etc.) with increased
autonomy/discretion and competen-
cies building (e.g. through training)
may raise workers' satisfaction and
health conditions when compared
with more conventional workplace
practices. The perceived favourable
impact of new forms of work organ-
isation on workers' well-being adds to
their positive effects on productivity,
174
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107 All supplementary variables in Chart 70 have been scaled in such a way that an increase in their values represents favourable outcomes. 
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Chart 69: Variables 
(axes D1 and D3: 64.3%)
Source: DG EMPL calculations using data from Eurostat, the European Foundation and the OECD.
Note: This graph plots the correlation coefficients of the variables being considered with the two principal 
components. A variable close to the unitary circle has a high correlation with a linear combination of the two
principal components.
Legend: EPL: Employment protection legislation; 
ETP: Education and training programmes; LMP: Labour market policies; WAC: Work autonomy/complexity; FWA:
Flexible work arrangements; WII: Work intensity/irregularity; RTW: Rotation and team work; VT_employer:
Vocational training paid by the employer; Inform_tec: Expenditure on information technology; HRST: Human
resources in science and technology as a share of labour force; IT_exports: High-tech exports; Patents: Patent
application to the European Patent Office; R&D: Gross domestic expenditure in R&D; School_leavers: People
aged 18–24 with only lower secondary education not in education; >=Upper_secondary: Population aged 25–64
having completed at least upper secondary education.
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Chart 70: Variables (axes D1 and D3: 64.3%)
after Varimax rotation
Source: DG EMPL calculations from Eurostat, European Foundation and OECD figures.
Note: This graph plots the correlation coefficients of the variables being considered with the two principal 
components. A variable close to the unitary circle has a high correlation with a linear combination of the two
principal components.
Legend: EPL: Employment protection legislation; 
ETP: Education and training programmes; LMP: Labour market policies; WAC: Work autonomy/complexity; FWA:
Flexible work arrangements; WII: Work intensity/irregularity; RTW: Rotation and team work; Work-life balance
(EWCS, Q18); Health risks (EWCS, Q32); Health effects (EWCS, Q33); Job satisfaction (EWCS, Q36).
 
innovation performance, and labour
market outcomes. This favourable
combination suggests that new forms
of work organisation may represent
win-win strategies, allowing for the
reconciliation of employers and
workers' interests. On the other
hand, this analysis suggests that task
rotation and teamwork are perceived
to lower job satisfaction and have a
negative impact on work-related
health outcomes.
External flexibility and lower seg-
mentation go together with better
basic education
Some education outcomes are particu-
larly relevant in order to interpret the
second axis (Chart 71). 'External flexi-
bility' is associated with better (basic)
education outcomes - i.e. a larger
proportion of the population having
completed at least upper secondary
education (>=Upper_education), and
a lower proportion of the young pop-
ulation (18-24) with only lower sec-
ondary education not in further edu-
cation or training (School_leavers). It
is interesting to note that high labour
market segmentation (i.e. a high pro-
portion of total and young tempo-
rary workers) is positively correlated
with bad (basic) education outcomes.
Self-reinforcing mechanisms might
be at work here, reflecting the ten-
dency for young people to accumu-
late disadvantages (Heckman and
Carneiro, 2003). On the one hand,
young people might become discour-
aged and drop out of high school
because of expected difficult transi-
tions into work life (i.e. a segmented
labour market); on the other hand,
firms might be reluctant to offer
permanent contracts to young peo-
ple with inadequate competencies. 
5. CONCLUSIONS
Flexicurity reforms should explore
policy synergies 
Flexicurity is a comprehensive policy
strategy that aims to improve the
adaptability of employees and enter-
prises to face competitiveness and
technological challenges, and to
respond better to societal changes. It
aims at enhancing, simultaneously,
the flexibility and security dimen-
sions of the labour market, by
exploring complementarities/syner-
gies between different policies and
institutions. Usually, these types of
reforms have significant distribution-
al effects, thereby implying the need
to reach enlarged social consensus in
order to strengthen the momentum
for reform. Flexicurity reform pack-
ages require a careful balancing of
components in order to maximise
synergies, political support, and the
sense of inclusiveness (i.e. avoiding
the marginalisation of any stake-
holder). 
…and forms of internal flexibility
(i.e. within the firm) have to be
included in the analysis
Flexicurity is a difficult concept to
tackle analytically, largely due to its
holistic nature. The dimensions of
flexibility and security can be further
sub-divided into several sub-
components, requiring the use of a
variety of information sources. To 
our knowledge, currently available 
analyses of flexicurity regimes/sys-
tems, including the one made in 
Employment in Europe 2006, focus
exclusively on the external compo-
nent of flexibility and do not consid-
er those forms of flexibility that are
provided within the firm through 
the implementation of different
work organisation practices (e.g.
working-time arrangements, rotation
and teamwork, discretion/ autonomy
at work).
Considering internal flexibility
This chapter aims at filling this gap by
explicitly considering forms of inter-
nal flexibility, making an extensive
use of a large number of data
sources, in particular the European
Foundation's EWCS, in order to map
the various dimensions of flexibility.
The theory of high performance (or
new work) organisations is used to
interpret results. 
Firms' work organisation practices
have significant effects on outcomes
Different work organisation practices
and human resource management
policies are expected to have distinct
effects on variables, such as the flexi-
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Chart 71: Variables (axes D1 and D2: 67.2%)
after Varimax rotation
Source: DG EMPL calculations using data from Eurostat, the European Foundation and the OECD.
Note: This graph plots the correlation coefficients of the variables being considered with the two principal 
components. A variable close to the unitary circle has a high correlation with a linear combination of the 
two principal components.
Legend: EPL: Employment protection legislation; 
ETP: Education and training programmes; LMP: Labour market policies; WAC: Work autonomy/complexity; FWA:
Flexible work arrangements;WII: Work intensity/irregularity; RTW: Rotation and team work; Temp: Temporary
employment rate; Temp_1524: Youth temporary employment rate (15-24);School_leavers: People aged 18–24
with only lower secondary education not in education; >=Upper_secondary: Population aged 25–64 having com-
pleted at least upper secondary education.
bility/adaptability of the workforce/
firm, productivity/profitability, and
incentives to carry out innovation
activities in-house. Descriptive analy-
sis suggests that the flexibility
requirements of firms and/or workers
are catered for in a distinct number
of ways across Europe:
• labour market segmentation
• external numeric flexibility
• rotation and teamwork
• advanced forms of flexible 
work organisation (e.g. flexible
working-time arrangements, job
autonomy). 
The analysis suggests that new
forms of work organisation are asso-
ciated with positive outcomes in the
labour market and increased job 
satisfaction… 
Both the descriptive analysis and the
probit estimations provide support
for the view that the advanced inter-
nal flexibility model – characterised
by new work organisation practices
that are complemented by HRM pol-
icies combining greater demands on
the workers with increased auton-
omy at work – is associated with high
levels of job satisfaction, and better
(perceived) work-life balance and
health outcomes in comparison with
more traditional forms of work
organisation. However, this chapter
does not address the effects of flex-
ible/new forms of work organisation
on wages, wage inequality, and
employment, because of the inad-
equacy of the available data
108
. 
Moreover, results of the PCA indicate
that the advanced internal flexibility
and security model is also associated
with positive outcomes in the labour
market, and on productivity and
innovation, suggesting that this
model may facilitate the reconcilia-
tion of employees with employers'
interests. 
...but dissemination of new work
organisation practices might be con-
tingent on the firm's business model 
Firms producing standardised pro-
ducts, relying more on economies of
scale and price competition, are like-
ly to have fewer incentives to adopt
certain forms of internal flexibility
associated with new forms of work
organisation, at least in the immedi-
ate future, than those firms that pro-
duce specialised products, whose
business models explore economies
of variety/scope, and learning and
innovation are their basis for compe-
tition. 
…while the basic functional flexibil-
ity model is associated with negative
outcomes
Finally, the analysis carried out in this
chapter also confirms that the basic
functional flexibility model – charac-
terised by high rotation and team-
work, high work intensity, and a low
degree of work autonomy – exerts a
negative impact on job satisfaction,
and on the perceived heath condi-
tions of workers. 
Internal flexibility plays an important
role in the taxonomy of flexicurity
systems
Country-specific indicators of internal
and functional flexibility, calculated
using the EWCS, are added to a broad-
er set of indicators to carry out a prin-
cipal components analysis of labour
market/flexicurity regimes followed by
a clustering analysis. Inclusion of these
new indicators represents an improve-
ment in the characterisation of flexicu-
rity systems, because of the large vari-
ation in their incidence across coun-
tries, and the different correlation pat-
terns with a broader set of socio-
economic variables, reflecting the
effects of institutional complemen-
tarities. 
Two flexicurity regimes/systems show
good socio-economic outcomes
The various regimes are characterised
by different socio-economic out-
comes/performances. Similar to the
results obtained in the OECD
reassessment of its job strategy, two
flexicurity regimes are found to be
associated with relatively 'good'
socio-economic outcomes. The first is
characterised by high external flexi-
bility, high rates of secondary educa-
tion attainment, moderate intensity
of vocational training and low spend-
ing in activation policies. The second
is characterised by a high incidence of
advanced forms of flexible work
organisation and by moderate levels
of external flexibility, complemented
by a large role for lifelong learning
policies, vocational training and
spending in R&D, as well as labour
market policies within activation
strategies. 
Socio-economic outcomes differ but
there is no overall best system.
The second ('good') flexicurity system
tends to be associated, on the one
hand, with better overall socio-
economic outcomes (labour market,
innovation and productivity), as well
as better working conditions as per-
ceived by workers (job satisfaction,
work-life balance and health condi-
tions); and, on the other hand, it pro-
duces a significant reduction in
inequality/poverty. 
However, the first ('good') flexicurity
system implies lower budgetary costs
due to lower spending on public
transfers in general, and on labour
market policies in particular, com-
bined with low distortions induced
by the tax/benefit system. Moreover,
the first flexicurity regime is also
associated with high labour mobility
(as measured by job tenure) and low
labour segmentation, while still
achieving a moderate success in
reducing inequality/poverty, in inno-
vation outcomes as measured by the
high percentage of high-technology
products in total exports, and in the
moderate percentage of employees
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attending vocational training paid by
their employers. 
Everything considered, there is no
single combination of policies and
institutions to achieve and maintain
good socio-economic results, but
rather there are different pathways
to good performance that are, to a
large extent, the result of distinct his-
torical trajectories. Respecting the
principles of subsidiarity (and the
Open Method of Coordination), this
allows scope for tailor-made policy
packages to suit national preferences
with respect to distributional aspects,
risk-taking and other national 
objectives. 
Autonomy and problem solving are
critical for learning and innovation
The results also suggest that there
are systemic links between the way
work is organised and innovation
performance. Forms of work organi-
sation characterised by high levels of
autonomy, complex problem-solving
activities and continuous vocational
training are associated with in-house
innovation activities as opposed to
the adoption/modification of existing
technologies. This suggests that, in
addition to 'standard' education (i.e.
upper secondary education), devel-
oping the right work environment/
structures is crucial to promoting
learning through problem solving
and discretion/autonomy at work,
helping employees to solve technical
and product-related problems, and
encouraging the effective use of
their competencies for career build-
ing and innovation activities. 
Need of harmonised employer-level
survey data to assess work organisa-
tion and other management practices
However, the employee-level data of
the EWCS are relatively inadequate
for developing indicators for the
analysis of work organisations,
because they cannot capture 
enterprise-based variables, especially
certain aspects of management strat-
egy. At present there are no har-
monised employer-level survey data
that can be used to characterise work
organisation and other management
aspects across EU Member States. 
Transitions need to be thoroughly
assessed to have an in-depth know-
ledge of the security dimension
Although this chapter carried out an
extensive analysis of the different
forms of flexibility available to both
firms and workers across Europe, it
could not deal adequately with secu-
rity aspects, particularly the assess-
ment of individuals' transitions
between different labour market sta-
tuses and pay levels. Use of up-to-
date longitudinal data – currently
unavailable on a harmonised basis
across EU Member States – is neces-
sary in order to overcome this short-
coming in the analysis of flexicurity
systems. 
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Table 1a: Dependent variable: Q21B_N (Market constraint)
Coefficients
Hours usually worked per week in the main job 0.010***
Working-time arrangements
(reference: set by the firm)
Arrangemets with different degrees of flexibility: i) choice between  
different fixed schedules; ii) flexitime; iii) entirely free 0.035
Sector
(reference: manufacturing)
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing -0.385***
Mining and quarrying -0.265*
Electricity, gas and water 0.109
Construction 0.222***
Wholesale and retail trade 0.607***
Hotels and restaurants 0.651***
Transport, storage and communication 0.357***
Financial intermediation and insurance 0.401***
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.242***
Public administration and defence, compulsory social security 0.079
Education 0.520***
Health and social security 0.545***
Other community, social and personal service activities 0.300***
Enterprise size
(reference: medium enterprises)
Micro-enterprises (fewer than 10 employees) 0.274***
Small enterprises (10-49 employees) 0.166***
Large enterprises (250+ employees) -0.129***
Gender
(reference: male)
Female 0.087***
Educational attainment
(reference: upper secondary education)
Pre-primary education (ISCED 0) -0.318*
Primary education (ISCED 1) -0.238***
Lower secondary education (ISCED 2) -0.160***
Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4) 0.082*
First stage of tertiary education (ISCED 5) 0.010
Second stage of tertiary education (ISCED 6) -0.040
Age
(reference: between 25 and 39 years old)
Less than 24 years old -0.044
Between 40 and 54 years old -0.080***
55 years old and over -0.165***
Indefinite/non indefinite
(reference: indefinite contract)
Fixed-term contract -0.134***
Agency contract 0.044
Full-time/part-time
(reference: full-time contract)
Part-time contract 0.018
Job tenure
(reference: between 2 and 6 years of job tenure)
Less than one year of job tenure -0.108**
Between 1 and 2 years of job tenure -0.121**
Between 6 and 15 years of job tenure -0.094***
More than 15 years of job tenure -0.060
Income level from main paid job
(reference: 1st and 2nd deciles)
3rd and 4th deciles -0.073
5th and 6th deciles -0.041
7th and 8th deciles -0.075
9th and 10th deciles -0.095
Occupation
(reference: blue-collar high-skill)
White-collar high-skill 0.368***
White-collar low-skill 0.468***
Blue-collar low-skill 0.188***
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Table 1a: Dependent variable: Q21B_N (Market constraint)
cont'd Coefficients
Workplace practices
Job rotation 0.120***
Teamwork 0.083***
Training paid by employer 0.065**
Quality norms 0.104***
Responsability for quality control 0.074**
Problem solving activities 0.300***
Monotony of tasks -0.092***
Complexity of tasks 0.147***
Learning new things at work 0.142***
Discretion in fixing task order 0.037
Discretion in fixing work methods 0.045
Discretion in setting work pace -0.008
Repetitiveness of tasks (10 minutes) 0.150***
Country fixed effects
(reference: France)
Belgium -0.217**
Czech Republic -0.301***
Denmark -0.215**
Germany -0.167*
Estonia -0.508***
Greece -0.143
Spain 0.038
Ireland -0.143
Italy -0.155
Cyprus -0.028
Latvia -0.743***
Lithuania -0.501***
Luxembourg -0.372***
Hungary -0.555***
Malta -0.121
The Netherlands -0.242***
Austria -0.205**
Poland -0.543***
Portugal -0.242***
Slovenia -0.385***
Slovakia -0.459***
Finland -0.151*
Sweden -0.184**
United Kingdom -0.214**
Bulgaria -0.508***
Romania -0.394***
Observations 12854
Obs with Dep=0 4044
Obs with Dep=1 8810
Pseudo R-squared 0.132
Source: European Foundation's fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
Note: *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 2a: Dependent variable: Q21D_N (Industrial constraint)
Coefficients
Hours usually worked per week in the main job 0.001***
Working-time arrangements
(reference: set by the firm)
Arrangemets with different degrees of flexibility: i) choice between  
different fixed schedules; ii) flexitime; iii) entirely free -0.057
Sector
(reference: manufacturing)
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing -0.249***
Mining and quarrying 0.082
Electricity, gas and water -0.627***
Construction -0.576***
Wholesale and retail trade -0.629***
Hotels and restaurants -0.657***
Transport, storage and communication -0.431***
Financial intermediation and insurance -0.637***
Real estate, renting and business activities -0.562***
Public administration and defence, compulsory social security -0.632***
Education -1.158***
Health and social security -0.788***
Other community, social and personal service activities -0.694***
Enterprise size
(reference: medium enterprises)
Micro-enterprises (fewer than 10 employees) -0.218***
Small enterprises (10-49 employees) -0.146***
Large enterprises (250+ employees) -0.029
Gender
(reference: male)
Female -0.178***
Educational attainment
(reference: upper secondary education)
Pre-primary education (ISCED 0) 0.069
Primary education (ISCED 1) 0.023
Lower secondary education (ISCED 2) 0.057
Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4) -0.016
First stage of tertiary education (ISCED 5) -0.059
Second stage of tertiary education (ISCED 6) -0.013
Age
(reference: between 25 and 39 years old)
Less than 24 years old 0.053
Between 40 and 54 years old -0.024
55 years old and over -0.119**
Indefinite/non indefinite
(reference: indefinite contract)
Fixed-term contract -0.046
Agency contract 0.199*
Full-time/part-time
(reference: full-time contract)
Part-time contract -0.045
Job tenure
(reference: between 2 and 6 years of job tenure)
Less than one year of job tenure -0.029
Between 1 and 2 years of job tenure -0.001
Between 6 and 15 years of job tenure 0.033
More than 15 years of job tenure -0.002
Income level from main paid job
(reference: 1st and 2nd deciles)
3rd and 4th deciles -0.024
5th and 6th deciles -0.001
7th and 8th deciles -0.054
9th and 10th deciles -0.049
Occupation
(reference: blue-collar high-skill)
White-collar high-skill -0.332***
White-collar low-skill -0.341***
Blue-collar low-skill 0.082*
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Table 2a: Dependent variable: Q21D_N (Industrial constraint)
cont'd Coefficients
Workplace practices
Job rotation 0.162***
Teamwork 0.120***
Training paid by employer -0.021
Quality norms 0.428***
Responsability for quality control 0.059
Problem solving activities 0.028
Monotony of tasks 0.312***
Complexity of tasks 0.075
Learning new things at work -0.016
Discretion in fixing task order -0.177***
Discretion in fixing work methods -0.095**
Discretion in setting work pace -0.102***
Repetitiveness of tasks (10 minutes) 0.288***
Country fixed effects
(reference: France)
Belgium 0.216**
Czech Republic 0.121
Denmark -0.148
Germany 0.107
Estonia 0.167
Greece 0.191
Spain 0.017
Ireland -0.004
Italy 0.156
Cyprus -0.046
Latvia 0.035
Lithuania 0.231**
Luxembourg -0.029
Hungary 0.178*
Malta -0.034
The Netherlands -0.030
Austria 0.162
Poland -0.306***
Portugal 0.096
Slovenia -0.118
Slovakia 0.072
Finland 0.196**
Sweden -0.272**
United Kingdom 0.119
Bulgaria -0.121
Romania 0.232**
Observations 12822
Obs with Dep=0 10499
Obs with Dep=1 2323
Pseudo R-squared 0.238
Source: European Foundation's fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
Note: *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3a: Dependent variable: EF6_N = EF6g OR EF6h (performance-based pay schemes)
Coefficients
Hours usually worked per week in the main job 0.000
Working-time arrangements
(reference: set by the firm)
Arrangemets with different degrees of flexibility: i) choice between  
different fixed schedules; ii) flexitime; iii) entirely free 0.258***
Sector
(reference: manufacturing)
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing -0.284**
Mining and quarrying -0.022
Electricity, gas and water -0.032
Construction -0.186**
Wholesale and retail trade 0.079
Hotels and restaurants -0.376***
Transport, storage and communication -0.107
Financial intermediation and insurance 0.332***
Real estate, renting and business activities -0.115*
Public administration and defence, compulsory social security -1.069***
Education -1.194***
Health and social security -0.865***
Other community, social and personal service activities -0.335***
Enterprise size
(reference: medium enterprises)
Micro-enterprises (fewer than 10 employees) -0.222***
Small enterprises (10–49 employees) -0.069
Large enterprises (250+ employees) 0.220***
Gender
(reference: male)
Female -0.133***
Educational attainment
(reference: upper secondary education)
Pre-primary education (ISCED 0) 0.216
Primary education (ISCED 1) -0.040
Lower secondary education (ISCED 2) -0.006
Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4) 0.103*
First stage of tertiary education (ISCED 5) 0.002
Second stage of tertiary education (ISCED 6) 0.000
Age
(reference: between 25 and 39 years old)
Less than 24 years old -0.028
Between 40 and 54 years old -0.120***
55 years old and over -0.186***
Indefinite/non indefinite
(reference: indefinite contract)
Fixed-term contract -0.106*
Agency contract -0.619***
Full-time/part-time
(reference: full-time contract)
Part-time contract -0.021
Job tenure
(reference: between 2 and 6 years of job tenure)
Less than one year of job tenure -0.203***
Between 1 and 2 years of job tenure -0.115
Between 6 and 15 years of job tenure -0.087*
More than 15 years of job tenure -0.036
Income level from main paid job
(reference: 1st and 2nd deciles)
3rd and 4th deciles 0.018
5th and 6th deciles 0.129*
7th and 8th deciles 0.320***
9th and 10th deciles 0.546***
Occupation
(reference: blue-collar high-skill)
White-collar high-skill 0.264***
White-collar low-skill 0.202***
Blue-collar low-skill 0.143**
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Table 3a: Dependent variable: EF6_N = EF6g OR EF6h (performance-based pay schemes)
cont'd Coefficients
Workplace practices
Job rotation 0.107***
Teamwork 0.107***
Training paid by employer 0.192***
Quality norms -0.033
Responsability for quality control 0.130***
Problem solving activities 0.101*
Monotony of tasks 0.032
Complexity of tasks 0.049
Learning new things at work 0.147***
Discretion in fixing task order -0.009
Discretion in fixing work methods 0.055
Discretion in setting work pace 0.075*
Repetitiveness of tasks (10 minutes) 0.007
Country fixed effects
(reference: France)
Belgium -0.770***
Czech Republic 0.011
Denmark -0.622***
Germany -0.725***
Estonia -0.089
Greece -0.652***
Spain -0.490***
Ireland -0.385***
Italy -0.629***
Cyprus -1.044***
Latvia -0.153
Lithuania -0.234*
Luxembourg -0.331***
Hungary -0.450***
Malta -0.467***
The Netherlands -0.059
Austria -0.699***
Poland -0.460***
Portugal -1.052***
Slovenia 0.255**
Slovakia 0.973***
Finland -0.193*
Sweden -0.180*
United Kingdom -0.751***
Bulgaria -0.434***
Romania -0.549***
Observations 12916
Obs with Dep=0 11340
Obs with Dep=1 1576
Pseudo R-squared 0.238
Source: European Foundation's fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
Note: *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 4a Table 5a
Health risks Health effects
Endogenous
Hours usually worked per week in the main job 0.014*** 0.013***
Working-time arrangements
(reference: set by the firm)
Arrangemets with different degrees of flexibility: i) choice between  
different fixed schedules; ii) flexitime; iii) entirely free -0.084*** -0.092***
Sector
(reference: manufacturing)
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 0.041 0.188**
Mining and quarrying 0.400*** 0.382**
Electricity, gas and water 0.151 0.041
Construction 0.211*** 0.190***
Wholesale and retail trade -0.161*** -0.088-*
Hotels and restaurants 0.181** 0.193***
Transport, storage and communication 0.203*** 0.152***
Financial intermediation and insurance -0.132* -0.039
Real estate, renting and business activities -0.024 -0.001
Public administration and defence, compulsory social security 0.219*** 0.058
Education 0.149*** 0.250***
Health and social security 0.509*** 0.296***
Other community, social and personal service activities 0.143*** 0.165**
Enterprise size
(reference: medium enterprises)
Micro-enterprise (fewer than 10 employees) -0.048 -0.095***
Small enterprises (10-49 employees) -0.001 0.019
Large enterprises (250+ employees) 0.082 ** 0.045
Gender
(reference: male)
Female -0.175*** 0.037
Educational attainment
(reference: upper secondary education)
Pre-primary education (ISCED 0) 0.371 * 0.366**
Primary education (ISCED 1) -0.004 0.030
Lower secondary education (ISCED 2) 0.043 0.059
Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4) 0.043 0.057
First stage of tertiary education (ISCED 5) -0.078 ** 0.039
Second stage of tertiary education (ISCED 6) -0.085 -0.082
Age
(reference: between 25 and 39 years old)
Less than 24 years old -0.140*** -0.198***
Between 40 and 54 years old -0.003 0.101***
55 years old and over -0.165*** -0.045
Indefinite/non indefinite
(reference: indefinite contract)
Fixed-term contract -0.076* -0.085**
Agency contract -0.175 -0.261**
Job tenure
(reference: between 2 and 6 years of job tenure)
Less than one year of job tenure -0.038 -0.029
Between 1 and 2 years of job tenure -0.046 -0.108**
Between 6 and 15 years of job tenure 0.088*** 0.077**
More than 15 years of job tenure 0.062* 0.080**
Income level from main paid job
(reference: 1st and 2nd deciles)
3rd and 4th deciles 0.022 0.001
5th and 6th deciles -0.010 -0.067
7th and 8th deciles -0.045 -0.028
9th and 10th deciles -0.041 -0.047
Occupation
(reference: blue-collar high-skill)
White-collar high-skill -0.481*** -0.345***
White-collar low-skill -0.453*** -0.393***
Blue-collar low-skill -0.162*** -0.121***
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Table 4a Table 5a
Endogenous Cont’d Health risks Health effects
Workplace practices
Job rotation 0.113*** 0.132***
Teamwork 0.122*** 0.107***
Training paid by employer 0.020 0.060**
Quality norms 0.078** 0.067**
Responsability for quality control 0.005 0.030
Problem solving activities 0.192*** 0.106***
Monotony of tasks 0.256*** 0.222***
Complexity of tasks 0.205*** 0.175***
Learning new things at work -0.027 -0.003
Discretion in fixing task order -0.126*** -0.115***
Discretion in fixing work methods -0.009 0.012
Discretion in setting work pace -0.083*** -0.065**
Repetitiveness of tasks (1 minute) 0.116*** 0.146***
Country fixed effects
(reference: France)
Belgium 0.125 0.148*
Czech Republic -0.341 *** 0.014
Denmark -0.068 0.362***
Germany -0.195 ** -0.251***
Estonia 0.390 *** 0.712***
Greece 0.534 *** 1.011***
Spain 0.182 * 0.054
Ireland -0.030 0.024
Italy 0.189 * 0.342***
Cyprus 0.270 ** 0.340***
Latvia 0.669 *** 0.948***
Lithuania 0.270 *** 0.348***
Luxembourg 0.130 0.191**
Hungary 0.072 0.339***
Malta 0.158 0.520***
The Netherlands 0.037 -0.062
Austria -0.145 0.014
Poland 0.451 *** 0.892***
Portugal -0.114 0.055
Slovenia 0.414 *** 0.728***
Slovakia 0.172 * 0.440***
Finland -0.152 * 0.220***
Sweden 0.733 *** 0.722***
United Kingdom -0.182 * -0.208**
Bulgaria 0.320 *** 0.344***
Romania 0.306 *** 0.257***
Observations 12735 12751
Obs with Dep=0 8740 7241
Obs with Dep=1 3995 5510
Pseudo R-squared 0.117 0.109
Source: Source: European Foundation's fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
Note: *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 6a: Dependent variable: Q18 (work-life balance)
Coefficients
Hours usually worked per week in the main job -0.032***
Working-time arrangements
(reference: set by the firm)
Arrangemets with different degrees of flexibility: i) choice between  
different fixed schedules; ii) flexitime; iii) entirely free 0.134***
Sector
(reference: manufacturing)
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing -0.116
Mining and quarrying 0.204
Electricity, gas and water 0.189
Construction -0.023
Wholesale and retail trade -0.254***
Hotels and restaurants -0.352***
Transport, storage and communication -0.217***
Financial intermediation and insurance 0.148*
Real estate, renting and business activities -0.014
Public administration and defence, compulsory social security 0.045
Education 0.102*
Health and social security -0.246***
Other community, social and personal service activities -0.045
Enterprise size
(reference: medium enterprises)
Micro-enterprises (fewer than 10 employees) 0.063
Small enterprises (10–49 employees) -0.007
Large enterprises (250+ employees) -0.127***
Gender
(reference: male)
Female -0.008
Educational attainment
(reference: upper secondary education)
Pre-primary education (ISCED 0) -0.180
Primary education (ISCED 1) 0.268***
Lower secondary education (ISCED 2) 0.101**
Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4) 0.003
First stage of tertiary education (ISCED 5) -0.034
Second stage of tertiary education (ISCED 6) -0.114
Age
(reference: between 25 and 39 years old)
Less than 24 years old 0.124**
Between 40 and 54 years old 0.100***
55 years old and over 0.298***
Indefinite/non indefinite
(reference: indefinite contract)
Fixed-term contract -0.020
Agency contract -0.019
Full-time/part-time
(reference: full-time contract)
Part-time contract -0.112**
Job tenure
(reference: between 2 and 6 years of job tenure)
Less than one year of job tenure -0.033
Between 1 and 2 years of job tenure 0.070
Between 6 and 15 years of job tenure 0.054
More than 15 years of job tenure 0.106**
Income level from main paid job
(reference: 1st and 2nd deciles)
3rd and 4th deciles 0.069
5th and 6th deciles 0.112**
7th and 8th deciles 0.074
9th and 10th deciles 0.016
Occupation
(reference: blue-collar high-skill)
White-collar high-skill 0.025
White-collar low-skill 0.012
Blue-collar low-skill -0.090*
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Table 6a: Dependent variable: Q18 (work-life balance)
cont'd Coefficients
Workplace practices
Job rotation -0.120***
Teamwork -0.060*
Training paid by employer -0.006
Quality norms -0.018
Responsability for quality control 0.066**
Problem solving activities -0.118***
Monotony of tasks -0.191***
Complexity of tasks -0.110***
Learning new things at work 0.040
Discretion in fixing task order 0.188***
Discretion in fixing work methods 0.002
Discretion in setting work pace 0.155***
Repetitiveness of tasks (10 minutes) -0.033
Country fixed effects
(reference: France)
Belgium 0.026
Czech Republic 0.210
Denmark 0.299*
Germany 0.143
Estonia -0.128
Greece -0.244**
Spain -0.009
Ireland -0.113
Italy -0.470***
Cyprus -0.061
Latvia -0.283***
Lithuania -0.092
Luxembourg -0.021
Hungary -0.149
Malta -0.132
The Netherlands -0.096
Austria 0.419***
Poland -0.086
Portugal -0.016
Slovenia -0.129
Slovakia 0.122
Finland 0.165
Sweden -0.137
United Kingdom 0.146
Bulgaria 0.146
Romania 0.095
Observations 12885
Obs with Dep=0 2477
Obs with Dep=1 10408
Pseudo R-squared 0.101
Source: European Foundation's fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
Note: *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 7a: Dependent variable: Q36 (job satisfaction)
Coefficients
Hours usually worked per week in the main job -0.010***
Working-time arrangements
(reference: set by the firm)
Arrangemets with different degrees of flexibility: i) choice between 
different fixed schedules; ii) flexitime; iii) entirely free 0.063*
Sector
(reference: manufacturing)
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 0.213**
Mining and quarrying -0.172
Electricity, gas and water 0.489***
Construction -0.032
Wholesale and retail trade -0.024
Hotels and restaurants -0.193**
Transport, storage and communication 0.002
Financial intermediation and insurance 0.161*
Real estate, renting and business activities 0.053
Public administration and defence, compulsory social security 0.029
Education 0.000
Health and social security -0.037
Other community, social and personal service activities -0.052
Enterprise size
(reference: medium enterprises)
Micro-enterprises (fewer than 10 employees) 0.121***
Small enterprises (10–49 employees) 0.068*
Large enterprises (250+ employees) -0.024
Gender
(reference: male)
Female 0.048
Educational attainment
(reference: upper secondary education)
Pre-primary education (ISCED 0) -0.229
Primary education (ISCED 1) 0.074
Lower secondary education (ISCED 2) 0.064
Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4) -0.020
First stage of tertiary education (ISCED 5) -0.144***
Second stage of tertiary education (ISCED 6) -0.187*
Age
(reference: between 25 and 39 years old)
Less than 24 years old 0.071
Between 40 and 54 years old -0.016
55 years old and over 0.084*
Indefinite/non indefinite
(reference: indefinite contract)
Fixed-term contract -0.104**
Agency contract -0.032
Full-time/part-time
(reference: full-time contract)
Part-time contract -0.071
Job tenure
(reference: between 2 and 6 years of job tenure)
Less than one year of job tenure 0.133***
Between 1 and 2 years of job tenure 0.136**
Between 6 and 15 years of job tenure 0.055
More than 15 years of job tenure 0.062
Income level from main paid job
(reference: 1st and 2nd deciles)
3rd and 4th deciles 0.040
5th and 6th deciles 0.308***
7th and 8th deciles 0.249***
9th and 10th deciles 0.431***
Occupation
(reference: blue-collar high-skill)
White-collar high-skill 0.188***
White-collar low-skill 0.238***
Blue-collar low-skill 0.120**
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Table 7a: Dependent variable: Q36 (job satisfaction)
cont'd Coefficients
Workplace practices
Job rotation -0.030
Teamwork -0.032
Training paid by employer 0.134***
Quality norms 0.078**
Responsability for quality control 0.094***
Problem solving activities -0.101***
Monotony of tasks -0.371***
Complexity of tasks -0.185***
Learning new things at work 0.209***
Discretion in fixing task order 0.163***
Discretion in fixing work methods 0.091**
Discretion in setting work pace 0.129***
Repetitiveness of tasks (10 minutes) -0.088***
Country fixed effects
(reference: France)
Belgium 0.096
Czech Republic 0.070
Denmark 0.435***
Germany 0.319***
Estonia -0.232**
Greece -0.322***
Spain 0.133
Ireland 0.144
Italy -0.368***
Cyprus 0.227*
Latvia -0.263***
Lithuania -0.230**
Luxembourg 0.002
Hungary -0.055
Malta 0.004
The Netherlands 0.048
Austria 0.346***
Poland 0.230**
Portugal 0.349***
Slovenia -0.245**
Slovakia -0.024
Finland 0.052
Sweden -0.019
United Kingdom 0.563***
Bulgaria -0.241***
Romania -0.260***
Observations 12853
Obs with Dep=0 2476
Obs with Dep=1 10377
Pseudo R-squared 0.107
Source: European Foundation's fourth EWCS and DG EMPL calculations.
Note: *, **, ***, statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 8a: Standardised data used in the PCA
EPL ETP LMP WII FWA WAC RTW TWED ER_1564T ER_1564F
AT -0.26 0.24 0.38 -0.32 0.93 0.06 0.16 0.56 0.71 0.53
BE 0.38 -0.29 1.53 -0.06 0.92 0.74 0.06 1.61 -0.56 -0.56
BG -0.55 -1.09 -0.82 -0.58 -1.54 -1.37 1.88 -0.43 -1.45 -0.84
CZ -0.66 -0.60 -1.09 0.84 -0.45 -0.74 0.42 0.49 0.07 -0.23
DE 0.32 -0.36 1.30 -0.99 0.52 -0.63 -0.38 1.23 0.17 0.21
DK -0.86 1.90 2.20 0.89 1.84 1.74 0.10 0.05 1.93 1.84
EE 0.01 -0.57 -1.27 0.57 -0.29 0.67 0.20 0.13 0.00 0.54
EL 1.12 -1.03 -0.97 -0.18 -1.06 -0.92 1.12 -0.73 -0.72 -1.58
ES 1.42 -0.04 0.45 -1.64 -0.93 -1.10 -1.37 -0.53 -0.19 -0.90
FI -0.32 1.34 0.98 1.41 0.83 1.26 -0.24 0.08 0.67 1.13
FR 1.10 -0.44 0.68 -0.52 0.96 0.62 -1.76 0.38 -0.22 -0.05
HU -1.01 -0.80 -0.88 -0.54 -1.03 -0.66 -1.43 0.62 -1.26 -0.93
IE -1.79 -0.39 -0.22 0.12 0.03 0.68 -0.29 -3.05 0.54 0.04
IT 0.26 -0.58 -0.25 -0.90 -0.07 -0.54 -1.32 0.43 -1.15 -1.69
LT 0.93 -0.56 -1.18 -0.32 -0.40 -0.75 -0.24 0.67 -0.30 0.18
NL -0.05 0.58 1.21 0.93 1.46 1.50 0.60 0.37 1.48 1.11
PL -0.30 -0.68 -0.30 0.29 -1.45 -0.52 0.87 0.54 -1.95 -1.49
PT 2.20 -0.77 0.23 -2.65 -0.47 -0.65 -0.77 -1.16 0.52 0.49
SE 0.59 2.44 0.68 1.40 1.56 2.09 -0.56 1.20 1.36 1.64
SI 0.19 0.51 -0.51 0.75 -0.29 -0.13 2.33 -0.41 0.27 0.44
SK -0.51 -0.72 -1.02 1.43 -1.43 -1.41 0.62 -0.59 -1.13 -0.94
UK -2.21 1.91 -1.15 0.09 0.37 0.05 -0.01 -1.45 1.23 1.05
Source: Eurostat, European Foundation, OECD and DG EMPL calculations.
Table 9a: Standardised data used in PCA
ER_5564T Part_time Temp Temp_1524 UR LabProd UneTrap Low Wage LowWage RedPov
Trap1 Trap2
-1.04 0.64 -0.41 0.01 -0.97 0.97 -0.55 -0.43 0.33 0.63
-1.04 0.73 -0.44 -0.12 0.02 1.46 0.94 0.84 -0.34 0.41
-0.78 -1.25 -0.84 -1.16 0.54 -2.17 0.28 -1.13 -0.74 -1.38
0.10 -0.97 -0.57 -0.85 -0.13 -0.91 -0.63 -0.43 0.13 0.78
0.18 0.93 0.30 1.26 0.36 0.47 0.12 0.51 0.77 0.37
1.44 0.74 -0.32 -0.40 -1.09 0.55 1.36 2.17 1.20 1.33
1.13 -0.68 -1.29 -1.15 -0.13 -1.19 -0.71 -0.87 -1.12 -0.92
-0.16 -0.96 -0.03 -0.42 0.45 0.42 -0.96 -1.42 -1.32 -1.66
-0.03 -0.23 2.92 1.71 0.27 0.26 0.53 -0.87 -1.28 -1.44
0.83 -0.10 0.60 0.52 0.02 0.60 0.28 1.23 1.51 1.07
-0.49 0.25 0.16 0.79 0.42 1.09 0.69 -0.43 0.03 0.63
-0.93 -1.05 -0.70 -0.91 -0.35 -0.71 -1.54 -0.65 -1.38 0.95
0.73 0.21 -1.15 -1.21 -1.24 1.47 0.03 0.46 0.70 -0.15
-1.07 -0.19 0.02 0.14 -0.20 0.61 -0.13 -0.37 -2.09 -1.18
0.52 -0.75 -0.89 -1.10 -0.01 -1.38 -1.42 -0.32 -0.42 -1.28
0.24 3.12 0.44 0.36 -1.12 0.73 0.78 1.56 0.77 0.63
-1.45 -0.38 1.86 1.64 2.89 -1.18 0.61 1.29 0.67 -0.61
0.63 -0.34 1.02 0.60 -0.23 -0.96 0.61 -1.20 0.70 -1.04
2.32 1.00 0.50 1.10 -0.29 0.56 1.11 0.84 1.27 1.80
-1.14 -0.56 0.70 1.50 -0.57 -0.44 1.60 -0.65 0.60 0.87
-1.17 -1.21 -0.99 -1.15 2.45 -0.96 -2.53 -1.04 -0.95 0.07
1.20 1.07 -0.89 -1.17 -1.09 0.68 -0.46 0.90 0.97 0.13
Source: Eurostat, European Foundation, OECD and DG EMPL calculations.
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Table 10a: Standardised data used in PCA
LTUR ALMP PLMP Avg_tenure Work-life Health risks Health Job R&D Patents
balance effects satisfaction
-0.97 -0.10 0.57 -1.14 1.79 0.74 0.66 1.14 0.90 0.83
0.20 1.05 1.66 -1.20 0.29 1.02 1.02 1.19 0.31 0.36
0.80 -0.15 -1.07 1.62 -0.80 -1.28 -0.37 -1.09 -1.13 -0.94
0.12 -1.07 -1.04 0.06 -0.21 0.51 0.20 -0.43 -0.13 -0.84
0.42 0.36 1.64 -1.43 0.87 1.31 1.36 0.65 1.06 1.91
-1.05 2.73 1.85 -0.18 1.66 0.84 0.14 1.97 0.98 1.21
0.12 -1.29 -1.19 -0.11 0.04 -0.92 -1.11 -0.76 -0.65 -0.84
0.46 -1.25 -0.79 -0.37 -2.38 -1.60 -1.57 -0.80 -1.01 -0.88
-0.63 0.26 0.50 2.10 -0.37 -0.13 0.33 -0.58 -0.46 -0.70
-0.63 0.64 1.07 -0.73 0.90 1.06 0.23 -0.05 2.12 1.86
0.04 0.50 0.72 -1.53 0.79 0.86 1.13 0.35 0.64 0.40
-0.26 -0.86 -0.85 0.43 -0.95 -0.02 -0.25 -0.95 -0.65 -0.81
-0.90 -0.03 -0.29 0.37 0.27 1.10 1.13 0.78 -0.32 -0.27
0.01 -0.09 -0.31 -0.85 -0.93 0.17 0.06 -1.05 -0.48 -0.17
0.16 -1.00 -1.19 0.39 -0.67 -1.32 -0.90 -1.25 -0.85 -0.93
-0.75 1.05 1.22 0.28 0.42 0.76 1.34 0.78 0.26 1.29
2.38 -0.39 -0.25 1.92 -1.40 -1.41 -1.78 -0.34 -1.06 -0.95
-0.07 0.07 0.29 0.00 0.16 0.15 0.22 -0.04 -0.80 -0.91
-1.01 1.76 0.18 -0.77 0.70 -1.09 -0.84 0.73 2.53 1.66
-0.29 -0.15 -0.63 -0.47 -0.71 -1.45 -1.51 -1.36 -0.35 -0.52
2.94 -0.93 -1.00 0.64 -0.67 -0.56 -0.99 -0.87 -1.12 -0.91
-1.09 -1.09 -1.11 0.96 1.17 1.28 1.50 1.97 0.21 0.14
Source: Eurostat, European Foundation, OECD and DG EMPL calculations.
Table 11a: Standardised data used in PCA
Inform_tec IT_exports LT_tenure School_leavers >=Upper_secondary VT_employer HRST
0.36 0.40 0.31 -0.58 0.51 0.90 0.09
0.25 -0.70 1.06 -0.08 -0.44 1.06 1.09
-1.02 -1.25 0.17 0.80 -0.02 -2.01 -0.93
0.25 0.26 -0.24 -0.91 1.12 0.17 -0.49
0.48 0.40 0.41 0.02 0.67 -0.18 0.63
0.82 0.13 -1.29 -0.65 0.53 0.02 1.39
0.25 -0.29 -1.86 0.05 1.06 0.16 0.90
-1.71 -0.70 1.68 -0.04 -0.84 -1.18 -1.21
-1.14 -0.84 -0.64 2.16 -1.59 -0.83 0.06
1.17 0.81 0.08 -0.55 0.39 2.23 1.33
0.82 1.09 1.05 -0.13 -0.42 -0.50 0.20
-0.33 1.37 -0.51 -0.17 0.23 -1.28 -0.91
-0.79 2.33 -1.55 -0.17 -0.50 0.79 0.13
-0.91 -0.70 1.01 1.04 -1.47 -0.75 -0.75
-1.25 -1.25 -1.35 -0.56 0.97 -0.66 -0.05
1.40 0.95 0.10 0.00 -0.07 0.13 1.55
-0.56 -1.25 0.67 -1.02 0.78 -0.06 -1.20
-0.56 -0.56 1.23 3.14 -3.03 -1.12 -2.30
1.97 0.26 0.04 -0.24 0.70 1.73 1.21
-0.79 -0.98 1.33 -1.17 0.49 0.21 -0.10
-0.45 -0.98 -0.40 -0.99 0.99 0.18 -1.04
1.74 1.50 -1.29 0.05 -0.07 1.00 0.40
Source: Eurostat, European Foundation, OECD and DG EMPL calculations.
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Table 12a: Description of the data
Symbol Variable Year Source Notes
EPL Employment protection legislation indicator 2003 OECD EU22(1)/ BG EE LT SI.  
EPL Employment protection legislation indicator 2002-2003 ILO BG EE LT SI 
ETP Percentage of population aged 25-64 participating 2005 EUROSTAT
in education or training programmes
LMP Expenditure on labour market policies as a percentage of GDP 2005 EUROSTAT SI based on an ILO estimate
WII First factor of the CatPCA on internal flexibility 2005 EWCS
FWA Second factor of the CatPCA on internal flexibility 2005 EWCS
WAC First factor of the CatPCA on functional flexibility 2005 EWCS
RTW Second factor of the CatPCA on functional flexibility 2005 EWCS
TWED Tax wedge on labour cost for a single person without children 2005 EUROSTAT
ER_1564T Total employment rate (aged 15-64) 2005 EUROSTAT
ER_1564F Female employment rate (aged 15-64) 2005 EUROSTAT
ER_5564T Older workers employment rate (aged 55-64) 2005 EUROSTAT
Part_time Part-time employment rate 2005 EUROSTAT
Temp Temporary employment rate 2005 EUROSTAT
Temp_1524 Temporary employment rate (aged 15-24) 2005 EUROSTAT
UR Unemployment rate 2005 EUROSTAT
LabProd Labour productivity per person employed 2005 EUROSTAT
GDP in PPS per person employed relative to EU-25 (EU-25=100)
UneTrap Unemployment trap for a single person without children 2005 EUROSTAT
(percentage of gross earnings which is 'taxed away' when 
an unemployed person returns to employment)
Low Wage Trap1 Low wage trap for a single person without children 2005 EUROSTAT
(percentage of gross earnings which is 'taxed away' when
gross earnings increase from 33% to 67% of average wage)
LowWageTrap2 Low wage trap for one earner couple with two children 2005 EUROSTAT
(percentage of gross earnings which is taxed away when 
gross earnings increase from 33% to 67% of average wage)
RedPov The difference between the risk of poverty before and after 2005 EUROSTAT BG 2002
social transfers divided by the former
LTUR Long-term unemployment rate 2005 EUROSTAT
ALMP Active labour market policies 2005 EUROSTAT SI based on estimates
PLMP Passive labour market policies 2005 EUROSTAT SI based on estimates
Avg_tenure Average tenure: the first factor of the CatPCA 2005 EWCS
on the job tenure indicator
Work-life balance Do your working hours fit in with your family or social 2005 EWCS
commitments outside work? (Q18) (CatPCA quantifications)
Health risks Do you think your health or safety is at risk because 2005 EWCS
of your work ? (Q32) (CatPCA quantifications)
Health effects Does your work affect your health, or not? 2005 EWCS
(Q33) (CatPCA quantifications)
Job satisfaction On the whole, are you very satisfied, satisfied, not very satisfied 2005 EWCS
or not at all satisfied with the conditions in your main paid job? 
(Q36) (CatPCA quantifications)
R&D Gross domestic expenditure on R&D (GERD) - Percentage of GDP 2005 EUROSTAT
Patents Patent applications to the European Patent Office  (EPO) 2005 EUROSTAT
- Number of applications per million inhabitants
Inform_tec Expenditure on Information Technology as a percentage of GDP 2005 EUROSTAT
IT_exports Exports of high technology products as a share of total exports 2005 EUROSTAT
LT_tenure Long term tenure: percentage of employees in the same job 2005 EUROSTAT
for more than 10 years
School_leavers Early school-leavers (percentage of people aged 18-24 2005 EUROSTAT
with only lower secondary education not in education or training)
>=Upper_secondary Percentage of the population aged 25 to 64 having 2005 EUROSTAT
completed at least upper secondary education
VT_employer Training paid or provided for by your employer 2005 EWCS
(Q28A) (percentages over total)
HRST Human resources in science and technology (HRST) as a share 2005 EUROSTAT
of the economically active population in the age group 25-64. 
(1) EU22: AT BE BG CZ DE DK EE EL ES FI FR HU IE IT LT NL PL PT SE SI SK UK.
1. INTRODUCTION
Education and training have a key
role in responding to the challenges
that are facing European economies:
globalisation, an ageing population,
rapid technical progress and skill
needs. Such a central role is reflected
in the European Union’s agenda, and
in the revised Lisbon Strategy and its
integrated guidelines for growth and
jobs 2005–2008. It calls for develop-
ment and improved investment in
human capital and for the adapta-
tion of education and training sys-
tems in response to these challenges.
The Commission’s 2001 Communica-
tion Making a European area of life-
long learning a reality and the 2002
Council Resolution on lifelong learn-
ing stress the importance of lifelong
learning strategies in that respect.
Vocational education and training is
an integral part of these strategies. It
plays a key role in human capital accu-
mulation for the achievement of eco-
nomic growth, employment and social
objectives, as emphasised in the 2006
Helsinki Communiqué of the European
Ministers of Vocational Education and
Training, the European Social Partners
and the European Commission on
Enhanced European cooperation in
vocational education and training.
Vocational education and training is
an essential tool in providing citizens
with the skills needed in the labour
market and more broadly in the
knowledge-based society. European
vocational and educational policies
should promote high-quality initial
vocational education and training, and
create conditions to improve the skills
of those in the labour force through
continuing vocational education and
training. It has a dual role in contribut-
ing towards competitiveness and
enhancing social cohesion. Vocational
education and training should address
all sections of the population, offering
attractive and challenging pathways
for those with high potential, while at
the same time addressing those at risk
of educational disadvantages and
labour market exclusion. In short,
vocational education and training
should be both equitable and efficient
as highlighted by the Commission’s
2006 Communication Efficiency and
equity in European education and
training systems. 
The Commission’s recent 2006 Com-
munication Adult learning: It is never
too late to learn puts the accent firm-
ly on adult learning, recognising that
it is a vital component of lifelong
learning. Adult learning – defined as
all forms of learning undertaken by
adults after having left initial educa-
tion and training – is increasingly
recognised in Members States’ Nation-
al Reform Programmes. However, with
some exceptions, implementation
remains weak. Most education and
training systems are still largely
focused on the education and training
of young people and limited progress
has been made in changing systems to
mirror the need for ‘lifelong’ learning.
For instance, an additional 4 million
adults would need to participate in
lifelong learning in order to achieve
the participation rate of the bench-
mark agreed by Member States in the
framework of the ‘Education and
Training 2010’ process.
Against this background the chapter
highlights the essential role of con-
tinuing vocational education and
training in the European Union as an
integral part of adult learning. Con-
tinuing vocational training (CVT) can
be financed by individuals, public
authorities or enterprises. This chap-
ter focuses only on CVT at the initia-
tive of the enterprise, defined as all
training measures or activities, which
the enterprise finances wholly or
partly for their employees who have
an employment contract (European
Commission, 2002).
There are at least four good reasons
which call for the strengthening of
CVT in the context of the Lisbon
Strategy for Growth and Jobs. These
reasons may also constitute the
objectives that policies targeted
towards CVT could pursue. 
Firstly, policies can reduce social
exclusion and income inequality,
caused by insufficient human capital,
by raising the skills and the employa-
bility of at-risk workers. 
Secondly, these policies can be a
means to keep older workers, who
entered the labour force with low
levels of schooling, active in the
labour market, thereby sustaining
our social protection systems. 
Thirdly, policies targeted towards
CVT are a crucial ingredient for the
implementation of flexicurity policies
as presented in the recently adopted
Commission’s 2007 Communication
Towards common principles of flexi-
curity: More and better jobs through
flexibility and security by making
internal labour markets more dynam-
ic in the context of permanent eco-
nomic changes, and workers’ skills
more transferable among employers,
while reinforcing the perceptions of
employment security. 
Finally, these policies can help ensure
that workers acquire the skills neces-
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sary to learn and innovate in a new
era characterised by rapid change
and learning, making European
enterprises more competitive in the
knowledge-based economy.
The structure of this chapter is as fol-
lows. Section 2 shows the importance
of CVT in the changing economic con-
text, by describing the long-term
trends and structural changes that
have affected European economies
over past decades. Section 3 discusses
efficiency and equity considerations in
CVT. It explains the reasons why the
training market may fail to induce an
efficient and equitable investment in
CVT justifying the implementation of
some forms of government interven-
tion. Section 4 presents the variety of
supply-side policies that may remedy
these problems by securing both
investment in CVT and the benefits
from such an activity.
2. THE IMPORTANCE
OF CONTINUING
VOCATIONAL TRAINING
The issue of continuing vocational
training (Box 1) in the European
economies appears particularly impor-
tant given the long-term trends and
implications of the structural changes
that have characterised modern
economies over past decades (Boyer,
2000). The latter have indeed been
marked by a transition from a Fordist
model of production based on mass
production methods to a post-Fordist
productive model driven by quality
and innovation. Moreover, European
economies have experienced a massive
employment shift from manufacturing
to the services sector. Finally, among
younger generations, the education
attainment level of the workforce in
these economies has significantly risen.
These long-term trends and structural
changes have pushed up the need for
CVT in order to ensure that workers
who entered the workforce a few
decades ago with low educational
attainment levels have the skills
required to fully participate in the pro-
duction process of today’s economy. In
addition, these trends and structural
changes have put an increasing pres-
sure on the new generations of work-
ers to continuously acquire the skills
necessary to learn and innovate in a
new era characterised by rapid
change.
Given these long-term trends and the
characteristics of the structural
changes that have affected modern
economies over past decades, it
becomes understandable that CVT is
particularly important for both work-
ers and firms. Besides, a growing
empirical literature has intended to
quantify the importance of CVT for
both employees and employers
through the estimation of its eco-
nomic returns. Despite many concep-
tual and methodological problems,
many studies show that CVT has eco-
nomic benefits for employees. In
addition to these benefits that are of
private nature, continuing vocational
training is also likely to have benefits
for the society.
2.1. Continuing
vocational training in a
changing economy
2.1.1. The emergence of a
new production model
After the end of the Second World
War until the beginning of the 1970s,
Western EU Member States experi-
enced a period of sustained econom-
ic development and rapid productiv-
ity growth characterised by weak
short-term fluctuations. While a few
countries such as the United States
were already at the technology fron-
tier or close to it, relying on the
results of scientific and applied
research to develop new products
and processes, Western EU Member
States were in a situation of catching-
up, adopting the characteristics of
the Fordist model of production
(Boyer and Didier, 1998). The Fordist
model of production (Figure 1) has
four principal objectives. 
Firstly, it aims at rationalising the pro-
duction process by means of mecha-
nisation. 
The second objective is to set clear
hierarchical coordination among the
key functions of the firm, namely
design, production and sales. 
The third objective of the Fordist
model of production is the maximisa-
tion of economies of scale in order to
minimise the price of products and
therefore to stimulate mass con-
sumption. In such a model, firms com-
pete essentially on the basis of price. 
Finally, only the small firms can
respond to the possible variations in
the demand; the production of big
firms is essentially dedicated to the
large and stable markets requiring a
standardised product.
In order to catch up rapidly and at
low cost, Western EU Member States
assimilated these management prin-
ciples through the absorption of new
technologies incorporated in single
purpose production equipment, but
also through the implementation of
specific methods of work organisa-
tion (Boyer and Didier, 1998).
These management principles called
for a particular organisation of work
within the firm. This organisation in
the Fordist model of production was
characterised by a high degree of
centralising decision making within
firms and a polarisation of skills in
order to minimise the need for high-
ly skilled, versatile and adaptable
workers while ensuring a sustained
growth in productivity levels. There
was a clear separation between man-
ual and non-manual labour. Further-
more, in this process of mass produc-
tion where firms exclusively compet-
ed on the basis of price, a high
degree of specialisation of workers’
tasks was seen as a precondition to
achieving cost reduction in order to
realise large economies of scale and
gain new market shares. This extreme
fragmentation of tasks led,
inevitably, to the deskilling of jobs
(Boyer, 1995; Lundvall and Johnson,
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1994) but a relative social peace was
ensured in this model by a system of
employment relations that, in partic-
ular, institutionalised the distribution
of productivity gains between the
workers and the firm.
This institutionalised distribution of
productivity gains played an essential
role in the Fordist model of produc-
tion. Not only did it contribute to
achieving a relative social peace in
the workplace, but it also fuelled the
economic performance of the model
itself, as shown by the sustained eco-
nomic growth of the post-war period.
The period was indeed remarkable
for two reasons (Juillard, 1995). On
the one hand, the growth in produc-
tivity was proportional to the
increase in real wages. The constant
increase in real wages contributed to
a continuous expansion of demand
for consumer goods and subsequent-
ly to the development of mass pro-
duction in Western EU Member
States, following the Fordist produc-
tive model. On the other hand, the
constancy of the labour income share
had, parallel to it, the constancy of
the capital income share, which
allowed firms to self-finance their
investments for expansion and ratio-
nalisation/modernisation.
Despite the apparent success of the
Fordist model of production in West-
ern Europe after World War II, the
economic situation started to deteri-
orate at the end of the 1960s and the
beginning of the 1970s. During that
period, the application of the man-
agement principles of Fordism start-
ed to be counterproductive while the
strengths of the system of employ-
ment relations became weaknesses
and the Fordist organisation proved
to be largely ineffective following a
series of macro-economic changes
(Boyer and Durand, 1997; Boyer and
Didier, 1998; Lundvall and Johnson,
1994). Among the many factors that
called into question the apparent
pre-eminence of this model of pro-
duction in industrialised economies
in the 1970s were the following:
• Demand became more uncertain
in both volume and pattern.
Overcapacity rapidly appeared in
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Box 1 – What do we mean by continuing vocational training at the initiative of the enterprise?
There is a profusion of definitions associated with the concept of continuing vocational training. The latter is often
referred to under different terms: employer training, company training, workplace training, employer-provided
training, enterprise-based training, work-related training, private sector training, etc. In order to avoid any con-
fusion, it is worthwhile to define this concept. 
Vocational training covers both initial vocational training and continuing vocational training. Here we are address-
ing only issues related to CVT, which, moreover, may be financed by individuals, public authorities or enterprises.
The chapter subject is CVT financed by enterprises – what we call ‘continuing vocational training at the initiative of
the enterprise’. Continuing vocational training is defined as ‘training measures or activities, which the enterprise
finances wholly or partly for their employees who have an employment contract’ (European Commission, 2002).
This definition calls for a few remarks. Firstly, the primary objective of CVT at the initiative of the enterprise is the
acquisition of new skills or the development of existing skills by employees having an employment contract. Con-
sequently, measures for training apprentices or unemployed persons are not considered in this chapter. Secondly,
the financing of CVT in total or partly by enterprises can be direct or indirect. Part financing could include the use
of work time for the training activity. Thirdly, enterprises may provide CVT for their employees through external as
well as internal courses. Finally, CVT at the initiative of the enterprise is different from other forms of training that
cannot be distinguished from work, such as on-the-job training (i.e. training carried out in the individual’s work set-
ting, using the job as the medium for learning). The latter falls into the category non-formal and informal learning,
which is growing in importance, as learning becomes more embedded in work, given the nature of the modern
workplace and the need for constant change, and the development of the learning organisation. However, due to
the heterogeneity of the data on non-formal and informal learning, this is not covered in the scope of this chapter.
Figure 1: The Fordist model of production
New technologies
Cost reduction but built-in rigidity 
and poor quality
Work organisation based on Taylorism Standardised products
Low-skilled workers Need for stable and growing markets
Source: based on Boyer (1995).
many industries and the mass
production process was too rigid
to satisfy an increasing demand
for vertically and horizontally
differentiated products. This
model was all the more inade-
quate to satisfy the new needs,
which led to an emergence of
problems with quality.
• The growing internationalisation
of trade exacerbated the prob-
lems associated with the rising
uncertainty of demand because,
in many cases, markets were no
longer domestic but worldwide
and thereby more difficult to
control. This increasing inter-
nationalisation also sharpened
competition among firms.
• Systematic incremental innov-
ation started to become a pre-
requisite for firms to survive in
more competitive and rapidly
changing environments (Lundvall
and Johnson, 1994). However,
many Western EU Member States
did not develop active research
and development policies during
the years of Fordism, except for a
few mission-oriented sectors such
as defence (Boyer, 1995). In addi-
tion, the Fordist productive
model led to the deskilling of
workers while innovation
required a well-educated, versa-
tile and adaptable workforce.
Moreover, the organisation of
the large and vertically integrat-
ed firms under the Fordist era
appeared to be too rigid to
favour systemic incremental
innovation that required strong
interactions among many differ-
ent actors, within and outside
their boundaries.
• Lastly, the rise of information and
communication technologies (ICT)
rapidly made obsolete a model of
mass production based on single-
purpose production equipment by
opening the way for more flexible
production processes, capable of
responding rapidly to changes in
demand, in terms of both volume
and patterns. Moreover, the meth-
ods of work organisation in the
Fordist-type firm were not adapt-
ed for the use of these technolo-
gies. Numerous studies have
indeed related the changes in
methods of work organisation –
leading, in particular, to flatter
structures and the upskilling of
skills – to the use of ICT (see, Euro-
pean Commission, 2005a for a sur-
vey on this).
These changes in the economic con-
text of the post-war period in the
advanced capitalist countries implied
a transition from a Fordist-type
model of production to a post-Fordist
productive model
1
(Figure 2). In the
post-Fordist production model, pro-
duction was differentiated and quality-
oriented in order to satisfy an
increasingly diversified demand. Con-
sequently, single-purpose production
equipment was replaced by new
equipment allowing for more flexi-
bility in the production process in
order to maximise economies of
scope. Greater efforts were devoted
towards improving the quality of
products, through the improvement
of existing products and the develop-
ment of new products, both resulting
from innovation.
New methods of work organisation
accompanied these changes in the
production process. The differences
in the way work was organised in the
Fordist firm and the post-Fordist firm
could be demonstrated by comparing
the typical American firm with the
typical Japanese firm in the 1980s
(Aoki, 1986). In the typical American
firms, emblematic of the Fordist
model, the jobs of workers were spe-
cified according to a detailed job clas-
sification scheme defined in accor-
dance with the trade unions. By con-
trast, in the Japanese firms, workers’
jobs were not specified exhaustively
and workers rotated among several
jobs. A second key difference con-
cerned the decision process. While in
the typical American firm decisions
were hierarchically organised, the
typical Japanese approach was
marked by a flatter structure in order
to encourage horizontal coordin-
ation among workers to allow for
rapid problem solving and learning
because the environment was more
uncertain. Finally, the typical Japan-
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Figure 2: The post-Fordist model of production
Differentiated products
Flexibility, cost reducation and quality 
are comparable
Response to the market Skilled, versatile and adaptable workers
Source: based on Boyer (1995).
Learning and adaptable organisation
1 Here we refer only to general trends. Economists such as Storper and Salais (1994) argue that there was a durable diversity of ‘worlds of 
production’, i.e. models of production, rather than a single new alternative model of production. The same goes for the forms of work 
organisation since there was not a full transition towards a universal model of work organisation (European Commission, 2007a).
ese firm was less integrated than its
American counterpart. Firms were
organised around networks. Workers
were encouraged to participate in a
process of interactive learning taking
place at a great number of interfaces,
not only inside but also outside the
firms (Lundvall and Johnson, 1994).
The transition from a Fordist to a
post-Fordist productive model there-
fore put human capital at the centre
of the firm. While low-skilled and
highly specialised workers were the
archetypal workers of the Fordist
firm, high-skilled, versatile and
adaptable workers become essential
elements of the post-Fordist one
where competition is based on innov-
ation and quality (Boyer, 1995; Lind-
beck and Snower, 2000).
Having a good supply of qualified
and adaptable workers through the
education system is thus crucial in the
context of this new model of produc-
tion. It is nevertheless insufficient
and needs to be supplemented by
CVT for two reasons. 
On one hand, technological and
organisational developments in the
process of production have made the
skills of workers that entered the
workforce during the Fordist era eco-
nomically obsolete because these
developments have changed the
skills demanded for many specific
jobs.
2
Several empirical studies have
shown that the introduction of new
methods of work organisation within
the firms, as well as the acceleration
of technical change over past
decades, has indeed led to an
increased need for upskilling the
workforce (Capelli et al., 1997; Euro-
pean Commission, 2005b). For this
reason, the need for CVT has pushed
up the agenda in order to upgrade
the skills of these workers.
On the other hand, a continual
upgrading of skills – not only for the
workers that entered the labour force
a few decades ago but also for the rel-
atively new entrants – has become a
necessity in the post-Fordist era due to
a rapid change in economic conditions
and high requirements for rapid
learning and innovation (Boyer, 1995;
Lundvall and Johnson, 1994). A num-
ber of empirical studies have shown
that firms which adopt new forms of
work organisation, encouraging in
particular innovation, autonomy,
learning and quality, often tend to
provide higher training to their
employees (Osterman, 1995; Lynch
and Black, 1998; Whitfield, 2000;
Behaghel and Greenan, 2005; Zaroma,
2006; Arundel et al., 2006). In order to
gauge the effects of the introduction
of new forms of work organisation on
the likelihood of accessing to training
in the EU Member States, this 
chapter use binary probit regression. 
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2 Two main types of skills obsolescence can be distinguished: technical and economic skills obsolescence (Rosen, 1975; de Grip and van Loo, 2002).
Technical skills obsolescence is caused by changes that stem from workers themselves (e.g. illness, ageing) while economic skills obsolescence is
due to changes in the job or work environment.
Box 2 – Probit model of the determinants of continuing vocational training at the initiative of enterprise
A large body of this chapter discusses the determinants of vocational training at the initiative of the enterprise.
Bivariate plots or cross-tabulations are used in order to examine the participation of employees in CVT. In that
respect, simple bivariate plots or cross-tabulations of CVT with different observable characteristics, such as gender,
age or level of education, can be used. However, bivariate plots or simple regressions have a major drawback since
they ignore the impact of another dependent variable on the independent variable. This is unsatisfactory because
frequently more than one factor matters. Take for instance, the relationship between participation in CVT and age.
Simple bivariate cross-tabulations of age and training may lead to misleading conclusions if age is correlated with
other factors (i.e. level of schooling) that are also associated with the likelihood of workers participating in training
(i.e. the omitted variable bias).
In order to disentangle the relative importance of factors that may be related to participation in training, multivari-
ate regression techniques are typically used. Binary probit regressions are standard when the dependent variable is
a dummy variable (i.e. 0 or 1), as this is the case for participation in training paid for or provided by their employ-
er. Bivariate probit regressions are not used because of the very low number of employees that pay for training
themselves, as reported in the fourth European Working Conditions Survey (see below). In this chapter, we charac-
terise the empirical relationship between participation of employees to CVT and other characteristics (i.e. workers’,
establishment, job-related and institutional characteristics) with the following two probit specifications:
(1) Prob {T2005=1} =Φ (αc+Z1’β1)
(2) Prob {T2005=1} =Φ (Z2’β2)
Where T2005 is a dummy equal to 1 if training paid for or provided by the employer occurred during the 12 months
preceding the survey (2005) and 0 otherwise the reference year, αc are country effects, Z1 and Z2 are vectors of
explanatory variables respectively, workers’, establishment and job-related characteristics; workers’, establishment,
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job-related and institutional characteristics), β1 and β2 are vectors of parameters and Φ is the standard normal dis-
tribution. In these two specifications, only employees with an indefinite contract or a fixed-term contract are con-
sidered in each regression. Employees who have a temporary employment agency contract, apprenticeship or other
training scheme are excluded.
Most of the variables included in the vector Z are drawn from the fourth European Working Conditions Survey (Parent-
Thirion et al., 2007). The dependant variable in the two probit specifications corresponds to question 28A: ‘Over the
past 12 months, have you undergone training paid for or provided by your employer, or by yourself if you are self-
employed?’. The survey is carried out simultaneously by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living
and Working Conditions in all EU Member States. It only covers individuals in employment. The survey questionnaire
asks more than 100 questions, including questions on household characteristics, time use, work organisation, per-
ceived health hazards and access to training. The survey methodology is based on a multi-stage random sampling
method called ‘random-walk’ involving face-to-face interviews conducted at the respondent’s principal residence.
This survey was carried out in each of the 27 EU Member States between 19 September and 30 November 2005.
Approximately 30 000 workers were interviewed. The survey questionnaire was directed at approximately 1 000
workers per country with the exceptions of Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia which had only 600
respondents each.
Table 1 reports on the estimated change in the probability of undergoing training, paid for or provided by the
employer, associated with each specific characteristic for an employee (those with a fixed-term or indefinite con-
tract) otherwise identical to the reference employee. The reference employee is a French employee working in a
medium-sized enterprise (50–249 employees) whose principal activity is in the manufacturing sector. This employee
is male, blue-collar and highly skilled with upper secondary education. He has an indefinite and full-time contract
and has been in his company for between two and six years. He is aged between 25 and 39 years old and has a low
income.
Table 1 - Probit estimates of the determinants of continuing vocational training at the initiative of enterprise
First probit model Second probit model
Institutional Lifelong learning
characteristics Participation in lifelong leaning 0.247 ***
Active labour market policies
Expenditures on ALMPs (in percentage of GDP) -0.158 **
Wage compression
90–50 wage differential -0.166 ***
50–10 wage differential 0.046
Establishment Sector (reference: manufacturing)
characteristics Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 0.083 0.036
Mining and quarrying 0.514 *** 0.381
Electricity, gas, and water 0.315 *** 0.251
Construction -0.106 * -0.077
Wholesale and retail trade 0.029 0.008
Hotels and restaurants -0.321 *** -0.389 ***
Transport, storage and communication 0.227 *** 0.198 ***
Financial intermediation and insurance 0.398 *** 0.363 ***
Real estate, renting and business activities -0.022 -0.007
Public administration and defence, compulsory social security 0.333 *** 0.365 ***
Education 0.201 *** 0.173 ***
Health and social security 0.203 *** 0.194 ***
Other community, social and personal service activities 0.227 *** 0.140
Enterprise size (reference: medium enterprises)
Micro-enterprise (fewer than 10 employees) -0.195 *** -0.181 ***
Small enterprises (10–49 employees) -0.135 *** -0.126 ***
Large enterprises (250+ employees) 0.030 0.030
Worker characteristics Gender (reference: male)
Female 0.050 *** 0.037
Educational attainment (reference: upper secondary education)
Pre-primary education (ISCED 0) -1.336 *** -1.337 ***
Primary education (ISCED 1) -0.196 ** -0.159 *
Lower secondary education (ISCED 2) -0.129 *** -0.175 *
Post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 4) 0.100 ** 0.102 **
First stage of tertiary education (ISCED 5) 0.163 *** 0.174 ***
Second stage of tertiary education (ISCED 6) 0.077 0.144
Age (reference: between 25 and 39 years old)
Less than 24 years old -0.053 -0.015
Between 40 and 54 years old -0.018 -0.016
55 years old and over -0.211 *** -0.270 ***
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cont'd First probit model Second probit model
Job-related Indefinite/non indefinite (reference: indefinite contract)
characteristics Fixed term contract -0.001 -0.007
Full-time/part-time (reference: full-time contract)
Part-time contract 0.020 0.040
Job tenure (reference: between 2 and 6 years of job tenure)
Less than one year of job tenure -0.183 *** -0.193 ***
Between 1 and 2 years of job tenure -0.029 -0.018
Between 6 and 15 years of job tenure -0.046 -0.019
More than 15 years of job tenure -0.008 0.018
Income level (reference: low income level)
Lowest income level -0.150 *** -0.188 ***
High income level 0.105 *** 0.089 **
Highest income level 0.231 *** 0.202 ***
Occupation (reference: blue-collar high-skill)
White-collar high-skill 0.428 *** 0.436 ***
White-collar low-skill 0.323 *** 0.363 ***
Blue-collar low-skill 0.202 *** 0.267 ***
Workplace practices Workplace practices
characteristics Job rotation 0.133 *** 0.120 ***
Team work 0.157 *** 0.166 ***
Quality norms 0.066 ** 0.042
Responsability for quality control 0.031 0.086 ***
Problem solving activities 0.059 0.047
Monotony of tasks -0.079 *** -0.068 **
Complexity of tasks 0.092 *** 0.060 *
Learning new things in work 0.419 *** 0.459 ***
Discretion in fixing work methods 0.080 ** 0.092 ***
Discretion in setting work pace 0.009 0.010
Repetitiveness of tasks -0.006 -0.028
Country Country (reference: France)
Belgium 0.355 ***
Czech Republic 0.015
Denmark 0.190 **
Germany -0.120
Estonia 0.159
Greece -0.326 ***
Spain -0.188 *
Ireland 0.503 ***
Italy -0.075
Cyprus -0.029
Latvia -0.155 *
Lithuania 0.172 *
Luxembourg 0.197 **
Hungary -0.180 **
Malta 0.197 *
The Netherlands -0.050
Austria 0.454 ***
Poland 0.103
Portugal -0.228 **
Slovenia 0.322 ***
Slovakia 0.300 ***
Finland 0.631 ***
Sweden 0.575 ***
United Kingdom 0.457 ***
Bulgaria -0.835 ***
Romania -0.265 ***
Observations 13025 11162
Pseudo R-squared 0.174 0.160
Source: DG EMPL estimates based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey.
***, **, *, statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Note: Each probit model estimates change in the probability of undergoing training, paid for or provided by the employer, associated with each spe-
cific characteristic for an employee (on a fixed-term or indefinite contract) otherwise identical to the reference employee. The sample population is
employees in the EU-27 interviewed in the framework of the fourth European Working Conditions Survey for the first probit model. For the second
probit model, the sample population is employees in all the EU-27 expect Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia interviewed in the
framework of the fourth European Working Conditions Survey. The reference individual is indicated in the table. The dependant variable is the par-
ticipation in training paid for or provided by employers over the past 12 months at the time of the interview. Only employees with an indefinite con-
tract or a fixed-term contract are considered in each regression. Employees who have a temporary employment agency contract or apprenticeship or
other training scheme are excluded.
Results of the first probit model on
the basis of the fourth European
Working Conditions Survey data (Box
2) indicate that the probability of par-
ticipating in CVT is higher for employ-
ees with jobs involving job rotation,
teamwork, meeting precise quality
standards, complex tasks and learning
new things on their own, and also for
employees able to choose or change
their methods of work. On the con-
trary, employees with jobs involving
monotonous tasks are, all things
being equal, less likely to participate
in CVT (Table 1, see page 204).
In that perspective, CVT allows for the
development of efficient internal
labour markets within firms, comple-
mentary to external labour markets, to
respond to changes in economic condi-
tions. Caroli and Walkowiak (2007)
show that skill upgrading through CVT
following technological changes takes
place in France, mostly through intern-
al labour market adjustments, without
relying heavily on support from the
external market. The importance of
internal labour markets is acknowl-
edged by the European Commission.
The recently adopted Commission’s
2007 Communication Towards com-
mon principles of flexicurity: More and
better jobs through flexibility and
security recognises that flexibility goes
beyond the ease or difficulty of hiring
and firing employees (i.e. external flex-
ibility) and can also be provided within
the firm, either via flexible working-
time arrangements (i.e. internal flexi-
bility) or high-quality organisation of
work which is capable of mastering
new skills and productive needs (i.e.
functional flexibility), as is the case in
firms that adopt work practices
encouraging innovation, autonomy,
learning and quality.
3
However, there
are indications that such new work
practices have also resulted in an
increased demand from employers for
broader-based forms of skills, often
referred under the term ‘generic
skills’
4
, alongside more traditional
technical skills (Griffiths and Guile,
2004).
2.1.2. The employment shift
towards services
Not only have Western European
economies been affected by the ero-
sion of the Fordist model at the begin-
ning of the 1970s, but they have also
experienced major sectoral changes. In
particular, there has been a massive
employment shift away from manu-
facturing and towards services.
When measured as a percentage of
the total value added or employment,
the decline of manufacturing and the
growth of services in Western Euro-
pean economies over the past
decades, and subsequently in the
Central and Eastern European
economies, are evident. As shown in
chart 1, the value added from EU
manufacturing industries accounted
for roughly 22% of total economic
activity in 1970. By 2004, manufactur-
ing’s share of EU output had shrunk
to just over 18%. Over the past 30
years, the number of people engaged
in manufacturing in relation to the
total economy has also fallen, from a
high of over 29% in 1970 to fewer
206
EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE 2007
3 See also European Commission (2007a).
4 The concept of generic skills is nevertheless ubiquitous (Griffiths and Guile, 2004).
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Chart 1: Long-term trends in value added in the EU by sector, 1970–2004
Source: EU KLEMS database, March 2007, http://www.euklems.net
Note: EU-15: 1970–1994; EU-25: 1995–2004.
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Chart 2: Long-term trends in the number of persons employed in the European
Union by sector, 1970–2004
Source: EU KLEMS database, March 2007, http://www.euklems.net
Note: EU-15: 1970–1994; EU-25: 1995–2004.
than 17% in 2004 (Chart 2). During
the same period, the value-added
share of the services sector relative to
the total economic activity climbed
from 49% to 67%. Many reasons
explain the growing importance of
services in these economies and the
employment shift away from manu-
facturing towards services. It is not
only the result of the reallocation of
resources towards these activities due
to their low productivity growth. This
growing importance of services can
also be related to demand-side fac-
tors, such as a high income elasticity
of demand for certain services; demo-
graphic developments; the provision
of some services as public goods; and
finally the increasing role of services
as providers of intermediate inputs
(Wölfl, 2005).
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Chart 3: Changes in the occupational employment structure in selected EU Member States since the 1980s by sector
Source: OECD (1998), Eurostat (Labour Force Survey).
Note: White-collar high-skill consists of ISCO groups 1, 2 and 3; white-collar low-skill of ISCO groups 4 and 5; blue-collar high-skill of ISCO groups 6 and 7; and blue-collar
low-skill of ISCO groups 8 and 9.
The employment shift from manufac-
turing to services in Western Europe has
been accompanied by a substantial
change in the occupational employ-
ment structure. Since the 1980s, there
has been, in particular, a significant rise
in white-collar, highly skilled occupa-
tions and, at the same time, a relative
decrease in blue-collar occupations in
these economies. This change in the
occupational employment structure is
particularly noticeable in four major
Western EU Member States – namely,
France, Germany, Italy and the United
Kingdom – for which comparable data
are available over that long period
(Chart 3, see page 207). Although this
change reflects, for instance, the grow-
ing role of technology and knowledge-
intensive activities in these economies
and the decline of Fordism charac-
terised by low-skilled jobs
5
, it is also a
direct consequence of the employment
shift towards services. Indeed the pro-
portion of white-collar, highly skilled
jobs is traditionally relatively high in the
services sector. For instance, they repre-
sented between 45 and 50% of total
employment occupations in services in
France and Germany respectively in
2005, compared to approximately 31
and 29% in manufacturing (Chart 3, see
previous page). At the beginning of the
1980s, the share of white-collar, highly
skilled occupations in total employment
in the services sector was already sub-
stantially higher in these two countries
than in the manufacturing sector.
The rapid increase in the employ-
ment share of services in Western
Europe associated with higher skill
requirements for service occupations
has contributed towards strengthen-
ing the need for CVT in many mod-
ern services, such as financial servic-
es, as well as in social services (Boyer,
2000). Results from the fourth Euro-
pean Working Conditions Survey
(Chart 4) show that the levels of CVT
increase with the skill levels of occu-
pations. Simple bivariate cross-tabu-
lations of employment by occupa-
tion and training may nevertheless
lead to misleading conclusions if
employment occupation is correlat-
ed with other factors (e.g. level of
schooling) that are also associated
with the likelihood of workers par-
ticipating in training. In order to dis-
entangle the relative importance of
factors that may be related to
participating in training, multivari-
ate regression techniques are typi-
cally used in many empirical studies.
Using data from the International
Adult Literary Survey
6
and the Euro-
pean Community Household Panel
7
,
these studies indicate that, all things
being equal, the probability of
receiving training increases with the
skills level of occupation (OECD,
2003; Bassanini et al., 2005). Results
of our first probit model on all EU
Member States also show that the
likelihood of participation in CVT
rises with the skill content of occu-
pation (Table 1, see page 204). In
consequence, it is not surprising that
the levels of training in the Euro-
pean Union are higher in most serv-
ice activities – especially public
administration, finance and insur-
ance, and education and heath –
than in manufacturing (Chart 5).
The need for CVT in many sector activ-
ities is high because many workers
joined firms during the Fordist era
with low educational attainment lev-
els to occupy very specific jobs charac-
terised by low-skill requirements.
While technological and organisation-
al developments in the production
process have made the skills of many
of these workers economically obso-
lete, the shift in the sectoral structure
of employment has decreased the
demand for several occupations associ-
ated with manufacturing activities.
This shift in the sectoral structure of
employment is, in that respect, a sec-
ond cause of the economic obsoles-
cence of the skills of many workers
that entered the labour force during
the years of Fordism. The situation of
these workers has even worsened since
the 1990s with the introduction of
new technologies. Indeed modern ser-
vices, such as wholesale and retail
trade, finance, insurance and business
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Chart 4: Number of employees who participated in continuing vocational training
in the European Union by employment occupations, 2005
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey.
Note: White-collar high-skill consists of ISCO groups 1, 2 and 3; white-collar low-skill of ISCO groups 4 and 5;
blue-collar high-skill of ISCO groups 6 and 7; and blue-collar low-skill of ISCO groups 8 and 9.
5 A recent study commissioned by the European Commission has found that the skill upgrading process within sectors contributed more to the
increasing demand for highly skilled workers than shifts of overall employment between sectors (European Commission, 2007b).
6 This survey covers the following countries: Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
7 This survey covers the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom.
services, have been characterised by a
growing use of ICT by firms in order to
boost productivity (European Commis-
sion, 2005a). The diffusion of these
technologies in many service-sector
firms has reinforced the importance of
CVT in order to reduce the digital
divide between older and younger
workers (Friedberg, 1999).
However, it would be a mistake to
conclude at this stage that the struc-
tural shift towards services, coupled
with a significant change in the occu-
pational employment structure has
increased the need for CVT for older
workers only. Indeed, many service
sector firms are becoming more in-
novative and knowledge-intensive,
contrary to widespread wisdom. 
Certainly the research and develop-
ment (R&D) intensity of the services
sector – measured by the share of busi-
ness R&D expenditure in the value
added of the services sector – is much
lower than the R&D intensity of the
manufacturing sector (Table 2). This
relatively low R&D intensity in services
can nevertheless be related to the
innovation process in services itself
which is, in many respects, different
from that in manufacturing (Tamura et
al., 2005). In other words, these low
investments in R&D do not preclude
any substantial innovative activities in
services, as shown by the results from
the new fourth Community Innovation
Survey. When looking at the results of
the survey (covering the three-year
period 2002–2004), the innovation
density of firms – defined as the pro-
portion of firms reporting an innova-
tion activity either through the intro-
duction of new or significantly
improved products to the market or
the implementation of new or signifi-
cantly improved processes – amounted
to around 37% in the services sector
within the European Union, compared
to nearly 42% in the manufacturing
sector (Table 2).
Of course training is useful for these
service-sector firms in order to
increase the ability of their workers
to learn and innovate. However,
what is relatively unexpected is the
high significance given by these firms
to training to sustain their innovation
activity compared to other innova-
tion mechanisms, such as intramural
R&D, extramural R&D or the acquisi-
tion of external knowledge through
the purchase or licensing of patents
and non-patented inventions, know-
how and other types of knowledge.
Among these service-sector firms
engaged in innovation activity dur-
ing the three-year period 2002–2004,
around 56% of them report, in the
fourth Communication Innovation
Survey, that they provided internal or
external training for their personnel
specifically for the development
and/or introduction of innovations,
compared to less than 50% in the
manufacturing sector (Chart 6, see
page 210).
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Chart 5: Number of employees who participated in continuing vocational training in the European Union by sector, 2005
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey.
Table 2 - Innovation density and R&D intensity in the European Union 
by sector, 2004
Innovation density R&D intensity
Manufacturing 41.7 1.0
Services 37.0 0.2
Source: Eurostat (fourth Community Innovation Survey), DG RTD estimates for R&D intensity
based on Eurostat data.
2.1.3. The rise in educational
attainment of the workforce
The expansion of high-skilled occupa-
tions in EU Member States over past
decades, due notably to the growth
of the services sector and the decline
of Fordism, has happened alongside
a substantial rise in the educational
attainment of the workforce (Euro-
pean Commission, 2006a), thereby
increasing the need for CVT for older
workers.
The rise in the educational attainment
of the whole population is particularly
observable in Southern EU Member
States – namely Portugal, Spain, Malta,
Cyprus, Italy and Greece – where the
population aged 45–54 years is charac-
terised on average by a low education-
al attainment level compared to the
25–34 age group (Chart 7). Less than
50% of the older group has indeed
attained at least upper secondary edu-
cation in many of these countries. The
difference in educational attainment
level between the 25–34 and the
45–54 age groups is also evident in
Member States such as France, Luxem-
bourg, Belgium, Ireland.
The substantial rise in the education-
al attainment of the female popula-
tion over the last few decades has
contributed towards accentuating
the differences in human capital (in
the form of initial education)
between the younger and older
workers. In many Member States the
difference in the share of population
with at least upper secondary educa-
tion aged 25–34 years and 45–54
years is higher for females (Chart 8).
This trend is again very apparent in
Southern Member States where
younger women tend to be more
educated than their elders. 
The older workers, particularly
women, that entered the labour force
a few decades ago without a relatively
strong academic background have
therefore had to face direct competi-
tion from new entrants who are, on
average, better educated. Such a dif-
ference in human capital (in the form
of initial education) between the two
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Chart 7: Population that has attained at least upper secondary education in EU
Member States by age group, 2006
Source: Eurostat (Labour Force Survey).
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education in EU Member States by age group, 2006
Source: Eurostat (Labour Force Survey).
Source: Eurostat (fourth Community Innovation Survey).
Note: European Union: EU-27 less Bulgaria, Ireland, Latvia, Malta, Austria, Slovenia, Finland and the United
Kingdom.
generations calls for an increased
access to CVT for older workers in
order to reduce a possible segmenta-
tion of internal labour markets within
firms (Boyer, 2000).
From the preceding developments, it is
clear that CVT has become increasingly
important for both workers and firms,
given the long-term trends and the
particularities of the structural
changes that have affected modern
economies, particularly in the Euro-
pean Union, over past decades. 
Nevertheless, there remain very sharp
differences among EU Member Sates
in terms of levels of training, as shown
by the results of the fourth European
Working Conditions Survey (Chart 9).
In 2005, Nordic countries such as Fin-
land and Sweden ranked joint first in
terms of the amount of training
received by workers at work. At the
other end of the scale are most South-
ern, Central and Eastern EU Member
States, where the levels of training are
very low, barely reaching 20% of
employees. 
Despite the growing importance of
continuing vocational training in our
economies, the quantitative evidence
of its benefits for employees, employ-
ers and the society needs to be
assessed. The next sub-section gives a
short (non-technical) review
8
of the
empirical literature on the economic
benefits of CVT for both employees
and employers through, notably, an
increase in wages and an increase in
productivity. Moreover, it discusses
the social returns of continuing voca-
tional training in relation to those of
initial education. 
2.2. The economic
benefits of continuing
vocational training
2.2.1. Economic benefits for
employees 
A growing empirical literature examin-
ing the effects of CVT on wages has
emerged due to the growing availabil-
ity of new datasets encompassing
direct measures on training (for the
United States: Brown, 1989; Barron et
al., 1989; Lynch, 1992; Veum, 1995a;
Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998,
1999b).
The early literature on the subject
gives strong evidence that CVT increas-
es wage growth. However the results
from this literature have been ques-
tioned over recent years because the
magnitude of the economic returns
from CVT is quite high, especially
when compared to that of formal edu-
cation. In many cases the effects of
CVT on wages are roughly similar to
the economic returns from an addi-
tional year of formal education, which
generally amount to between 5% and
15% (European Commission, 2006a).
This result is rather curious given that
the CVT duration is often very short
(Schone, 2004).
Over recent years, the empirical litera-
ture on the subject has attempted to
explain why the economic returns to
CVT are so high and to refine estima-
tion techniques (Schone, 2004; Booth
and Bryan, 2007; Leuven and Ooster-
beek, 2007). Estimating the wage
effects of training is indeed not with-
out its difficulties due to conceptual
and methodological problems posed
by the endogeneity of training. Indeed
workers who participate in CVT activi-
ties are just as likely to have different
observable (e.g. higher levels of
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Chart 9: Number of employees who participated in continuing vocational training in EU Member States, 2005
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey.
8 There are many conceptual and methodological problems associated with the measurement of the economic returns on workplace training. A
detailed discussion of these problems is far beyond the scope of this chapter. For more details on these problems, see, for instance, Leuven and
Oosterbeek (2002), Leuven (2004), Frazis and Loewenstein (2003), Bassanini et al. (2005), and Dearden et al. (2006). For a non-technical survey of
the empirical literature on the benefits of workplace training, see Asplund (2004).
schooling) or unobservable (e.g. high-
er abilities) characteristics as other
workers do. Moreover, firms are also
likely to choose CVT for those workers
who have the highest expected pro-
ductivity. Several recent studies have
aimed to correct for this possible
endogenous bias using different tech-
niques (e.g. Heckman-type selection
models, instrumental variables, fixed-
effect estimators) (Leuven and Ooster-
beek, 2007). These studies have found
more mixed results (for France, Goux
and Maurin, 2000; for Germany, Pis-
chke, 2001), although some still indi-
cate positive wage effects of CVT (for
Norway, Schone, 2004; OECD, 2004a;
for the United Kingdom, Booth and
Bryan, 2007). However, these mixed
results can be interpreted as the exis-
tence of a compressed wage structure
relative to productivity differentials, as
we will see later in the chapter
9
.
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that
several empirical studies have exam-
ined the wage effects of CVT on the
different categories of employees.
Results from these studies indicate
that the wage effects are generally
lower for the workers with low edu-
cational attainment levels than for
those with a stronger academic back-
ground (Bassanini et al., 2005).
Beyond the wage effects of CVT,
other economic benefits for employ-
ees have also been identified. Train-
ing is usually assumed to provide
workers with increased promotional
opportunities and improved employ-
ability and job security (Blundell et
al., 1996; Wooden et al., 2001; OECD,
2004a), especially in the case of both
older and low-educated workers.
Continuing vocational training is
associated with job satisfaction too
(European Commission, 2007a).
2.2.2. Economic benefits for
employers
Few empirical studies (for the United
States: Bartel, 1994; Black and Lynch,
1996; for France and Sweden, Ballot
et al., 2006; for the United Kingdom:
Dearden et al., 2006; for Germany:
Zwick, 2007) have intended to meas-
ure the effects of CVT on productivity.
These studies are small compared to
those on the wage effects of CVT
because the direct measures of pro-
ductivity are scarce. Although the
effects of CVT on productivity gains
could indeed be, at first sight, meas-
ured indirectly through wage increas-
es, the new theoretical training
literature has nevertheless suggested
that the strict relationship between
wages and productivity is often hard
to identify due to labour market
imperfections that lead to wage com-
pression
10
.
Moreover, although a positive effect
of CVT on productivity at the firm
level is usually found, it is advisable to
remain cautious because these studies
often face quite similar conceptual
and methodological problems, as in
the case of studies on the wage effects
of training, leading to estimation bias
(Dearden et al., 2006; Zwick, 2007).
Training is endogenous and therefore
cannot be strictly treated as an
exogenous variable in the productivity
equation. Firstly, firms do not random-
ly choose to provide CVT. Indeed, as
noticed by Zwick (2007), transitory
shocks resulting from the introduction
of new technology or from changes in
labour market institutions may
change output and may thus lead to
changes in training efforts. There is
therefore likely to be a selection bias.
Secondly, firms may differ from each
other with respect to some character-
istics such as employer-employee rela-
tionships or corporate cultures that
are constant over time but which
remain unobservable. This unob-
served heterogeneity is also a source
of estimation bias because it can
explain why some firms that offer
training are structurally more produc-
tive than others. Lastly, another source
of potential estimation bias lies in
omitted variables that are not con-
trolled for but which have an impact
on productivity and training. The most
recent studies that have intended to
correct for these possible sources of
estimation bias still indicate a positive
effect of training on productivity (Bal-
lot et al., 2006; Dearden et al., 2006;
Zwick, 2007).
In this section, the importance of CVT
for employers and employees in
terms of productivity and wages has
been emphasised. Attention has also
been drawn to the new economic
context in which CVT lies: the emer-
gence of a new world of production
oriented towards innovation and
quality in which highly skilled and
versatile workers are key elements; a
major structural change that has led
to a massive employment shift from
manufacturing to the services sector
associated with higher skill require-
ments; and finally, the rise in educa-
tional attainment of the new
entrants into the labour force. It has
also been argued that the issue of
the importance of CVT in today’s
economy should be, first and fore-
most, understood in relation to this
new economic context.
2.2.3. Social returns to
continuing vocational
training
Most the economic benefits, from
continuing vocational training, dis-
cussed so far are of private nature. A
large theoretical literature under-
scores the possibility that the social
returns to education could be higher
than the private returns because edu-
cation may be a source of positive
externalities (European Commission,
2006a). For instance, an important
positive externality from initial edu-
cation is that one person may benefit
– in terms of higher productivity and
earnings – from another’s education
without any compensation. More-
over, education can generate non-
economic (i.e. non-pecuniary) bene-
fits such as better health, crime
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9 See section 3.1.3.
10 See section 3.1.3.
reduction, higher civic participation
which are beneficial for the society as
a whole.
The theoretical literature is never-
theless much more reduced with
regards to the social returns of con-
tinuing vocational training (Cahuc
and Zylbergberg, 2006). First of all,
continuing vocational training may
induce positive externalities in the
sense that one employee may benefit
from another’s knowledge acquired
in the context of training. However,
these positive externalities generated
by continuing vocational training are
likely to be primarily local, inside a
firm or an industry. In addition, initial
education has non-pecuniary bene-
fits in terms of crime reduction or
higher civic participation because it
mainly improves the non-cognitive
abilities of individuals, such as motiv-
ation and self-discipline. These exter-
nalities do not really concern contin-
uing vocational training for the
employed. However, these externali-
ties may be more significant when
employed become unemployed.
3. ENSURING EFFICIENCY
AND EQUITY IN
CONTINUING
VOCATIONAL TRAINING
In the previous section, the growing
importance of CVT in today’s econo-
my and the need to sustain it was
shown. When considering sustain-
able CVT, two common objectives of
education and training policies
should be pursued: efficiency in the
allocation of resources and equity in
the distribution of these resources
(Woessmann, 2006). These two
objectives are multidimensional
11
because they cover a variety of con-
cepts. In this section, we restrict these
objectives to efficiency in the alloca-
tion of resources and equity in the
distribution of these resources. 
There is efficiency in the allocation of
resources for training if employers
and employees are fully rewarded
for the training costs they have
incurred. In these circumstances,
there is no need for government
intervention to encourage training
provision or skills acquisition (Booth
and Snower, 1996). Instead, the role
of government would be to ensure
that the market for training remains
free and to guarantee the achieve-
ment of the second overall objective
of education and training policies:
equity in the distribution of
resources for training. 
Likewise, there is equity in the distri-
bution of resources for training if the
access to training only depends on
characteristics that are relevant for
training, such as motivation and
effort, as opposed to other charac-
teristics such as the initial level of
education, age and gender (Ooster-
beek, 1999). The equal access of
workers to CVT is not only essential
because a highly skilled workforce is
seen as a key engine of economic
growth in today’s economy (Euro-
pean Commission, 2006a), but also
because CVT is assumed to provide
workers with better promotional
opportunities, higher wages and
improved job security.
Hence, before discussing equity consid-
erations in the access to training in
more detail, it is essential to examine
whether the market for training is a
free market, and to identify market
failures that may hamper the incen-
tives for employers to provide ade-
quate training to their employees or
for the latter to acquire new skills.
Indeed, a number of authors have
emphasised possible market failures
(Ritzen and Stern, 1991; Booth and
Snower, 1996). The following review of
possible market failures presented is
by no means exhaustive. Rather it is
intended to provide a conceptual
framework for understanding when
and why public policies towards CVT
are justified on efficiency grounds. This
review is relevant given the significant
amount of funds allocated by govern-
ments in the EU Member States to CVT,
on the one hand, and the diversity of
policy instruments to foster training of
the employed on the other (Booth and
Snower, 1996; EIM and SEOR, 2005).
3.1. Market failures in
continuing vocational
training
3.1.1. The training market as
a free market
From a theoretical perspective, a free
market in CVT would imply that both
employees and employers are fully
rewarded for the training costs they
have incurred in relation to this activ-
ity, so that the benefits from training
are only reaped by them and the
costs from training are only borne by
them. In other words, the private
benefits from training are identical
to the social benefits generated from
this activity. In a similar way, the pri-
vate costs from training are equiva-
lent to the social costs. In such a situ-
ation, the free market would be effi-
cient since it provides employers and
employees with adequate incentives
respectively to provide training and
to acquire adequate skills without
the need for government interven-
tion. The role of government should
thus be confined to ensuring that the
training market remains free. Put dif-
ferently, the allocation of resources
in such a market would be optimal
since it would not be possible to
increase the satisfaction of certain
people without decreasing the satis-
faction of others. In such a view,
training is not so different from other
ordinary goods such as apples or hair-
cuts (Booth and Snower, 1996).
Investing in human capital through
training is nevertheless different from
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11 Commission staff working document (2006), accompanying document to the Communication from the Commission’s 2006 Communication Effi-
ciency and equity in European education and training systems.
investing in other forms of capital.
While an employer can hold the full
property rights on physical capital, this
is not possible for human capital
because the latter is, by definition,
embedded or embodied in the person
investing (Becker, 1993), namely the
trainee. Consequently, trained employ-
ees have the choice of how to use their
own human capital (Leuven, 2005; Bas-
sanini et al., 2005): they can choose to
stay in the firm after having received
training or they can separate from the
training firm. This distinctive attribute
of human capital opposed to physical
capital is central because it implies that
employers and employees have to
agree on the division of the costs and
benefits from training. Such a condi-
tion is at the heart of the theoretical
literature on training. 
The theoretical argument for a free
market in training was strongly
defended by the standard human cap-
ital theory, developed notably by the
economist Gary Becker (1962).
Acknowledging the fact that human
capital is embodied in employees,
Becker examines the optimal division
of the costs and benefits of training
between employees and employers in
the case of a perfectly competitive
labour market, that is a market in
which no firm or worker has the power
to influence wages. Becker distinguish-
es between two forms of training:
‘general’ and ‘specific’. General train-
ing has a productive value that is useful
to many firms whereas specific training
is only useful to a particular one. As a
consequence of this distinction, Becker
shows that employees have to bear the
full costs of general training while the
costs of specific training are to be
financed by employers.
The theoretical explanation for this
difference in the distribution of the
costs between general and specific
training is relatively straightforward
(Leuven, 2005; Stevens, 1999; Bassani-
ni et al., 2005).
Since general training has a value for
numerous employers and in a situ-
ation where labour markets are per-
fectly competitive, the employee will
be paid a wage equal in value to his
marginal productivity after having
received training. If the firm decides
to pay him less than this marginal pro-
ductivity value, he may immediately
resign and join another firm which will
offer him a higher wage. However, as
the employee reaps the full benefits
of general training and may be
‘poached’ by other firms acting as
free-riders, the employer also has to
pay the full training costs associated
with this activity. The training costs
may be financed through a decrease
in the wage of the employee during
the training period or through a loan
on the capital markets assuming they
are perfectly competitive.
Conversely, because specific training
only has value for a specific firm, the
employer will not necessarily pay the
employee its marginal productivity
afterwards because the latter will
receive only the market wage in other
firms if he decides to resign. Neverthe-
less, as the current employer receives
the full benefits from specific training,
he also has to finance all the costs.
Hashimoto (1981) demonstrated that
the firm has, nonetheless, incentives
to share the benefits of such training
in the form of a wage slightly higher
than the market wage in order to
reduce costly turnover. The training
costs are also likely to be shared
between the employer and employee.
How relevant are the theoretical pre-
dictions of the standard training litera-
ture in practice? Several recent empiric-
al studies have questioned the predic-
tions of the standard literature on
training. Using data from the Inter-
national Adult Literacy Survey (IALS)
for four countries – namely, Canada,
the Netherlands, Switzerland and the
United States – Leuven and Oosterbeek
(1999) show that firms provide substan-
tial financial support for training initi-
ated by their employees and for off-
the-job training, which is often seen as
general training (Loewenstein and
Spletzer, 1998; 1999a). Bishop (1997), in
his literature survey, gives strong
empirical evidence that employers are
sharing the costs and benefits of ‘gen-
eral’ training. Confronting the predic-
tions of the standard human theory
with data from the British Household
Panel Survey for the period 1998–2000,
Booth and Bryan (2005) find that
employers finance training that is
‘transferable’ across employers. The
reason why employers finance train-
ing, which is perceived as general, may
nevertheless be explained by the fact
that trainees accept lower starting
wages and/or lower wages while in
training. However, the results of the
empirical literature in that respect are
not clear-cut (Veum, 1995b; Loewen-
stein and Spletzer, 1998; Barron et al.,
1999; Silician, 2001).
3.1.2. Capital market
imperfections
In the previous paragraphs, the the-
oretical argument of the standard lit-
erature on human capital for a free
market in CVT in a context of perfect-
ly competitive capital and labour
markets has been presented. This
theoretical literature only admits a
case where there could be an under-
investment in training. This case
appears in the presence of capital
market imperfections. It mainly con-
cerns ‘general’ training for which the
employee has to support all the costs. 
From a theoretical point of view, an
inefficient investment into general
training can arise in a situation where
the employee is credit constrained
while the labour market remains per-
fectly competitive. 
Access to capital markets for finance
investment in general training is
problematical because human capi-
tal, contrary to other kinds of capital,
is poor collateral to lenders (Becker,
1993). In other words, human capital
by itself cannot act as a guarantee for
lenders in the case of default.
Employees can fail to refund the
loan, for instance, by working less
than expected or by accepting low
wages. Because there is a moral haz-
ard resulting from asymmetric infor-
mation between the borrower, for
example the employee, and the
lender, the latter is likely to request a
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very high interest rate which would
hamper the capability of the former
to enter into a contract (Stevens,
1999).
12
Such a moral hazard can also
result in a situation where it is not
possible to write a complete contract
(Stevens, 2001). Another associated
problem is caused by risk-adverse
behaviour (Layard et al., 1995): if the
returns of training are uncertain
13
, as
a result of a potential shock in the
demand for skills or a possible misuse
of some acquired skills, and if
employees cannot be insured against
the risk of inadequate returns, then
they will be discouraged to invest in
training.
Given that capital market imperfec-
tions may reduce the demand for
CVT, leading to an under-investment
in it, it is necessary to assess how sig-
nificant they are in practice. The sig-
nificance of credit constraints that
may face workers to finance general
training is particularly difficult to
assess due to the scarcity of relevant
empirical studies. Simple bivariate
cross-tabulations of the levels of
income and training reported in the
fourth European Working Conditions
Survey show that, in the European
Union, the levels of training received
from employers and paid for by the
employees themselves is lower for
employees with the lowest incomes
compared to the others (Chart 10).
Obviously several economic forces
(e.g. low level of schooling) are likely
to affect the decisions of employees
with the lowest incomes to finance
training. However, the ratio of the
level of training paid by employees to
the level of training paid by employ-
ers is lower for employees with the
lowest incomes than for the other
employees. Consequently, it may be
the case that these employees face
credit constraints and that they are
more risk-adverse than other employ-
ees due to their low income. More-
over, results from our first probit
model indicate the probability that
the employees with the lowest
incomes receive less training than the
employees with higher incomes. In
other words, not only may employees
with the lowest incomes face liquidity
constraints but they are also, all
things being equal, less likely to par-
ticipate in CVT (Table 1, see page 204).
Another interesting empirical argu-
ment for the existence of financial
constraints is also given in an OECD
study (2003). Using the results of the
International Adult Literacy Survey
over the 1990s for a sample of 16
industrialised countries, of which 10
are EU Member States
14
, the OECD
indicates in this study that about 7%
of trained workers and 5% of non-
trained workers reported that they
could not fully or partially finance the
costs of the training courses that they
wanted to take for career or job-
related reasons. Moreover, using mul-
tivariate regression techniques, this
study also shows that, all things being
equal, the probability of reporting
financial constraints is even higher for
workers in elementary occupations or
clerks than for managers. 
3.1.3. Labour market
imperfections
The consequences of potential labour
market imperfections on the efficiency
of investment in CVT have also been
examined more recently in new theo-
retical works (Acemoglu, 1997; Ace-
moglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999a,
1999b; Stevens, 1994; Katz and Zider-
man, 1990; Booth and Zoega, 1999).
15
Once the hypotheses of perfectly
competitive labour markets are
relaxed, investment in general train-
ing is also likely to be inefficient.
While in perfect labour markets firms
do not invest in general training but
have all the training costs borne by
the trained workers, the presence of
labour market frictions can lead to a
very different theoretical prediction.
There are many potential factors that
can induce wage compression and
labour market rents for employers
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999b; Booth
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Chart 10: Number of employees who participated in continuing vocational training
in the European Union by income level, 2005
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey.
Note: In the fourth European Working Conditions Survey, pay was measured by asking respondents to position
their usual monthly earnings in their main paid job on a 10-point scale corresponding to the 10 income deciles
in each country. Here the income variable has been transformed from a 10-point to a 4-point scale.
12 However, the fact that potential trainees can be credit-constrained all the more since human capital is poor collateral is particularly true for blue-
collar workers but such argument is less convincing for white-collar workers since training is often cheap for them (Ritzen and Stern, 1991).
13 As noticed by Ritzen and Stern (1991), investment in general and specific training is often risky. However, in the case of specific training, the
employers have more possibilities to distribute the risks than employees have.
14 Australia, Belgium (Flanders only), Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Poland, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
15 For detailed surveys on the new training literature, see, for instance, Leuven (2005); Bassanini et al. (2005); Brunello and De Paola (2006).
and Zoaga, 2000; Bassanini et al., 2005)
(Box 3). Among these potential factors
can be cited search and matching fric-
tions as well as mobility costs. If these
labour market frictions induce a com-
pressed wage structure, firms may
react by financing general training.
Indeed, trained workers will face rela-
tively worse opportunities outside
their current employers because the
external wage structure is compressed.
This compressed external wage struc-
ture incites current employers to
compress the internal wage structure
by paying workers at the same level
as their outside alternatives because
the former have bargaining power
(i.e. the so-called monopsony power)
over the latter. Wage compression
thereby generates a rent for employ-
ers that encourages them to finance
general training if there is a positive
probability that workers will stay
with them after training (Acemoglu
and Pischke, 1999a). Otherwise, cur-
rent employers will not be persuaded
to sponsor general training because
of the ‘poaching externality’: future
employers will in fact benefit from
general training without having to
support its costs.
The risk of poaching stressed in the
theoretical literature may be a reason
why EU employees, who have been
less than two years in the same com-
pany, received less training paid for
by employers than, other employees
with more years of job tenure (Chart
11), as reported in the fourth Euro-
pean Working Conditions Survey.
However, other factors correlated
with job tenure or contract duration,
such as workers’ characteristics (e.g.
level of education) or establishment
characteristics (e.g. industry sector),
are also likely to affect the decision
of employers to provide less training
for these employers. Indeed, a high-
er-than-average proportion of
unskilled workers hold fixed-term
contracts in the European Union.
Moreover, sectors characterised by
short periods of job stability, such as
wholesale and retail trade, real
estate, hotels and restaurants, are
often characterised by low levels of
training (Parent-Thirion et al., 2007).
Yet, a number of empirical studies
using multivariate regression tech-
niques find that, all things being
equal, the probability of partici-
pating in CVT decreases when job
turnover is high (Booth et al., 2003),
rises with job tenure (Loewenstein
and Spletzer, 1999b; Frazis et al.,
2000; Majumdar, 2007), and is lower
for temporary workers (Bassanini et
al., 2005). The results of our first pro-
bit model also suggest that, in the
European Union, such a likelihood is
quite low for employees in jobs with
less than one year of job tenure. Our
results related to the probability of
participation in CVT are, neverthe-
less, not statistically significant.
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Box 3 – Trade unions and continuing vocational training: an ambiguous relationship
Not only can labour market imperfections result from search frictions or mobility costs, but they can be derived from
institutional features such as minimum wage legislation (Acemoglu and Pischke, 2003), social security systems or the
presence of unions. The latter can induce a compressed wage structure and therefore has an impact on CVT acqui-
sition and provision, which is different from the prediction of the standard literature on human capital (Booth,
Francesconi and Zoaga, 2003; Bassanini et al., 2005). The relationship between unions and CVT is nevertheless
ambiguous.
On the one hand, trade unions may lead to an increase in the provision of CVT because they may negotiate better
training opportunities for their members, and because they may reduce labour turnover and thereby the risk of
poaching by ensuring the commitment of workers to their contracts. Moreover, they may negotiate better training
opportunities for the union-covered workers so that they receive more training in order to keep their skills up to
date with higher returns compared to the non-union workers.
On the other hand, union wage bargaining may lead to a compressed wage structure that prevents employers from
reducing the wages of trainees during the training period and then increase them afterwards. In those circum-
stances, both employers and employees have no incentive respectively to provide ‘general’ training and acquire
‘general’ skills. 
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Chart 11: Number of employees who participated in continuing vocational training
in the European Union by job tenure, 2005 
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey.
According to the theoretical literature,
a distorted wage structure coupled
with a low turnover can thus be con-
sidered as a necessary condition for
employers to accept bearing the costs
of general training because it makes
‘general’ skills in fact ‘specific’ (Ace-
moglu and Pischke, 1999a, b). Booth
and Zoega (2004) show that the
wage compression defined by Ace-
moglu and Pischke (1999a, b), what
the former call ‘absolute wage com-
pression’, requires that the marginal
effect of training on productivity to
be greater than that on wages in
absolute terms. However, such a defi-
nition of wage compression is not the
one traditionally used in the econom-
ic literature. The latter, which they
choose to call ‘relative wage com-
pression’, is measured in terms of the
ratio of productivity to wages. They
demonstrate theoretically that, con-
trary to a relative wage compression,
an absolute wage compression is a
necessary condition for firms to
finance general training. Indeed,
firms will sponsor training even if the
latter raises both productivity and
wages in equal proportions so long as
wages are lower than output.
Does a compressed wage structure
coupled with a low probability of
quit rate mean, from a theoretical
perspective, that employers sponsor
the full costs of ‘general’ training?
Since employees also benefit from
general training, employers may be
less inclined to bear all the costs of
this training. The distribution of the
costs of general training between
current employers and employees
depends thus on the compressed
wage structure: the more the wage
structure is compressed, the more
firms will be willing to pay for all the
costs of general training.
It is, however, important to note here
that, from a theoretical point of view,
a compressed wage structure may
lead to an under-investment even if
‘general’ skills turn into ‘specific’
skills. Indeed, the uncertainty about
the turnover of employees incites
employers not to invest the desired
amount in general training. More-
over, because of the distorted exter-
nal wage structure, employees have
no incentives to invest in general
training even if they are not credit-
constrained, since they anticipate
that their future employers will
appropriate a fraction of the benefits
from general training without any
compensation (Acemoglu, 1997; Ace-
moglu and Pischke, 1999b). 
A very similar theoretical argument is
developed by Stevens (Stevens, 1994,
1996, 1999). Here, the presence of
labour market imperfections can also
be explained by the nature of train-
ing itself. Indeed, some skills are nei-
ther general nor specific but are
‘transferable’, meaning that they
have a value for only a few firms.
16 
As a result, the competition to pos-
sess such skills among firms is reduced
and becomes insufficiently tight that
it raises the expected wages of the
trained employees to the level of
their post-trained marginal produc-
tivity. Employers thus have some
monopsony power over them all the
more the employees face relatively
high mobility costs or imperfect
information. It could be argued that
the trainee and the training firm
would find an agreement in order to
share the training costs. However, as
training is ‘transferable’, it has also a
value for other firms who may want
to hire the trainee in the future.
Since the benefits of training accrue
to firms who may hire the trainee in
the future, then the incentive of the
trainee and the training firm to
invest is reduced, resulting in an
under-investment in ‘transferable’
training
17
.
Because the recent theoretical works
stress that labour market imperfec-
tions may reduce both the demand
and supply of CVT, it is important to
gauge how significant these imper-
fections are in practice. There is a
growing empirical literature on the
relationship between labour market
imperfections and (general) training
(Bassanini et al., 2005; Brunello and
De Paola, 2006; Bassanini and Brunel-
lo, 2006). However, problems with the
definition and measurement of gen-
eral training (Ericson, 2004) hinder
reaching clear-cut conclusions all the
more since existing empirical studies
follow different strategies to address
this issue and are not systematic.
As already noted earlier in the chap-
ter
18
, several empirical studies show
that many employers sponsor a sig-
nificant part of CVT, which is often of
a general nature. This can be inter-
preted as the existence of some
monopsony power (Brunello and De
Paola, 2006). The fact that the bene-
fits from general training are appro-
priated by trained workers with some
delay and/or when they join other
employers (Loewenstein and Splet-
zer, 1998, 1999a; Booth and Bryan,
2005) also suggests that current
employers have certain monopsony
power (Bassanini and Brunello,
2006)
19
. A few related papers indicate
that there is a negative relationship
between the training wage premium
and the incidence of general training
(Bassanini and Brunello, 2006), which
is again in sharp contrast with Beck-
er’s predictions. In line with the
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16 Lazaar (2003) also questions the standard distinction between ‘specific’ and ‘general’ training. He argues that specific skills do not exist as such;
instead, this is the combination of different general skills and it is how the firms value them that makes the skills specific.
17 Stevens (1996) mentions a few predictable responses that may persuade firms to address the problem of skill shortages resulting from an under-
investment in ‘transferable’ skills. Among these responses, firms might choose to adopt methods of production that rely on mechanisation and
low-skilled labour. Such predictable responses can be related to some key features of the Fordist model of production, as described in section
2.1.1.
18 See section 3.1.1.
19 However, as noticed by Bassanini and Brunello (2006), reasons other than the presence of labour market imperfections can explain why wages
increase faster when trainees are hired by other firms. For example, workers may have participated in training in order to have the necessary skills
required by other firms. See also OECD (2004).
results of these papers, the results of
our second probit model show that,
all things being equal, participation
in CVT is less frequent in EU Member
States where the 90–50 wage differ-
ential is high (Table 1, see page 204).
However, a different paper finds
opposite results for Norway (Ericson,
2004). Another way to empirically
address the issue of the under-invest-
ment in general training is to look at
whether voluntary turnover is affect-
ed by the general training provided
by employers. In their study based
on the European Community House-
hold Panel, Brunello and De Paola
(2006) find that there is a significant
voluntary turnover among workers
receiving employer-provided train-
ing, which tends to confirm the exis-
tence of the poaching problem.
20
3.1.4. Information
asymmetries
The theoretical discussion above iden-
tified the sources of a compressed
wage structure and labour market
rents that are essentially related to the
presence of transactions in the labour
market, e.g. matching and search fric-
tions as well as mobility costs. There
are, nevertheless, other reasons for
wage compression. The latter may be
due to asymmetric information
between current and potential future
employers as well as between current
employers and their employees. While
the presence of transaction costs in the
labour market caused by matching
and search frictions is relatively simple
to recognise, the existence of asym-
metric information may be more diffi-
cult to grasp. At least three cases of
information problems can be consid-
ered from a theoretical perspective
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999b; Leu-
ven, 2005).
Firstly, the skills acquired by employ-
ees as a result of training provided
by their current employers are not
observable by future employers,
especially if training is not certified
(Katz and Ziderman, 1990; Chang
and Wang, 1996) or does not receive
some kind of accreditation (Ritzen
and Stern, 1991)
21
. This lack of infor-
mation for the potential employers
reduces the competition for the pos-
session of non-accredited skills
acquired by the trainee. As a conse-
quence, the outside wage will be
lower than the marginal increase in
the post-training productivity of the
trainee. Current employers will thus
be more inclined to finance general
training due to the compressed
wage structure.
Secondly, it is possible to argue that
it is not training itself that is imper-
fectly observable by outside employ-
ers, but the ability of the trainees
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998). The
result of this adverse selection prob-
lem between the current employer
and potential future employers is
also a compressed wage structure
that encourages firms to finance
training.
Thirdly, while information asymmetry
raises the monopsony power of
employers over their employees,
which incites the former to invest in
general training, it also decreases the
incentives of workers to invest in the
acquisition of skills because part of
the returns from training will accrue
to their current employers. If employ-
ees have to exert effort for training
to be productive, then employers
have to give them the right incen-
tives. However, since the effort of
employees is barely observable by
employers, firms cannot reward their
trained employees at the level of
their effort. This information asym-
metry creates a hold-up opportunity
for current employers, which is antic-
ipated by the employees, thereby
putting forward insufficient effort in
training if the latter is not certified
(Acemoglu and Pischke, 2000).
All the above information problems
can be traced to the labour market.
However, there is another informa-
tion problem that is associated with
the market of vocational training
itself. This is the asymmetric infor-
mation between employees and
employers regarding the nature and
the quality of training. Indeed, in
many circumstances, the market for
CVT is not entirely visible to them
because training is, to some extent,
hidden from the labour market if it
is provided within firms (Stevens,
1999) or because employers and
employees are not able distinguish
between different providers of
external vocational training. Thus,
employers do not advertise prices
for CVT provided internally and
employees do not have enough
information to take training deci-
sions. Moreover, in the case of exter-
nal vocational training, both
employers and employees do not
have enough information to invest
in training decisions. Such informa-
tion problems about the nature and
quality of training may result in an
under-investment, notably because
training fails to become fully con-
tractible.
How significant are these problems
of asymmetric information in prac-
tice? Empirical studies that have
attempted to test the predictions of
the above models are still quite rare.
Booth and Bryan (2005) indicate that
their results for Britain suggest that
accredited training financed by
employers is more strongly associat-
ed with higher wages at both current
and future employers than non-
accredited training, and that only
accredited training is transferable
between employers. Beyond these
empirical results, the significance of
information problems in practice is
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20 This conclusion seems at odds with the results obtained by Dreaden et al. (1997), which show that, in the United Kingdom, employers providing
training to their employees have a lower probability than the average to lose them in the next year compared to employers who do not provide
training to their employees. They nevertheless interpret this result as a sign that employers sponsor training to the employees they wish to retain.
21 For more discussion on accreditation and certification, see section 4.2.3.
testified by the fact that numerous
industrialised countries, in the first
place European ones, have under-
taken policy initiatives to increase
the certification of adult learning
and to accredit related programmes
in order to better signal the out-
come of non-‘specific’ training,
thereby making it more attractive
for workers (OECD, 2007).
22
In the first part of this section on effi-
ciency, the provision of CVT gave
strong theoretical arguments that
both capital and labour market
imperfections may be sources of mar-
ket failures, making investment in
training inefficient. Even though the
empirical evidence of an inefficient
investment in CVT still has to be
taken cautiously, the possible pres-
ence of market failures is the ration-
ale of government intervention on
efficiency grounds. Moreover, even if
the conclusions of the empirical
literature about efficiency in invest-
ing in CVT are not clear-cut, public
policies can still be justified by equity
considerations. In such cases, the role
of government intervention is to
ensure that access to CVT depends on
characteristics that are relevant only
to this activity, such as motivation,
effort and ability (Oosterbeek, 1999).
The equal access of workers to CVT is
not only essential because a highly
skilled labour force is seen as a key
engine of economic growth in
today’s economy (European Commis-
sion, 2006a), but also because CVT is
assumed to provide workers with
better career opportunities, higher
wages and increased job security. The
principle of equal access in vocation-
al training has even been enacted at
EU level. Directive 76/207/EEC of 1976
applies for the first time, in its Article
1, the principle of equal treatment to
the area of access to vocational train-
ing. Directive 76/207/EEC was modi-
fied in 2002 by Directive 2002/73/EC.
Article 3 (1b) of Directive 76/207/EEC
in the modified version specifies the
meaning of equal treatment in the
domain of training. Furthermore,
Article 3 (2) of Directive 76/207/EEC in
the modified version defines which
measures are to be taken by Member
States in order to comply with the
principle of equal treatment. Yet,
within the labour force, training is
not received by all groups of workers
on an equal basis.
3.2. Equity
considerations
3.2.1. Level of educational
attainment
Learning is a life-cycle process. This
means that an investment at one
stage of education raises not only the
skills and competences attained at
that stage but builds the foundation
for the acquisition of further skills
and competences at the next level.
This skill-multiplier effect implies that
education is a dynamic synergistic
process in which early learning
begets later learning (Heckman,
1999; Carneiro and Heckman, 2003)
23
. 
Because learning tends to lead to later
learning, inequality of opportunity in
education is likely to be amplified by
unequal opportunities in training. As
noticed by Brunello (2004), this idea of
a complementarity between educa-
tion and training was already under-
lined, in particular, by Rosen (1976) for
whom education raised job-related
learning skills and hence decreased
training costs. As a consequence, the
probability of accessing CVT is likely to
be lower for workers with a low level
of schooling than for those who are
well educated, with all other factors
being the same.
Is there empirical evidence that
inequality of opportunity in educa-
tion is likely to be amplified by
unequal opportunities in training?
Simple bivariate cross-tabulations of
levels of schooling and training from
the fourth European Working Condi-
tions Survey show that the propor-
tion of employees that reported to
have received training increases with
the levels of educational attainment,
from pre-primary education to the
first stage of tertiary education, and
then slightly declines for the employ-
ees holding advanced tertiary educa-
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22 See section 4.2.3.
23 See also Commission staff working document (2006), accompanying document to the Commission’s 2006 Communication Efficiency and equity in
European education and training systems.
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Chart 12: Number of employees who participated in continuing vocational training
in the European Union by level of educational attainment, 2005 
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey.
tion degrees (Chart 12, see page 219).
There is also a considerable body of
research evidence that shows, using
multivariate regression techniques,
that, all things being equal, the likeli-
hood of receiving training rises with
the level of educational attainment,
suggesting that education and train-
ing are complementary in the United
States (Lillard and Tan, 1986; Lynch
and Black, 1988; Loewenstein and
Spletzer, 1999b; Frazis et al., 2000) and
in some EU Member States (Brunello,
2004; Bassanini et al., 2005)
24
. The
results of our first probit model for
the European Union confirm that the
probability of employees to partici-
pate in CVT rises with the level of
schooling (Table 1, see page 204).
Clearly the disadvantaged position of
low-educated workers in terms of
accessing CVT is undesirable given
the substantial individual benefits
that training can bring, such as
improved employability and job secu-
rity while these workers are often in
precarious situations, higher wages
and better promotional opportun-
ities (Wooden et al. 2001; OECD,
2004a).
3.2.2. Age
There are widespread concerns about
the lower access to CVT for older
people (CEDEFOP, 2006; European
Commission, 2006b), particularly in 
a context of an ageing population 
in EU countries resulting from at 
least three demographic trends: a
decrease in fertility rate, the ageing
of the baby boomers and an increase
in life expectancy at birth (European
Commission, 2006b, 2007c).
A number of studies have suggested
that older workers are likely to face
several barriers in gaining training
(Wooden et al., 2001). These barriers
can be grouped into three broad cate-
gories: employer attitudes, lower
learning ability and the attitudes of
the older workers themselves. 
Many employers often hold stereotyp-
ical views about the productivity
potential of older workers compared
to their younger counterparts (Rosen
and Jerdee, 1976a, b). 
Moreover, older workers are frequent-
ly characterised as more difficult, and
consequently more costly, to train.
This problem is made worse by the
fact that employers often have insuffi-
cient time left before the retirement
of these workers to recoup the cost of
that training. Rosen (1975), for
instance, indicates that skills become
obsolete not only because of external
developments independent of work-
ers, such as technological and organi-
sational developments, but also
because of the wear on skills resulting
from the nature of the ageing process.
More precisely, Rosen makes a distinc-
tion between the general deprecia-
tion of mental and physical capacities
of the older workers and the declining
capacity to learn and to adapt to new
situations (de Grip and van Loo, 2002).
The latter can obviously negatively
influence their access to training
(although the decline in physical and
mental capacity occurs only at an
older age); it is also very gradual, is
subject to wide variations depending
on the individuals concerned and can
be reduced by preventive health poli-
cies (European Commission, 2006b). 
Finally, the relatively disadvantaged
position of older workers in terms of
accessing CVT may be further aggra-
vated by the attitudes of workers
themselves. In many circumstances,
older workers are less confident about
their potential during and after the
training period or do not see the
financial advantages of such training. 
Is there empirical evidence that older
workers are less likely to receive train-
ing than other age groups? The
unequal access of older workers to
CVT seems to be supported by the
fourth European Working Conditions
Survey, although the differences
among the age groups in terms of
access to training are not consider-
able. Simple bivariate cross-tabula-
tions of age and the levels of training
show effectively that workers aged
45–54 and especially those aged 55
and over receive less training paid by
their employer than the workers aged
25–39 (chart 13). A few empirical
studies using multivariate regression
techniques also indicate that the like-
lihood of receiving training is lower
for older workers than for their
younger counterparts in industri-
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24 Oosterbeek (1988), nonetheless, argues that this complementarity is mainly due to omitted ability and self-selection problems. His results suggest
that employers have no particular preferences for training well-educated employees or less-educated ones.
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in the EU–27 by age, 2005 
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey.
alised countries, including European
ones (Wooden et al., 2001; OECD,
2003; Brunello, 2004; Bassanini et al.,
2005; CEDEFOP, 2006). The results of
our first probit model suggest that
participation in CVT is also less fre-
quent for older workers in the Euro-
pean Union (Table 1, see page 204). 
There are several reasons why the
position of older workers in terms of
accessing CVT should be improved. An
unequal access to training put these
workers in a relatively bad position in
the labour market vis-à-vis the work-
ers that have entered the labour force
recently with a higher level of school-
ing, especially in the context of the
new production model where the
requirement in terms of cognitive
skills is on the rise. In fact many older
workers entered the workforce during
the Fordist era with a low level of edu-
cational attainment. Furthermore,
due to the demographic changes that
many industrialised countries have
undergone over the past decades – in
particular, the decline of fertility rates
and the ageing of the baby-boom
generation – many of these workers
need to delay their exit from the
workforce in order to sustain employ-
ment rates and social protection sys-
tems (pensions and healthcare sys-
tems) (European Commission, 2006b,
2007c). This necessitates an increased
access of these workers to employer-
provided training in order to maintain
their employability.
3.2.3. Gender
The situation of women in the labour
market has experienced dramatic
changes over past decades in EU
Member States. 
The employment rate of women has
increased sharply, narrowing the gen-
der gap in employment and unem-
ployment. These developments result
from changes in the labour supply
behaviour of women, who report
higher educational achievement than
men in all Member States, and to a
progressive change in role models
and a push to improve the reconcilia-
tion of work and private life. Many
factors have contributed to these
developments (OECD, 2002), ranging
from changes in household composi-
tion, which have given a growing
importance to the incomes of
women, to the expansion of policies
related to family support, which have
eased the participation of parents in
the labour market. 
Despite these developments, concerns
remain that women and men still face
inequalities in the labour market. In
all EU Member States without excep-
tion, women still are still at a disad-
vantage compared to men in fields
such as their participation in employ-
ment or pay levels (European Commis-
sion, 2007d). By extension, these con-
cerns have also been expressed in
terms of access to CVT.
Is there empirical evidence that
women are less likely to access CVT
than men? The results of simple
bivariate cross-tabulations of gender
and the levels of training using the
fourth European Working Conditions
Survey suggest that women and men
have a relatively equal access to CVT
(Chart 14). However, these results
may be biased if gender is correlated
with other factors that are also asso-
ciated with the probability of women
participating in CVT. For instance, the
survey indicates that a higher propor-
tion of female than male employees
hold fixed-term contracts (Parent-
Thirion et al., 2007). The results of
our first probit show that women are
more likely than males to participate
in CVT (Table 1, see page 204). Bas-
sanini et al. (2005) also suggest that
women have, all things being equal,
a higher probability to participate in
CVT than men in EU Member States,
although the difference is small. Nev-
ertheless, other empirical studies for
the United States indicate that men
are more likely to receive training
than women are (Lynch, 1992; Barron
et al., 1993). However, other empiri-
cal works using advanced statistical
techniques also do not come up with
clear-cut conclusions on a gender gap
in training participation. For
instance, Arulampalam et al. (2004)
find that, in Europe, women are typi-
cally no less likely than men to
receive training.
In this section, we have argued that
potential market failures in training
justify government intervention on
the ground of efficiency in order to
provide employers and/or employees
with the right incentives to invest in
skill developments. Moreover, we
have shown that policy intervention is
also socially desirable in order to
ensure equal access to CVT for disad-
vantaged groups, i.e. older workers,
low-educated workers and, to a lesser
extent, women. What kinds of gov-
ernment intervention might respond
221
Chapter 4 Strengthening continuing vocational training at the initiative of the enterprise
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Women Men
Pe
rc
en
ta
g
e
Paid by employer Paid by employee
Chart 14: Number of employees who participated in continuing vocational training
in the European Union by gender, 2005
Source: DG EMPL calculations based on the fourth European Working Conditions Survey.
to these issues?
4. FINDING THE RIGHT
BALANCE IN
GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION
Government intervention can be in
three forms for vocational training:
provision, funding and regulation
(Oosterbeek, 1999). Government pro-
vision of training differs significantly
from government financing or regu-
lation. In many circumstances, gov-
ernment financing or regulation may
be justified in order to achieve the
objectives of efficiency and equity,
but government provision can only
be justified in limited cases, where
the capacity or infrastructure are
lacking for private provision or gov-
ernment provision can be demon-
strated to be the most effective and
efficient means of provision (Middle-
ton et al., 1993). Also governments
have to be careful when choosing
among these forms because their
intervention may, in some cases,
worsen the situation, leading to so-
called ‘government failures’. Most of
the policy instruments are only par-
tial solutions to strengthen CVT,
meaning that they are not general
remedies to all problems that may
cause under-investment or make
access to CVT unequal. While certain
policy instruments may be good
remedies in some situations, they
may also have side effects that con-
tribute to exacerbate problems in
others (Oosterbeek, 1999). Finally,
government intervention is not with-
out problems. These problems
include, for instance, possible dead-
weight and displacement as well as
administrative complexity.
This section presents a quick
overview of supply-side policies that
aim at securing investment in CVT at
the initiative of the enterprise and its
benefits
25
. It first discusses the multi-
plicity of financing arrangements
that have been set up across the EU
Member States to strengthen invest-
ment in CVT by firms. There are vari-
ous types of financing arrangements
regarding CVT. These arrangements
range from the absence of regulation
for CVT through to subsidies and tax
incentives offered to employers that
provide training to compulsory train-
ing obligations set by governments
for firms (Gasskov, 2001; Green et al.,
2001). The section then considers
policies that contribute towards
influencing the returns on CVT.
4.1. Securing
investment in
continuing vocational
training
4.1.1. Demand-led market
regulation
Some governments have opted not
to intervene in the financing of CVT.
A well-known example of countries
where there is almost no state regu-
lation related to enterprise-based
CVT is the United Kingdom, universal
levies having been abolished (Green-
halgh, 1999). In this country there is
no formalised funding mechanism
such as a levy across the industrial
sectors except for the construction
and engineering industries which
have their training boards. From time
to time, the policy issue is raised as to
whether continuing training should
be funded through some kind of
requirement (perhaps a levy) on
employers. By and large, employers
resist the concept of such measures
and hold firmly to the principal of
voluntarism. Thus employers expect
that public funds will provide subven-
tion for a substantial element of ini-
tial vocational education and train-
ing, and are firm in the view that the
training of people outside employ-
ment is a matter for the state or the
individual. 
Although employers and individuals
are the main contributors to the cost
of adult education and training, pub-
lic subsidies are being used in the
areas of market failure where private
contributions are not forthcoming.
Full public expenditure on adults’
learning is used to train some key
competencies (literacy, language and
numeracy) and on lower-level courses
without which individuals may not be
employable on a permanent basis.
Such a demand-led approach has
been criticised on the ground
because it does not provide the right
incentives to workers and firms to
invest in skills, resulting in under-
investment in CVT (Green et al.,
2001). For instance, at the end of the
1980s, the United Kingdom was said
to be trapped in a ‘low-skills equilib-
rium’, in which the majority of firms
were operated by poorly trained
managers and employees producing
low-quality goods and services. The
apparent absence of skill shortages at
the time was seen as the result of the
decisions of employers to adapt their
methods of production to these low
levels of skills (Finegold and Soskice,
1988; Gasskov, 2001).
Despite these criticisms of the
demand-led approach, chart 9 (see
page 211) shows that a large number
of employers in the United Kingdom
especially invest in CVT compared to
other countries with a more regulat-
ed approach (Greenhalgh, 1999).
Besides, this approach does not suffer
from the problems of deadweight
and displacement that is associated
with public support to CVT. More-
over, it allows for much more flexibil-
ity than state-regulated or social-
partnership approaches (Green et al.,
2001).
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25 Because continuing vocational training consists of training measures or activities, which enterprises finance wholly or partly for their employees
who have a working contract, the section does not discuss financial arrangements or policy instruments targeted towards individuals – either
employed or unemployed – and covers only those which are targeted to firms. The reader interested by a presentation of instruments targeted
to individuals in the broader context of lifelong learning may see OECD (2003, 2004b, 2005), EIM and SEOR (2005), and Bassanini et al. (2005).
4.1.2. Subsidies, tax
incentives and loan
arrangements
Instead of opting for a neutral
approach, several governments in the
European Union have provided vari-
ous financial and fiscal incentives to
employers in order that they may
invest in CVT, as shown by Figure 3
which presents a schematic view of
financial flows in the vocational
training market.
Subsidies to firms are used by gov-
ernments to share the direct costs of
training and also a substantial share
of the indirect costs (e.g. foregone
income) of internal [Area C] or
external [Area B] training borne by
the firms. These subsidies are fre-
quently granted to firms on a selec-
tive basis, often to firms in the
framework of active labour market
policies (European Commission,
2006c) in order to provide training
to at-risk workers so that they are
not excluded from the labour mar-
ket.
26
Subsidies are also often used
by governments to support the
training of workers in small and
medium-size enterprises (Gasskov,
2001), who are often less likely to
receive CVT than their counterparts
in larger firms, as shown by the
results of our first probit model
(Table 1, see page 204).
Governments also provide various tax
incentives for employers in order to
persuade them to invest in continu-
ing vocational training [4]. These tax
incentives for firms usually allow
them to deduct more than the total
costs of training (or an increase
above a certain threshold) from their
taxable profits or revenues (Gasskov,
2001; Bassanini et al., 2005). Tax
incentives vary across industrialised
countries according to the amount
and types of training costs that are
eligible for deduction. Concerning
the types of training costs, govern-
ments may restrict the scope of
deduction to only those that result
from external training. Moreover,
government support for CVT by
means of tax incentives can be tar-
geted towards specific firms like
SMEs (small and medium-sized enter-
prises) or groups of workers (e.g. low-
skilled, older workers) (OECD, 2006).
Finally, government intervention to
support CVT can take the form of
training loans [4], especially for
SMEs (Gasskov, 2001).
These financial and fiscal instruments,
which support investment in CVT, have
advantages and disadvantages. Gov-
ernments can efficiently increase the
level of CVT by granting subsidies to
firms in proportion to their investment
in CVT. In this respect, subsidies are
particularly appropriate because they
correct market failures (e.g. poaching
externality) while ensuring that the
private benefits of training accrue to
the firms that invest in training (Cahuc
and Zylbergerg, 2006). As we will see
later in this chapter, levy exemption
schemes do not allow for correcting
these market failures in a satisfactory
way. Moreover, even in the absence of
under-investment in CVT, subsidies or
tax incentives may increase the skills of
workers at the bottom end of the skills
distribution and serve to reduce
income inequality (Acemoglu, 2001).
Finally, subsidies/grants increase the
returns to training while loans do not
affect returns (when interest rates are
market-based). Subsidies/grants are
therefore more appropriate to correct
for labour market imperfections while
loans are the more efficient govern-
ment instrument to combat capital
market imperfections.
Although these financial and fiscal
instruments seem appropriate to per-
suade employers to invest in CVT, an
important question in the assessment
of the effectiveness of these instru-
ments is what would have happened
in their absence? This question
implies considering the two key com-
ponents of the additional impact of
public support: deadweight and dis-
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Figure 3: A schematic view of financial flows in the vocational training market
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26 Note that governments also allocate part of their training budget to public training institutions, especially to support the unemployed through
labour market (re-) training [2].
placement. An increase in the partici-
pation of employees on CVT in firms
that have benefited from public sup-
port that can be judged to have
occurred anyway, in the absence of
any assistance, is termed deadweight.
Even if the conclusion is that zero
deadweight exists, the possibility still
remains that public support provided
to a particular firm or to specific
groups of workers may displace train-
ing participation in other firms or
other groups of workers. Unfortu-
nately, empirical studies on the effec-
tiveness of fiscal and financial public
support to CVT are few. The results of
our second probit model showed that
the participation of employees to
CVT is less frequent in EU Member
States where expenditure on active
labour market policies in relation to
GDP is high. This might suggest that
there is a substitution effect between
CVT and labour market (re)training
(Table 1, see page 204). In addition, a
recent evaluation by Leuven and
Oosterbeek (2004) on the implemen-
tation of a tax law in the Netherlands
in 1998, allowing Dutch employers to
claim an extra tax deduction when
they train employees aged 40 years
or older, reveals that many firms
respond to this new tax incentive by
substituting training for workers
above 40 for the training of those
below it.
4.1.3. Collective labour
arrangements
Some EU Member States have estab-
lished collective labour arrangements
where the responsibility for a voca-
tional training policy is jointly shared
between social partners and the gov-
ernment (Gasskov, 2001; Green et al.,
2001; Smith and Billet, 2005). Indeed,
the increasing need for CVT in the
changing economic context has
become a key subject in dialogue
among social partners, firms and gov-
ernments. Tripartite or bipartite dia-
logue on collective bargaining has
often resulted in the inclusion of spe-
cial clauses related to training in col-
lective agreements. The introduction
of these special training clauses has
led in particular to the creation of
(inter-) sectoral training funds cover-
ing specific industry sectors and
groups of sectors, which allows
employers to provide training that is
paid by funding from these (inter-)
sectoral funds.
The main features of (inter-) sectoral
training funds can be described as
follows (Gasskov, 2001). Sectoral
training funds are instituted on a vol-
untary basis under sectoral agree-
ments and are administered by bipar-
tite bodies. (Inter-) sectoral training
funds finance the development of
training policies at the industry level.
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Box 4 – The European Social Fund support for restructuring and training
What is the European Social Fund?
The European Social Fund (ESF) is one of the EU’s Structural Funds, set up to reduce differences in prosperity and
living standards across EU Member States and regions and therefore promoting economic and social cohesion. The
ESF is devoted to promoting employment in the European Union. It helps Member States make Europe’s workforce
and companies better equipped to face new, global challenges. Funding is spread across the Member States and
regions, in particular to those where economic development is less advanced. 
Among the various fields of activity of the European Social Fund, one can cite its support for restructuring and
training.
The European Social Fund support for restructuring
For the 2007–2013 programming period, the ESF is supporting actions aimed at anticipating and managing eco-
nomic and structural changes to ensure more and better jobs for Europe.
As European firms have undergone and are undergoing restructuring, it is important to pursue policies aimed at
parallel improvements of flexibility and security for workers and enterprises that will help maintain human capi-
tal and employability. A major aim is to move away from ‘corporate restructurings’ that include job losses and are
essentially a reaction to events, and instead to anticipate such events and circumstances in ways that allow for
smooth changes that support jobs. For this, forward-looking planning of human resources is a core issue. Creating
conditions which will support human capital and employment security depends on several factors: the qualifica-
tions of the workforce, including their ‘transferable’ skills; the internal flexibility of companies, including issues
such as multiskilling and working-time arrangements; and external flexibility in the form of company outplace-
ments, for example.
The development of mechanisms for such ‘active employment measures’ requires partnerships between many
actors at national, regional and local levels, as well as at Community level.
The ESF is funding national and regional projects in the following areas:
• Systems that anticipate change, including projects supporting employment observatories that predict eco-
nomic change, and identify future training needs and communicate these to the regions, sectors, companies
and training providers. Also, partnership systems that link employers, trade unions, workers and social part-
ners together in efforts to anticipate and manage restructuring.
Funds are mostly financed by firms
through (inter-) sectoral training
levies, although several funds have
received financial support from the
European Social Fund (Box 4). Some-
times employees have also participat-
ed in the financing of these (inter)
sectoral training funds through com-
pulsory payroll contributions. Gov-
ernments can also contribute to
(inter)sectoral training funds on a
voluntary basis in order, for instance,
to sustain the access to CVT for cer-
tain disadvantaged groups of work-
ers and firms. 
4.1.4. Compulsory
arrangements
Many industrialised countries have
taken initiatives, through compulsory
arrangements, in order to ensure a
minimum financial commitment of
firms in CVT. These compulsory
arrangements mainly consist of train-
ing levies (5 and 6 on Figure 3, see
page 223) (OECD, 2006; Bassanini et
al., 2005). Several common types of
training levies, relevant for CVT, can
be identified: levy exemptions, levy
grants and levy reimbursements
(Gasskov, 2001).
27
Based on a percentage of firms’ pay-
rolls fixed by governments, levy
exemption schemes, also called train-
or-pay schemes, set up predeter-
mined minimum levels of funding in
CVT to be committed to by employ-
ers. Firms can then reduce their levy
obligations and even be exempted of
such obligations by financing train-
ing to their employees. Unspent
funds are then transferred to special
funds.
Levy-grant schemes are also based on
firms’ payrolls. Payroll contributions
are collected from employers by gov-
ernments or sectoral bodies and then
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• Company and sector restructuring, including projects to develop early-warning systems in companies; to build sec-
toral networks between companies, trade unions and others that can help foresee and manage change in an inte-
grated manner; and to support business networks and consulting on change management.
• Support to individuals in order that workers become more adaptable, mainly given under the priority ‘workforce
adaptability’.
The European Social Fund support for training
To help meet the objectives of the EU Strategy for Growth and Jobs, European workers must be among the best in the
world: well educated and trained, with the skills to meet the demands of the knowledge economy and take it forward.
The European Union has a comprehensive set of policies and strategies, at European, national and regional levels, to
improve the qualifications of the European workforce. Many of these improve higher education and vocational train-
ing systems, and build better links between these training providers and industry – to ensure that the skills they teach
are those that companies need, today and in the future.
The ESF 2007–2013 priority for human capital covers all activities concerning education and training. Not only does it
aim towards improving the quality and availability of education and training to help people get a job, but it also sup-
ports training as a lifelong process to help workers keep their jobs, advance in their jobs, prepare themselves to change
jobs, and get back into work if they have lost their jobs.
The ESF supports:
• The design and introduction of reforms in education and training systems that make people more employable,
make initial and vocational training more relevant to employers’ needs, and update the skills of the educators and
trainers to take account of the need for innovation and the knowledge-based economy;
• Networks between higher education institutions, research and technology centres and enterprises. These organi-
sations are all involved in vocational training, so communication between them is critical for the relevance and
effectiveness of training programmes – and also for the design and implementation of innovative approaches to
lifelong learning.
In the less-developed EU regions, the ESF is funding additional types of activity in order to:
• Implement reforms in education and training systems in ways that raise people’s awareness of the importance of
the needs of the knowledge-based economy, and in particular the need for lifelong learning;
• Increase participation in lifelong learning by reducing early school-leaving, reducing gender disparities in some
subjects and improving access to quality education;
• Expand the pool of researchers and innovators by supporting postgraduate studies and the training of researchers.
27 In addition to these schemes, revenue-generating levies should be mentioned. Revenue-generating levies are based principally on firms' payrolls
and have the main purpose of financing national or sectoral vocational education and public training institutions [5a, b]. The emphasis is on pro-
viding public sector training, especially for the unemployed, rather than encouraging firms to invest in training. Because revenue-generating
schemes do not provide incentives for firms to invest in continuing vocational training, they are not mentioned in the main text.
redistributed among firms in the
form of grants. These grants do not
necessarily reflect firms’ levy contri-
butions because they are conditional
on certain criteria – corresponding,
for instance, to national or sectoral
training priorities – that firms have to
meet once they have adopted their
training plans.
Conversely to levy-grant schemes,
levy-reimbursement schemes allow
firms to be offered grants to cover at
least part of their training costs.
These schemes usually encourage ad
hoc approaches to training provision,
rather than inciting firms to develop
systematic training plans.
Levy-based schemes have advantages
and disadvantages (Gasskov, 2001).
The main advantage of these
schemes is that they ensure that firms
invest in CVT at a level that is likely to
be higher than the one provided by
the free market, mainly because of
the poaching externality. In addition,
these schemes contribute to the
development of a CVT culture by
equalising training expenditures
among firms. Moreover, levy-based
schemes allow, to a certain extent,
management of the profile and qual-
ity of the CVT provided by employers,
either internally or externally, by
establishing conditions that firms
must meet in order for training pro-
grammes to be eligible for financing
from these schemes.
In spite of these advantages, levy-
based schemes have several draw-
backs. They may not be powerful
enough to induce additional invest-
ment by firms given that, above the
threshold, the investment decisions of
firms are only governed by the rules of
the free market (Cahuc and Zylberg-
erg, 2006). Then, mandatory invest-
ments made by employers in CVT may
not be ‘additional’ to non-mandatory
financing and consequently may sub-
stitute or tend to ‘crowd out’ invest-
ment that would have been provided
by firms in any case. Experiences in
many countries show also that levy-
based schemes do not allow all firms
to recover their levy contributions
entirely; in many cases, large firms
tend to benefit most from levy-grant
and training-cost reimbursement
schemes, while smaller firms pay levies
but do not often get any financial
returns. Furthermore, levies for train-
ing fall upon employers, who are sup-
posed to bear the burden of these
taxes. But do employers bear the cost
of the taxes, or are they passed onto
employees in the form of lower net
wages? Suppose the costs are passed
on to employees: the levy-based
schemes, especially the levy-exemp-
tion ones, are not really equitable
because they make all the workers pay
for only a small number of them, the
workers who are well-educated, in the
prime of life, in highly skilled occupa-
tions, who have indefinite contracts.
Indeed, the results of our first probit
model show that disadvantaged
groups of workers – namely low-edu-
cated and older workers – and work-
ers with temporary contracts have a
lower probability of participating in
continuing vocational training.
4.2. Securing the
benefits of continuing
vocational training
4.2.1. Productivity and wage-
bargaining systems
When labour markets are imperfectly
competitive, the supply of CVT by firms
is higher than in perfect competition
because the induced compressed wage
structure generates a rent for employ-
ers that encourages them to finance
‘general’ training if there is a positive
probability that workers will stay with
them afterwards. A number of empiri-
cal studies have shown that such theo-
retical predictions of the new training
literature are consistent with empirical
evidence (e.g. Brunello, 2004; Bassani-
ni and Brunello, 2006). The results of
our second probit model also show
that the higher the 90–50 wage differ-
ential is, the lower the likelihood is of
employees participating in CVT (Table
1, see page 204).
This evidence suggests that reforms
aiming at developing a policy mix to
encourage a greater alignment of
wages and productivity should be
treated cautiously because such
reforms may reduce the rents of
employers induced by their invest-
ment in CVT, thereby aggravating
under-investment in human capital
for workers (Bassanini and Brunello,
2006), even if they may have positive
effects on the demand-side.
4.2.2. Payback clauses
In the context of imperfectly
competitive labour markets, the idea
that employers under-invest in CVT
because they fear that potentially
trained employees will quit the firm
after the training period to join other
firms that choose to free-ride has
been outlined in the previous section.
In order to reduce the risk that
trained employees leave their current
employers after training without
allowing the latter to recoup the
benefits of their investment (i.e. risk
of poaching), the introduction of
‘payback clauses’ can be helpful.
These clauses, which are provided by
law or instituted in collective agree-
ments or individual contracts in many
EU Member States (OECD, 2006), stip-
ulate that an employee leaving the
firm within a specified period after a
training spell has to agree to reim-
burse at least part of the training
costs borne by the employer. Not only
are payback clauses attractive for
employers, but they can also be use-
ful for employees that are credit-
constrained since they allow them to
share the costs of training, by having
a loan from their employers with a
low risk of default (OECD, 2003).
Although attractive, payback clauses
have several drawbacks. The enforce-
ment of theses clauses by employers
may be difficult if trained employees
are credit-constrained, especially if
firms overstate the training costs, or
encourage their employers to lay them
off. Then, payback clauses may dimin-
ish the incentives of many employees
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to participate in CVT if the training has
a poor content and quality. Indeed, in
the case of voluntary quitting,
employees will have to reimburse the
training costs to their current employ-
ers even if the benefits of CVT are low
(Bassanini et al., 2005). As a conse-
quence, the argument for a payback
clause may make sense only in cases
where the training is certified. In
addition, payback clauses do not
entirely prevent trained employees
from quitting their current employers
after training since future employers
may pay them higher wages, allowing
them to reimburse the training costs
and to appropriate the additional
benefits. Finally, these clauses may
also reduce the incentives of low-edu-
cated workers to acquire new skills
because the returns to CVT for them
are often low (OECD, 2006). 
4.2.3. Quality, accreditation
and certification
The quality and nature of training
programmes afforded by private
training institutions [Area B on Fig-
ure 3] are often difficult to assess by
employees and employers because of
a shortage of information. The conse-
quence of such incomplete informa-
tion is that both workers and firms
face difficulties when taking training
decisions, resulting in under-invest-
ment in CVT (see section 3.1.4.).
An important policy dimension is the
accreditation of training providers,
used in many EU Member States to
harmonise and legitimise a wide vari-
ety of training providers (Box 5). This
means compelling training providers
to meet a set of fixed minimum stand-
ards in order to be incorporated in a
vocational education and training sys-
tem. Accreditation is particularly sig-
nificant for CVT in which there is often
little regulation and review of quality.
Such accreditation can thus improve
the information available to employ-
ees and employers and consequently
increases investment in CVT at the ini-
tiative of the enterprise. The process
of granting accredited status to a
training institution should be under-
taken by independent institutions,
either public or private. However, in
any case, such accreditation processes
should be regulated by governments
in order to ensure a fair competition
among external training providers
since such activity can lead to the cre-
ation of (too) high entry barriers in
the market of vocational training
(Cahuc and Zylbergerg, 2006).
Although policies targeted toward
quality assurance are likely to have a
positive impact on investment in CVT
at the initiative of the enterprise, poli-
cies supporting the certification, vali-
dation or recognition of skills acquired
after training may have more mixed
effects (Box 5) (see section 3.1.4.).
On the one hand, certification, by
reducing asymmetric information
between employees and outside
employers, increases the probability
of employees leaving after the train-
ing period and may therefore discour-
age firms from investing in CVT due
to the poaching problem. One solu-
tion to this poaching problem could
be to establish universal levies in
order to make all firms pay for CVT,
including the poaching firms. 
On the other hand, certification may
have positive effects on the demand-
side since it may incite employees to
devote more effort to the acquisition
of new skills in the context of CVT.
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Box 5 – Towards the implementation of common European tools for quality assurance, accreditation 
and certification: examples of policy initiatives
A Common Quality Assurance Framework (CQAF)
In order to improve the quality of CVT, efforts have been undertaken by EU Member States and the social partners,
with the support of the European Commission, to enhance European cooperation in the field of quality assurance
in vocational education and training through the promotion of a Common Quality Assurance Framework (CQAF),
following the May 2004 Council Conclusions on Quality assurance in vocational education and training. The CQAF
constitutes a European reference framework to ensure and develop quality in vocational education and training,
building on the key principles of the most relevant, existing quality assurance models. It may be considered as a cross
reading instrument that can help policy-makers and practitioners get a better insight as to how the existing quali-
ty assurance models work, identify areas of provision that need improvement, and take decisions on how to improve
them, based on common quantitative and qualitative references. It also allows for capturing and classifying best
practices within and across Member States.
A European Credit System for vocational training and education (ECVTS)
Significant efforts have been made in the EU context to develop and test a European Credit System for vocational
training and education (ECVTS). The objective of the ECVTS is to create a European framework which will facilitate
the transfer, validation and recognition of learning outcomes acquired by individuals moving from one learning
context to another or from one qualification system to another, particularly during a mobility period, and who wish
to obtain a qualification.
Certification may complement the use
of financial and fiscal incentives 
targeted towards firms by enabling
the government to monitor whether
a firm receiving such incentives is
actually providing training to its
employees (Acemoglu, 2001). More-
over, the certification, validation and
recognition of skills acquired in the
context of CVT are essential to ease
their transferability among firms and
thereby to support job-to-job mobili-
ty, which is important for the imple-
mentation of flexicurity policies
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. 
The possible mixed effects of policies
supporting the certification, valida-
tion and recognition of skills acquired
during training on investment in CVT
should, nevertheless, be kept in mind.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
This chapter has shown that the grow-
ing importance of CVT in EU Member
States results from the long-term trends
and the specificities of the structural
changes that have characterised mod-
ern economies over past decades. 
The latter have indeed been marked by
a transition from a Fordist-type model
of production based on mass produc-
tion and consumption to a post Fordist-
type productive model driven by quality
and innovation. In addition, European
economies have experienced a signifi-
cant employment shift towards services.
Lastly, the education attainment level of
the workforce in these economies has
significantly risen. 
These changes have raised the need for
CVT in order to guarantee that workers
who entered the workforce a few
decades ago with a relatively low edu-
cational attainment level have the skills
required to participate effectively in
the new production process that pre-
vails in today’s economy. Moreover,
these changes have put an increasing
pressure on the new generations of
workers to keep acquiring the skills
necessary to learn and innovate in a
new era characterised by rapid change
and learning. Despite the growing
need to invest in CVT, many EU Mem-
ber States – primarily the Southern
European and new Member States –
exhibit comparatively low levels of CVT.
Against this background, the chapter
has suggested that there are four good
reasons which call for the strengthen-
ing of CVT in the context of the Lisbon
Strategy for Growth and Jobs. These
reasons may constitute the objectives
that policies targeted towards CVT
could pursue:
• reduce social exclusion and income
inequality by increasing the human
capital of at-risk workers;
• sustain our social protection sys-
tems (pensions and healthcare sys-
tems) by keeping older workers
active in the labour market;
• support the implementation of
flexicurity policies by making inter-
nal labour markets more dynamic
and by enhancing job-to-job
mobility;
• increase the innovation capacity of
European firms by allowing work-
ers to continually upgrade their
skills to respond more rapidly to
changes in economic conditions.
This chapter has, nevertheless, provid-
ed evidence that these objectives are
far from being reached for reasons: 
• Firstly, access to CVT is unequal
because workers with low levels of
schooling and income are less like-
ly than their counterparts to partic-
ipate in CVT at the initiative of the
enterprise. Consequently they are
not able to increase their human
capital and their employability,
which increases the risk of social
exclusion and income inequality. 
• Secondly, older workers – who
entered the labour force a few
decades ago, often with low levels
of schooling – are less likely to par-
ticipate in CVT at the initiative of
the enterprise than their younger
counterparts. This increases the
older workers’ probability to exit
the labour force early, thereby
aggravating our social protection
systems. 
• Thirdly, while there are signs that
CVT makes internal labour markets
more dynamic by supporting func-
tional flexibility, the transferability
of workers’ skills acquired during
training is restricted by the fact
that these skills are often not
observable to firms and that the
market for CVT is, to some extent,
hidden from the labour market. 
• Finally, while training is an impor-
tant means for firms to sustain
their innovation activity compared
to other innovation mechanisms,
such as intramural or extramural
R&D, the likelihood of participating
in CVT remains quite low in micro
and small enterprises in Europe.
What can be the role of government in
achieving these objectives? This chapter
has stressed that government interven-
tion in CVT at the initiative of the enter-
prise can be justified to ensure that the
two traditional objectives of education
and training are reached, namely effi-
ciency and equity.
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Regarding efficiency, there are indica-
tions that the free market cannot pro-
vide an efficient level of investment in
CVT at the initiative of the enterprise
because of possible market failures. 
Probably the most prominent market
failure related to CVT at the initiative
of the enterprise is the poaching prob-
lem. This refers to the possibility of a
trained employee leaving the firm
that provided the training in order to
join another firm, who did not pay for
such activity but who gains some of
the resulting benefits. In many circum-
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28 See the recently adopted Commission's 2007 Communication Towards common principles of flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility
and security.
29 See the EC's 2006 Communication, Efficiency and equity in European education and training systems.
stances, such market failure does not
provide adequate incentives for
employers to invest in CVT. Such
uncertainty, created by the risk of
poaching, may explain the probability
of why employees in the European
Union with less than one year of job
tenure receive lower levels of CVT
than their counterparts with more
years of job tenure. 
Employers may nevertheless be per-
suaded to invest in CVT in the presence
of a compressed wage structure, which
rewards trained workers relatively less
for their skills. Consequently, a com-
pressed wage structure may encour-
age further investment in CVT, because
it increases the returns to firms from
raising the productivity of their
employees. Our empirical findings
have shown that participation in CVT
at the initiative of the enterprise is
actually more frequent in countries
where the wage structure is com-
pressed. At the same time, this invest-
ment is likely to remain inefficient,
especially if the wage structure is too
compressed because it diminishes the
incentives of employees to participate
in training. 
Another important market failure,
which is likely to generate an ineffi-
cient or under-investment in CVT, is
the lack of information to employees
and employers regarding the nature
and the quality of CVT.
Regarding equity, this chapter has pro-
vided empirical evidence that access to
CVT at the initiative of the enterprise is
unequal among workers, as discussed
above. 
Some groups of employees have a lower
likelihood to participate in CVT than
others in the European Union. These
groups of workers are the older work-
ers, the less educated, those with low
professional experience, and the work-
ers with the lowest income. Paradoxical-
ly, training needs are the highest among
these workers. 
How can government intervention
help achieve efficiency and equity in
CVT at the initiative of the enterprise?
Supply-side policies designed to
secure investment in this area may
contribute to reduce under-invest-
ment in CVT, while, in certain circum-
stances, ensuring equal access of all
workers to training. These policies
may also affect the benefits of contin-
uing training.
Several supply-side policies aiming at
securing investment in CVT have been
identified in the chapter. These policies
include fiscal incentives and subsidies,
collective labour agreements and com-
pulsory agreements through levy-
based schemes. 
Governments may equitably and effi-
ciently increase the level of CVT by
granting subsidies to firms in propor-
tion to their investment in CVT. Even
in the absence of under-investment
in CVT at the initiative of the enter-
prise, subsidies and tax incentives
may contribute to reducing inequali-
ty by being targeted towards certain
categories of firms, such as micro or
small firms or of workers, for instance
those at the bottom end of the skills
distribution. However, they also have
a major disadvantage because they
may have deadweight and displace-
ment effects. 
Collective labour agreements leading
to the creation of (inter-) sectoral
training funds have the advantage of
little need for government interven-
tion. But, transparency of these train-
ing funds should be ensured. 
Finally, the main advantage of levy-
based schemes (i.e. levy exemption
and levy-reimbursement schemes) is
that they ensure that employers
invest in CVT at a level that is likely to
be higher than the one provided by
the free market. Nevertheless, these
schemes have drawbacks. Firstly, they
may not be powerful enough to
induce additional investment by firms
given that, above the threshold, the
investment decisions of firms are only
governed by the rules of the free mar-
ket. Furthermore, these schemes are
often inequitable. For instance, levy-
reimbursement schemes do not allow
all firms, in particular small ones, to
recover their levy contributions
entirely. Another example is given by
levy-exemption schemes. These
schemes often make all workers pay
for a scheme that benefits only a
small number of them: those who are
well educated, in the prime age
group, in highly skilled occupations or
who have been with their employers
a long time.
A diversity of supply-side policies
aimed at securing the benefits from
CVT has been discussed in this chapter. 
Results from the theoretical literature
suggest that reforms aiming at devel-
oping a policy mix to encourage a
greater aligment of wages and pro-
ductivity should be considered with
caution because they may reduce the
benefits from CVT that accrue to
training firms, although they may
have positive effects on the demand-
side. 
On the contrary, policy instruments
aimed at reducing turnover such as
payback clauses may be useful since
they, to a certain extent, allow
employers to secure the benefits of
their investment in CVT. 
Lastly, policies promoting quality,
accreditation and certification of
training may have mixed effects on
investment in CVT. On the one hand,
the accreditation of training con-
tributes towards improving the infor-
mation on the quality and nature of
training, thereby helping employers
to take training decisions. On the
other hand, the certification of train-
ing may reduce the incentives of firms
to provide CVT to their employees
because it increases the transferability
of their employees’ skills by making
them more visible to other employers.
Nevertheless, on the demand-side,
the certification of training remains
essential to persuade employees to
devote more effort to the acquisition
of new skills. Moreover, it is socially
desirable because it eases job-to-job
mobility and consequently helps in
the implementation of flexicurity
policies. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
In recent years, the evolution of the
labour income share has gained the
attention of policy-makers, academics
and commentators across the world.
1
This has happened in the context of a
widespread perception that globalisa-
tion tilted the functional distribution
of income in favour of capital and that
technological progress has become
biased against labour, especially
against low-skilled workers. Indeed,
after having peaked in the late 1970s
and early 1980s, the labour income
share started to decline in most Euro-
pean Union (EU) Member States and
now stands at low levels by historical
standards. At the same time, there was
also a significant change in the distri-
bution of the overall wage bill, charac-
terised by a gradual fall in the share of
unskilled workers and a steady rise in
the share of skilled workers. 
The socio-economic importance of
these developments can hardly be
underestimated as it involves issues of
equity and economic efficiency, as well
as macro-economic stability. Firstly,
labour’s share in gross domestic prod-
uct provides a good indicator of the
extent to which national income is dis-
tributed between capital and labour,
and in recent years there has been a
growing body of opinion that workers
are not getting their fair share of the
gains from technological progress and
globalisation (Roach, 2006; Bernanke,
2007). As the labour income share –
along with the unemployment rate,
relative wages, the structure of owner-
ship of assets, income taxes and bene-
fits – determines the personal income
distribution, then a clear understand-
ing of the drivers of the labour income
share is of particular relevance from
the perspective of social cohesion
(Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa, 2005)
2
.
Secondly, the evolution of the labour
income share also concerns issues of
economic efficiency. If the labour
income share is above its trend level
there will be downward pressure on
employment and wages to the point
where equilibrium (between real
wages and productivity) is restored.
However, if real wages are not flexible
enough downwards in the face of
adverse shocks, then there will be
higher employment and output
volatility in the short to medium run
and higher equilibrium unemploy-
ment in the medium to long run (due
to a misalignment of real wages with
labour productivity). Moreover, to the
extent that the labour income share is
perceived to be the result of the on-
going process of the international divi-
sion of labour, pressures may arise to
impose protectionist measures which
may lead to a decrease in economic
efficiency. 
Thirdly, the dynamics of the labour
income share also affects macro-
economic stability through, among
other things, its impact on the compo-
sition of the tax base and the different
components of aggregate demand.
Indeed, given the different tax rates
applied to labour income and capital
income, a change in the distribution of
factor income could have significant
effects for fiscal revenue and thus also
for the balance of a country’s public
finances. Moreover, as the marginal
propensity to spend out of disposable
labour income is higher than the mar-
ginal propensity to spend out of capi-
tal income, and investment decisions
are, to a large extent, determined by
the rate of return on capital, a shift in
the allocation of gross domestic prod-
uct between capital and labour can
have important implications for the
level and composition of domestic
demand (Stockhammer et al., 2007). In
addition, as the labour income share is
also a measure of the extent to which
real wages and productivity evolve
together in an economy, its develop-
ment can have important implications
for an economy’s international com-
petitiveness. 
1.2. Coverage of the
chapter
This chapter explores the mechanisms
underlying the recent evolution of the
labour income share and considers
possible policy responses in the context
of social cohesion in the EU. This study
does not intend to elaborate on the
evolution of the labour income share
in individual EU Member States, but
will rather draw some general lessons
by studying a diverse set of country
experiences. Moreover, it will deal
solely with the distribution of gross
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1 Generally speaking, the labour income share measures the ratio of total labour compensation to gross domestic product. Synonyms for ‘labour
income share’ include ‘labour share’ and ‘wage share’. 
2 In an empirical analysis covering 16 OECD countries over the period from 1960 until 1996, Checchi and Garcia-Penalosa (2005) find that the labour
income share is a significant determinant of overall inequality patterns and that stronger unions, minimum wages and a more generous unem-
ployment benefit tend to reduce income inequality through wage compression and through a reduction in the rewards to capital. Nevertheless,
they also emphasise that their analysis is a static one and that more research is needed to examine the dynamic feedbacks between labour mar-
ket institutions and capital formation.
domestic product between the pro-
duction factors. This chapter does not
therefore discuss personal income dis-
tribution, nor the allocation of the
wage bill between wages and employ-
ment or the impact of some of the
underlying drivers, such as technologi-
cal progress and globalisation, on the
size of gross domestic product.
The next section describes the evolu-
tion of the labour income share in the
EU for the period from 1960 until
2006, and compares it with the evolu-
tion of the labour income share in the
United States and Japan.
3
There it is
highlighted that in most of the EU-15
countries the labour income share
reached a peak in the second half of
the 1970s and early 1980s, and subse-
quently declined towards levels that
are below those that were attained
before the first oil price shock. 
Traditionally the evolution of the
labour income share has been studied
in the context of economic growth
theory and in this literature the con-
stancy of the labour income share has
long been considered as one of the
important regularities that characteri-
ses economic growth (Kaldor, 1963;
Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). How-
ever, as time progressed and the data
clearly indicated that the labour
income share was not evolving in a 
stable way, researchers started to test
new hypotheses regarding the
mechanisms that drive the labour
income share (Blanchard, 1997; Bento-
lila and Saint-Paul, 2003; IMF, 2007),
and it is this literature on which this
chapter will build further.
In sections 3 to 5 it is investigated as
to what extent the evolution of the
labour income share can be seen as
the outcome of the interaction
between shocks, production technol-
ogy, institutions, globalisation, and
shifts in the skill (and sectoral) com-
position of the economy. First, the
relationship between the nature of
the production technology and the
labour income share is examined.
There, the analysis not only stresses
the importance of the degree of sub-
stitutability between capital and
labour and relative factor endow-
ments, but also focuses on the effects
of technological progress that is
biased against (low-skilled) workers.
Next, the impact of goods and labour
market institutions is studied. Such
institutions create rents in the goods
market and affect the distribution of
rents between labour and capital
through their impact on the bargain-
ing power of the production factors.
Moreover, as these institutions also
affect the adjustment costs in the
labour market, it is also investigated
as to what extent they affect the
behaviour of the labour income share
over the business cycle. Finally, the
theoretical analysis concludes with a
description of the transmission mech-
anisms through which globalisation
affects the functional income distri-
bution .  
In section 6, a system of income share
equations is estimated with data
retrieved from various sources, includ-
ing the recently released EU KLEMS
database
4
. This data allows an estimate
of the different drivers’ impact on the
income share of the low, medium and
high-skilled workers, as well as on the
income share of aggregate labour. Sub-
sequently, the estimated system is used
to gauge the contribution of the differ-
ent drivers to the recent decline of the
aggregate labour income share, and to
the evolution of the income share of
the different skill types. 
Finally, the last section summarises
the most important findings and
draws some policy conclusions. The
first annex to this chapter describes
the data that is used in this chapter.
The data sources include the Commis-
sion’s AMECO database, the EU
KLEMS database and the Bassanini
and Duval (2006) database. The sec-
ond annex derives some basic analyt-
ical results that should help to clarify
the details of the impact of the driv-
ers on the labour income share.  
2. THE EVOLUTION OF
THE LABOUR INCOME
SHARE IN THE EU,
1960–2006
The labour income share is defined
as the total compensation of labour
divided by gross domestic product.
However, the exact measurement of
the nominator as well as the denom-
inator is not always straightforward
(Gollin, 2002; Gomme and Rupert,
2004; Krueger, 1999; Askenazy,
2003). Data for the compensation of
employees is usually readily available
for the EU Member States. However,
data on the labour income of the
self-employed has to be estimated as
the national accounts record labour
income of self-employed together
with capital income of corporations
and quasi-corporations. A common
practice is to assume that the wage
rates of employees and the self-
employed are the same and adjust
the labour income share according-
ly
5
. Further adjustments to the cal-
238
EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE 2007
3 It should also be noted that for the countries that have acceded to the European Union since 2004, the analysis will cover only the period 
ranging from the (mid-) 1990s to 2006.
4 See www.euklems.net/ for more details regarding this database. 
5 The adjusted labour share is then calculated as                                                                       , a measure which is readily available in
the Commission’s AMECO database as variable ALCD0. Askenazy (2003) notes that such an adjustment is implicitly based on the assumption that
the composition of self-employed remains constant over time, which is not necessarily the case. For instance, a high proportion of self-employed
was working in the agricultural sector in the 1960s compared with a high proportion of self-employed in the liberal professions (e.g. lawyers, med-
ical doctors, etc.) in the 2000s.
compensation of employees
number of employess
total employment
gross domestic employment at marquet price x 100
culated labour income share could
include adjustments to the value
added of the financial sector
6
, the
measurement of capital income of
the non-market producers
7
, and the
use of gross domestic product at
current factor costs instead of gross
domestic product at current market
prices
8
.
In this chapter, the labour income
share is measured as the compensa-
tion of the total number of employed
divided by gross domestic product at
current market prices
9
, whereby the
wage bill of the self-employed is cal-
culated under the assumption that
the wage rate of the self-employed is
equal to the wage rate of the
employees. From now on we will
refer to this ‘adjusted labour income
share’ as the ‘labour income share’.
For the EU-15 Member States the
labour share is available from 1960,
while for the Member States that
have acceded since 2004 the data is
only available from the mid-1990s.
The following sections briefly review
the trend and cyclical developments
in the labour income share in the
European Union, the United States
and Japan. Special attention is also
being paid to the development of the
shares of the different skill types,
though the latter is not only of inter-
est to understand the evolution of
the aggregate but also to study the
issue from the perspective of social
cohesion. 
2.1. The labour income
share in the EU, the US
and Japan 
Chart 1 ( see page 240) and Table 1
(see page 240) illustrate the evolu-
tion of the labour income share in
the EU-15 for the period ranging
from 1960 until 2006
10
. After having
increased during the 1960s and the
first half of the 1970s with a peak of
69.9% of GDP in 1975, the labour
income share began a gradual
decline and reached a low of 57.8%
of GDP in 2006, with the actual
labour income share falling below its
trend in recent years. The evolution
of the labour income share in the EU-
27 as of 1995 is also shown in Chart
1. Due to the relative small share of
the new Member States’ economies
in the aggregate, the addition of the
labour income share of the 12 new
Member States does not alter the
overall trend in a significant way. 
Chart 2 shows the evolution of the
labour income share in the United
States. Compared with the EU, the
American labour income share
behaved in a more stable way, reach-
ing a high of 65.9% of GDP in 1970
and a low of 60.9% of GDP in 2005.
Moreover, the American labour
income share also has a much lower
coefficient of variation over the
1960–2006 period (Table 1 - see page
240). Nevertheless a formal statistical
test shows that the hypothesis of a
non-stationary labour income share
could not be rejected at a high confi-
dence level for the United States, as
well as for the EU-15 and Japan.
11
In Japan (Chart 3 - see page 240), the
labour income share displayed a
marked upward trend from the mid-
1960s to the early 1970s, reaching a
peak of 76% of GDP around
1975–1977, after which it started a
noted fall until the mid-1990s, fol-
lowed by a further decline towards a
low of 60% of GDP in 2006. All in all,
charts 1 to 3 show that the labour
income share was the most stable in
the United States, and that the differ-
ence between the highest and lowest
level was largest in Japan. 
It should be noted that although there
is no consensus in the literature
regarding the exact way to measure
the labour income share, the finding
of a hump-shaped profile for the
(adjusted) labour income share in the
EU over the period covered by our
sample has also been documented by
Bentolila and Saint Paul (2003), Blan-
chard (2006), BIS (2006), IMF (2005;
2007), OECD (2007), Orellana et al.
(2005) and de Serres et al. (2002). 
Before examining the likely forces
behind this behaviour, we will have a
closer look at the evolution of the
labour income share in the different
EU Member States and describe the
evolution of the income shares of
the different skill types of workers. 
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6 See for instance Askenazy (2003).  
7 By construction, the national accounts do not allow for capital income of the non-market producers (including healthcare, education and 
administration), as the only sources of income are labour income and capital depreciation allowances. As a consequence, the inclusion of the 
public sector tends to increase the labour income share. 
8 Gross domestic product at factor cost is not explicitly present in ESA 1995. However, gross domestic product at factor costs can easily be calculated
as gross domestic product at market prices minus taxes on production and imports, plus subsidies.  The adjusted labour share is then calculated
as  x 100, a measure that is readily available in the Commission’s AMECO database as variable ALCD2. 
9 By using gross domestic product at current market prices the analysis explicitly takes into account the fact that the government absorbs part of
value added.
10 The labour income shares for EU-15 and EU-27 are calculated on the basis of the country aggregates of the different components in the nomina-
tor and denominator. 
11 Column 8 of Table 1 shows t-student statistics for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, whereby the null hypothesis of non-stationarity (i.e. a unit
root) is tested against the alternative hypothesis of stationarity. If the computed student-t statistic is smaller than the lower critical value for a
particular number of observations, the null-hypothesis has to be rejected and the alternative hypothesis accepted. For the current sample size,
the critical values at the 1%, 5% and 10% confidence level are respectively -4.17, -3.51 and -3.19. 
2.2. The labour income
share in the EU
Member States
2.2.1 The EU-15 
Chart 4 shows the evolution of the
labour income share for the total
economy in each of the 27 EU Mem-
ber States.
12
The solid lines show the
actual observations of the labour
income share, while the dotted lines
display the underlying trend. Table 1
summarises the main characteristics
of the evolution of the labour share
in each of the 15 Member States over
the period from 1960 until 2006.
Given the limited number of observa-
tions, Table 2 (see page 243) sum-
marises the evolution of the labour
income share in the new Member
States for the period ranging from
the mid-1990s until 2006.
Following an increase during the
1960s and especially in the early
1970s, the labour income share start-
ed to fall in most of the EU-15 from
the second half of the 1970s until the
early 1980s.
13
In six of the EU-15, the
labour income share reached a peak
in 1975
14
, while in 11 Member States
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Chart 1: EU-15 and EU-27 Chart 2: The United States Chart 3: Japan
Source: AMECO database and own calculations. 
Table 1 - The labour income share in the EU-15 Member States – summary
Average Coefficient Maximum Minimum ADF- Fluctuations
1960–2006 of variation share year share year t-value synchron. persistence variability
Belgium 61.3 5.5 66.9 1981 55.2 1961 -1.49 -0.0 0.67 0.67
Denmark 59.1 3.1 62.9 1975 56.3 2005 -2.98 -0.5 0.34 0.47
Germany 61.6 4.1 66.1 1974 55.9 2006 -1.49 0.2 0.54 0.42
Greece 66.5 12.5 91.9 1960 57.0 2003 -3.50 -0.3 0.40 0.78
Spain 62.4 5.8 67.9 1976 54.5 2006 -2.68 -0.0 0.71 0.49
France 61.4 5.3 66.9 1981 56.7 1998 -1.62 -0.4 0.62 0.63
Ireland 62.1 12.1 71.2 1975 47.1 2002 -1.59 -0.5 0.45 0.54
Italy 62.5 8.5 69.7 1975 53.3 2000 -1.76 -0.5 0.43 0.64
Luxembourg 52.6 7.1 62.2 1977 46.4 1969 -2.20 -0.4 0.42 0.66
Netherlands 63.0 5.7 70.4 1975 56.7 2006 -2.09 -0.1 0.54 0.54
Austria 66.2 6.9 72.9 1978 55.8 2006 -1.52 -0.3 0.50 0.69
Portugal 67.0 9.4 87.9 1975 59.6 1969 -1.80 -0.2 0.60 1.14
Finland 62.5 8.0 70.3 1966 53.7 2000 -2.74 -0.2 0.57 0.55
Sweden 62.1 5.8 69.2 1977 55.4 1995 -2.77 -0.1 0.67 0.75
United Kingdom 65.3 2.8 72.2 1975 61.8 1997 -4.07 -0.2 0.61 0.70
EU-15 64.2 5.6 69.9 1975 57.8 2006 -1.72 -0.1 0.65 0.51
Japan 68.0 6.4 76.4 1975 60.2 2006 -1.77 -0.6 0.69 0.61
United States 63.7 1.8 65.9 1970 60.9 2005 -2.49 -0.1 0.53 0.34
Source: AMECO database and own calculations.
Note: Coefficient of variation: standard deviation of labour share divided by mean; maximum/minimum share: maximum/minimum value recorded
for the share; maximum/minimum year: year in which the maximum/minimum was observed; ADF t-value: t-value for augmented Dickey-Fuller test
(unit root test with constant and trend); fluctuations-synchron: correlation between trend-deviation in labour income share and trend-deviation in
GDP; fluctuations-persistence: coefficient of auto-correlation; fluctuations-variability: standard deviation of fluctuations in labour income share divid-
ed by standard deviation of fluctuations in GDP.
12 Readers should take note of the fact that the scales of the graphs are not uniform. 
13 Greece is an important exception to this rule, as its labour share fell from close to 90% in the early 1960s to about 60% in the early 1970s.
14 Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
 
it peaked between 1974 and 1978
15
.
In Belgium and France, the labour
share reached its peak in 1981, while
in Finland the peak was reached in
1966 and in Greece in 1960. Subse-
quently, in most of the EU-15 the
labour share decline had reached a
low in the late 1990s to early 2000s
which was, on the whole, lower than
the levels reached in the 1960s or
1970s. Only in Belgium, Luxembourg
and Portugal was the labour income
share lower in the 1960s than in the
1990s or 2000s. 
In recent years, the fall in the labour
income share seems to have been lev-
elling off in some Member States
(e.g. France, Belgium and Finland) or
even showing a rebound in others
(e.g. Ireland and Italy). Nevertheless,
some countries continue to experi-
ence a downward trend (e.g. Austria,
the Netherlands, Greece and Spain).
Overall, the labour income share was
not stable in most of the EU-15 over
the period ranging from 1960 until
2006
16
and the differences between
the lows and highs are quite notable.
The smallest difference is recorded for
Denmark, where the difference is just
6.6 percentage points, and the largest
difference is recorded for Greece,
where the difference is a significant
34.9 percentage points. In Portugal
the difference between peak and
trough amounts to 28.3 percentage
points while in Ireland it reaches 24.1
percentage points. In the other EU-15
Member States, the differences were
between 10.2 percentage points and
17.1 percentage points. 
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15 The six countries mentioned in footnote 14 plus Germany, Spain, Luxembourg, Austria and Sweden.
16 The statistics in the eighth column of Table 1 underline the non-stationarity of the labour income share in most of the EU-15. Notable exceptions
are the United Kingdom and Greece for which the null hypothesis of non-stationarity (i.e. a unit root) could be rejected at a fairly high 
confidence level. Due to the lack of sufficient observations a unit root test could not be performed on the data of the new Member States.
40
50
60
70
80
90
contemporaneous
cilbupeR hcezCairagluBmuigleB
ainotsEynamreGkramneD
Greece ecnarFniapS
trend
40
50
60
70
80
90
50
60
70
80
90
40
40
50
60
70
80
90
40
50
60
70
80
90
50
60
70
80
90
40
40 40
50
60
70
80
90
50
60
70
80
90
40
50
60
70
80
90
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20051960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20051960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20051960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20051960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20051960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20051960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Chart 4: Labour income share in Europe
242
EMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE 2007
Ireland surpyCylatI
gruobmexuLainauhtiLaivtaL
contemporaneous trend
40 40
50
60
70
80
90
50
60
70
80
90
40
50
60
70
80
90
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20051960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 20051960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
40
50
60
70
80
90
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
40
50
60
70
80
90
40
50
60
70
80
90
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
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2.2.2. The new Member States
In the new Member States, the
income labour share has been on a
downward trend since the mid-1990s,
with the exception of the Czech
Republic, Malta, Cyprus and Romania.
The strongest variations in the labour
income share are found in Latvia, Bul-
garia, and Romania, while the weak-
est variations are found in Cyprus, the
Czech Republic, Malta and Slovakia. 
With the exception of the evolution in
Cyprus and Malta, these developments
occurred in countries undergoing deep
structural transformations of  their
economies whereby, for instance, real
wages have had to converge to meet
productivity levels and the sectoral
composition of the economies have
had to adjust to the needs of a service-
oriented, knowledge-based modern
market economy.
17
2.3. Wages, productivity
and the labour income
share
As an accounting exercise, the labour
income share can be decomposed
into the real wage and (the inverse of
average) labour productivity
18
. When
the real wage grows at a slower pace
than labour productivity, the labour
income share shows a decline, and
vice versa. As we decompose labour
productivity further, the evolution
of the labour income share can be
written in terms of the evolution of
the real wage (in efficiency units),
the capital-to-output ratio (i.e. the
inverse of capital productivity) and
the capital-to-labour (in efficiency
units) ratio – whereby ‘labour in
efficiency units’ refers to the fact
that the labour stock has been aug-
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Chart 4: Labour income share in Europe (continued)
Source: AMECO database and own calculations. 
17 Though measurement problems related to the assumptions regarding the renumeration of the self-employed may also account for some of the
decline (Askenazy, 2003).    
18 Let L be employment, W the nominal wage rate, Q value added and P the price level, then the labour share, LS, is defined as 
LS =
i.e. the ratio of the real wage and (average) labour productivity, which shows that the labour share is also a measure of the real unit labour cost.
Conventionally, the level of real unit labour costs is expressed relative to a base year, while the labour income share is expressed in levels. 
WL = W 1
PQ P (Q)L
Table 2 - The labour income share in the new Member States
muminiMmumixaMtneiciffeoC
Average of variation share year share year
Bulgaria 51.1 10.9 62.2 1995 44.6 2006
Czech Republic 51.7 2.6 54.2 2003 49.9 1995
Estonia 51.5 5.0 57.4 1994 48.2 2002
Cyprus 57.2 2.2 59.3 2003 54.8 2001
Latvia 49.9 11.5 60.5 1994 37.6 1992
Lithuania 48.6 7.0 53.9 1999 40.4 1993
Hungary 55.4 9.6 68.3 1992 50.1 1999
Malta 51.0 2.8 53.3 2003 48.6 1990
Poland 55.5 7.3 62.5 1992 48.6 2005
Romania 68.2 10.5 84.1 1990 54.3 1997
Slovenia 64.4 3.6 69.8 1995 61.9 2006
Slovakia 44.3 2.8 46.9 1998 42.3 2006
Source: AMECO database and own calculations.
Note: Sample size: MT, RO: 1990–2006; LV, HU, PL: 1992–2006; EE, LT: 1993–2006; SK: 1994–2006; BG, CZ, CY, SI: 1995–2006.
mented by an index of technological
progress
19
.
Table 3 shows the annual growth
rates of the labour income share and
its components (in percent) in the
EU-15 for the sub-periods ranging
from 1960–1980 and from
1981–2006. During the first sub-peri-
od the labour income share was
characterised by a steady increase in
most of the EU-15, while the second
sub-period was characterised by a
decline in the indicator. Comparing
the two sub-periods, it is striking to
note that in the period ranging from
1981–2006 the real wage (measured
in efficiency units) showed a nega-
tive average growth rate for all
Member States, except for Portugal
where it was slightly above zero,
indicating that during this period its
real wage growth did not keep up
with technological progress. The
strongest negative growth is record-
ed for Ireland, where the real wage
(measured in efficiency units)
decreased at an average annual rate
of 2.62%, followed by Luxembourg,
the Netherlands and Finland where
the average annual decline is equal,
respectively, to 1.64, 1.39 and 1.38%.
At the same time, it should also be
noted how the signs of the growth
rates of the capital-to-output ratio
and the capital-to-labour ratio var-
ied across countries. 
Due to a lack of data, Table 4 only
shows average growth rates for the
labour share, the real wage and
(average) labour productivity for the
countries that joined the EU in
recent years, covering the period
mid-1990s to 2006. In 7 of the 12
Member States the labour share
showed a negative average growth
rate, indicating that real wages
grew more slowly than productivity
over the reference period. Given the
deep structural reforms that were
still going on in these countries in
the mid-1990s, the data in this table
should be interpreted with caution
as, for instance, specific results may
be very sensitive to the choice of the
starting year of the sample over
which averages are taken.
Taken together, these different
Member State experiences clearly
show that changes in the real wage
rate and the components of prod-
uctivity cause changes in the labour
income share that may differ signifi-
cantly across countries and periods.
This illustrates then that simply look-
ing at the evolution of the compo-
nents of the labour income share is
not enough to understand the
behaviour of the labour income
share, and that a more thorough
investigation of the issue is warrant-
ed. This examination will be tackled
in the next section. 
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19 The equation in the previous footnote can be rewritten in terms of log growth rates as
where K is the capital stock and where A is an index of labour-augmenting technological progress which is calculated by dividing the Solow 
residual for each year by the contemporaneous share of labour and integrating it over time. See Blanchard (1997; 2006) who applies this type of
adjustments to the real wage (and the capital-to-labour ratio) in order to take out the trend drift in wage growth that can be attributed to 
technological progress.
In this context, ‘real wage in efficiency units’ refers to the real wage divided by the index of technological progress, i.e.,           while ‘labour in effi-
ciency units’ refers to the labour stock augmented by the index of technological progress, i.e. L A.
d ln(LS) = dln( W )+ dln (K)- dln( K )PA Q LA
Table 3 - Components of the labour income share by country: EU-15 (average annual growth rates)
Period 1960–1980 Period 1981–2006
(inverted) (inverted)
Labour share Real wage1 Capital-to- Capital-to- Labour share Real wage1 Capital-to- Capital-to-
output ratio labour ratio1 output ratio labour ratio1
Belgium 0.84 0.11 -0.83 1.56 -0.40 -0.40 -0.03 0.03
Denmark 0.48 0.03 -0.66 1.11 -0.39 -0.84 -0.59 1.05
Germany 0.40 NA 0.22 NA -0.60 -1.08 -0.05 0.18
Greece -1.76 -0.60 1.12 -2.28 -0.46 -0.31 0.70 -0.85
Spain 0.40 0.22 -0.59 0.76 -0.78 -0.59 0.57 -0.76
France 0.33 0.39 0.04 -0.10 -0.58 -0.66 0.14 -0.06
Ireland 0.16 1.17 1.18 -2.18 -1.40 -2.62 -1.29 2.51
Italy -0.03 -0.04 -0.43 0.43 -0.76 -0.75 0.41 -0.42
Luxembourg 1.04 -0.26 -1.10 2.40 -0.80 -1.64 -0.88 1.72
Netherlands 0.91 0.82 0.47 -0.39 -0.75 -1.39 -0.32 0.96
Austria 0.01 0.21 -0.23 0.03 -0.89 -0.72 0.40 -0.57
Portugal 0.58 -0.44 -1.83 2.85 -0.55 -0.11 1.13 -1.58
Finland -0.30 -0.12 0.01 -0.19 -0.58 -1.38 -0.92 1.72
Sweden 0.28 0.63 0.43 -0.78 -0.62 -0.99 -0.37 0.75
United Kingdom 0.17 0.13 -0.06 0.09 -0.14 -0.52 -0.65 1.04
Japan 0.02 -0.04 -0.28 0.34 -0.77 -0.47 0.76 -1.06
United States 0.00 -0.38 -0.69 1.07 -0.27 -0.51 -0.37 0.62
Source: AMECO database and own calculations.
Note: 1: Measured in efficiency units. Efficiency units are available for Germany as of 1991. Averages for Germany are averages of available data.
( W )PA
 
2.4. The cyclical
behaviour of the
labour income share
Charts 1 and Table 1 (see page 240)
indicate that, where possible, a clear
distinction should be made between
transitory developments in the
labour income share that are due to
the business cycle or temporary
shocks, and trend developments
which are more likely to be caused by
structural changes in the underlying
drivers. 
More precisely, the statistics in the
third-to-last column of Table 1 show
that, with the exception of Germany,
the labour share behaved counter-
cyclical, i.e. it rose above its trend
value during an economic downturn
and fell below its trend during an
economic upswing
20
. In the EU, the
strongest counter-cyclical behaviour
is found in Denmark, Ireland and
Italy, and the weakest in Belgium and
Spain. 
The penultimate column of Table 1
gives an indication of the degree
with which a deviation from trend
persists
21
. There we see that trend
deviations show the highest persist-
ence in Spain, Belgium and Sweden,
and the lowest in Denmark, Greece,
Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg. 
The last column of Table 1 measures
the degree of the relative volatility of
the fluctuations in the labour income
share by comparing them with the
volatility of the fluctuations in out-
put.
22
Clearly, in all Member States,
except Portugal, the fluctuations in
the labour share are less volatile than
the fluctuations in output, with the
least volatility in Germany and Den-
mark. 
2.5. Skill composition
of the wage bill
Using data available under the EU
KLEMS research project
23
, charts 5, 6
and 7 (see page 246) show the evolu-
tion of the different skill-types’ share
in the aggregate labour income in a
representative set of EU Member
States
24
, the United States and Japan
for the period 1980–2004. 
These charts show that the share of
the low-skilled in total labour com-
pensation declined steadily in each of
the regions. In the EU and Japan, for
example, the share of the low-skilled
was higher than the share of the
high-skilled at the beginning of the
reference period, but it fell below the
share of the high-skilled by the early
- 1990s in the EU and by the mid-
1980s in Japan. In the United States,
the share of the high-skilled was larg-
er than the share of the low-skilled
throughout the period and, further-
more, rising so that it approached a
similar size to the share of the medium-
skilled by the mid-2000s. In all three
economic areas, the share of the
medium-skilled was larger than the
sum of the shares of the low and
medium-skilled, except for the Unit-
ed States around the turn of the cen-
tury. 
The two principal findings from this
section can be summarised as fol-
lows. Firstly, the aggregate labour
income share was not stable over
the past four decades. This was espe-
cially the case for the labour income
share in continental Europe and
Japan, and to a lesser extent for the
labour income share in the Anglo-
Saxon countries. There is a general
consensus in the literature that,
whichever degree of sophistication
is used for the measurement of the
labour income share, it started to
decline in most EU Member States
shortly after the first oil price shock
and that it fell towards levels which
are well below those attained in
the1960s. Secondly, there was also
an important change in the compos-
ition of the wage bill, with the share
of the low-skilled showing a
marked decline and the share of
the high-skilled workers displaying
a steady rise. 
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Table 4 - Components of the labour income share by country: the new Member States
(average annual growth rates)
Labour share Real wage (Inverted) average 
labour productivity
Bulgaria -3.03 -1.22 -1.79
Czech Republic 0.46 3.40 -2.94
Estonia -1.24 6.08 -7.32
Cyprus 0.02 1.41 -1.39
Latvia -1.80 4.60 -6.40
Lithuania 0.87 6.88 -6.01
Hungary -1.00 2.51 -3.52
Malta 0.09 1.83 -1.74
Poland -1.35 3.16 -4.51
Romania 0.43 4.69 -4.26
Slovenia -1.09 2.72 -3.81
Slovakia -0.19 4.11 -4.30
Source: AMECO database and own calculations.
Note: Sample size: MT, RO: 1990–2006; LV, HU, PL: 1992–2006; EE, LT: 1993–2006; SK: 1994–2006;
BG, CZ, CY, SI: 1995–2006.
20 Counter-cyclical behaviour means that there is a negative correlation between the fluctuations in the labour income share and output. 
21 The persistence of the trend deviation is measured by the regression coefficient rho in the equation 
(LSt-LS_trendt) = rho (LSt-1-LS_trendt-1) + ut 
22 Volatility is measured by the standard deviation in the trend deviation of the variable. 
23 The EU KLEMS research project is funded by the European Commission, Research Directorate General as part of the 5th Framework Programme,
Priority 8, ‘Policy Support and Anticipating Scientific and Technological Needs’. As such these data are not official data. 
24 Charts 5, 6 and 7 show the aggregate for a select set of countries for which the data is available as of 1980. The 10 EU countries for which the
data is available are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland and the United Kingdom. See Timmer et
al. (2007) for the definition of the skill types in the Member States. 
The subsequent analysis will explore
to what extent technological
progress, globalisation and changes
in labour market institutions, as well
as policies, contributed to these
developments. 
3. THE LABOUR INCOME
SHARE AND THE
PRODUCTION
TECHNOLOGY
In an influential paper published in
the early 1960s, Kaldor (1963) identi-
fied the constancy of the labour
income share as one of the important
empirical regularities characterising
economic growth (in the United
States).
25
This ‘empirical fact’ found
its theoretical underpinning in the
basic neo-classical growth model. 
The basic neo-classical growth model
assumes perfect competition in the
goods and factor markets, no adjust-
ment costs and, most importantly, a
production technology with a unit
elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour. A unit substitu-
tion elasticity implies, for instance,
that when the relative factor prices
change the relative factor inputs
change within the same proportion –
but in the opposite direction. In this
model, the labour income share is
always at its natural level and this
level is solely determined by the
underlying parameters of the exoge-
nous production technology
26
. As a
consequence, in this model, (labour
market) policies are unable to influ-
ence the labour income share.
As the basic neo-classical growth
model is not capable of explaining
the hump-shaped profile of the
labour income share observed in
most of the EU Member States over
the last 40 years, researchers started
to explore the implications of
changes in the assumptions concern-
ing, among other things, the value of
the elasticity of substitution between
labour and capital (Rowthorn, 1999),
the nature of technological progress
(Acemoglu, 1998; 2002; 2003), the
degree of (international) competi-
tion in labour and goods markets
(Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003; Harri-
son, 2002; IMF, 2007), the sectoral
composition of the economy (Serres
et al., 2002), as well as the size of
adjustment costs (Kessing, 2003). 
As it seems unlikely that the relax-
ation of only one of these assump-
tions will be capable of providing a
full explanation of the labour
income share’s behaviour over the
past decades, the subsequent ana-
lysis will examine the impact of sev-
eral of these issues. Firstly, it will be
demonstrated how the qualitative
nature of a change in the relative
endowment of labour and capital
and technological progress depends,
to a large extent, on the size of the
elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour. Next, it will be
examined how labour and product
market institutions, as well as global-
isation, affect the labour income
share. Finally, a system of labour
income share equations will be esti-
mated in order to determine the
empirical significance of the differ-
ent drivers. 
3.1. Factor substitution
and the labour income
share
The prediction of a constant labour
income share is closely related to the
assumption of a unitary elasticity of
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25 Though a thorough criticism of this fact was already formulated by Solow (1958).
26 It should be noted that in this model the parameters of the production function may be subject to random shocks, giving rise to a volatile labour
income share. Nevertheless, in such a stochastic environment, the basic policy implication of the neo-classical growth model should remain valid,
i.e. polices cannot influence the labour income share. See also Annex B. 
Chart 5: 10 Member States Chart 6: The United States Chart 7: Japan
substitution between labour and cap-
ital. Once this elasticity takes a differ-
ent value, the labour income share
no longer remains constant when, for
instance, relative factor endowments
change. Moreover, the direction in
which the labour income share
responds to a change in relative fac-
tor endowments depends to a large
extent on the size of the elasticity of
substitution between labour and cap-
ital. When the elasticity of substitu-
tion between capital and labour is
smaller (larger) than 1, the labour
income share will increase (decrease)
if the capital-to-labour ratio (meas-
ured in efficiency units) increases
27
.
Indeed, when capital grows faster
than labour, a change in relative
prices is needed to absorb this shock,
and this price adjustment will have to
be larger the smaller the elasticity of
substitution between capital and
labour is
28
. As such, the price effect
will dominate the quantity effect if
the substitution elasticity is below 1
so that the labour income share
increases. Alternatively, in the case of
an elasticity of substitution larger
than 1, the quantity effect will be
stronger than the price effect and the
labour income share will decrease
when the capital-to-labour ratio
increases. This shows, then, that both
the capital-to-labour ratio and the
elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour are two important
determinants of the distribution of
gross domestic product. 
Before investigating the empirical
relevance of the capital-to-labour
ratio for the evolution of the labour
income share in a more systematic
way, the following remarks can
already be made. Firstly, several esti-
mates of the elasticity of substitution
are presented in the literature.
Rowthorn (1999), for instance,
reports (indirect) estimates for the
substitution elasticity that are well
below 1 for 19 countries
29
. Antras
(2004) obtains estimates of the elas-
ticity of substitution that are signifi-
cantly below 1 if biased technical
change is allowed for. 
Secondly, if an elasticity of substitu-
tion lower than 1 is assumed, then
the rise in the labour income share
until the late 1970s (or early 1980s in
some countries) should have been
accompanied by an increase in the
capital-to-labour ratio and a decline
in the labour income share as of the
mid-1980s with a decline in the capital-
to-labour ratio. Alternatively, if an
elasticity of substitution that is larger
than 1 is assumed, then a declining
capital-to-labour ratio until the late
1970s and a rising capital-to-labour
ratio as of the mid-1980s would be
expected. 
Chart 8 shows the correlation
between the annual change in the
capital-to-labour ratio (measured in
efficiency units) and the labour
income share. Although this chart
shows some correlation, it should be
clear from this first look at the data
that the capital-to-labour ratio (meas-
ured in efficiency units) cannot be
considered as the sole driver of the
labour income share and that a fur-
ther analysis of the issue is needed. 
3.2. Direction of
technological progress
and labour income
share
3.2.1. Capital and labour-
augmenting technological
progress
One popular interpretation of the
facts described in the previous section
is that the labour income share rose
during the 1960s and 1970s because at
that time technological progress was
of a labour-augmenting nature
(assuming an elasticity of substitution
larger than 1), while the labour 247
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Chart 8: Labour income share vs. capital-to-labour ratio (in efficiency units)
Source: AMECO database and own calculations.
27 See also Annex B.
28 In the case of a small open economy that faces an exogenous interest rate such a change in relative factor prices would then be carried by wages.
See, for example, Cotis and Rignols (1998) for an illustration of the importance of the behaviour of an exogenous interest rate to explain the evo-
lution of the labour income share in France.
29 Rowthorn (1999) estimates the substitution elasticity indirectly on the basis of the estimation of the labour demand functions while assuming that
labour earns its marginal product. Other studies presenting estimates below 1 include Krusell et al. (2000). However, alternative estimation pro-
cedures find results that indicate that the elasticity of substitution may be higher than 1, see Duffy and Papgeoriou (2000) or Caballero and Ham-
mour (1998). The latter estimate the substitution elasticity assuming a putty-clay aggregate production function so that only the capital-output
ratio of new production units is considered. They obtain estimates for the substitution elasticity in France that are between 2.4 and 6.5. 
income share fell during the 1980s
and 1990s because technological
progress became capital-augmenting
in response to the inertia of real
wages in order to adjust to higher oil
prices (and other negative shocks). 
In this context Acemoglu (2003) devel-
oped a model
30
that endogenises the
direction of technological progress,
and he shows that profit maximisation
leads to technical change that is pure-
ly labour-augmenting in the long run.
It is only when the economy deviates
from its steady state that technological
progress becomes capital-augmenting
and pulls the labour income share
back to its equilibrium. For example, if
the user cost of capital increases
exogenously, firms will have an incen-
tive to reduce their investment in cap-
ital which leads to a fall in the labour
income share – assuming a low substi-
tution elasticity. Investment in capital
can be reduced by directing spending
towards research and development
activities that augment the efficiency
of the capital stock. This capital-aug-
menting research, which is an endoge-
nous response to the exogenous
increase in the user cost of capital, will
then contribute to an increase in the
labour income share up to the point
where the labour income share is back
to the level that was reached before
the exogenous shock in the user cost
of capital occurred. This model implies
then that the economy has a self-
equilibrating mechanism in the form
of R&D spending that drives the
labour income share back to its ‘natu-
ral’ level. 
3.2.2. Technological progress,
skill bias and labour income
share
Charts 5, 6 and 7 ( see page 246) show
that in the EU, the United States and
Japan the share of the low-skilled
workers in the overall wage bill has
been declining gradually since the
early 1980s
31
and that the share of the
high-skilled workers has been on a
steady rise. 
Two hypotheses have been presented
in the literature to explain this phe-
nomenon: one referring to globalisa-
tion and the other one to skill-biased
technological progress (Feenstra,
2004; 2007). Focusing on technologi-
cal progress
32
, empirical research indi-
cates that new technologies substi-
tute for that unskilled labour charac-
terised by repetitive routine tasks
33
,
while they complement skilled work-
ers in their problem solving tasks
34
.
See Krusell et al. (2000), Johnson
(1997) and Autor et al. (1998; 2003)
for (an overview of) estimates of sub-
stitution elasticities between capital
and workers of different skill levels. 
These different degrees of substitu-
tion between the different skill
groups and capital imply that
changes in the capital intensities of
the production process can have
quite different effects on the income
shares of the various skill types. In
reality, these differences can be so
large that capital deepening effec-
tively increases the income share of
the skilled workers but lowers the
share of the unskilled workers as the
latter are substituted by capital,
(Griliches, 1969), or have to accept
lower wages
35
.  
Moreover, it should also be noted
that the complementarity between
capital and skills does not come by
nature, but by design. Acemoglu
(1998) derives this property in the
context of a model where technolo-
gies are non-rival goods that can eas-
ily be used across different firms at
low marginal cost so that profit-
maximising firms have a strong incen-
tive to develop technologies which
complement the production factor
that is most abundant. By applying
this idea to the European and Ameri-
can context, it could be argued that
with the strong, (policy-) induced
increase in the supply of skilled
labour in recent decades, technologi-
cal progress became more comple-
mentary to skilled labour. This then
caused a virtuous circle whereby
higher labour productivity (and thus
also higher wages for the skilled
workers) created an additional
increase in the supply of skilled
labour, which in turn stimulated the
further development of skill-comple-
mentary technologies. 
Closely related to the change in the
skill composition of labour income is
the change in the sectoral composition
of the economy. The behaviour of the
aggregate labour income share can
then be seen as reflecting changes in
the underlying sectoral composition of
aggregate output, whereby sectors
with a lower than average labour
income share, such as the information
and communication technology (ICT)
sector, have gained in importance in
recent years (Serres et al., 2002; Law-
less and Whelan, 2006).
4. THE LABOUR INCOME
SHARE AND INSTITUTIONS
The previous analysis assumed per-
fect competition in the goods and
labour market so that the labour
income share was solely determined
by technological factors. If this
assumption is abandoned, it should
be noted that imperfect competition
in the product market creates rents,
which are distributed between cap-
ital and labour as a function of their
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30 This model satisfies the standard assumptions of endogenous growth theory, though with the explicit assumption that capital can be accumulat-
ed asymptotically but human capital cannot because of the finite time of individuals to invest in human capital. 
31 Period for which the first observations are available. 
32 The impact of globalisation will be discussed in Section 5.
33 i.e. the substitution elasticity between capital and low-skilled labour is greater than 1.
34 i.e. the substitution elasticity between capital and high-skilled labour is smaller than 1.
35 If they accept less favourable working conditions, a fall in the labour income share does not necessarily follow.
 
relative bargaining power (Blanchard
and Giavazzi, 2003). It may therefore
be worthwhile to explore to what
extent rents in the goods market and
the bargaining process in the labour
market have an impact on the evolu-
tion of the labour income share. 
Moreover, as labour market institu-
tions also affect the adjustment
process over the business cycle, it may
be of some importance to examine to
what extent labour market institu-
tions give rise to counter-cyclical fluc-
tuations in the labour income share,
as was described in Section 2.4.
4.1. Imperfect
competition and the
labour income share
Under imperfect competition, profit-
maximising firms set their prices by
charging a mark-up over the margin-
al cost of labour
36
. The size of this
mark-up is to a large extent deter-
mined by the business cycle (Rotem-
berg and Woodford, 1999), and by
regulations that affect competition
(such as tariff barriers or standardisa-
tion measures) and entry costs.
In recent decades several major
reforms have been introduced that
reduce rents in the goods markets in
the EU. These reforms include the
further opening of domestic product
and service markets under the Single
Market Programme, and the intro-
duction of the single currency
enhancing price transparency across
EMU (Economic and Monetary
Union) Member States. As these
measures increase competition in the
goods market, they should have
exerted upward pressure on the
labour income share in the countries
of the EU.
37
Indeed, in the case of
imperfect competition in the goods
market, a wedge is created between
the real wage and the marginal prod-
uctivity of labour. At the same time,
output is lower than the level
attained under perfect competition,
but profits will be larger than under
perfect competition. However,
assuming that workers have no bar-
gaining power, labour will lose out
on its share in the profits and the
labour income share will be lower
than in the case of perfect competi-
tion. Increasing competition in the
goods market will then lower the
wedge between the real wage and
marginal productivity of labour, so
that the labour income share will
increase. This result raises the ques-
tion as to how the labour income
share will behave if workers have
some bargaining power. 
In an imperfectly competitive labour
market, workers and employers bar-
gain over wages. The right-to-man-
age regime is generally considered
to be the regime that captures bar-
gaining practices in Europe fairly
well (Layard et al., 2005).
38
Under
this regime, bargaining proceeds in
two stages. In the first stage the
employees, usually represented by
their trade unions, and employers
bargain over the wage, and in the
second stage the employers decide
how many employees they will hire
for the given wage. Under such a
regime employees will be hired up
to the point where the marginal
labour productivity equals the real
wage, and the size of the elasticity
of substitution between capital and
labour determines whether a fall in
the bargaining power of employees
leads to a decrease or increase in
the labour income share (Bentolila
and Saint Paul, 2003).
Although a reduction in the bargain-
ing power of the workers leads to a
decline in the real wage and, assuming
an elasticity of substitution smaller
than 1, to a decline in the labour
income share in the short run, the long
run effects may look different. Indeed,
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) argue
that as the labour income share falls
and the profitability of capital increas-
es, new firms will start to enter the
market. Their entrance will increase
competition, leading to a rise in total
output as well as in the demand for
labour and wages, which then causes a
rebound in the labour income share. 
Moreover, Acemoglu (2003) further
underlines the complexity of these
interactions by focusing on the endo-
geneity of the direction of technologi-
cal progress, and he also relates the
evolution of the labour income share
to the evolution of the unemployment
rate. His main point is that the strong
bargaining power of trade unions in
the 1970s allowed employees to resist
downward pressures on real wages
after the oil price shocks, leading ini-
tially to an increase in both the labour
income share and the unemployment
rate
39
. However, this development low-
ered the profitability of capital, so that
it was accumulated at a slower pace
and, more importantly, from the mid-
1980s labour-saving technologies were
introduced. As a result of this, the
unemployment rate and the labour
income share started to evolve in a dif-
ferent direction, whereby the unem-
ployment rate continued to rise and
the labour income share started to
decline
40
. Nevertheless, as adjustment
takes place and labour is reallocated
between the production and R&D, the
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36 Provided the absolute value of the demand elasticity is larger than 1. 
37 Assuming perfect competition in the labour market. See also Section B.5 in Annex B.
38 Though Dumont et al. (2006) find empirical evidence allowing them to reject an efficient bargaining or right-to-manage framework in favour of
a labour-hoarding framework.
39 Assuming a low substitution elasticity.
40 Alternatively, Blanchard (1997; 1998; 2006) refers to the reduced scope for labour hoarding, due to increased competition and higher corporate
governance, to explain the decline in the labour income share and the simultaneous increase in the unemployment rate. However, he also points
out that the resulting higher capital income share should improve the return on capital which will then in turn lead to a higher capital stock, and
thus ultimately to a recovery of employment and the labour income share. 
economy will ultimately return to its
long-run balanced growth path. 
A last point is that it should be noted
that the bargaining power in the
labour market is to a large extent
determined by labour market institu-
tions, such as unemployment benefits
(relative to wages), and employment
protection laws, but also by measures
that affect capital mobility (Harrison,
2002) and the tax wedge. The latter
acts as a disincentive to work and
influences the attractiveness of work
in the informal economy, thereby
affecting the options of employees
during the bargaining process. 
Charts 9, 10 and 11 illustrate the
correlation between annual per-
centage point changes in the labour
income share and percent changes
in some of the variables that deter-
mine the bargaining power of the
employees.
41
These charts suggest
that increases (decreases) in the
trade union density are accompa-
nied by increases (decreases) in the
labour income change, that changes
in unemployment benefits do not
correlate with changes in the labour
income share, and that changes in
the tax wedge and the labour
income share move in opposite
directions.
42
Furthermore, in addition to this sug-
gestive evidence, there is also micro-
econometric research, based on
linked employer-employee data,
which indicates that workers are
capable of capturing rents accruing
in profitable sectors. See Box 1. 
These observations make it com-
pelling to investigate in a more sys-
tematic way the empirical evidence
regarding the link between the
labour income share, and the deter-
minants of bargaining power in the
labour market and rents in the goods
market. This will be done in Section 6
of this chapter.
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Source: AMECO database, Bassanini and Duval (2006), and own calculations.
41 See Annex A for a description of the data underlying these and the following charts.
42 Nevertheless, here it should be stressed that – without further econometric analysis – such correlations do not allow us to make any firm state-
ment about causal links between these indicators and the labour income share, as both may be driven by a third variable (including a common
trend).  Such an analysis will be provided in Section 6 of this chapter.
Chart 9: Labour income share vs. trade union density Chart 10: Labour income share vs. unemployment benefit
replacement ratio
Chart 11: Labour income share vs. taxe wedge
 
Box 1 – Inter-industry wage differentials and rent sharing
The empirical debate about the causes of earnings inequalities was reopened at the end of the 1980s in an art-
icle by Krueger and Summers (1988). These authors highlighted the fact that the structure of wages in the United
States was not compatible with the competitive framework, according to which wage differentials at equilibri-
um were explained, either through differences in the quality of the labour force – measured in terms of product-
ive capacity – or by so-called compensating differences. In other words, they showed that wage disparities per-
sisted between agents with identical observed individual characteristics and working conditions, employed in
different sectors. Since then, similar results have been obtained for many industrialised countries (Araï et al.,
1996; Hartog et al., 1997, 2000; Lucifora, 1993; Vaïniomaki and Laaksonen, 1995). 
Based on detailed matched worker-firm data for Belgium covering the period 1995–2002 and comprising data
from the Structure of Earnings Survey and the Structure of Business Survey, Plasman et al. (2006) point to the
existence of persistent but decreasing wage differentials among workers with the same observed characteristics
and working conditions, employed in different sectors. The best paying industry over the period 1995–2002 was
the electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply sector. Depending on the period considered, the average worker
in this sector earns, all things being equal, between 27 and 31% more than the average worker in the whole
economy. The hotel and restaurant sector is at the very bottom of the wage scale: the average worker’s wage in
this sector is, all things being equal, between 11 and 14% lower than that of the average worker in the econo-
my. 
These inter-industry wage differentials may of course derive from the fact that the unobserved quality of the
labour force is not randomly distributed across sectors. In other words, high-paying industries might simply be
those in which the unobserved quality of the labour force is highest. This potential explanation has been tested by
Plasman et al. (2006) based on Martins’ (2004a) methodology. The authors thus verified, based on quantile
regressions, whether sectors with high average premiums pay even higher premiums to high-wage workers.
Their empirical results show that unobserved ability only partially accounts for observed inter-industry wage 
differentials. Therefore it appears that the role of non-competitive forces should not be neglected.
The most natural non-competitive explanation for the existence of industry wage premiums is that they result
from inter-sectoral variations in profits. This explanation has been investigated by Plasman et al. (2006) based
on simple correlation coefficients and cross-sectional regressions. Their results show that industry wage premi-
ums are significantly and positively correlated with industry profits, in all periods, both at the NACE two- and
three-digit level. They thus support the hypothesis that industry wage premiums derive at least partly from the
heterogeneity in sectoral profits. 
The magnitude of rent sharing in the Belgian private sector and its contribution to observed inter-industry wage
differentials has also been examined by Plasman et al. (2006). Their empirical results show firstly that individual
gross hourly wages are significantly and positively related to firm profits-per-employee, even after controlling
for group effects in the residuals, individual and firm characteristics, industry wage differentials and endo-
geneity of profits. The instrumented wage-profit elasticity estimated at the mean is equal to 0.063. However,
workers at the top end of the wage distribution are found to obtain a significantly larger share of profits than
those at the bottom of the wage distribution. Further results show that substantial wage differentials are still
recorded between workers employed in different sectors after controlling for rent sharing. However, the pro-
portion of significant industry wage premiums decreases from around 74 to 42%. The authors also find that dis-
persion in inter-industry wage differentials drops by almost one-third when profits are taken into account. These
findings suggest that rent sharing accounts for a significant fraction of the inter-industry wage differentials.
Another empirical analysis of rent sharing can be found in Martins (2004b), who uses matched employer-employ-
ee panel data (Quadros de Pessoal, personnel records) from a subset of large firms based in Portugal, covering
the period 1993–1995. He finds significant levels of rent sharing, indicating that workers who were to move from
firms with ‘low’ profits to firms with ‘high’ profits would gain pay increases of about 15%. Moreover, when
focusing only on firms with increasing levels of profits, the same pay increases grow to about 50%. The latter
result may suggest that rent sharing exhibits some asymmetry: pay increases when profits increase while pay
does not fall when profits decrease. Martins (2004b) also finds evidence that different groups of workers bene-
fit differently from rent sharing. Men, more educated workers and more tenured workers tend to gain much
more from their firms’ rents than women, less educated workers and less tenure workers, respectively.
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4.2. Other institutions
and policies
Active labour market polices (ALMP)
also affect the outcome of the labour
income share. Active labour market
policies are selective policies targeted
at certain sub-groups in the labour
market, and they include measures
focused on training, public employ-
ment services and employment subsi-
dies for specific groups of un-
employed people or workers at risk
of becoming unemployed. As such
these policies have an impact on total
employment and its composition,
and thus also on the labour income
share. 
The effect of active labour market
policies on the labour income share
depends to a large extent on the
elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour, and, more import-
antly, on the effectiveness of these
policies to allow workers to progress
in their job and skill level, and
enhance their complementarity with
capital and the other production fac-
tors so that they no longer have to
compete with a persistently cheaper
capital stock, but can use it in their
activities so that a further increase in
the capital stock will lead to an
increase in their labour income share.
If the elasticity of substitution
between labour and capital is larger
than 1, then an increase in employ-
ment leads to an increase in the
labour share, on the basis that a high
substitution elasticity allows for a
smooth absorption of labour. By con-
trast, if the elasticity of substitution is
smaller than 1, a policy-induced
influx of workers into employment
will lead to a decrease in the labour
share. The previous section has
already indicated that low-skilled
workers have a high degree of substi-
tutability with the other production
factors, so it is to be expected that
ALMPs will increase the income share
of the low-skilled. Chart 12 shows the
correlation between a change in the
expenditures for ALMPs and the
labour income share. Though the
chart does not suggest a significant
relationship between ALMP and the
labour income share at the aggre-
gate level, a more systematic investi-
gation of the empirical link between
ALMP and the labour income share,
both at the aggregated level as well
as the disaggregated level, will be
made in Section 6. 
The minimum wage may also affect
the labour income share. In the case
of a binding minimum wage, the
wage will tend to be higher than the
marginal productivity of labour, and
labour will be able to extract a high-
er share from total revenues. Chart
13 shows the correlation between
the annual changes in the labour
income share and changes in the min-
imum wage for a selected group of
countries where a statutory minimum
wage exists. This chart suggests that
the link between both variables is
weak. Nevertheless, as such correla-
tions are not controlled for the
effects of third variables, a more sys-
tematic investigation of the link
between the minimum wage and the
labour income share will be carried
out in Section 6. 
So far we have only considered the
distribution of gross domestic prod-
uct between labour and capital.
However, a small part of gross
domestic product (at market prices)
accrues to the public sector in the
form of indirect taxes (minus subsi-
dies) imposed on production. In this
chapter the share of the net indirect
taxes is assumed to be exogenous.
Nevertheless, changes in its size will
induce a reallocation between labour
and capital as both factors will try to
mitigate part of the burden of an
increased government take in value
added. The empirical nature of these
interactions will be established in
Section 6. 
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Source: AMECO database, Bassanini and Duval (2006), and own calculations.
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4.3. A counter-cyclical
labour income share
The evidence presented in Table 1
indicates that the labour income
share behaves counter-cyclically over
the business cycle. Labour hoarding
may contribute to this behaviour as it
causes labour demand to fall by less
than output in downturns and rise by
less than output during upswings, so
that the labour income share, which
is measured as the ratio of the two
former variables, increases in a down-
turn and decreases in an upswing –
provided that real wages do not
move pro-cyclically over the business
cycle. 
Labour hoarding is to a large extent
determined by adjustment costs,
including hiring and firing costs. Part-
time and fixed-term contracts are
usually associated with lower hiring
and firing costs, and give lower
incentives to hoard labour. In addi-
tion, hiring and firing costs do not
apply to the self-employed. Hence, to
the extent that an economy has a low
share of fixed-term and part-time
employment, and a low share of self-
employed, the labour income share
will show a strong counter-cyclical
pattern (Giammariolli et al., 2002).
Imperfect information regarding the
nature of the shocks that hit the
economy (e.g. temporary or perman-
ent) may reinforce the counter-
cyclical effects of hiring and firing
costs, as employers may seek to hoard
labour in the face of a drop in aggre-
gate demand that is perceived to be
temporary. In a more formal setting,
Kessing (2003) shows that with linear
adjustment costs and a Cobb-Douglas
technology, fluctuations in the labour
income share are independent of the
size of the shocks (in aggregate
demand or wages) and depend only
on the size of the adjustment costs
(e.g. hiring and firing costs.)
Alternative mechanisms leading to
counter-cyclical behaviour have been
proposed in the literature. For
instance, Gomme and Greenwood
(1995) use a real business-cycle model
to illustrate how the counter-cyclical
behaviour of the labour income share
reflects an optimal implicit contract
between firms and employees,
whereby firms cover workers against
income fluctuations caused by the
business cycle. In upswings the work-
ers use part of their income to pay an
‘insurance premium’ to protect them
against strong income fluctuations,
and in downturns the firms add an
insurance component to the workers’
wage (by not cutting wages). In this
way, labour income is to some degree
protected against business cycle fluc-
tuations, but is lower (than the trend
income share) in upswings and high-
er in downturns. Firms are prepared
to make such arrangements because
they are less risk-averse than employ-
ees and they can monitor their
employees so that they can distin-
guish between a loss in productivity
caused by a downturn and a loss in
productivity caused by, for instance,
shirking. Young (2004) argues in the
context of a real business cycle model
that the counter-cyclical nature of
the fluctuations in the labour share is
due to exogenous, biased techno-
logical shocks. 
Finally, it should also be noted that
the counter-cyclical behaviour of the
labour income share (caused by
adjustment costs in the labour mar-
ket) might be tempered by the cyclic-
al behaviour of the price mark-up in
the goods market. Indeed, Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1999) document
that the price mark-up in the goods
market behaves counter-cyclically,
and the analysis in section 4.1 shows
that a rise (fall) in the price mark-up
exerts downward (upward) pressure
on the labour income share. This
implies that the effects stemming
from a counter-cyclical mark-up in
the goods market run in the opposite
direction to the effects arising from
the existence of adjustment costs in
the labour market. Nevertheless, it is
an empirical issue to determine the
net outcome of these opposite
effects. 
5. THE LABOUR INCOME
SHARE AND
GLOBALISATION
With the entrance of China, India,
Brazil and the former Soviet-bloc
(BRICs) into the world economy, the
world supply of labour increased sig-
nificantly – with estimates going as
far as a quadrupling of the effective
world supply of labour between 1980
and 2006 (IMF, 2007)
43
. As this
increase in labour supply was not
accompanied by a proportional
increase in the world capital stock,
the capital-to-labour ratio came
under downward pressure across the
world
44
; and to the extent that capital
and labour are gross complements,
this decline will have lowered the
labour income share worldwide.
However, the importance of the
impact of this increase in the global
supply of labour on the labour
income share in the developed world
should not be exaggerated, as the
data clearly indicates that the fall in
the labour income share started well
before the integration of the BRICs
into the world economy. Neverthe-
less, to the extent that the entrance
of the BRICs is responsible for the
deterioration of the labour income
share in Europe, a low global capital-
to-labour ratio may persist for some
time as it can only be restored
through sustained investments in
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43 This number takes also into account demographic developments in the world. Freeman (2006) estimates that with the entrance of China, India
and the former Soviet-bloc, the supply of labour increased by 1.5 billion people worldwide, which is almost a doubling of the existing labour supply. 
44 However, this overall decline in the capital-to-labour ratio should be qualified to the extent that, in effective terms, the increase will have been
less pronounced as the new entrants possess relatively low skills.  
capital and through capital-
augmenting technological progress. 
Apart from the worldwide shift in the
relative supply of labour and capital,
the specific mechanisms through
which globalisation affects the labour
income share in EU Member States
mainly include the imports of final
goods and the outsourcing of the pro-
duction of intermediate goods. 
Traditional trade theory
45
predicts that
when trade barriers lower, countries
will specialise further in the areas of
their comparative advantage (which
are primarily determined by relative
factor endowments) so that capital-
abundant countries will export more
capital-intensive goods, and labour-
abundant countries will export more
labour-intensive goods. In this process,
factor prices converge across countries
along with traded good prices, so that
the price of a country’s relatively
abundant production factor increases
and the price of the relatively scarce
production factor falls. Hence, to the
extent that a country is to be consid-
ered as capital-abundant, the labour
income share will fall in the wake of
further trade liberalisation – provided
that the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour is smaller
than one.
46
Although the predictions of the tra-
ditional trade models are unambigu-
ous, they can be qualified in several
ways. Consider first, for instance, the
assumption of perfect competition.
In imperfect competitive labour mar-
kets, globalisation adversely affects
the relative bargaining position of
the least mobile production factor
(Harrison, 2002). To the extent that
the fixed costs of relocating are much
larger for workers than for capital (in
the medium term) and globalisation
enhances capital mobility, the bargain-
ing position of labour would deteri-
orate so that wages would fall (rela-
tive to the price of capital), leading to
a further decrease in the labour
income share
47
. 
Furthermore, traditional trade models
only consider international trade in
final goods of different industries (usu-
ally two-sector, two-factor models),
but the predictions of trade models
become much richer once they distin-
guish between different skill types and
the assumption is made that activities
related to the different skill types
within the same industry can be out-
sourced across the world (Feenstra
2004, 2007; Feenstra and Hanson,
1996). In traditional trade models, the
demand for unskilled labour decreases
in the developed countries because
international trade causes a shift from
low-skilled industries to high-skilled
ones in these countries. However, once
the outsourcing of activities within the
same industry is allowed for, inter-
national trade will also create a shift
away from low-skilled activities to
high-skilled activities within that same
industry. The expected effect on factor
prices is then of the same nature as the
effects of the movement of production
factors between countries, thereby
creating additional pressure on factor
prices to converge worldwide.
Finally, it should be noted that
although globalisation may reduce the
labour income share in the Member
States of the EU, this does not imply
that globalisation would also lead to a
decline in real wages or employment
(of the low or high-skilled). Indeed, the
further division of labour and
increased opportunities to specialise in
terms of technologies, products and
markets, has the potential to enhance
labour productivity, thereby creating
room for non-inflationary wage
increases, while at the same time sup-
porting employment growth.  
Graph 14 shows a negative correlation
between the change in the indicator
of the international openness of the
economy
48
and the change in the
labour income share for the EU, the
United States and Japan over the
period 1960–2006. However, as this
correlation was not controlled for the
effects of other variables it is clear that
a more thorough investigation of the
relation between these two variables
is warranted. 
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Chart 14: Labour income share vs. openness of economy
Source: AMECO database, Bassanini and Duval (2006), and own calculations.
45 See the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuleson model which assumes, among other things, two countries, two sectors, two goods, perfect competition, as
well as identical technologies and tastes across countries.
46 It remains an empirical issue to assess to what extent the EU Member States are capital-abundant countries and to determine the size of the elas-
ticity of substitution between labour and capital in order to fully understand the impact of globalisation. Indeed, while the EU Member States
may be capital-abundant in terms of low-skilled labour, they are probably labour-abundant in terms of high-skilled labour. Moreover, as both skill
types are expected to have a different degree of substitutability with capital, an empirical analysis of the impact of globalisation on the labour
income share should reflect these potential differences between skill types.
47 Under the assumption of a low substitution elasticity.
48 Openness of the economy is measured as the sum of exports plus imports divided by gross domestic product.
6. SOME EMPIRICAL
RESULTS
6.1. A system of
income share equations
The previous sections have identified
several variables that affect the evo-
lution of the labour income share.
This section assesses their empirical
significance by estimating a system of
income share equations for low,
medium and high-skilled labour
49
.
Such a system of equations allows us
to calculate how a change in one of
the explanatory variables induces a
shift in the distribution of gross
domestic product between the differ-
ent production factors, and it also
allows us to interpret the decline of
the labour income share in Europe. 
Each of these equations includes the
following explanatory variables:
• the capital-to-labour ratio (in
efficiency units) (see Section 3.1) 
• the ICT-intensity of the produc-
tion process (see Section 3.2)
• variables affecting the rents 
in the goods market (see Section
4.1)  
• variables affecting the relative
bargaining power in the labour
market (see Section 4.1) 
• active labour market policies (see
Section 4.2)
• the direct government take in
value added (i.e. indirect taxes
imposed on production minus
subsides, see Section 4.2).
Rents are primarily determined by
product market regulation and the
openness of the economy, while the
bargaining power of the trade
unions is determined by, among
other things, trade union density,
unemployment benefits, and the
openness of the economy (which
affects both rents in the goods mar-
ket and bargaining power in the
labour market). Finally, in order to
capture cyclical movements, the
equations also include the output
gap (see Section 4.3). 
Data for these variables were
retrieved from various sources and
they are described in more detail in
Annex A. The aggregate labour
income share, the capital to labour
ratio and openness of the economy
are calculated with data available in
the Commission’s AMECO database.
Shares in total labour compensation 
according to skill-type and the indica-
tor for the use of ICT services are
from the EU KLEMS database
50
. The
labour income share per skill type is
obtained by multiplying the share of
the skill types in total labour compen-
sation (EU KLEMS) with the aggre-
gate labour income share (AMECO).
Data for expenditures on active
labour market policies (ALMP)
51
,
employment protection legislation
(EPL), product market regulation
(PMR), unemployment replacement
ratio, trade union density, the tax
wedge and (statutory) minimum
wages
52
are from various OECD data-
bases, and are readily available and
documented in the Bassanini and
Duval (2006) database. 
Table 5 ( see page 256) shows the
point estimates for the income share
of the three skill types as well as for
the labour aggregate for 13 countries
for the period 1983–2002
53
. Standard
errors are shown between parenthe-
ses. Several robustness checks were
performed, including a check on the
sensitivity of the point estimates to
the deletion of countries from the
data pool (i.e. the United States,
Japan and the United Kingdom)
54
, the
addition of country-specific trends
55
and the use of instrumental variables
in order to deal with possible simul-
taneity biases
56
.
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49 IMF (2007) follows a similar strategy although there a distinction is made between skilled and unskilled sectors.
50 In EU KLEMS, capital input is measured as capital services, rather than stocks.
51 ALMP expenditures are calculated per unemployed person and in order to ensure cross-country comparability this indicator is expressed as a 
percentage of GDP per capita. See also Bassanini and Duval (2006).
52 Reliable minimum wage series exist only for countries where minimum wages are statutory; countries with statutory minimums during the whole
sample period are Belgium, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States. For the other countries where minimum wages may be
collectively negotiated but for which we do not have observations, the variable was set to zero.
53 These countries are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Unit-
ed States of America and Japan. The available data were pooled yielding an unbalanced dataset with 207 observations per equation. The equa-
tions have been estimated with least squares assuming fixed effects. 
54 The sensitivity of the point estimates to the composition of the data pool was checked by deleting the non-European countries (i.e. the 
United States and Japan). This yielded a change in the sign of the parameter of only three variables, which are also not very significant in Table
5, i.e. the openness variable in the equation of the low and high-skilled, and the unemployment benefit variable in the equation of the high-
skilled. An additional robustness check was made by deleting the United Kingdom from the pool, as it was the only country in the pool for which
the null-hypothesis of a non-stationary labour income share could be rejected at a fairly high confidence level. Compared with the point estimates
reported in Table 5, this deletion resulted in a change of the sign of two parameters, i.e. the one of the openness variable in the equation of the
low-skilled workers and the one of the ALMP variable in the equation of the high-skilled workers. 
55 Compared with the point estimates reported in Table 5, adding a country-specific trend changed the parameter value for only two variables, i.e.
PMR in the equation of the medium-skilled and the openness variable in the equation of the high-skilled workers. In addition, there was a notable
fall in the significance of the variable measuring ICT use in the equation of the high-skilled workers, as well as in the unemployment benefit vari-
able in the equation of the low-skilled workers. 
56 Estimation with instrumental variables changed the sign of three parameters, i.e. the parameter of the openness variable in the equation of the
low-skilled workers, and the EPL variable and minimum wage variable in the high-skilled equation. The instruments are the lagged variables, and
a country-specific trend and constant.
The point estimates in Table 5 illus-
trate that the impact of these drivers
on the income shares of the differ-
ent skill types may differ strongly.
The key to interpreting these results
is the scope for substitution
between the different production
factors. A case in point is the point
estimates for the capital-to-labour
ratio. The estimation results for this
variable indicate that a rise in the
capital-to-labour ratio raises the
income share of the medium and
high-skilled workers, but lowers the
share of the low-skilled, thereby
underlining the complementarity
between capital and high and medi-
um-skilled workers on the one hand,
and the high degree of substitution
between capital and low-skilled
workers on the other. On balance,
the impact on the high and medium-
skilled workers dominates the
impact on the low-skilled workers so
that the parameter value of the cap-
ital-to-labour variable in the equa-
tion of the aggregate income share
is larger than zero.
57
An increase in the intensity at which
ICT services are used in the produc-
tion process
58
lowers the income
share of the low-skilled, but raises
the share of the medium and high-
skilled workers. These results are in
line with the results obtained for the
capital-to-labour ratio. However,
here the negative impact on the
share of the low-skilled outweighs
the positive impact on the share of
the medium and high-skilled work-
ers, so that on balance the intensity
of ICT use has a negative impact on
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57 The point estimates for the aggregate labour income share can be obtained either by adding the point estimates of the equations of the differ-
ent skill types, or by estimating the equation of the labour aggregate directly. Estimating the aggregate labour income share equation directly,
as was done for this exercise, has the advantage that it provides estimates for the standard errors in an easy way. Although the point estimates
of the aggregate labour income share is equal to the sum of the point estimates of the different skill-types, the standard errors of the aggregate
also captures the existence of co-variation between the impacts on the different skill types.
58 i.e. the use of ICT services per worker. 
Table 5: Estimation results of a system of equations
1
Skill composition of labour Total labour
low-skilled medium-skilled high-skilled
Constant -32.577*** 88.414*** 45.863*** 101.694***
(5.213) (5.867) (2.742) (5.445)
Capital-labour ratio (in log) -4.770*** 8.900*** 5.788*** 9.917***
(1.655) (1.862) (0.870) (1.728)
ICT use (in log) -4.140*** 1.587*** 2.104*** -0.449
(0.355) (0.399) (0.186) (0.370)
PMR (in log) 3.752*** 0.111 -2.587*** 1.276
(0.917) (1.032) (0.482) (0.958)
Openness 0.003 -0.059*** 0.004 -0.052***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.007) (0.014)
Union density -0.232*** 0.190*** 0.090*** 0.048
(0.039) (0.044) (0.021) (0.041)
UBenefit -0.103*** -0.197*** -0.013 -0.312***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.015) (0.029)
EPL (in log) -2.071* -5.584*** 3.060*** -4.595***
(1.057) (1.190) (0.556) (1.104)
Labour tax wedge -0.289*** 0.042 -0.084*** -0.330***
(0.046) (0.052) (0.024) (0.048)
Minimum wage 0.439*** -0.241*** -0.045 0.153*
(0.075) (0.085) (0.040) (0.079)
ALMP 0.056*** -0.057*** -0.005 -0.006
(0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010)
Output gap -0.144*** 0.220*** -0.031 0.045
(0.052) (0.059) (0.027) (0.055)
Indirect tax share 0.178 -0.518*** 0.260*** -0.080
(0.110) (0.124) (0.058) (0.115)
Fixed country effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 207 207 207 207
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.86
Source: EU KLEMS database, AMECO database and Bassanini and Duval (2006)
Note 1: Standard errors are between brackets. One, two, and three asterisks indicate that the parameter is significant at the 10, 5, and 1% levels,
respectively.
the aggregate labour income share –
albeit not very significant. 
Apart from these drivers which are
directly related to the production
technology, there are also market
institutions that influence the evolu-
tion of the labour income share. In
the product market, the degree of
competition is, to a large extent,
determined by the strictness of prod-
uct market regulation (PMR) and the
international openness of the econo-
my
59
. The point estimates in Table 5
show that an increase in the strictness
of PMR lowers the income share of
the high-skilled workers and raises
the income share of the low and
medium-skilled workers – albeit not
very significantly in the case of the
medium-skilled workers. The net
effect of an increase in the strictness
of product market regulation on the
aggregate labour income share is
positive, but not very significant.
Stricter PMR gives firms more power
to increase their price mark-up over
marginal costs. As profits accrue to
capital (unless workers have a strong
bargaining position) an increase in
product market regulation will lead
to a fall in the labour income share as
is found for the high-skilled work-
ers
60
. The fact that it rises for the low-
skilled is somewhat puzzling, but
could point towards the fact that
PMR does not affect all sectors in the
same way and that sectors have a dif-
ferent skill composition. 
The bargaining power in the labour
market is determined by several vari-
ables, including trade union density,
unemployment benefit, employment
protection legislation, the tax wedge
and the openness of the economy.
Point estimates are reported in Table
5 for each of these variables. 
An increase in the density of trade
union membership has a positive
impact on the income share of the
medium-skilled workers and to a
smaller extent on the income share of
the high-skilled workers, but it has a
significant negative impact on the
income share of the low-skilled work-
ers. The former two effects dominate
the latter so that the net effect on
the total income share is positive –
albeit not very significant. A higher
trade union density increases the bar-
gaining power of the workers which
leads to higher unit wage rates. The
outcome of this wage push on the
income share of the different skill
types is in line with the earlier
described results, i.e. it yields an
increase in the income shares of the
medium and high-skilled (being com-
plements to capital), and a decrease
in the income share of the low-skilled
(being substitutes to capital). 
A rise in the unemployment benefit
replacement ratio has a negative
impact on the income share of all
skill-types – albeit only significant for
the low and medium-skilled workers.
In view of the transmission mecha-
nisms discussed earlier, and the idea
that an increase in unemployment
benefit increases the bargaining
power of labour, it would be expect-
ed that an increase in the unemploy-
ment benefit would increase the
labour income share of the medium
and high-skilled workers and lower
the income share of the low-skilled
workers. 
The strictness of EPL primarily has a
significant negative effect on the
income share of the medium-skilled
workers and to a lesser extent on the
income share of the low-skilled work-
ers, while it has a significant positive
effect on the share of the high-
skilled. As the effect on the medium-
skilled workers is by far the largest,
the parameter of the EPL variable
takes a negative value in the equa-
tion of the overall labour income
share. Increases in EPL raise the bar-
gaining power of employees, and
thus also the wages of the workers.
In line with earlier results, such wage
hikes should then lead to a lower
income share for the low-skilled
workers and a higher income share
for the high-skilled workers. The fact
that in the equation of the medium-
skilled workers the parameter has a
significant negative value may indi-
cate that EPL may also induce some
other effects. Indeed, an alternative
interpretation of EPL is that it pro-
vides job security to the individual
jobholder, creating a kind of insur-
ance contract between the employee
and the employer for which the
insurance premium is paid in the
form of a lower wage, which then
dampens the effect of the increased
bargaining power. 
The point estimates in Table 5 indi-
cate that an increase in the labour
tax wedge leads to a significant
decline in the income share of the
low and high-skilled, while the
impact on the medium-skilled is not
significant. In the equation of the
aggregate labour income share the
parameter value of the tax variable is
negative and significant. An increase
in the tax wedge acts as a disincen-
tive to work or raises the attractive-
ness of working in the informal sec-
tor of the economy. As such it will
reduce employment in the formal
economy and should lead to a
decrease in the income share of the
low-skilled workers (with their rela-
tive high elasticity of substitution)
and an increase in the income share
of the high-skilled workers (with
their relative low elasticity of substi-
tution). The fact that it is not the case
for the high-skilled workers may indi-
cate that an additional transmission
mechanism is operating. 
The parameter of the variable meas-
uring the openness of the economy
has a significant negative value in the
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59 The international openness of the economy also affects the bargaining position of labour in the labour market, and will be discussed below. 
60 See also the analytical results in Annex B. 
equation of the medium-skilled
workers, and an insignificant positive
value in the equation of the low and
high-skilled workers. The negative
effect in the share equation of the
medium-skilled workers dominates
so that an increase in the openness of
the economy tends to decrease the
total labour income share. In inter-
preting these results it should be
remembered that an increase in the
openness of the economy reduces the
bargaining power of labour thereby
putting downward pressure on wages
(relative to the price of capital). Given
the high degree of substitutability of
low-skilled workers with capital (and
the other skill types), a fall in the
wage of the low-skilled will cause the
income share of the low-skilled to
increase. At the same time, the
reduced bargaining power of labour
will also decrease the wages of the
medium-skilled workers, and, given
their low degree of substitution with
capital, this wage fall will induce a
decrease in the income share of the
medium-skilled workers. 
Focusing on the impact of ALMPs, the
estimates indicate that the param-
eter value for this variable is greater
than zero in the equation of the low-
skilled and smaller than zero in the
equation of the medium and high-
skilled – albeit not significant for the
latter. A main objective of ALMP is to
activate well-targeted groups of
unemployed people or people at risk
of becoming unemployed, by giving
them training that meets their needs,
assist them in job searching, provide
counselling and vocational guidance,
etc. As such these measures primarily
induce an increase in the employ-
ment of the low-skilled workers.
Given the high degree of substi-
tutability of the low-skilled with the
other production factors, an increase
in the employment of low-skilled can
be absorbed without a big change in
relative prices so that the income
share of the low-skilled will rise. The
point estimates indicate that it is pri-
marily the share of the medium-
skilled that will fall to compensate
for the increase in the income share
of the low-skilled. Nevertheless, as
these two effects cancel each other
out almost entirely, the net impact of
ALMP on the aggregate labour
income share is small. 
The parameter value of the minimum
wage variable is positive and very sig-
nificant in the share equation of the
low-skilled workers, while it is nega-
tive in the share equation of the
medium and high-skilled workers. On
balance, the value of this parameter
is greater than zero in the share
equation of aggregate labour. These
point estimates indicate that a rise in
the minimum wage increases the
income share of the low-skilled, but
that this happens at the expense of
the medium and high-skilled workers
and capital.
61
In order to capture cyclical move-
ments in the labour income share the
output gap was added as an explana-
tory variable. The parameter associat-
ed with the output gap has a signifi-
cant negative value in the equation
of the low-skilled and a significant
positive value in the equation of the
medium-skilled workers, while the
net impact of the output gap on the
aggregate is positive. 
The parameter of net indirect taxes
minus subsidies imposed on produc-
tion has a significant negative value
for the medium-skilled workers, an
insignificant value for the low-skilled
and a significant positive value for
the high-skilled workers, indicating
that it is primarily the medium-skilled
workers who carry the burden of an
increase in the government’s share in
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61 Estimating the equations with pooled data for the countries for which only the statutory minimum wage is available reduces the number of obser-
vations from 207 to 102, and affects mainly the sign of the parameter of the PMR and openness variables in the equation of the low-skilled 
workers, and of the unemployment benefit variable in the equation of the medium-skilled workers albeit that their significance is low. 
62 i.e. the countries and the period for which all-explanatory variables are available. These countries are Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France,
Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The annual growth rates are averages of the country growth rates
weighted by the countries' share in aggregate GDP.   
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Chart 15: Change in labour income share in EU-11: total
(percentage points, annual averages)
Note: EU-11 includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria,
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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Chart 16: Change in labour income share in EU-11: low-skilled
(percentage points, annual averages)
Note: EU-11 includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria,
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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value added. Nevertheless, the net
impact on the labour income share is
not significant. 
6.2. The contribution of
the different drivers 
Charts 15 to 18 summarise the previ-
ous results by showing the average
annual contributions of the different
drivers to the labour income share for
a selected group of EU Member
States between 1983 and 2002
62
.
Chart 15 illustrates the results for the
aggregate labour income share,
while charts 16 to 18 show the results
for the income share of the different
skill types. ‘Technology’ covers the
capital-to-labour ratio and the indi-
cator measuring the ICT use per
employee; ‘bargaining power’
includes union density, unemploy-
ment benefit replacement ratio and
the tax wedge, while the openness of
the economy and EPL are shown as
separate variables. ‘Other’ covers the
contribution of the output gap, the
indirect taxes minus subsidies and the
residual.
63
Chart 15 shows the results for the
aggregate labour income share. At
the aggregate level, technological
progress has been the most impor-
tant cause of the fall in the labour
income share. However, the picture
changes dramatically once a closer
look is taken at the contribution of
technological progress at the level of
the different skill types. Comparing
the charts for the different skill types,
it is striking to note how in recent
decades the income share of the
high-skilled workers, and to a lesser
extent the income share of the medium-
skilled workers, has benefited in a
marked way from technological
progress, while the income share of
the low-skilled workers has lost a sub-
stantial part due to technological
progress. These results once again
highlight the importance of the
degree of substitution between the
different labour types and capital. 
The charts also show that the general
decline in the strictness of product
market regulation led to a fall in the
total labour market income share.
This overall negative contribution of
PMR was primarily due to a strong fall
in the income share of the low-skilled
workers, while it had no impact on
the income share of the medium-
skilled workers and it increased the
income share of the high-skilled
workers in a notable way. The fall in
the bargaining power of labour,
measured here by the joint change in
trade union density, the unemploy-
ment benefit replacement ratio and
the tax wedge (which acts as a disin-
centive to work or raises the attrac-
tiveness of work in the informal sec-
tor of the economy), contributed to
the overall decline in the labour
income share. However, its distribu-
tion was not even: while the income
share of the low-skilled workers
increased, the income shares of the
medium and high-skilled workers fell.
The further opening of the economy
also played an important role in the
decline of the labour income share,
but to a lesser extent than technologic-
al progress and, in line with the earlier
discussed point estimates, with most of
the burden falling on the medium-
skilled workers. Furthermore, the
decrease in the strictness of EPL made
a positive contribution to the overall
labour income share. Also in line with
the earlier discussed point estimates, it
was primarily the income share of the
low and medium-skilled workers
which benefited from this deregula-
tion, while the income share of the
high-skilled declined somewhat. 
The charts show that the erosion of
the minimum wage, measured by the
decline in the ratio of the statutory
minimum wage to the median wage,
also contributed to the decline in the
overall labour income share, and
especially to the decline in the income
share of the low-skilled workers.
63 The equation was estimated in levels with
fixed effects, implying that for each country the level values of the error terms sum up to zero over the sample. However, it should be noted
that the first differences of the error terms do not necessarily add up to zero.
-0.500 -0.300 -0.100 0.100 0.300
labour income share
contribution of technology
contribution of PMR
contribution of baragining power
contribution of openness
contribution of EPL
contribution of minimum wage
contribution of ALMP
other
Chart 17: Change in labour income share in EU-11: medium-skilled
(percentage points, annual averages)
Note: EU-11 includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria,
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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Chart 18: Change in labour income share in EU-11: high-skilled
(percentage points, annual averages)
Note: EU-11 includes Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria,
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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Finally, a modest increase in the labour
income share of the low-skilled can be
attributed to ALMP, while its impact
on the aggregate labour income share
is negligible.
7. CONCLUSIONS
The evolution of the labour income
share involves issues of equity, eco-
nomic efficiency as well as macro-
economic stability as it has, for exam-
ple, an impact on personal income
distribution and social cohesion, the
direction of the adjustment in wages
and employment, and the composi-
tion of aggregate demand. 
This chapter illustrates how the
labour income share in the EU started
to decline around the second half of
the 1970s and fell towards levels that
are below those that were attained
in the 1960s. In addition, the chapter
also shows that the share of the low-
skilled workers in the total wage bill
fell gradually while the share of the
high-skilled workers rose steadily.
The rest of the chapter examines the
drivers of these developments, both
at a theoretical and empirical level. 
A first result of the analysis is that the
labour income share is not an invari-
ant variable which is solely deter-
mined by the parameters of the pro-
duction technology – as is predicted
by the (basic) neo-classical growth
model, but that capital deepening,
technological progress, globalisation,
labour and product market institu-
tions and policies can have a signifi-
cant impact on its evolution. 
Another important result is that eco-
nomic variables can have a significant
different impact on the income share of
the skilled and unskilled workers, and
that the degree of substitution
between the different production fac-
tors is at the heart of a clear under-
standing of the direction in which a
change in an economic variable affects
the labour income share. For instance,
events that push up wages will lower
the labour income share if the elasticity
of substitution between labour and
capital is high, and they will increase
the labour income share if the substitu-
tion elasticity is low
64
. This insight is of
particular interest when we look at the
evolution of the income shares at the
level of the different skill types, as it is
found that capital and new technolo-
gies tend to substitute for low-skilled
workers and tend to complement high-
skilled workers. 
A last major finding is that, for the
period for which the data is available
(i.e. from the mid-1980s to early
2000s), the estimation results clearly
indicate that technological progress
made the largest contribution to the
fall in the aggregate labour income
share, but that this loss was unevenly
spread over the different skill types
as the high-skilled workers were able
to increase their share while the low-
skilled workers lost income share as a
result of technological progress.
Globalisation also had a negative
impact on the aggregate labour
income share but to a lesser extent
than technological progress, and its
impact was primarily on the medium-
skilled workers. 
Following the insights of the theoreti-
cal and empirical analysis of this chap-
ter, it is clear that in order to address
any adverse developments in the dis-
tribution of gross domestic product
between capital and labour and
between the different skill types of
labour, policy-makers have to vigor-
ously pursue a well-balanced policy
package. Macro-economic polices
should be oriented towards stability
and growth so that an economic
environment is created that con-
tributes to further capital deepening
and technological progress. However,
in order to realise the potential of the
knowledge-based economy it is imper-
ative that these policies are comple-
mented by labour market polices that
take into account the different respons-
es of the different skill types, and, most
importantly, by policies that a) allow
the low-skilled to progress to a higher
skill level so that the adverse effects,
which stem from their high degree of
substitutability with capital, can be mit-
igated, and b) address, at the same
time, the social needs of the workers
during this period of adjustment by
providing them, for example, one-off,
time-limited individual support that
goes beyond passive measures
65
.
In this context, policies based on flexi-
curity principles should be seen as the
way forward to promote a fairer shar-
ing of the returns from economic activ-
ity in the face of rapid technological
progress and globalisation, without
compromising on the issues of efficien-
cy and stability.
66
Indeed, some degree
of employment flexibility within a
secure context should facilitate the
creation of new jobs and the destruc-
tion of unproductive jobs, and facili-
tate the swift progression of workers
to better rewarding jobs rather than
keeping them trapped in low-skilled
jobs, the income share of which is
adversely impacted by capital deepen-
ing and technological progress. 
64 This statement has to be qualified once we start to consider measures that drive a wedge between wages and the marginal productivity of labour. 
65 At EU level, the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF) is a financial instrument aimed at cushioning the adverse effects of globalisation
by providing one-off, time-limited individual support to workers who are severely and personally affected by globalisation-related redundancies.
The EGF seeks to complement support provided by the employers and national authorities of the different Member States to workers in the form
of job-search assistance, occupational guidance, tailor-made training and re-training, including IT skills and certification of acquired experience,
outplacement assistance and entrepreneurship promotion or aid for self-employment, special time-limited measures, such as job-search
allowances, mobility allowances or allowances to individuals participating in lifelong learning and training activities, measures to stimulate in par-
ticular disadvantaged or older workers, and measures to remain in or return to the labour market.  For more details on the European Globalisa-
tion Adjustment Fund, see http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/egf/index_en.html
66 See the recent EC Communication Towards common principles of flexicurity: More and better jobs through flexibility and security available at
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/emplweb/news/news_en.cfm?id=263
ANNEX A – THE DATA
Several sources were used to construct the database of this chapter. 
The following variables were retrieved from the AMECO database (when available)
67
: 
• adjusted labour income share, total economy (% GDP at market prices): ALCD0
• compensation of employees, total economy: UWCD 
• total employment, persons: NETD
• employees, persons: NWTD
• gross domestic product at current market prices: UVGD
• net capital stock at 2000 prices, total economy: OKND
• exports of goods and services (national accounts) in current prices: UXGS 
• imports of goods and services (national accounts) in current prices: UMGS
• total factor productivity: ZVGDF. 
The following variables were retrieved (where available) from the EU KLEMS database
68
: 
• high-skilled labour compensation (share in total labour compensation) LABHS
• medium-skilled labour compensation (share in total labour compensation) LABMS
• low-skilled labour compensation (share in total labour compensation) LABLS
• ICT-capital services, volume indices 1995 = 100, CAPIT_QI.
The policy variables are from different sources and are readily available in the Bassanini and Duval (2006) database, (B-D)
69
:
• The employment protection legislation indicator measures the strictness of employment protection legislation and
allows for meaningful cardinal comparisons over time and across countries. The value of the EPL indicator ranges
from 0 to 6, with a low score indicating a low level of labour market regulation. Variable EPL in B-D, see also OECD
(2004).
• The product market regulation indicator measures regulatory impediments to product market competition in
seven non-manufacturing industries (passenger air transport, railways passenger and freight services, road freight,
gas, electricity, post and telecom). The value of the PMR indicator ranges between 0 and 6, with a low value indi-
cating a low level of product market regulation. Variable REGREF in B-D, see also Conway et al. (2006). 
• The unemployment replacement ratio measures the average of the unemployment benefit replacement rates cov-
ering two income groups (i.e. 100% and 67% of the average production worker earnings), three family types (i.e.
single, with dependent spouse, with spouse in work), and three unemployment durations (i.e. first year, second and
third years, and fourth and fifth years of unemployment). Variable ARR in B-D, see also the OECD Benefits and
Wages Database. 
• Trade union density measures the share of workers affiliated to a trade union. Variable UNDENS in B-D, see also
OECD (2004).
• The tax wedge covers the wedge, expressed as a percentage of total labour cost, between the labour cost to the
employer and the corresponding net take-home pay of the employee for a single-earner couple with two children
receiving the average production worker wage. Variable TWCOUP in B-D, see also the OECD Taxing Wages Data-
base. 
• The expenditures on active labour market policies cover outlays for public employment services (PES) (placement,
counselling and vocational guidance, job-search courses, assistance with displacement costs, administration of
unemployment benefits, etc.), training (including unemployed adults and those at risk, and training for employed
adults), youth measures (including special programmes concerning measures for unemployed and disadvantaged
youth, support of apprenticeship and related forms of general youth training), subsidised employment and meas-
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67 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/annual_macro_economic_database/ameco_en.htm
68 Available at www.euklems.net
69 Available at www.oecd.org/els/workingpapers  See WP 35 in the list of working papers.
 
ures for the disabled. Here these expenditures are calculated per unemployed person and, in order to ensure cross-
country comparability, this indicator is expressed as a percentage of GDP per capita. Variable ALMPU in B-D.
• The (statutory) minimum wages is measured as the ratio of statutory minimum wage to median wage. Reliable
minimum wage series exist only for countries where minimum wages are statutory; countries with statutory min-
imums during the whole sample period are Belgium, France, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the United States.
Variable RMINMED1 in B-D.
The openness of the economy is measured as the sum of exports plus imports divided by gross domestic product. 
Trend labour income share is obtained by applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter to the historical series, with the smoothing
parameter set equal to 100. The cyclical movement in the labour share is calculated by subtracting the trend labour
income share from the historical series. 
Data for Germany before re-unification have been extrapolated, based on data for West Germany using the infor-
mation for the years when an overlap in the series for Germany and West Germany was available.
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ANNEX B – SOME BASIC ANALYTICAL RESULTS
ON THE LABOUR INCOME SHARE
This annex recalls some basic analytical results regarding the determination of the labour income share. The emphasis
of this annex is on presentational clarity rather than academic rigor. Readers who want to learn more about the
technical details are referred to the papers listed in the reference section. 
After defining the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, some analytical results regarding the labour
income share are derived. These results illustrate the importance of the size of the elasticity of substitution in order to
gauge the impact of a change in one of the drivers of the labour income share. First some general results are derived
in the context of perfect competition in the goods and labour market. Next, it is investigated as to how imperfect com-
petition in the goods and labour market affect the labour income share. Table B.1 summarises the main qualitative
results. 
B.1 The elasticity of substitution
The elasticity of substitution, , measures the percentage change in factor proportions due to a change in the margin-
al rate of technical substitution, i.e.
where fL and fK are the first derivatives w.r.t. labour and capital of the production function f(L,K)
70
. 
Depending on the specific nature of the production function, the elasticity of substitution can take some specific values: 
in the case of no substitution (i.e. if Leontief production technology)
in the case of perfect substitution (i.e. if no declining marginal factor productivity), and
in the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function.
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70 The elasticity of substitution is non-negative provided the production function is a quasi-concave function.
Table B.1: Effects of an exogenous change in selected variables on the labour income share – summary
Capital-labour substitution elasticity Equation
<1 >1 =1
Capital-to-labour ratio + - 0 B.12
Labour-augmenting technological progress - + 0 B.13
Real wage + - 0 B.16
Minimum wage (binding) + + +
User cost of capital - + 0 B.18
Product market regulation -/+ - - B.29
Employment adjustment costs - - - B.33
B.2 The labour income share
A widely used production function is the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function, which reads as: 
where A and B are indices of productive efficiency, while is the substitution parameter and is the distribution
parameter. For the parameters of this production function it holds that and that . Labour- and
capital-augmenting technical progress is measured by an increase in respectively A and B
71
.
For the CES production function, the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour,    , is found to be
62
:
Assume that firms are price takers in the factor market, paying the nominal wage rate, W, and the nominal user cost,
USER, and price takers in the goods market, receiving a price, P, for their output, Q. Profit maximisation gives then the
first order conditions
73
:
and 
Equations (B.4) and (B.5) allow writing the labour income share, LS, and capital income share, CS, as
64
:
and 
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71 We make the distinction between labour- and capital-augmenting technological progress for analytical reasons. In empirical applications, the
inclusion of both labour- and capital-augmenting technological progress poses problems of identification. Labour-augmenting technological
progress is usually assumed in the literature. See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
72 Indeed, note that  
73 Whereby it should be noted that equation (B.2) can be rewritten as:
Which reads on total differentiating as:
74 Using    so that  .
or
and so that 
In the case of a Cobb-Douglas production function, i.e. 1, equations (B.6) and (B.7) reduce to the following: 
and
Equation (B.8) shows that in the case of a unitary elasticity of substitution the labour income share is constant
75
. 
Checking the adding-up condition for the shares (B.6) and (B.7) yields
76
: 
B.3 Factor endowments and the labour income share
Using equations (B.2) and (B.6) the labour income share can be written in terms of the capital-labour ratio as: 
The effect of a change in the capital-labour ratio on the labour income share is then equal to:
and the effect of a change in the labour-augmenting productivity on the labour income share is equal to: 
Equation (B.11) allows us also to assess the impact of a change in the employment level, e.g. as a result of a transi-
tion from unemployment to employment, i.e.
:
265
Chapter 5 The labour income share in the European Union
75 In empirical applications, this constancy of the labour share could be formulated as LSt = LS + ut where ut is a white noise random variable. 
76 No indirect taxes minus subsidies are assumed. 
B.4 Factor prices and the labour income share
Equation (B.4) allows writing the labour income share as a function of the real wage, i.e.:  
The effect of a change in the real wage on the labour income share rate is then equal to: 
Similarly, one can derive from equation (B.5) that the capital share can be written in terms of the user 
cost of capital as:
implying that a change in the user cost of capital has the following effect on the labour income share
77
:
B.5 Imperfect competition in the goods market and the labour share
This section examines how imperfect competition in the goods market affects the labour income share. 
Assume that there are N firms, i = 1, ….N, and that the production technology of firm i is in equation (B.2). 
Nominal wages, W, and the user cost, R, are given for each firm. Each firm faces a downward sloping 
demand function for its output, characterised by:
where is demand for the output of firm i, AD is total real income, is the price of output i, P is the general
price level. The demand elasticity exceeds unity (in absolute terms), i.e.
Firms choose the input mix and output prices in order to maximise their profits. Output prices are set with a view to
clear the goods market, i.e. . Profit maximisation implies then that:
From equation (B.20), it follows that prices are set above the unit labour cost as: 
with the price mark-up
. 
The lower the competition in the goods market, the higher the value of
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77 Remember that LS = 1 – CS.
Using equation (B.20), the labour income share can be written as:
and the capital share as:
Comparing equation (B.23) with equation (B.6) for the case of perfect competition in the goods market, the labour
income share now also depends on the firm’s scope to generate rents in the goods market. 
Two remarks should be made here. First, note that in the case of imperfect competition: 
i.e. measures the share of profits in total revenues. In the case of perfect competition in the labour market 
these profits accrue to the owners of the firm (by assumption also the owners of the capital). 
Second, in the case that , i.e. a Cobb-Douglas production technology, we get the labour share reduced to: 
and
so that an increase in the mark-up, i.e. less competition in the goods market, always leads to a lower 
income share, i.e. :
Noting that in equilibrium       = Q and that                             , equation (B.23) allows us to derive the impact of a
change in the mark-up     for the case that           , i.e.: 
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where use has been made of equation (B.19) to define the logarithm of the share
78
: 
B.6 Imperfect competition in the labour market and the labour share
Here we derive some stylised results in the context of a simple model with imperfect competition in the labour market.
First we have a look at the impact of adjustment costs in labour demand on the labour income share. Next we have
a look at the impact of a change in the bargaining power on the labour income share. 
B.6.1 Labour costs
For analytical clarity, assume that in each period all labour has to be re-hired and that this happens at a cost propor-
tional to the wage so that the total labour cost is equal to 
W C L with c>1  
The first order conditions under profit maximisation read then as
79
:
The labour share is then equal to: 
The effect of a change in the labour adjustment cost is then found to be: 
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78 Furthermore note that if or if
or if or if or if as
79 No adjustment costs for capital are assumed.
B.6.2 Wage bargaining
Let workers and the employers bargain over the wage in a non-cooperative way, the wage is then of the form:
where RESW  is the reservation wage and the parameter , measures the bargaining power of the workers.
(Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004). When the workers have all the bargaining power, i.e. , then total production Q is
appropriated by the workers. When the workers have no bargaining power, i.e. , the wage is equal to the
reservation wage. The wage is a weighted average of the total product per employee and the reservation weight for
a value for , between 0 and 1. 
Using equation (B.34) the labour income share can be written as: 
which shows that 
and
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